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The opening sentences in the  IIASA Charter  speak about the  problems gen- 
erated by industrialization. Therefore industry, technology, and the  economy have 
been implicitly o r  explicitly embodied in most of the  Institute's projects.  
The f i r s t  big IIASA research  program, on energy, naturally entailed studying 
the  impacts and dynamics of technology diffusion. This w a s  the f i r s t  research  at 
the Institute t o  touch on the  possible causes of long-term economic growth. Later  
studies of the  management of innovation acknowledged the  need t o  understand the  
interaction of technological with economic (and social) development beyond the  
frame of classical and neoclassical economics. One part icular  question reflected 
tha t  need: How could cyclical influences be  distinguished from structural  ones? 
W e  t r ied t o  gain a b e t t e r  view by doing some case studies, which only increased o u r  
conviction tha t  examination of these issues promised t o  be  rewarding. 
The small meeting on long waves that  we s ta r ted  t o  a r range  eventually 
developed into a conference. The way the conference was organized and the  
cooperation i t  engendered fu r the r  demonstrated tha t  studies of these issues are 
timely. The problem tha t  the  organizers had t o  face  was how t o  make maximum use 
of all the  creat ive potential of the  participants. I t  was therefore  decided t o  
a r range  the conference in the  following way: 
Ful! papers  describing results of research  on long waves were distri- 
buted before the conference and not read  t o  the audience. 
Position papers  on part icular  topics were selected before t he  confer- 
ence so  as t o  focus attention on the  most important issues; the ensuing 
discussions and comments captured interesting views and ideas, reflect- 
ing the creat ive atmosphere of the  meeting. 
This proceedings volume i s  s t ructured accordingly: P a r t s  I and I1 consist of a 
selection of the  papers  and comments on the  five topics, and P a r t  I11 includes 
fur ther  discussion by various participants. P a r t  I s t a r t s  with J. Delbeke's, paper  
which gives an  overview of t he  conference. This pape r  is particularly useful f o r  
those who are making a f i r s t  acquaintance with this topic. W e  were also fortunate 
tha t  several  complete models o r  position papers  on different long-wave schools 
were submitted t o  us. To keep the  proceedings volume t o  a manageable and 
economic length, we were obliged t o  publish several  of t he  papers  submitted (by A. 
Piat ier ,  A. Kleinknecht, 3. Sterman, and J. Delbeke) separately as IIASA Collabora- 
tive Papers .  W e  feel tha t  this s t r ikes  a sensible middle course between the need t o  
document the  conference's work and the  dictates of size and finance. 
The presence of leading representatives of different theories of long waves 
made i t  possible t o  gain first-hand insight into the  state of the a r t ,  as w e l l  as t o  
h e a r  about the  more promising directions f o r  fu r the r  research .  
Most meetings on long waves tend t o  be  exclusively economy oriented, but the 
SienaRlorence meeting was r a t h e r  different. Consistent with IIASA's interdisci- 
plinary role,  representatives of o ther  disciplines were present  and i t  is  worth 
recording tha t  r e sea rche r s  working in biology, demography and sociology hinted, 
in t he i r  contributions, at mechanisms studied in t he i r  own disciplines tha t  could 
also lead t o  long-wave phenomena. 
In spite of t he  fact  tha t  many economists do not accept  the existence of long 
waves as proven, the  majority of scientists at the meeting did not question the 
existence o r  relevance of long-wave phenomena, i r respect ive of the i r  cause. 
Nevertheless, i t  i s  extremely difficult t o  identify long-wave phenomena and several  
participants mentioned the  problems t o  b e  expected in such investigations. 
IIASA and IRPET both focus on policy orientation and policy instruments. Pro- 
ponents of a! t he  theories  represented were united in t h e  idea t ha t  numerous 
phenomena could be  be t t e r  understood by applying long-wave theories.  This 
understanding is  essential f o r  t he  design of optimal policies; therefore  i t  appears 
t ha t  fu ture  r e sea rch  into long-wave issues is both desirable and necessary. 
W e  were very for tunate  t o  have the  support of ou r  Italian hosts at an ear ly  
stage in the  development, preparat ion and organization the  Conference. I t  i s  also 
t o  t he i r  credi t  t ha t  t he  meeting surpassed al! expectations as f a r  as scientific cov- 
e r age  of the  topics and international representation was concerned, and w e  owe 
them our  thanks f o r  t he i r  warmth and generosity. Finally, t he  meeting in Siena and 
Florence was exceptional, both in t ha t  i ts  scope was wide and tha t  i t  integrated the  
work of r e sea rche r s  from East  and West. 
The publication of this  proceedings volume was f raught  with more than the  
usual amount of difficulties and changes of plan. Our thanks are due t o  many IIASA 
staff members without whose perseverance and hard  work w e  would have been 
unable t o  bring t h e  volume t o  a successful conclusion. 
Tibor Vasko Gerhar t  Bruckmann 
The Conference which led to  these proceedings would not have taken place 
without the generous support of 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
Regione Toscana, 
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Video Heaage  fram J. Tinbergen (Netherlands) 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I apologize for not being able to attend this Conferenoe. I very much appreci- 
ate, however, the possibility given to me by Professor Bruokmann to make a contri- 
bution on tape. The main point I would like to deal with is the following: it seems to 
me that to do research on the causes of the long waves does not necessarily supply 
us with the information that w e  need in order to follow the optimal policy, that is, 
to eliminate, as f a r  as possible, these long waves. The reason is that not all causes 
of some past movement can indeed be eliminated in order to avoid any movement. 
The causes can be divided into two types. There a r e  causes that aan be changed, 
there are other causes that oarmot and f o r  the best policy to be found we have to 
think of other problems, namely to find means snd instrmnents that will affect 
employment in the sense w e  desire. This means that not all the knowledge about the 
causes is useful for finding the best policy. In addition we have to know instru- 
ments that are able to campensate for those causes that cannot be changed. Now, 
assume that technologioal developments cannot be changed but a r e  the outcome of 
an autonomous process, technological research. In that aase we have to look f o r  
other means  to affect employment in the way we wish and it is these other factors 
that I think we have to discuss especially. I would like to call them social innove- 
tions in contradistinction to technological innovations and as a first example I 
would give first  of all the implementation of the recommendations of the Bmndt 
Report. That means, among other things, that the quota of the International Mone- 
tary Fund would be increased. 
Another example of possible social innovations may be found f r o m  looking at 
the Japanese example. It is remarkable that Japanese management consults its col- 
labomtars much m o r e  often than is in either the United States o r  
Europe and it seems that, as a consequenoe, the satisfaction f r o m  work in Japanese 
enterprises is definitely higher than it is in the other cmntinents. There are 
further examples to be found by studying the Japanese economy. Another aspect is 
that the income distribution in Japan is much less unequal than for instance in the 
United States and this too, of course, may oontribute to a better atmosphere in an 
enterprise. Finally, we may even remind ourselves of the fact that also the 
Japanese worker works very hard, which also could be a contribution to improving 
the position of especially Europe on the world market. Therefore i t  seems to me 
that alongside doing research about the causes of the long waves it is important 
also to organize research that brings us to find social innovations able to create 
an employment policy more in correspondenoe with our desires. 
I thank you very much for your attention. 

PART I 
PAPERS ON TOPICS 1 TO 5 

LONGWAVE KESEBBCB: THE STATE OF THE AEl, ANN0 1983 
Jo8 Dslbeke 
Given the current state of long-wave research, i t  is difficult to present a 
comprehensive summary of all the papers and discussions at the Conferenoe. 
Therefore, this paper presents only one of the possible interpretations of the 
state of the art. Nevertheless, we are convinoed that this disadvantage represents 
at the same time a m e r i t  of the paper. Indeed, i t  is in the early stages of research, 
when the confusion is considerabb, that insights are essential. This is why the 
paper will not adhere to the five planned topics, but w i l l  review the most important 
ismes. 
In the next section, w e  sketch the theories that have been revived or 
developed recently and classify them aacording to which variables are considered 
crucial in the different explanations. The rest  of the paper deals with relatively 
new methods and models. After a short review of the inductive investigations, the 
fourth and m o s t  extensive seation conaentrates on theory building. Four main 
classes of explanations can be disaerned: the hisWioal-institutional, the growth- 
theoretical, and the macroeconomic approaches, completed with theories based on 
the hfluenae of noneconomic variables. The final discussion is dedicated to policy 
issues and the probable directions of further research. 
In a general sense, we may state that long-wave research deals with struatmal 
ahanges in the economy. Nevertheless, there a r e  many different approaahes, and 
several authors have developed schemes of the most important ones. In our view, 
three main categories of theory can be disaerned: the real, the monetary, and the 
institukional. A t  the time of writing, the real theories clearly are the most attrac- 
tive, and this was made evident at the Conference. 
Delbeke (1981) classifies the real theories acoording to the production factor 
that is supposed to be crucial and shows the complementary character of the 
different approaches. The role of entrepreneurship is considered to provide the 
most important approach (Bruchmunn)*. Schmnpeterian innovation theories are 
oertainly the most widely debated since h s  Technologische k t t  (Mensch 1975). 
E'reeman stresses the impact of innovation on labor demand, and he and his Soienoe 
Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex are becoming increas- 
ingly involved in a fundamental disoussion with Mensch (Freeman et (3. 1982). The 
capital theories of Forrester (1977) (exoess capacity) and W d e l  (1980) (the 
Marxist l a w  of the falling rate of profit) are taking up and modifying the original 
ideas of Kondratiev. Rostow (1978) stresses the availability of r a w  materials and 
is, to a oerhin extent, generdhhg f r o m  the oil saarcity of the l97Os. 
This olassifioation soheme oan be broadened to inoorporste relative prioes, 
which many authors treat either implicitly or explicitly. In our scheme, we 
observe that the produotion factors gradually beaome scnnroe during the upswing 
and abundant during the downswing, but to varying degrees. This is, in principle, 
reflected in the relative factor prices. However, this redistribution of factor 
income, which is an essential feature of the long wave, can be hindered by inertia. 
Some institutional theories consider this disturbance explicitly, and interpret the 
time lags as neoessary to produce the long-wave depression. Some authors take 
the Marxist approach to be a different olass of real theory. However, Marxists 
are opposed to this, in our view rightly, because the declining and rising rate of 
profit, i.e. the rate of capital accumulation, is also inherent in any other 
approach. In fact, they take the distribution of faotor incame, and the concomi- 
tant social struggle, as the most important element of their theory. 
Theories based on the relative prioes of goods oan also be included in our 
classification scheme sketched out above. For example, the rapid growth of lead- 
ing sectors is caused by declining relative prioes of their products, made possible 
by improvement innovations in the products and in the production pmesses. Simi- 
larly, on an international scale, Rostow's theory deals explicitly with the terms of 
trade of primary versus industrial goods. 
The monetary theories can be treated as a seoond oategory. Interest in the 
monetary aspects of the long wave has been remarkably Low in reoent research. 
During the interwar period it was quite the reveme, when most researchers 
stressed that the price level most clearly refleoted the long wave, being the Link 
between the real and the monetary sector (Dupriez 1947, 1959). Of late, few 
researohers have been attmoted to this type of analysis beoause of the constant 
rise in prioes sinoe the 1930s. Therefore, when prioes were analyzed, interest 
shifted more to relative prices. Moreover, most researchers are troubled by the 
stress laid by Kondratiev and Cassel on gold discoveries, whioh have, of course, 
been important to the gold standard but much less so to the fiduciary standards 
shoe the int- period. 
Some Conferenoe participants mentioned, however, that the prioe level, d- 
culated as the wholesale prioe relative to gold, showed the dearest iong wave 
(maig and W a t t ,  Ooodurfn). Others stated that a study of long-term flnctuations in 
prioe formation, oredit, and money circulation is absolutely essential (Akmh&v 
and KLirnanko). The group f r o m  the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
emphasizes the role of these variables in the downswing, particularly for eoonomic 
policy. Two papers were presented to stimulate long-wave analpsis of the monetary 
sector. Ssnge analyzed the interplay of nominal interest rates and inflation, i.e. 
the real interest rate, while Mbeke and Schokkaert studied the interaction of 
investment and debt, indicating the possibility of endogenous money creation 
Authors' n.lws are itallcised where referen- are t o  Conference papem (sea lid of 
References at end of paper). 
daring the long wave. 
Theories that emphasize social and institutional strPctures can be considered 
as the third main category of long-wave theory. A very appealing approach of this 
kind was presented by Fkrez-Fbez of the SPRU. She calls for a global view 
instead of a too narrow economic analysis: to explain long waves the total s y s t e m  
must be studied, i.e. the interactions of the technological, social, and institutional 
components w i t h  the economic subsystem. (The work of Gordon et crl. (1982), 
stressing the social strvcture of capital accumulation, should also be mentioned 
here.) For example, the distortion of market signals as a result of the c o u n t e r p m  
duative behavior of institutions, which prolongs the depression, a m  be interpreted 
as a specific case of institutional factors at work (Gtisnrclmnn). 
This alassification of real and monebry economic theories and of theories 
referring to social strPature allows us to make some useful observations. All three 
types of approach agree, implicitly or explicitly, that the long wave is inherently 
based on capital accumulation and is therefore most notiaeable in the industrial 
economies, especially the m a r k e t d e n t e d  eaonomies. Moreover, i t  seems that a 
fruitful integration of long-wave theories is not possible if these three main 
categories are not included. The monebry and financial sector seems to be par- 
ticularly neglected in research, because it has to be considered as more than a 
m e r e  reflection of the real sector. Finally, i t  should be noted that any classifica- 
tion is only possible with some degree of simplification. In fact, many long-wave 
theories belong to more than one of our categories, because the present classifi- 
cation uses the basic variable as its sole criterion. This classifiaation is there- 
fore f irst  and foremost a logical scheme developed for the confused observer who 
wants some insight into a rapidly expanding field of research. 
3. THE INDUCTIVE RESEARCH 
The identification of the long wave is the crucial f i rs t  phase of research fo r  
several reasons. Mensch (Paper B) calls it "exploratory research [which] usually 
means descriptive, historiographic, empirico-inductive (data-driven) work 
directed at formulations of tentative hypotheses and tentative assumptions." W e  
think this is an unavoidable phase, sinae there  is no firm body of deductive reason- 
ing available. Henae, the different long-wave theories had to start from diverse 
empirical indications, and this has led to different aonal~sians - at f i rs t  sight, at 
least. 
Secondly, and related to the first reason. mainstream eaonomists feel quite 
s k e p t i d  about the  long-wave conaept. Statisticlans see the long wave as a 
"result" of wrong statistical proaednres, especially of detrending with moving 
averages, with filters in spectral analysis, or with the choiae of the basic move- 
ment (Slutzky effect; see Slutzky 1937, Adelman 1965). Others argue that there 
are very different s h t i s t i d  p m e d u r e s  that e m p i r i d y  show the exhtenae of 
the long wave ( G l h a n n ) .  Indeed, we may at least accept that there are some 
recument unstable movements over the long term. Another criticism is that the 
statistioal procedures are applied to series that are found to be too shart, given a 
length of about 50 years f o r  one long wave. Thus, the whole idea of the long wave 
could have started erroneously, from overinterpretation (Entov). Forrester and 
his MIT group try to avoid this problem by rejecting correlation analysis in favor 
of the methods of system dynamics. In their view, a model that generates data com- 
parable to the historical data farms a good statistical test, while what remains 
unexplained by the model consists of historical peculiarities. 
We a r e  convinced that a reconstruction of economic time series for the whole 
industrial period is a crucial task, of which the largest part  still has to be done. 
Freeman even remarks that this task should be seen as an art (Fkesmcrn and 
Soete). Moreover, when reconstructed data, especially national accounting data, 
are available, historical criticism remains essential to show where the weaknesses 
a r e  situated, in order to avoid drawing empirical conclusions f r o m  a prior5 rea- 
soning. W e  consider this art of data reconstruction as one of the most important 
and promising forms of research, which must be continued despite the rapid 
development of the more deductive approaches. 
However, empirical analyses were of minor importance at the Conferenoe, and 
we attribute this to the absenoe of economic historians. Nevertheless, a good sam- 
ple of inductive long-wave research was presented. Firstly, there was the 
approach of C r a i g  and Marchetti, who collected, selected, and analyzed several 
groups of long-term data. They concluded that a certain long-wave pattern wus 
observable, and made extrapolations for  the future, the former cautiously, the 
latter self-confidently. 
Craig found some, but not abundant, evidence to support the idea of the Long 
wave as a metaphor for  change. His long waves w e r e  strongly comelated with war, 
and therefore the extrapolation suggests an extremely dangerous period early in 
the 21st oentury. 
Marchetti can be considered as the leading advocate of the inevihbfflty of 
logistic growth caused by innovation prooesses (Craig and Waff). Craig sees the 
saturation problem as very difficult for this type of analysis. Indeed, the fit  of 
logistic equations assumes that one knows in advance what the saturation level is, 
while at the point where saturation is reached there seems to be ample reason to 
believe in further growth, e.g. in the automobile sector (Craig and Watt). In con- 
trast ,  Marchetti uses the logistic curve as the best method to describe physical 
phenomena and concludes that "the signals ... a r e  crystal clear" when one is "get- 
ting out of the quicksands of money indications". In his view, long waves go beyond 
economics, and therefore he prefers to define them as 'long-term pulsations in 
social behavior". He concludes that "A pulsation of about 50 years seems to p e r  
vade all sorts of human activity", and that this takes place without much decision 
making. For example, "car populations grow exactly like animal populations", 
while nuclear fusion can be expected for 2025, "AUes i m  Schtiff". What Craig 
mentioned as possible is strongly advocated by Marchetti, i.e. that str ict  biological 
rules are  at work in the economy, and in human society. 
This kind of research raises a lot of interesting questions. The use of Logistic 
curve analysis, showing saturation levels, is taken up by several authors, impli- 
citly o r  explicitly (e.g. van  Duijn and l k c a ) .  However, one has to realize that 
saturation in economics is never absolute but relative. But most of dl it  is crucial 
to know whether economic behavior follows the deterministic rules of a biological 
system. If the answer is positive, the search for policy measures has no sense at 
dl. This suggestion will be taken up in Section 4 when w e  deal with the self- 
organization paradigm. However, at this moment it is good to keep in mind the 
warning of Schmnpeter (1942), quoted by Isiam: "Analysis, whether economic o r  
other, never yields more than a statement about the tendencies present in an 
observable pattern. And these never tell us what tuiU happen to the pattern but 
only what would happen if they continued to act  as they have been acting in the 
time interval covered by our observation and if no other factor intruded." 
The inductivist approach, borrowed from natural science, was not followed by 
BiesAaar and Meinknecht. They analyzed GNP and production data for  the world 
and for seven individual countries. Their aim was to supply some practical evi- 
dence as a basis for further development of long-wave theory. Their m o s t  
interesting conclusion is that the evidence for the existence of long waves before 
1890 is ambiguous, except for Belgium, Italy, and Sweden, but that there is a fairly 
significant pattern after that date. The pre-1890 ambiguity can be explained in 
three ways: by underest,imated data. by movements wi th  stronger impacts than the 
long wave (e.g. the hegemonic life cycle of G r e a t  Britain), o r  by the hypothesis 
that long waves become primarily important for the era of Hoch- und 
~&fkapi taZismus .  A complementary explanation could be the remark of van 
Duijn that, during and af ter  its economic take-off, a country is less affected by 
the next long-wave downswing. This claim is confinned by Bianchi's empirical 
regional analysis for  Italy (Banchi  et d.). Indeed, sinae 1890 all countries 
analyzed by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht have become mature economies. 
In our view, the latter way of empirical analysis is helpful and must be pur- 
sued further, not only for production data but also f o r  more qualitative and social 
information. In this way new insights can be brought to the fast-growing deductive 
research. However, i t  would be more sucaessful if this theoretical development 
could help define important areas for further empirical investigation. 
4. THE MOBE DEDUCTIYE RESEAECH 
In recent years, most energy has been dedicated to the interpretation of the 
long wave, and to the search for underlying aausal mechanisms. In fact, several 
people implicitly assume that further efforts to demonstrate empirically the possi- 
ble existence of long waves may be subject to rapidly declining marginal retrrms 
(e.g. hlbeke  a n d  Schokkaert). Several researchers even doubt whether a defin- 
ite statistical proof can be produced in the neat future (Z+aman and Soete, 
BesAaar and Kleinkmcht, Rnbergen), while for van Duijn using the long-wave 
concept is an act  of faith (van Duijn, oral comment). M m c h  (Paper B) goes a big 
step further, claiming that we a r e  leaving the inductive phase and entering the 
deductive one. Indeed, waiting for  the next hundred years has no sense at all, 
while we can take the prediction by several authors (e.g. Mandel) of the present 
downswing as an indication that "something" is happening over a very long te rm.  
Menshikov and Klimenko offer some consolation with the remark that we have nei- 
ther strong empirical evidence for the existenae, nor convincing t h e o r e t i d  argu- 
ments for the impossibility of the long wave. Given that any scienoe needs a frame- 
work of thought for its development, w e  a r e  aonvinoed that enhanoed dedudive 
reasoning becomes essential. 
C r i t i c a l  observers often state that the long-wave conaept cmn only attain 
credibility if scholars develop theoretically oonvincing endogenous models for  it 
(Beshrurr and Meinknecht). While most  Conference participants fully agmed 
about this need, i t  remained dubious within which boundaries the fundamental 
forces are supposed to be a t  work: wlthin the economic system or within the whole 
society. Coodurin made a remarkable intervention, doubting the possibility of an 
endogenous economic explanation of the long wave. In particular, he thought the 
determination of the lower turning point extremely difficult. In our view, 
Goodwin's remark goes to the heart of the present research. The assertion that 
the long wave is intimately connected with the whole of society, i.e. with economic, 
social, and political variables, gained support f r o m  many researchers. This argu- 
ment can also be found in the older theories, which state, f o r  example, that wars 
acaelerate existing p m e s s e s  and a r e  responsible for the change in their direc- 
tion (Dupriez 1947, Akenaan 1957). However, within such a broad framework, some 
made a deterministic interpretation, e.g. Marchetti, while many others made a 
nondeterministic one, e .g . Goodwin, Freeman, and Tinberg en. According to Tinber- 
gen, only conditional predictions can be made because of the important role of 
exogenous variables. Therefore, we may state that the economic-holistic and 
deterministic-nondet-c dualities in long-wave analysis will have strong 
implications for the design of economic policy. 
Freeman pointed out that a meaningful division of the various long-wave 
theories might be between the neo-technological theories and the rest (fi~snran 
a d  Soete). Indeed, most interest in the recent past was given to Schumpeter's 
thesis about innovation as a process of creative destruction. In 1975, in his work 
Drrs ~chwLoqische k t t ,  Mensch reopened the debate by claiming that a long- 
wave depression can only be overcome by a cluster of basic innovations. This clus- 
ter breaks through because entrepreneurs a r e  foraed to innomte, given the 
saturation of existing markets and the urgent need to create new ones. The follow- 
ing upswing is carried by rapidly expanding leading sectors, in which the basic 
innovations are improved. Mensch's interpretation of Schumpeter's work has been 
named the "depression-trigger" hypothesis, because in the middle of the downsw- 
ing, the "technological shlemate", numerous radiaal innovations are the only way 
out of it. 
This hypothesis has been criticized by Freeman and his SPRU group. They 
question the supposed clustering of basic !nnovations in the depression. According 
to them, reaovery is based upon the rapid diffusion of applications of new techno- 
logies that had emerged as basic innovations before the depression. Moreover, 
counting basic innovations can be misleading, as it is not primarily the individual 
innovations but ra ther  the sysLems of interrelated product and prooess, t e c h n i d  
and managerial innovations that seem to be of most importanoe. Aacording to the 
SPRU, then, the main policy objective is not so much to stimuiate new basic innova- 
tions as to develop policy measures  aimed at fostering the diffusion of the new, and 
existing, technologid complex in suah a way as to minimize social costs worldwide 
and to reap the nrarimum sooial benefits. Freeman's stress on the Ufusion of the 
new technology complex is ah indicated in the literature as the "demand-pull" 
hypothesis. 
This teahnology debate opened a wide and fruitful discussion on the basis of 
Schumpeter's work and foroed both g m p s  of researchers to deepen their ana- 
lyses and arguments. In this way two very Ufe ren t  methodologies developed. 
Mensch refined his hypothesis on a more mathematid basis, and together with his 
collaborators he tried to integrate his innomtion hypothesis into fonnal growth 
theory using noniinear dynamic models. Freeman and his SPRU group followed a 
completely Ufe ren t  way of research. They stressed the need to analyze the 
unique features of microelectronics and related technologies. In their view, a 
rapid diffusion of the new technologies is hindered because there is an urgent need 
for accompanying institutional innovations, on both the national and the interna- 
tional level. Using an historically oriented and institutional approach, they are 
able to develop clear, operational directions for economic policy. 
To these two important technological theories must  be added two other 
approaches, namely the more macrcnnlented research and the analysis of 
noneconomic variables. However, we have the impression that these might possibly 
be integrated into the two methodologies described above. The system dynamics 
methodology of Forrester and his MIT group emphasizes the growing exoess capa- 
city in the upswing, which must be brought back to "normal" levels during the 
downswing. Technologid innovation is essentially playing a passive role, although 
it can be activated. The basis of their analpsis is the microstrnctore of seif- 
ordering in the capital goods sector, although numerous amplifying variables aan 
ah be integrated. Menshikov and Mimenko utiiize the Marxist law about the 
tendency of the falling rate of profit. In a small model they illustrate the interpiay 
of Labor and capital productivity and the effect on profits and industrial change. 
Delbeke and Schokkaert demonstrate that long-wave instability may aLso follow 
from financial and monetary variables and that even a simple linear dynamic model 
oan generate long waves. They describe some important macroeconomic barriers 
to rapid diffusion of innovations. Finally, Millendorfer and Screpanti model the 
important influenoe of noneconomic variables. Following these principal iines of 
thought, we will review the different contributions to the bnilding of theories of 
the long wave. 
4 1  The Elistorid-Institutional Approach 
Freeman and the SPRU group be considered as the main representatives 
of what we can call "the historid-institutional approach". Indeed, they reject 
any deterministic conclusions f r o m  history, and look for aoncrete policy measures, 
particularly of an institutional character, in order to cope with the enormous 
problems accompanying the diffusion of the present technological complex. 
Foliowing Reeman, we can learn a lot about the historical relationship 
between innovation diffusion and economic growth. However, mechanistic predic- 
tions have no sense at all, because the actual technology complex and its effects 
must be piaced in the broader framework of human society. Each long wave must 
be studied as an h i s t o r i d  epoch, containing constant and Pariable relationships, 
both having considerable importanoe. For example, i t  is ussentiid to tnke into 
account that Great Britain was overtaken as a technological and world leader in 
the third Kondratiev cycle. Analogously, researchers must be very careful with 
historical statistics, because their classifiontion is closely conneoted with pnst 
historical circumstances. 
Partly for that reason, the oounting of innovations and the division between 
basic and improvement innovations, the basis of Mensch's work, s e e m  to be prob- 
lematic. We mus t  urgently study the diffusion of the present interrelated group of 
fundamental innovations, i.e. the microelectronics meator. Not only eoonomic but 
also institutional and social factors a r e  determining whether this potential carrier 
of new growth wi l l  have a positive impact on society. In particular, an accompnny- 
ing policy w i l l  determine the demand for, and thus the speed and the effects of dif- 
fusion of the new technology complex. W e  mus t  renlize that technologid and insti- 
tutional innovations a r e  two sides of the same aoin, but that very different combi- 
nations of both a r e  possible. 
The diffusion of the microelectronics sector has been analyzed in d e w  by 
Soete and Dosi. Their most interesting conclusion is the enormous rise of anpital 
productivity, and henoe the anpital-saving potential that could ease the shortage 
of this production factor to a considerable extent. A t  the same time, however, the 
labor displacement effects are signtfiuant and therefore handling the combined 
consequences, including the inevitable resishnoe f r o m  workers, will require skill- 
ful and imaginative policies. As regards the diffusion m, Soete points out that 
the aonditions for sucoessful entry into the area of microelectronics technology 
a r e  different f r o m  those of the more traditional industries. Instead of requiring 
production experience ('learning by doing"), as in mechanical engineering, o r  
o v e d  plant experience ('learning by investing"), as in the chemical and other 
process industries, these technologies, at least in the present phase, can be based 
on direct application of scientific and engineering knowledge. Since, in addition, 
the particular features of the technology make it difficult to protect, technologi- 
cal competition on a world scale could increase in importance. For these rensons, 
the international diffusion of microelectronic applications to the newly industrial- 
izing countries might be more rapid than generally expected. In Soete's view, a 
period of recession and depression is not only a period of drarnatic national struc- 
tural  "shakeups"; it is also a period of shakeup in the relative ranking of coun- 
tries according to both growth and technologiaal perfonnanae. 
hrez-Aerez has worked further on the swia l  and institutional innovations by 
adding an  attractive dimension to the long-wave debate. She claims that, while the 
economic subsystem can iargely be treated as self-contnined, this cannot explain 
long waves. The depression in the long wave must be  oonaeived as the symptom of a 
serious mismatch between the technoeconomic subsystem and the swiofnstitutional 
framework, while the upswing is a positive interaction between these two spheres: 
"depression is a 'shouting8 need fo r  full-saale reacdommodation of social behavior 
and institutions in order to suit the requirements of a major  shift that has already 
taken plaae, to a considerable extent, in the teahnoeconomic sphere." The depres- 
sion is thus a prooess of "creative destmation" not only in the productive sphere 
but also in the social and institutional spheres. The mismatch is occurring because 
the  two subsystems have very different rates of change: the  economic sector, 
spurred by profit and growth motives, is rather flexible in amparison with institu- 
tions, which suffer from a high degree of inertia. 
Perez-Perez' main contention is that technologiaal evolution is neither con- 
tinuous nor haphazard, but that it occms in successive distinct waves related to 
the  dynamics of the relative aost strncture of all possible inputs to production. 
She suggests that, in a very broad sense, each teahnologiaal wave would be built 
around the intensive use of a particular input or set of inputs - which she calls the 
"key factor" - with certain basic characteristics: (a) low (and desaending!) rela- 
tive cost, (b) apparently unlimited availability, (c) potential all-pervasiveness, 
and (d) a capacity to reduce the  unit costs of capital, Labor, and products and to 
change them qualitatively. 
Perez-Perez proposes that, around the peak of a Kondratiev cycle, the tech- 
n o l o g i d  wave, or "technoeconomic paradigm", based on the  prevafllng "key fac- 
tor", exhausts its capacity to increase productivity and profits further. During 
this period, through a trial-and-error prooess, a new group of teahnologies 
emerges, based on a new low-cost input, involving not only strictly techniaal inno- 
vations but also new managerial and organizational principles. This new set of 
technologies allows a quantum jump in potential productivity, which is why it h d u -  
ally turns engineering and managerial "aommon sense" toward intensive use of the 
new "key factor" and toward the  now higher "best-practice frontier". 
Thus, she  suggests that the oil-based "mass production" paradigm, which lay 
behind postwar growth, is being substituted by an information-intensive, 
microelectronics-based, "flexible production" paradigm, which increasingly deter- 
mines the new "how", "what", and "where" of profitable production, transforming 
the pattern of investment and influencing the behavior of most markets. But the 
social and institutional framework that was appropriate f o r  the  deployment of the 
energy- and material-intensive industries does not suit the requirements of the new 
teahnological wave, and even constitutes an obstacle to its diffusion. This increas- 
ing "mismatch" between the socioinstitutional framework and the technoeconomic 
sphere is, according to Perez-Perez, responsible f o r  the aontinuation of the 
downswing. And it is only through appropriate social and institutional innovations, 
which take into acaount the specific characteristics of the new paradigm, that the  
next upswing can be unleashed. 
This broad analysis stresses the  need fo r  a qualitative dimension in the long- 
wave debate, and offers clear insight that the social-institutional barr ier  is 
hindering further  diffusion of technological innovations in the downswing. 
Moreover, it is attractive beaause it is consistent not only with the approach of 
Freeman but, as Perez-Perez stresses, also with that of Forrester, Mensch, and 
van Duijn. However, her  call for more interdiscipiinary research w a s  most 
actively answered by proponents of m i s t  d y s i s ,  perhaps because, paradoxi- 
cally, her theory about how capitalism goes through, and overwmes, long-wave 
crises has a similar stmcture to the original thesis of M a r r  about how the coUapse 
of the capitalist system would come about. Indeed, the depression aan be inter- 
preted as a manifestation of the tension between the productive foraes and the 
social relations of production. E n b v  describes the depression as "the crisis of 
the entire structure of established socioeconomic relations". Menshikov and 
RZimenko deal explicitly with ''he major role of changes in the production rela- 
tions of capibllsm, which do not neatly coincide with long waves in mat- pro- 
duction". These changes have to be associated with consecutive stages in the evo- 
lution of capitalism, which are clearly acaelemted by the long wave. 
Ooodurin comes very near to the hypotheses of the SPRU group. In his view, 
'long swings a r e  the result of the slow perfection and adaptation of major techno- 
logical innovations, which persisted over a number of shorter fluctuations". G m -  
dually, the whole production struature becomes transformed as a result of a great 
number of sucaessive small improvements and adaptations of the new technology. 
However, this constant flow of technologiaal change is converted by the economy 
into fluctuating growth, because aacelemtor and multiplier mechanisms accompany 
investment. Once the potential of the new technology is exhausted, weak booms and 
prolonged depressions occur until a new set  of innovations becomes feasible. In 
this prooess, the role of extraeconomic variables is considered to be essential in 
the long run of the economy, e.g. the role of state activity such as wars, social 
serviaes, and control efforts. Goodwin therefore concludes: "How long the 
present depression wil l  last and how vigorous wi l l  be the recovery will surely 
depend on such extmeconomic factors and not on systematic, economic relations". 
4.2. The Gmuth-Theoretical Approach 
Starting f r o m  inductive insights, Marchetti and Craig took up the idea of the 
economy o r  society behaving as an ecological o r  sociobiological system. "Our view 
is that the same laws of nature that gave rise tc all other living systems a r e  also 
controlling for man" (*a& and Watt). They suggest that the long-term instabil- 
ity, of which the long wave is a major expression, be analyzed along such lines. 
Indeed. if w e  define the long wave as the sucaession of recovery, growth, reaes- 
sion, and depression, there is only a small differenae from the statement of Prigo- 
gine (1980), quoted by Islam: "All self-organization systems opemte in the cycle 
of becoming, growing, changing, and decaying." But also economists have already 
launched this idea, as fndiaated by SiLwbcrg: 'That socioeconomic development 
aan be considered an ecological history of human artefacts and populations is the 
theme of Bodding (1978, 1981)". 
The attraativeness of this view of economic life stems from the inability of 
current economic theory to analyze the processes of transition, which is in fact 
the essence of industrial development. Especially the deepsr insights of Schw- 
peter on the "creative destruction" nature of innovation have largely failed to find 
entranae into the main stream of analytical eaonomics (Siiwbcrg). Therefore, 
more and more economists a r e  treating the technological innovation embodied in 
investment as the core of growth theary. They use nonlinear dynamic models to 
study the emergence of new configurations f r o m  structural instability. Two varia- 
tions aan be distinguished: that of Mensch-Haag-Wold and Nijkamp on the one 
hand, and that of Silverberg on the other. While the former concentrate on models 
in which stable and unstable periods alternate, the latter stresses more the 
existence of an essentially unstable historical trend. They all prefer the use of 
the term "structural instability" instead of 'long waves", but they do not exactly 
indicate the difference between the two. 
Mensch starts from a metamorphosis model of long-term industrial innovation. 
Its four phases can be discerned from the existing mix of innovation types, distin- 
guishable by their basic/improvement, radical/moderate, o r  product/process 
character. Innovative investment causes intensifying (R) and extensifying (E), or 
contractional and expansionary, effects, but to a different degree in each phase. 
This double aspect of technical progress has to be interpreted as the origin of 
structmal instability in economic life: 'Progress just is not 'well-behaved' but 
ambiguous" (Mensch, Paper A). 
To integrate this view into growth theory, the equilibrium tendency 
restriction of the neoolassical and neo-Keynesian models has to vanish. In this 
way, the ambivalence of economic growth can be made explicit, while a t  the same 
time a potential for regime change is introduced. Then, a bifurcation model is con- 
structed with, in Mensch's words, ''neoclassical and postSchumpeterinn features". 
A bifurcation model allows for a critical domain, where either small 
unpredictable fluctuations o r  facts will decide which of the alternative paths - 
potentialities - will  be chosen. More concretely, Mensch uses a production poten- 
tial function, explicitly allowing for E and R effects. The neoclassical specifica- 
tion indicates that the capital factor is heterogeneous over time and that a 
biequilibrium property is incorporated, i.e. that two maxima are separated by a 
minimum while only one maximum can exist at a specific time. The post- 
Schmnpeterian feature reflects the ambivalence of innovation by the hysteresis 
property, i.e. inertia causes a discontinuous pattern between periods of high 
growth and E/R figures and periods of low growth and E/R figures (Mensch, Paper 
A) 
Mensch is refining his theoretical and empirical research in collaboration 
with Haag, Weidlich, and Wold. The latter proposes his Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
method for the estimation of Path Models with Latent Variables (PMLV). This tech- 
nique has the advantage of modeling and estimating directly and indirectly 
observed variables, o r  manifest and latent ones. Starting from the theoretical 
basis he developed with Weidlich, Huag elucidates some crucial points of Mensch's 
model by empirical investigation (Weidlich and Hang 1983). F r o m  economic data, he 
develops a macroeconomic potential, i.e. a nonlinear relationship that can assign 
to one set of input variables more than one set of output variables, in times of 
structmal change. A t  a critical point, closely related with the business cycle, the 
economy changes f r o m  a stable to a less stable structure, o r  undergoes a phase 
transition f r o m  a monostable to a bistable potential. Haag is able to calculate f r o m  
the empirical data the parameters of this potential that show the combination of E 
and R effects chosen by the economy. Moreover, he alaimR that it is possible to 
link the potential parameters with an appropriate set of input variables with the 
help of an optimization procedure (Haag st al. 1984). In this way, Haag's analysis 
allows for prediction and analysis of possible human influence for realigning the 
economy toward a monostable path. A t  the same time, many relevant structmal 
macroeconomic variables can be formulated explicitly, while the parameters and 
their significance aan be determined f r o m  the set of known data. 
Mjkamp developed a nonlinear dynamic model including the element of space 
as both a driving and a constraining factor for economic dynamics. He gives par- 
ticular attention to a specific kind of Lotka-Volterra equation used for modeling in 
population biology. Such a model has the advantage of incorporating some key fao- 
tors (innovation, public overhead investments) that act as driving forces for a 
spatial system. It is possible to insert technological progress in the "depression- 
trigger" as well as in the "demand-pull" hypothesis. Moreover, the model is able to 
generate a wide variety of dynamic growth patterns, of which the long wave is only 
a particular oase. Nijkamp's conclusion is that long waves are not a necessary 
phenomenon, but may emerge under specific eaonomic and technological conditions 
in a spatial economic system. 
While the former models conoentmte on the dichotomous alternation of stable 
and unstable growth periods, Silverberg refers m o r e  to historical instabilities In 
the underlying trend. Shr t ing from Goodwin's 1967 growth cycle model, he 
developed a pair of equations formally equivalent to the Lotka-Volterra model. 
Then he incorporated innovations embodied in new capital goods and analyzed the 
consequences in terms of nonlinear dynamic interaction between wages, profits, 
seotoral and aggregate employment, and productivity. In this way, the dynamics of 
technological progress are fundamentally integrated because of the feedback from 
the level and aomposition of investment to the growth of productivity and effective 
demand. He emphasizes that this way of analysis is f a r  more than a capital-stock 
adjustment model (Silverberg, oral aomment) . 
Silverberg argues that within his model the ra ther  new "self-arganization 
paradigm" can be used for  a thorough analysis of strvctuxnl instability. This 
theory, derived from natural scienoe, is in fact built on the dialectic of whole and 
part,  on the one hand, and on chance and necessity, on the other. Physical, bblog- 
ical, and chemical systems normally show a tendency to equilibrium, 'beaause their 
various components compense~te each other's behavior. However, at aertain 
moments the disequilibrium foraes are more powerful and they drive the whole sys- 
t e m  to a new state. This theory was originally formulated by H. Haken (Stuttgart) 
under the name "synergetics", and by Prigogine (Brussels), who named it "dissipa- 
tive systems". This notion of negative and positive feedbaaks is also used by 
Toffler (1980) to explain the transition from an industrial toward a 'Third Wave" 
society. 
According to Silverberg, the transition processes of the industrial sys tem,  or 
the whole of industrial history. aan be interpreted along these lines. The dynamic 
interaction between the mamPsystem and its component subsystems be 
analyzed using nonlinear dynamic models (e.g. bifumation), while the outoame of 
innovations aan be treated as stochastic fluctuations. This would allow for  the 
simultaneous existence of a diversity of expectations, techniques, and rates of 
profit, a feature that has been neglected by eaonomic theorists. The interaation 
between the system's components and external aonstmints wi l l  create a structure 
characterized by a aertain stability and h k b r i a a l  instabilities, driving the sys tem 
toward new basic technological conditions and institutions. Onae the domirrant 
trend a m  be observed, it will be possible to describe its frrrther%volution, i.e. the 
final oubome from instability or the beginning of a new equilibrium period. This 
prediction is based on the dynamic interaction of the system's heterogeneous aom- 
ponents , such as labor, various aapital and consumer goods, ,and energy. 
As a conclusion. w e  can state that the integration of the long wave into growth 
theory is a promising field of research. The essential feature is that, owing to the 
embodiment of technology, instability pressures are cmcial. Thus, Long-wave 
research is only one sign of the reaent evolution in eaonomic analysis, where the 
attention paid to nonlinearity, microeconomic heterogeneity, and macroeconomic 
disequilibrium is growing fast. There are ,  some questions left, however. For exam- 
ple, the precise difference between long waves and strnctmal instability was not 
made clear. In particular, there seems to be no agreement whether the former is a 
specific o r  a general form of the latter. Moreover, all models presented w e r e  
treated in real terms while monetary and financial variables were completely 
neglected. It can also be argued that socioeconomic systems a r e  characterized by 
intentions and expectations, and that social research cannot be controlAed in the 
same way as laboratory investigations. In neoclassical models, one assumes that 
the market is working perfectly, and that the entrepreneur has a perfect 
knowledge of the future, while in reality he is speculating on a favorable outcome. 
In other words, the basic lesson f r o m  Keynes' work seems to have been forgotten, 
while economic policy is implicitly considered as ineffective o r  of minor impor- 
tance. 
Silverberg is nevertheless convinoed that human aspects can be modeled 
within an ecological-evolutionary framework, bemuse this approach is not marred 
by a deterministic starting point. He agrees that endogenizing everything into a 
closed dynamic model creates a straitjaoket on thinking. Yet, an open dynamic sys- 
t e m  is critically dependent on the interaction of stochastic and determMstic ele- 
ments, and this means far more than imposing noise on a closed deterministic sys- 
tem. 'In an interdependent nonlinear system, fluctuations, innovations, o r  changes 
in external constraints can play a decisive role in triggering bifurcations and 
ohanges in regime, and thus serve as the driving fmoe in an evolutionary prooess" 
(Silverberg, oral comment). In this way, theory a m  be opened to history and 
irreducible diversity. In  other words, this fundamental point is very close to that 
of the SPRU group, and in particular of Reeman, who stresses the role of unique 
historical factors, despite the very different methodology used. 
4.3. The HacroeconaaDic Approach 
V a r i o u s  authors constructed macroeconomic models that do not strictly 
belong to the growth-theoretical approaoh described above. W e  think the study of 
the long wave dong these lines is impartant, in particular when an economic policy 
has to be designed, and when financial and monetary variables have to be included. 
The system dynamics method of Forrester and his co-wmkers is in this regard very 
interesting. Menshikov and Klimenko model the Marxist l a w  of the falling ra te  of 
profit, and indicate useful leads and lags. Lastly. Delbeke and Schokkaert show 
that even a traditional linear model, based on financial variables, oan offer useful 
insights for  theory and policy. 
Sinoe 1975, the System Dynamics National Model (SDNM) has been the vehicle 
for the development of an endogenous structural theory of the long weve at bIIT. 
There, the System Dynamics Group is b a s i d l y  modeling the behavior of 
microeconomic agents, and the macro-result is a self-ning long-tsrm cycle 
which, onoe set in motion, g r o w s  in amplitude up to a limit. Severd important 
channels contribute to the generation of the Long wave, suoh as se l f~ rde r iug ,  
debt/price dynamics, technology and innovation, and political and social values. 
However, Skrman emphasizes that self-ordering is the basic mechanism at wurk, 
because it is sufficient to generate the long wave. The other factors have a more 
amplifying cheunoter. The self-ordering of oapital reflects the dependence of the 
capital-producing sectors of the economy, in the aggregate, on their own output. 
In fact, s e l f ~ r d e r i n g  amplifies the disequilibrium pressures created by the 
interaction of locally rational decision rules ( b o d e d  rationality) and the lags 
involved in capital acquisition within a firm. As a result, "irrational behavior" is 
produced on a macro-level. Therefore, Forrester states that the accelerator 
mechanism of s e l f d e r i n g  "creates the 50-year cycle of what would o t h w  be 
a 20-year medium cycle in capital acquisition" (Forrester 1977, p.534). 
SLerman stresses that this self-rdering principle does not exclude other 
approaches. On the other hand, he calls for a demonstration of the sufficienoy of 
other mechanisms for the generation of long waves. In particular, the role of 
technological innovation, essentially treated as passive in the SDNM, seems to be 
more the result instead of the origin of self-ordering (Graham and Senge 1980). 
This view has considerable implications for policies directed at stimulating innom- 
tion, because they may be insufficient to mitigate the effects of the current 
downswing. Therefore, economic policy has to be directed more toward the sol* 
tion of excess capacity in the capital goods sector, which is caused by the self- 
ordering accelerator. Indeed, during the upswing, this mechanism creates a seri- 
ous excess of capital stock, and the downswing has the function of bringing the 
economy back to internal equilibrium. 
Sehge expanded the SDNM by developing a t h e m  of the real interest rate 
behavior in a long-wave perspective. In his view, real interest rates tend to r ise 
as the inflationary pressures of the upswing give way to deflationary ones during 
the downswinjg. Onoe they star t  to rise, they reduoe demand, reinforoe the defla- 
tionary pressure, and keep increasing. A crucial assumption concerns the relative 
sluggishness of nominal interest rates in adjusting to changes in inflation. Nominal 
rates rise until credit shortages a r e  eliminated, i.e. at the end of the upswing. 
Prices tend to move in parallel with nominal interest rates, and increase until the 
excess demand of the expansion is absorbed. However, inflation, being the rate of 
change in prioes, s tar ts  to decline conisiderably before nominal interest rates 
reach a peak, and henoe the rise in real interest rates. Senge shows that the 
simulated data a r e  consistent with historical observations and with Fisher's empir- 
ical analysis. A major implication of his theory is that it  questions the "crowding 
out" effect of government deficits and tight monetarypolicy as being responsible 
for the recently high real interest rates. 
The system dynamics analysis develops a causal t h e m ,  offering an 
endogenous structural explanation of the long wave. It rejects the direct use of 
historical data, but compares them with the data generated by the model. It  allows 
for historical particularities and f o r  a qrmlitative dimension, being a powerful 
complement to the formal analysis of model behavior. In other words, the System 
Dynamics Group looks for a mechanism, not for a determinism (Senge, oral com- 
ment). The major advantages of the system dynamics method are ,  however, not 
clear to us. In our opinion, macroeconometric models oan also be powerful tools of 
analysis. They offer the opportunity f o r  interdependent theoretical and empirical 
analysis, while historical data can be used directly. Following the remarks of 
Freeman and of Perez-Perez, the basic microstructures used can change fundamen- 
tally over a long period (cf. pure and monopolistic competition during, respec- 
tively, the industrial revolution and late capitalism). In any acme, the Conference 
produoed a fruitful confrontation between the different views on this matter, and 
the opportunity for publication of some parts  of the model, which had unfor- 
tunately remained largely a 'blaok box" until then. 
Mmhikov and KLimenko utilize the l aw of Marx about the tendency of the 
ra te  of profit to fa l l .  Firstly, they empiriaally investigate indicators of labor p m  
ductivity, capital intensity, the output-capital ratio, the rate of profit, and the 
profit per  man-hour. They conclude that long waves clearly exist and that a new 
recovery in growth rates can oocur only after  a recovery in the output-capital 
ratio. They then construct an economic model in which the relationship between 
the growth rates of the capital-labor ratio and the rate of profit is considered as 
the driving force behind the long wave and as crucial for explaining the turning 
points. In the simulated figures, the leading and lagginjg variables a r e  analyzed. 
The turning point of the growth rate of the profit rate (p) precedes the change of 
the growth ra te  of the capital-labor ratio (k) in the opposite direction by 7 years, 
while the turn in the growth rate of labor productivity (y) comes 6 years later. It 
takes another 13 years for p to reach its peak o r  trough. 
DeLbeke and Schokkaert presented a macroeconomic model for the financial 
sphere. They emphasize the role of small partial models, which a r e  as simple as 
possible, deepening our understanding of the basic mechanisms a t  work. In partic- 
ular, the interaction of investment and debts, being a simple stock-flow mechan- 
ism, is able to generate endogenously a long wave for empirically reasonable 
values of the parameters. In the upswing both investment and debts a r e  increas- 
ing, until the debt position, and henoe the cost of credit, become too high. A t  that 
moment, investment starts to decline until a normal debt level is reaahed again. 
The recurrence of the long-wave phenomenon can only be produoed by the intro- 
duction of exogenous shocks, such as innovations. However, when prices a r e  
inserted in the debt inflation and deflation model, the cycles become permanent. 
This suggests that the intagration of a monetary sector may be a promising traak. 
In particular, the money supply seems to be endogenously detennined dong the 
long-wave path. This simple model shows the necessity of studying the 
macroeconomic conditions that dominate the diffusion of innovation. Further 
exploration in this direction seems worth while, especially for the analysis of the 
downswing and for  the design of economic policy. Of course, this form of partial 
analysis is extremely useful for integration into other approaches. 
4.4. The Importance of Nonsconmuic Variables 
Most authors stress the role of noneconomic variables in the long wave, as was 
the aase in the interwar period. Perez-Perez of the SPRU was the most  active pm- 
ponent of this approach at the Conference. However, two other papers explicitly 
dealt with sociopsychological factors, within a model framework, namely those of 
Millendorfer and of Screpanti. 
MiUghdorfer presented some remarkable insights from the Austrian STUDIA 
model, investigating long-term mechanisms of societal development. He claims, and 
proves empirically, that we must  try to understand the economy by looking beyond 
the economy to a comprehensive holistic approach. Therefore, STUDIA uses a 
huge quantity of empirical data, not only on economic and technologiaal variables, 
but also on "soft" variables like m e a s u r e s  of motivation, sociopsychological vari- 
ables, indicators of the quality of family life, etc. To analyze the observed 
growth-reducing factors every five to six decades, a new formal method of mul- 
tivariate analysis, named Main Plain Analysis, was developed. This method facili- 
tates theory building on a large empiriaal base, and in particular the relationships 
between hard and soft variables can be made clearer. Then, with the help of 
sociopsychological mechanisms. STUDIA tries to explain why the innovative push 
occurs in cycles of 50-60 years, a question unanswered by Schmnpetar. The length 
of the cycle in the feedback system is determined by something similar to anthm 
pological constants, regulating the dynamics of the relationships between genera- 
tions. In addition, the oscillations of creativity and achievement motivation in the 
sociopsychological cycle a r e  used to help understand the oscillations of inventions 
and innovations. Indeed, intensive growth rates, i.e. those mainly caused by inno- 
vations, are positively correlated with constmcted Reudian sublimation India- 
tors. Thus, creativity and innovation have strong mats in the living area, 
described by soft variables and their mechanisms. 
The analysis by Mil lendeer  has a ra ther  deterministic character. This is 
shown, in particular, when he concludes that "the length of the cycle is determined 
by something like an anthropological constant. It means that w e  have no instru- 
mental variables, no political tool to change the length of [it]." Nevertheless, Mil- 
lendorfer suggests some policy advice that is close to the proposals of the SPRU. 
'What we can do is to minimize the amount of the downswing by anticipation of the 
coming upswing". In more concrete terms, he proposes four principles: (1) the 
human-economic principle: more emphasis on the importance of man instead af 
things in economic life; (2) the priority of nonmaterial over material factors: 
more creativity, initiative, qualification of Labor, and a reduction in the exploita- 
tion of material factors; (3) finely structured formations ra ther  than "gigan- 
tomania": rejection of the overemphasis of the large soale; (4) context and total- 
ity: a maximum of autonomy and freedom of decision making for small units, whiah 
acknowledges their rightful plaae in the wider context. 
Screpanti analyzed a set of social variables in addition to economic variables 
and constructed a model with the use of a h s t r o p h e  theory and the notion of tran- 
sition phases. In the years 1808-20, 1866-77, 1911-22, and 196'7-73, being the 
upper turning points of the Kondratievs, major proletarian insurgencies broke 
out. These periods m u s t  be considered as transition phases, with more than "nor- 
mal" unrest. The upswing brings improvement in workers' achievements, but at the 
same time their frustration rises at an increasing rate. Social tension accumulates 
until the effects of frudmtion overcome those of achievements. A t  that moment, 
workers express in a f e w  years the tension suppressed over a long time. As a 
consequence, capitalists8 'high spirits" collapse and investment declines. The 
downswing begins and has a worsening effect on workers' achievements. Only after  
some time does frustration adapt to the decreasing achievements, when the work- 
ers realize their defeat. According to Screpanti, '!In a sense it  could be said that 
the entire B-phase of the long cycle serves to bring workers back to reason." The 
declining militant behavior then paves the way for  a new upswing. The whole p r e  
aess is further strengthened by the coming of new generations of young workers, 
because major wars occur during the critical transition phases of the long cycle. 
In fact, the generational cyale of Screpanti is closely analogous to the anthrope 
logical constant of Millendorfer. In our view, these methods of analysis are good 
illustrations of the promising field of interdisciplinary research in the long-wave 
perspective. 
5. MPUCATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLK- AND FURTHER BESgARCH 
There is considerable agreement that the long wave oannot be considered as a 
monoausal phenomenon, and that future lines of research have to integrate the 
several theories. The System Dynamics Group at MIT is calling for  "a grand unlfi- 
cation theory" (Fbwester et d.), while Mensch perceives a regrouping of the 
existing theories under only two umbrellas, namely a neoclassical and a neo- 
Marxian theory (Mensch, Paper B). In the previous section we tried to sketch 
some major directions along which further integration of research could procleed. 
However, the main question, as posed by Mensch. is 'Who integrates whom?" As f a r  
as w e  can see, there is no agreement on this matter. 
According to the MIT group, further integrative research has to contain the 
following characterfstics: a formal dynamic model, for which all assumptions a r e  
made explicit, endogenously generating long waves, and built on a 
s t r u c t u r a l - c a d  and not a correlative o r  econometric approach. For the MIT 
group i t  is essential that microstructures create the m a ~ c o n o m i c  outcome. 
Small models have to be developed showing sufficient o r  necessary conditions for  
the long wave, o r  the amplifying role of some characteristics. Moreover, tests 
have to prove the adequacy and the robustness of the model structure, while gen- 
erated data have to be compared with historical data (Fbwester et aL). In other 
words. the starting point is the SDNM methodology, in which an active innovation 
proaess can be inserted. 
From a phenomenological point of view, Mensch is near to agreement with the 
Forrester proposals, emphasizing that a postSchumpeterian theory has to start 
from micro-foundations to show the rnacrodynamics. Indeed, these micro-macro 
models can remove the vague and impressionistic ways of research of Schumpeter 
and Man, which caused a lot of skepticism as expressed by W. Baumol (Mensch, 
Paper B). However, Mensch is also convinaed that his model is a good starting 
point fo r  cooperation. Moreover, he observes the research frontier moving from 
data- to model-driven, and is already expecting the next phase transition, i.e. to 
instrumental research, prescribing economic activity in scenarios, and forecast- 
ing. He states that the long wave is the aore area of the much Larger field of dish 
quilibrlum dynamics, while he sees "much of o m  special theories already embedded 
in mainstream economics" (Mensch, Paper B). 
However, in our opinion, to situate current long-wave research in this way is 
to exaggerate its present role. For van Duijn the aim of it  becoming a part  of stan- 
dard economics is not so important. Schumpeter never has been regarded as a 
mainstream economist, while many scholars have read and med his interesting 
ideas. In van Duijn's view, all that counts is to do good research, and to avoid 
becoming a sect. Mareover, at this moment, we think that long-wave research is 
neither a full par t  of present economic research, nor the aore of it, and it wi l l  
reqaire a long time to consider i t  as a new paradigm. Lastly, the methodologies of 
Forrester and Mensch a r e  so different that it is Aikely that the former wants to 
integrate the depression-trigger hypothesis mare than the cmequenaes of the 
Schumpeter Clock approach. Consequently, the path to integration will  be long and 
difficult, without clear "umbrellas" for the near future. Nevertheless, long-wave 
research inevitably has to follow that path, in order to deepen our understanding. 
In our view, conferenaes such as this one automatically widen the scope for  
further integrated research. The broad interest in the institutional aspeats can 
only be proof of that. 
A concrete example of integration of various approaches, and therefore one 
that is difficult to plaae in the scheme developed here, is the research aarried out 
by Ra t t e r .  Starting from the study of innovations and renovations, he integrates 
some ideas of Marchetti and Mensch. Being a business cycle analyst, he stresses 
the importance of the way in which the long cycle determines the JugLar, which he 
considers very meful fo r  the analysis of turning points. However, he also has 
similar insights to the Sussex group and does not neglect the role of noneconomic 
variables. Indeed, he emphasizes the role of demand, the diffusion of microelec- 
tronics, and the economic, social, and political problems concomitant with this pro- 
oess. Not only is the whole production system foraed to change, but also its 
environment: the managers, the educational .system, the h fmdmotu re ,  etc. In 
the short term, the effect on labor demand will  be disastrous. While Piatier 
expects the next upswing at the end of om aentury, he believes that an adequate 
economic policy can shorten this period by a deoade. However, this am only h a p  
pen on one condition, namely that the financial problems postponLng the reawery  
a r e  solved, and not, i t  is hoped, with a KrucA, as happened in 1929. Such integra- 
tive approaches s e e m  to be essential for  our future research, but i t  is clear that 
at present only the first q d t a t i v e  steps have been made in this direation. 
A second major field of research has to be the design of an adequate economic 
policy. Following Zhbergrn in his video message, i t  seems at least just as w o r t h  
while to think about policy measures, given the insurmountable difficulties and the 
long time i t  wi l l  require to have a definite proof of the existenoe of the long wave. 
ALso Freeman sees a gigantic task in this field in order to ease the enormously bad 
and possibly dangerous consequences fo r  mankind. He quotes Keynes (1923) in this 
context, as follows: 'Xconomists set themselves too easy a task if in tempestuous 
seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is fiat 
again" (Beeman and Soete). 
However, only a minority of the Conferenae papers dealt explicitly with the 
matter of eaommic policy, while the proposals made cover a broad range, from 
pure liberalism (Glismann) to international interventionism (Tinbergen). The 
groahh-theoretical approach is mthe r  silent on this matter. However, Silverberg 
(oral comment), following Forrester and SMbaldi, raises the fundamenhl question: 
Have we to conaentmte our energy to start the next long wave as quickly as possi- 
ble, o r  to reach some kind of stationary state, i.e. to enjoy the frults of eocmornic 
development without instability pressures and unemployment threats? The former 
option seems inevitably to be implied by industrial capitalism, or ,  stated the other 
way round, the Latter requires a mdiaal reorganization of social and economic 
stractures. Given the powerful economic and political pressures, it seems that the 
combination of permanent change and social aost will  be chosen. Foliowing this 
logic, then, Craig states that a primary goal of policy shouid be to minimize the 
disruptions associated with the transitions of social systems from one mode of sta- 
bilization to another (Craig and Watt). This suggestion is not worked out in more 
aoncrete terms, however. 
Most researchers dealing with policy issues agree that the long wave is an 
international phenomenon, originating from unstsble investment in the developed 
capitallst countries. The industrid pianned economies wouid also show the same 
behavior but to a lesser extent, and this aan be attributed to their own saturation 
of markets and to the linkage of international trade. Therefore, v a n  h i j n  con- 
cludes that it  is f irst  and foremost in the OECD countries that the problems a r e  
situated, and it is there that they have to be solved. Iboreover, historically, inno- 
vations diffuse from the core to the periphery. Hence a massive transfer of funds 
from North to  South is not the best solution. In contrast, aapihl  shortage w i l l  be 
aggravated in the industrialized countries, and a reaovery wi l l  be postponed 
farther. According to van Duijn, this is not an argument for egoism, but the resuit 
of long-wave analysis that only the groarth-aenter eaonomies a r e  able to be a 
locomotive for the peripheral economies. Mareover, the problems for  the new 
industrialized countries (NICs) a r e  not so enormous because historical research 
shows that after  a country has taken off it  is less affected by the next long-wave 
downswing. A t  the same time, a new upswing will create chanaes for  new takcroffs, 
transforming once again same less developed countries into NICs. 
Other researchers cannot agree with van Duijn's policy adviae. The WT Sys- 
t e m  Dynamics Group also situates the cause of the long wave in the industrial world 
because of the dominant role of self-ordering: the m o r e  capihl  there is engaged, 
the more serious the long wave. The disequilibrium effects are distributed over 
the whole world, but with different time lags. The dowmwing has an fmporhnt 
function, namely the elimination of overbuilt capital, the Latter being the resuit of 
the upswing. This exaess capital, instead of van Duijn's shortage, cmn be removed 
in a slow o r  a catastrophic way. The latter solution has to be avoided. but the key 
to it lies not in the real, physical sector of the economy, but instead in the finan- 
cial, attitudinal, and institutional aspects (Fbwestcr et a). 
Aacording to the WT group, there a r e  very f e w  high-leverage policies avail- 
able and, moreover, they can be pushed in the wrong direction o r  are subject to a 
tendency to overreact. Some poiicies can ease the impact of dislocations o r  
reduce the severity of the downturn. However, it has absolutely no sense to look 
for a guilty person o r  group, as Glismann is doing for  bureaucracy, because the 
fnstability was created by the interplay of all foraes in society. What has to be 
found is a combination of fiscal, monetary, and banking policies that can sustain 
public purchasing power and prioes without dowing further debt accumulation o r  
inflationary money creation for speculative investments (Fbrrestar et d.). In 
other words, this advice is a kind of Keynesian policy without inflation, and without 
investment incentives, given the massive exoess aapacity. 
The HIT advice is basically built on a "passive" technological innovation, 
beoause Forrester is convinced that its role is overemphasized in the long-wave 
debate. In contrast, the Sussex group stresses the importance of the new techne  
logical paradigm at length, adding a post-Schumpeterian dimension to the rather 
Keynesian policy of the System Dynamics Group (Fbtrestar et a). Reeman is 
"going back to basics", i.e. to the original work of Keynes and Schnmpeter. The 
latter was very hostile to government intervention, which he tolerated reluctantly. 
The basic lesson of Keynes, i.e. ''the socialization of investment without public own- 
ership" m a n  and Soete), made him the architect of the new match betweem the 
prevailing technological paradigm and the social institutions. For Keynes, aggre- 
gate demand had an important role, while Schnmpeter was more sectorally oriented 
beoause of the role of technology. Nowadays, w e  have to look for a new theory 
because none of the dominant theoretical paradigms (neoclnssical, Keynesian, 
Marxist) oan offer an answer to the question how to solve the growing mismatch 
between technology and the institutional environment. 
Prom n neo-Schumpeterian point of view, Freeman is in favor of government 
policies encouraging a new wave of public and private investment, and offering 
incentives for the adaptation of social institutions (h.eeman and Soete). The main 
goal is to achieve the maximum gain f r o m  the new technological complex with the 
minimmn social costs. If private investment is too timid, public investment has to 
fill the gap. Anyhow, specific demand pressures and institutional changes have to 
be created to stimulate the diffusion of microelectronics. R n h w g r n  also calls for 
social changes and refers to the Japanese worker being very productive because 
of the high satisfaction gained f r o m  work, owing to more consultations involving 
workers and a less unequal income distribution than, for example, in the USA. Gen- 
erally, the SPRU group is calling f o r  more optimism and redism, and for  avoidance 
of the creation of a "lost generation" (Freeman, oral comment). W e  only have to 
remind ourselves of the collective f d n t i o n  of the 1930s and its concomitant 
social and political instability. T&y, we can again observe growing tendencies of 
l a w  and order, conservatism, and militarism (Manshikov and Kliraenko). Tinber- 
gen (in a written comment to the author) treats the intensive competition in arma- 
ments as the most urgent problem to be solved. One must be aware that these new 
tendencies a r e  again trying to cope with the wrong problem. 
f ieeman and Soete further emphasize the mcial role of the 
technologid-institutional match in an international framework. In fact, Soete in 
his research has shown that the new technology is more international in scope and 
requirements than anything that has preoeded it. For newoomers it is easier to 
create new social institutions than to adapt old ones, as in the mature econamies, 
while the aapihl-saving nature. of microelectronics and the potential for small- 
scale applications are partionlarly favorable f o r  the NICs. Moreaver, it must be 
noted that the balance of eaonomic and political p o w e r  is changing in favor of the 
developing world. Thus, a very rapid international diffusion of the new technology 
is very likely, and therefore the need for a "matching" new international frame- 
work becomes very urgent. However, this new matoh is probably the most  diffioult 
challenge confronting the world economy. Indeed, as Reeman and Soete observe, 
"the national boundaries of decision making, the intensified international competi- 
tion, the growth of protectionism, the r-mergenoe of Cold War attitudes and poli- 
tics, and the persistent failure of North-South dialogues all serve to emphasize 
the great difficulties of re-establishing a new and more favorable international 
economic and p o l i t i d  framework for  expansion". 
At this time, international solutions seem to be taking the place of the national 
ones of the 1930s, and a r e  likely to become dominant in the next "match". How- 
ever. a t  that time, nobody could propose with certainty the right policy that was 
needed. Goodwin (oral comment) reminded us of the policy of the Roosevelt 
administration, which tried a lot of valuable proposals until one proved to be suc- 
cessful. Indeed, we may state that the major  merit of Hoover, the predecessor of 
Roosevelt, was that he showed a t  length that the classical deflationary solution, or 
the restoration of 19th century rules, was no lower possible. The dominant 
economic thinking of the time no longer had consistent solutions available, and this 
opened the way for  positive policy experimentation. W e  have the feeling that we 
have arrived a t  the same situation again. flnberpen claims that a good policy does 
not necessarily require knowledge of the right explanation. Consequently, he sug- 
gests spending f a r  more energy in searching for good policy advice, instead. of 
hoping to build the good theory first and then derive the right policy from it. It 
can work the other way round, as is illustrated by the development of Keynesian 
theory. At present, the most concrete and valuable policy proposals a r e  those of 
the Bmndt Report (Bmndt 1980), and Tinbergen and the SPRU group a r e  urgently 
asking for their implementation, in order to solve the acute social, political, 
economic, and financial problems on a world scale (Fketman and Soete, ?Enbe+ 
pen) 
As a general conclusion, then, we may state that this Conference was an impor- 
tant step toward a better understanding of what is happening and what should hap- 
pen in our world today. It was shown that the long-wave idea is very useful for  this 
understanding, not least because it has to be seen as a multidimensional 
phenomenon. It has important economic features, while the social, political, and 
even cultural aspects cannot possibly be neglected. The notion that technological 
innovation creates structural instability, which forces institutional innovation, was 
one of the most interesting themes dealt with a t  length at the Conference. Because 
the long-wave idea is able to throw new light on neglected o r  even forgotten 
aspects of our industrial development, we a r e  convinced that it deserves further 
research on empirical, theoretical, and policy levels. 
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THE LONG WAVE AS BETAPHOB- SUGGESTIONS FROM ECOLOGY 
Paul P. Cra ig  and Kenneth E.F. Watt 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an economics blessed with an intellectual consistency, and one 
having implications that extend far beyond the realm of conventional 
economic theory. It is, in short, also a political philosophy, often becom- 
ing something approaching a religion. 
Lester Thurow (1983, p. xviii) commenting on equilibrium "price-auction analysis 
as the prevailing intellectual mode in economics".] 
The long wave in socioeconomics has been intensively debated for over half a 
century. The idea has had continuing, but intermittent appeal. Despite many hints 
as to its existence, both the existence and the merit of the concept remain contr- 
oversial. Today much of economic thinking has, a s  Thurow (1983) observed, been 
captured by a limited set of ideas as to how the world works. 
While there a r e  many reasons that can partially explain the current domi- 
nance of this single paradigm in economic thinking, one important factor is cer- 
tainly the several decades of virtually uninterrupted growth that occurred from 
the end of the Second World W a r  until about the time of the OPEC oil embargo in 
1973. Today the idea of the continuous nature of economic progress is less obvi- 
ous, and the need for  new paradigms is becoming clearer. The metaphor of the 
long wave offers promise. 
We approach the long wave as natuml scientists. Our starting point is experi- 
mental. We emphasize an ecological perspective, with a focus on concepts of sta- 
bility. We conclude, a f te r  examining both data and theory, that at the present 
state of knowledge the long wave offers a very promising world view for  thinking 
about the future. A t  this time, however, long waves lie more in the realm of 
imagery than of established knowledge. The promise of this imagery is substantial, 
for  it  contains seeds that could lead to improvements in the way in which we manage 
our social systems. These seeds will require careful tending if they a r e  to influ- 
ence policy. 
The long wave emerges from our analysis as a powerful metaphor for the idea 
- somewhat out of synchronism with the dominant paradigm of our time - that con- 
tinuing progress should be viewed as normal. Long waves offer a larger perspec- 
tive, and thus an element of needed caution. 
W e  begin with a review of data supporting the long wave. From this review w e  
conclude that  the most compelling argument f o r  a repetitive half-century cycle is 
found in financial, demographic and war data. The long-wave case is supplemented 
by processes of replacement of one technology by another. Though replacement 
processes clearly exist, w e  do not find market penetration data t o  be  the most con- 
vincing of the evidence fo r  long waves. These observations lead us to  focus on 
ideas and beliefs, and specifically on the importance of optimism and pessimism as 
socio-demographic drivers. The Easterlin cycle in demography assumes an impor- 
tant role, as do ideas from the 1920s and 1930s about the importance of belief in 
gold as a bastion of stability in turbulent times (Warren and Pearson 1935, 1937). 
W e  conclude with observations on ways of thinking about change in social sys- 
tems, using as a focus generalizations from our review of the  ecological literature 
(Watt and Craig 1985) applied to social systems. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE? 
If the  idea of long waves is  t o  achieve broad acceptability it must be sup- 
ported by concepts and by data. The concepts are likely the most important, but 
there  is no substitute f o r  firm data. Unfortunately little of this exists. To one 
trained in an experimental science, a good figure o r  diagram often proves f a r  
more convincing than thousands of words. The long wave literature contains 
remarkably few curves that  w e  find convincing. 
Much of the  best of the  published data on long waves is due t o  Kondratiev him- 
self (1926). An early and extensive critique is due t o  Garvey (1943). The studies 
cut off before the  depression of the 1930s. though they point clearly toward that 
event. 
The Catalog of Cycles (Wilson 1964) includes figures of British Consol prices 
and US interest rates, including reference to  the  work of Kondratiev and others. 
In most cases only two cycles are reasonably clear t o  the eye, not enough t o  make 
a compelling case. Contrast this with, for  example, the  l&year  real estate cycle 
(prdcis 922). Here a full eight cycles are available from 1795 to 1945, each with 
about the same amplitude. A review of recent books on the  long wave shows a con- 
ceptual curve in Mensch (1979, p. 73), and data on moving averages of dates of 
major scientific discovery in Freeman et al. (1982, p. 180). There is a striking 
peaking of "radical innovations in the  mid-1930s and about 1960" (Freeman et al. 
1982, p. 52). 
The best graphical evidence f o r  the  long wave w e  have come across is  the  
wholesale price relative t o  gold. This w a s  used by Kondratiev (1926) in his origi- 
nal work, and has been frequently refer red  t o  since (e.g. Rostow, 1978). While 
some analysts believe "long waves in the  price level are p e r  se of no particular 
interest" (Glismann 1985) our observation is that price indicators offer  the  only 
long-wave data so compelling that  a naive observer would easily notice a half- 
century cycle. W e  r e f e r  t o  data from the  real world. Computer models easily gen- 
erate cycles. 
Figure 1 shows the  US wholesale price index relative t o  gold. Referencing to  
gold is  important, fo r  reasons made clear by Warren and Pearson (1935), having to 
do with fundamental concepts of faith and value. Since all prices are relative it  is 
equally correc t  to  observe that  wholesale prices are low, o r  that gold is highly 
valued. Failure t o  provide referencing causes a rapid increase in the value in 
recent  years  when the  US dollar depreciated dramatically relative t o  gold. In Fig- 
ure 1 there  is an indication of cyclical behavior, but the  eye is distracted by 
Figure 1 Wholesale price index for  the United States, relative to gold. No 
averaging., It  is difficult for  the eye to extract  the long-cycle peaks and troughs. 
Figure 2 The data of Figure 1, but with 21-year arithmetic averaging. This Figure 
shows the four long waves more clearly than any o ther  data of which we a r e  aware. 
Peaks occur in 1813, 1869, 1919, and 1959; nadirs in 1846, 1895, and 1936. The 
square is for  1979. 
short-term fluctuations and does not unambiguously extract  the long waves. 
The short-term fluctuations are removed in Figure 2, which uses a running 
21-year average, plotted a t  the midpoint. This simple analytical approach w a s  
used by Kondratiev, and la ter  by Kuznets. I t  has the great advantage of simplicity. 
A disadvantage is that each point is influenced by events a decade in the future as 
well as in the past, thus decreasing the utility f o r  prediction. The square is the 
point for  1979, with no averaging. Maxima a r e  found in 1813, 1869, 1919, and 1959, 
and minima in 1846, 1895, and 1936, in close agreement with general ideas on good 
t imes  and bad. 
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Figure 3 The autocorrelation of the data shown in Figure 1 f o r  the period 
1844-1896. Autocorrelation analysis clearly shows the 21-year half-period for  
this inte-val, but at the price of loss of insight. W e  believe it is a mistake t o  apply 
this type of analytical technique in situations where there  is great uncertainty 
about the timing and phasing mechanisms involved. 
To the best of our knowledge Figure 2 shows the clearest available direct evi- 
dence fo r  the existence of the long wave. More sophisticated analytical techniques 
can be applied. Figure 3 shows the autocorrelation analysis of a portion of the 
data from Figure 1. A 32-year half-period is apparent. While cross-correlation 
and other analytical techniques may easily be applied, w e  believe this approach is 
a mistake. Long-wave analysis is in an early stage, and such analysis is more likely 
to  mislead than instruct. For example, in the absence of sound theoretical reasons 
fo r  fixed periodicity and phasing (in the mathematical sense of phase), there  is no 
justification whatsoever fo r  combining data from several waves in a single cross- 
correlation plot - even though the resulting curve is smooth and (apparently) 
elegant. 
The connection of the long wave to  wars has often been noted (e.g. Thompson 
and Zuk 1982, Mensch 1979, p. 79, Forrester 1979, p. 54). Craig and Levine (1984) 
have analyzed Richardson's extensive data base on w a r s ,  with the results shown in 
Figure 4. Richardson (1960a.b) estimated the number of persons killed in each of 
several hundred w a r s .  The figure is produced by adding the number of persons 
killed in each year fo r  all of the w a r s  analyzed, then averaging the  results arith- 
metically over a 21-year interval. The closed and open boxes show the maxima and 
minima respectively, from Figure 2. The visual correlation is striking, with the 
exception of the Second World War, which was two decades "premature". The 
economic data is fo r  the USA, while w a r  deaths are global. The long-wave period is 
quite slow enough that  migration and economic interaction take place even prior  to 
the advent of modern transportation and communications technology. This problem 
is discussed by Thompson and Zuk (1982). 
The fact of a correlation visible as clearly as this presents, in our v i e w ,  a 
major theoretical problem t o  anyone attempting to argue that there  is not  a causal 
relation between economies and war .  On one side is the argument that wars gen- 
erally lead to  inflation; on the other side is the view that inflationary periods a r e  
conducive to  war.  A statistical analysis of these matters leads to the  observations 
that while price increases tend to precede as wel l  as succeed wars, the wars are a 
powerful reinforcing mechanism: 
Not only do major wars reinforce the Kondratiev upswing; they appear to 
be largely responsible f o r  the fundamental shape of the Kondratiev wave 
phenomenon.. . 
Our findings suggest that were it not for  global w a r s  and the  Civil W a r ,  
the US and British price waves of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
tury might also seem a bit like optical illusions. (Thompson and Zuk 1982) 
A (very weakly) optimistic remark following f r o m  these observations is that if 
w e  a r e  now in a long-wave downswing, w e  may have available some ex t ra  time to sta- 
bilize our world against the ever  present threat  of nuclear war. 
Kuznets (1958), Easterlin (1980), Keyfitz (1972), and Samuelson (1976) exam- 
ined various aspects of the relation between demography and long waves. A cycle 
two human generations long emerges in a very natural way. A particularly appeal- 
ing aspect of the demographic argument is that it may become increasingly signifi- 
cant with increases in reproductive choice (entrainment). The argument is most 
easily expressed in the  context of the current long wave. 
In the depths of the depression of the 1930s there  w e r e  few prospects f o r  an 
improved future. Many couples elected to have small families. As these children 
g r e w  up, they discovered they belonged to a small cohort and that their job pros- 
pects were excellent. They opted f o r  large families. But a generation later these 
second-generation children had many contemporaries, poorer job prospects, and 
therefore decided upon smaller families. Since the average age of women bearing 
children is about 27 years, a twegenerntion cycle of 54 years emerges. 
This demographic mechanism is powerful only when options f o r  choosing the 
number of children a r e  readily available, and socially acceptable. Only in recent 
decades has infant mortality dropped, and birth control technology developed to 
the  point where one might expect the phenomenon to be important. Demography is 
thus an excellent candidate as a prime driver of the present and future waves. 
Figure 5 presents data on the ('log) birth rate in the US. The minima and max- 
ima from Figure 2 a r e  shown as closed and open boxes. The correlation since 1919 
is obvious. In t imes  of economic downturn women produce fewer children, and vice 
versa. Close inspection of the curve suggests that even in the last century a drop 
in the birth rate w a s  roughly coincident with a peak in the wholesale price/gold 
ratio. 
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Figure 6 There is a correlation between the  long cycle as it appears in the  
price/gold data (Figure 2) and deaths in wars based on Richardson's data. The 
minima and maxima from Figure 2 are shown as open and closed squares, respec- 
tively. Any successful theory of long waves should discuss this correlation. 
Figure 5 Logarithm (base 10) of the birth rate p e r  thousand women in the USA. 
The minima and maxima from Figure 2 a r e  shown as closed and open boxes. The 
correlation since 1919 is  clear, and a close inspection reveals a correlation even 
in earlier years. 
In order to examine this matter further we have differentiated the data of 
Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the results (shown is the derivative, less a linear back- 
ground). The wholesale price/gold minima and maxima a re  shown as arrows. This 
graph is more complex than that of Figure 5, but shows more clearly the tendency 
for birth rates to  rise after economic minima, and to fall after maxima. 
If decisions on childbearing a r e  based on individual perceptions of the future, 
then one might expect that wages would be a good long wave indicator. US wages 
relative to the consumer price index (CPI) a r e  shown in Figure 7. The most striking 
features a r e  the persistent rise in wages, punctuated by declines in the recessions 
of the 1840s and 1930s. 
Figure 8 shows the same data on a logarithmic scale with 21-year averaging. 
Here a different message emerges. The curve breaks neatly into three parts: 
prior to about 1860; 1870 to 1920; and 1930 onward. The half-century long wave 
peaking in 1869 and 1919 is wel! confirmed. 
MARK!ET SATURATION 
Many investigators have focused on the innovation process a s  a key com- 
ponent to the long wave. Marchetti (1983) is the leading advocate of the inevitabil- 
ity of logistic growth. Freeman and Soete (1985) comment on the "agnostic" stand- 
point of van der Zwan that Long Waves consist "only of successive major structural 
crises of adjustment in the economy". This appears to us to be a striking under- 
statement. If the most dynamic sectors of the economy a r e  key drivers, their 
floods and ebbs must be highly correlated with other key indicators of long waves. 
A critica! point for long-wave theory is whether there a r e  correlations with 
other indicators. Two examples suggest that there are.  The growth of the rail- 
roads is a spectacular example of a technology meshing in growth with the long- 
wave periods obtained from price data. Figure 9 shows the penetration of train 
trackage in the United States. The indicator is the number of miles of railroad per 
capita. This is r a w  data - there is no smoothing. If smoothed with, say, an 11-year 
average, minor recessions a r e  hidden and the data lead to a good Marchetti 
diagram. The growth fits well with the long-wave cycle having minima in 1846 and 
1895. The long-wave peak in consumer price index of 1869 is clearly visible as a 
time of very fast growth, and the growth phase ended with the bust of the 1890s. 
(In more recent times the railroad industry entered a decline, and the number of 
miles per capita dropped.) 
Figure 10 shows the mileage of railroad constructed annually per 1000 per- 
sons, with 11-year averaging. The railroads began with a high growth ra te  a t  the 
end of the depression of the 1840s. But the high growth ra te  in the mid-1850s is 
unexplained. The 1869 peak in wholesale price index is correlated with a spurt in 
railroad construction. But this spurt is no larger than that in the mid-1850s. 
Further, as the wholesale price index bottomed out in 1895, railroad construction 
began to take off again, though not for long. The burst of construction in the early 
1880s likewise shows no correlation with other long-wave indicators. 
While the railroad business in the USA boomed between two long-wave minima, 
the detailed correlation fails. It is in these details that one must search if one is 
looking for the kind of understanding that wi l l  lead to predictive capability. 
Finally, the fact of saturation of railroad mileage, and especially the level of 
saturation which occurred in about 1890 (Figure 9), is in no way explained by the 
data presented here. The most obvious explanation is in terms of an imminent new 
mode of transportation - the automobile. Yet in the context of the times there w a s  
every reason to believe that the railroad business could have continued to expand 
for many decades. 
Figure 6 The derivative of the birth rate data of Figure 5, less a linear back- 
ground correction. Maxima and minima from Figure 2 are indicated by azl-ows. 
There is a clear tendency for  birth rates to  drop in the vicinity of long-wave mini- 
ma, and to rise near long-wave maxima. 
Figure ? US wages relative to  the Consumer Price Index. No averaging. 
Figure 8 US wages relative t o  the consumer pr ice  index, logarithmic presentation 
with 21-year arithmetic averaging. The curve is clearly divided into th ree  re- 
gions, with t he  middle region corresponding closely t o  the  long wave of Figure 2. 
Figure 9 Penetration of t ra ins  in t h e  USA the indicator is the  total number of 
t rack  miles p e r  thousand persons. This penetration is wel l  correlated with the  
third long wave. No averaging is used. After about 1895 trackage became con- 
s tant ,  and later on declined. 
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Figure 10  Hiles pe r  year  of railroad track installed pe r  capita. This is the de- 
rivative of the d a b  of Figure 9, but with I l-year  averaging. The beginning and the 
end of the growth phase are evident, along with the  slowdown during the recession 
of the mid-1860s. The long-wave minima and maxima f r o m  Figure 2 are indicated. 
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Figure 11 Automobiles were a dominant component of the  US economy in the early 
twentieth century, with the major growth phase ending at the  time of the long-wave 
minimum in the  early 1930s. The figure shows the  growth rate (in percent pe r  
year) of registrations (Il-year averaging). A surprising conclusion is that  the  in- 
dustry did not show rapid growth af ter  the Depression. 
Growth in the railroads is reflected in the experience of the iron and steel 
business, which provided the material for  the &. From the trnn of the 
nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth, business boomed. Steel production 
went from 5 ounces per  capita to 285 pounds, and the proportion of iron refined 
into steel rose from 25! to 74Z (Strass- 1956; see also Singer 1958, Burke and 
Eakin 1979). The concurrent development of the machine tool industry with its 
spectacular series of inventions nnd innovations provided a driving force that 
could not be slowed. A detailed analysis here corroborates the discussion of rail 
growth, but does not provide good indicators for satmation. 
The problem of saturation is especially severe for  a Marchetti type of 
analysis, since the fit to logistic equations assumes one knows in advance what that 
saturation level is. A t  the time satmation actually occurs there  seems often to be 
ample reason to believe that  a great deal of growth still lies ahead. The automo- 
bile industry illustmtes the same point. Figure ll presents growth data for the 
automobile industry. The format is slightly different from that of Figure 9. The 
growth rate of registrations is shown ra ther  than cumulative numbers of cars. At 
the time automobile registration was f imt  required in the USA the growth ra te  was 
phenomenal; it fell until about 1930, and then leveled off. F r o m  the point of v i e w  of 
impact on the economy the automobile satmated at the beginning of the depres- 
sion, and never recovered. Car sales were a key driver in the early years of this 
century, and a dynamic indicator of the state of the economy. Figure 12 shows 
sales per capita, with a rapid r ise f r o m  the begimhg of the industry until the col- 
lapse during the Depression, followed by a secondary rise af ter  the Second World 
War. An 8 million car year comesponds (with the current population) to about 0.04 
sale pe r  capita, and this is about where the automobile industry may wel l  remain 
for quite a while. The sales data thus fail to fit a Marchetti-type diagram, though 
the registration data would. While the number of cars per  capita seems to have 
saturated, there is certainly ample opportunity, from a technical point of v i e w ,  for  
further expansion. 
These two examples f r o m  the transportation sector fit  wel l  with the long-wave 
dates for the Last two cycles, as identified from wholesale prices measured relative 
to gold. Other sectors do not f i t  the model so well. Chemicals and oil, excellent 
candidates for the dominant sectors in recent times (prior to the OPEC embargo) 
measured as a fraction of industrial output, increased through the Depression of 
the 1930s (Figure 13). So too has total energy use and electrical energy use, 
which resumed rapid growth af ter  the depression and maintained it until the mid- 
19?0s, when growth virtually ceased. Theories based on samrming of innovation 
are appealing in the sense of a metaphor of progress, but Utt le  actual data that  we 
have seen catch the eye convincingly. The best hope for sharpening the case Lies, 
w e  suspect, in careful attention to identification of indicators for  leading sectors, 
and in disaggregation. 
.STABILITY CONCEPTS: SUGGESTIONS FROH ECOLOGY 
The previous section has examined empirical data supporting the idea of l ow  
waves. W e  found that evidence, while not abundant, is at least adequate to support 
the idea of the lo= wave as a metaphor for  change. The evidence we found most 
compelling is in the areas of price, birth rate, growth and satmation of new indus- 
tries, and w a r .  We now turn to the matter of interpretation. 
O u r  darting point is the observation that positive associations need not imply 
causality. In the approach to  scientific investigation of Popper, a key concept is 
Figure 12 Antomobile sales per capita (Il-year avemge). Total sales per capita 
dropped during the Depression, then increased. The increase was not anough to 
lead to a sharp rise in registrations per capita. 
F i  13 Capital in chemicals and oil, relative to total capital invested in US in- 
dustry. These data illustrate the rise of a major sector even during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. This sector presents a problem f o r  long-wave theory. 
that of falsifiability. According to this view, no theory can ever be proven true. 
However, to be acceptable, a theory must be subject to practicable tests which can 
prove it wrong. This is a difficult enowh requirement in the laboratory sciences, 
where experiments can be repeated with changed conditions. The requirement is 
f a . .  more vexing when one is dealing with social systems for which repetition is not 
an option. 
Yet thinking about the future is impossible without some kinds of models as to 
how the world works. Models, be they conceptual or mathematical, offer a simpli- 
fied view of the world that allow the a z z y  of a broad spectrmn of facts and obser- 
vations about the world into a systematic structure having predictive content. 
One potential source of guidance comes f r o m  non human living systems. This is 
the domain of ecology, the science which attempts to identify patterns in assern- 
bhges of living systems. Any proposal to generalize f rom non haman to human sys- 
tems must face the problem of self-awareness. There can be no totally convincing 
answer to this objection. O u r  view is that the same ' l aws  of nature" that gave rise 
to all other living systems are also controlling for man Wer 1978, Prigopine 
1981). There is no escaping these constraints, any more than we can hope to 
escape f r o m  physical h w s  such as the l a w  of gravity, o r  the universal speed Limit - 
the velocity of light. 
We reviewed concepts of stability as these have been identified in the ecologi- 
cal Literature (Watt and Craig 1985). From this review we identified 13 principles. 
These principles illustrate that there are  many diiferent types of stability, and 
that what is perceived as stability f r o m  one perspective may very well be per- 
ceived as instability from another. The principles also help to clarify the obser- 
vation that stabilization of a system is often not the goal of choice. This is particu- 
larly relevant in discussing social progress, where a typical goal is continuing 
advancement (e.g. of material wealth, o r  of knowledge). 
A particularly vexing problem in the analysis of complex systems is the fact 
that many types of systems structures are of such a character that their behavior 
is exceedingly erratic, f o r  reasons having to do wlth their structure, their 
environment, or  both. This can be the case even with spstems that a re  entirely 
deterministic: the nature of some systems is such that their evolution in time is 
exquisitely sensitive to the details of initial conditions, or  to the values of parame- 
ters. The complexity of apparently simple systems was brought to general atten- 
tion by Mizp (1974, 1976), and there is now a large literature on the subject of 
catastrophe theory and of chaotic systems (Wilson 1981). 
We analyzed the industrial revolution in terms of a transition f r o m  one type of 
stabilizing principle to another (Watt and Craig 1984). In this view the industrial 
revolution in England was characterized by stresses in the energy sector brought 
about by depletion of forests. The next energy resource tapped was coal, but 
trouble developed as shallow coal was depleted. The Watt steam engine provided 
the technology to mine deeper (since water could be pumped more efficiently), and 
to develop railronds. The Watt engine was a possible technology a t  least seveml 
decades before it actually developed as a commercial protiuct. The resources to 
bring the technology to fmltion could not be assembled before the need existed. 
Once the new technology became available, many applications emerged that could 
hardly have been imagined only a f e w  decades earlier. 
These ideas can be expressed in the language of several of the general princi- 
ples of stability. Reliance on wood (and later on coal) as a primary fuel is stabili- 
zation based on high-flus use of a single resource (monoculture). Systems can sta- 
bilize by high throughput, but are then highly vuinerable to shortage of that 
resource. An alternative strategy based on diversity of resources may be less 
efficient when times are good, but has higher survival value when key resources 
are in shortage. This stability principle is captured in the folk adage "don't put 
dl your eggs in one basket". 
As Lransportation and communications systems improve, the economies of the 
world =e becoming increasingly tightly coupled. This is leading to the reduction 
of stabilization mechanisms associated with isolation - the "patchiness" principle. 
This has several effects. A positive effect is that good ideas are  mpidly pro- 
pagated. An adverse effect is that trouble developing in one area is mpidly com- 
municated elsewhere. The depression of the 1930s was more intense in the USA 
than in Europe, due to the relatively loose economic co~@lng that then existed. To 
what extent are.the tighter and faster couplings that exist today leading to a more 
vulnerable world? 
In order to begin to test these ideas we explored the degree to which key indi- 
cators can be explained in terms of the variation of a hypothesized lead sector. 
We'focused on energy as a driver, using the ratio of the price of a market 'basket" 
of fossil fuel energy to average spendable family earnings as an indicator. In the 
period 1957 to 1966 only 29% of year-byear variance in the dmable goods sector 
of GNP could be explained in terms of this mtio. In the period 1967 to 1973 the 
explainable proportion of the variance increased to 38%, and in the 1974-80 period 
80% of the variance could be .explained. Analysis with long-term trends removed 
lowered the variance to 69%. 
This approach emphasizes the identification of key driving variables 
appropriate to any given em. It emphasizes simplification, following o m  belief 
that if the results a re  to prove broadly convincing the models used must be simple, 
a lesson we believe is one of the most important messages f r o m  the history of 
large-scale modeling. As instabilities inevitably develop, the social system makes 
transitions f r o m  one mode of stabilization to another. A primary goal of policy, we 
believe, should be to minimize the disruptions associated with these transitions. 
Work is in progress to develop this approach in detail. 
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THE INTERACTION OF INYESTKENT ANXI D m  INTHE LONG WAVE 
Jam Delbeke and Erik SchokLacrt 
INTBODUCTION 
The present long-wave discussion is rather confused. M o s t  economists do not 
aaaept the theoretical and empirical relevsnae of the wnoept. Within the small 
circle of long-wave researchers, many theories a re  competing, each of which 
claim to give the basic cause of the Kondmtiev. The main starting point of this 
paper is that this canfusion aan only be resolved if long-wave researchers t r y  to 
buiAd an integmted theoretical framework in close aonhct with standard economic 
theory. This framework shonld offer an endogenous exphnution f o r  the long-wave 
phenomenon. These basic st,arting points are sketched in Section 1. 
Such a macroeaonomic framework shanld describe the conditions under which 
innomtion will take place. In Section 2 we argue that the financial sector may be 
important in this respect and has been relatively neglected in reaent research. 
We present a simple model that can explain the Long wave through the intemction 
of investment, debt and the cost of credit. In Section 3 we enlarge somewhat the 
approach and analyze the role of i nno~ t ion ,  of priaes and of the multiplier- 
acaelerator mechanism. In each aase we simulate our model f o r  reasonable values 
of the parameters and show that it generates cycles with a periodicity of about 50 
Y-. 
It is oertainly not o m  intention to describe or explain the a c d c  develop- 
ment sinae the industrial revolution. Our approach rsmains pure& deductive aad 
theoretioal. We want to show that some simple economic mechanisms may generate 
long waves and deepen our undershnding of the reAative imporhnae of these 
mechanisms and of their intemction. 
1. THE NEED FOB A MACWECONOMIC FBAEEWOBK 
In gensral one oan shte that there ure two main streams in the lang-nave 
literature; the same holds for reaent research in the field.. The first, and larger, 
group of researchers is mainly ampiriaally oriented. Eaorunnic h b t o r h m  aollect- 
ing data about sectors and regions over a long period obseme in most oases fluc- 
tuations of different length and amplitude. With the help of a whole range of SLR- 
tistical methods the trend and all short-run nuctuntions are eliminated. On the 
basis of the resulting series they conclude to aaaept or reject the so-called long- 
wave hypothesis. In o ther  w o r d s ,  the fluctuation in a number of series is con- 
fronted with the  best known conclusion of Kondxatiev (1926), i.e. the existence of a 
i 50 year  fluctuation. 
Given the present state of the theory on the  long wave, such empirical data 
collection undoubtedly is an  essential job. However, one aan ask if it is  meaningful 
to follow fur ther  this way of research with practically all means. Have w e  not 
passed the  point where the  marginal returns of more investment in the same direc- 
tion are rapidly declining? Of course, not all problems have been solved: the  data 
problem is enormous and the  filtering is critical. Y e t  i t  seems fair to conclude that 
most authors agree about the existence of long-term fluctuations. The crucial 
question which has remained open, however, is "whether these long-term variations 
are more than the  outcome of a sunmation of random events, and further ,  whether 
they exhibit recurrent  temporal regularities that  are sufficiently well-behaved to 
call them 'long wnves"' (Rosenberg and Frischtak 1983, p. 146). 
The answers to these questions cannot be found by e m p i r i d  research alone. 
Therefore, a small but growing group of researchers takes a more deductive start- 
ing point. They try to formulate the  mechanisms, that  could generate a long-wave 
phenomenon. They wmt to ezplain the  possible existence of long waves. I t  is  
clear that  the  results of the  f i r s t  group are a necessary precondition for this 
theoretical work. However, it is only a f irs t  step: fruitful empirical research in 
science is possible only on the  basis of theoretical insights. I t  is  therefore not 
surprising that the  best known authors on long waves must be situated in this 
second group: if  they a r r ive  at reasonable explanations, these appeal also outside 
the  small circle of long-wave researchers (prominent examples have been Schm-  
peter  1939, and Dupriez 1947, 1959). 
Until now, most authors have been looking fo r  one strategic variable, that  
could be  considered as the  fundamental cause of the  50-year fluctuation. To a cer- 
tain extent w e  will  also follow that  approach in this paper. However, we are con- 
vinced that  this is only a f irs t  step. A complete explanation should take into 
account the  general interdependenoe, that is such an  important feature of the  
economic system. More concretely, a review of the  l i terature (Delbeke 1981) 
shows that  the  different theories of various authors are to a large extent comple- 
mentary. The Schumpeter (1939), Mensch (1975), Kleinknecht (1979), and van 
Duijn (1979) hypotheses about the  clustering of innovations are compatible with 
the  labor approach of Freeman et d. (1982), with the  declining-profit hypothesis 
of Mandel (1980), the  fluctuating fixed capital of Forrester (1977), or the  scarcity 
of primary goods suggested by Rostow (1978). The same can be said for the more 
sociologically inspired theories of Simiand (1982) and many reoent authors. Essen- 
tially, the  monetary theories (e.g. Dupriez 1947) can also be reformulated to fit 
into the general macroeconomic framework. 
The acceptanoe of such an interdependent approach throws a new light upon 
some actual problems in long-wave research. One of these is the  difficulty of 
meastlring and dating the  long waves. Is i t  reasonable to claim one turning point or 
year for a 50-year cycle? W e  suggest that  this is not the case, because the timing 
depends on what variable is considered as essential. If we a l l o w  for a turning 
period, let us say a decade, many different explanations can be reconciled. The 
pattern of leads and lags can give us important insights into the  eoonomic fluctua- 
tions, along which the  adaptive mechanisms have to break through numerous iner- 
tias. 
The quest f o r  one basic factor seems to have biased the long-wave research. 
The older approach (before the  Second World War) is using primarily price data. 
Nowadays most of the researchers prefer  the analysis of real data, because they 
want to avoid the  constant rise in prices sinoe the  1930s. As a consequence of this 
choice, the majority of long-wave research is based on the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. Enormous efforts a r e  made to analyze empirically the historical pat- 
tern of the outcome of basic innovations. It need not be stressed how difficult such 
a task is, given the fact that new products a r e  only classified o r  registered when 
the quantity produoed becomes of some importance. The innovative act  is so nar- 
rowly connected with the entrepreneur who wants to protect his secret, that the 
sample of available statistics is likely to be biased towards successful stories. 
Only when the entrepreneurial function is institutionalized, i.e. during the last long 
wave, is this situation likely to be remedied to some extent. 
We do not claim that the Schumpeterian hypothesis is useless, just the oppo- 
site, but we doubt that further empirical investigation can offer us a definitive 
proof. We think that it would be more fruitful to study m o r e  actively the role of 
the macroeconomic environment in the innovation process. Today, almost nobody 
.doubts the need for basic innovations. Even people who have never thought about 
the long wave agree with this opinion. On the other hand, many people a r e  disap- 
pointed about the small s c d e  on which the innovation process starts  and about the 
many negative short-run effects. A better understanding of these questions can 
only be obtained within a complete macroeconomic framework. 
In this view, the choice between real, price or monetary bta becomes 
irrelevant, because their interdependence is the rule in economic life. Indeed, the 
continued prices rise (since the 1930s) and the transition of a meta l  to a fiduciary 
monetary standard create problems for the study of the long wave. Within the 
macroeconomic framework, however, these problems become neither insoluble nor 
irrelevant. On the c o n t m ,  the integration of such phenomena is one of the main 
research objectives. 
2. A STOCK-FLOWS MECEKANISM IN THE FINANCIAL SPHEBE 
A t  present, the study of the macroeconomic interdependence of real and 
monetary variables in a long-wave perspective still is a neglected area of 
research. In a prevous paper (Delbeke 1983) we tried to draw a first sketch of a 
relevant macroeconomic framework. It is obvious that the construction of a com- 
plete macroeconomic model, which could give an endogenous explanation for the 
existence of long waves, is the ultimate purpose of the research. However, it is 
often difficult to see clearly the mechanisms that a r e  working in such a huge 
model. In the present state of the art, i t  seems interesting to gain additional 
theoretical insights through the constmction of simple models. The main purpose 
of these models must be the ezpLanatwn of the dogstzous creation of turning 
points. 
The prototype of such a simple model is the multiplieraccelerator model, the 
success of which can largely be explained by its combination of simplicity and 
intuitive appeal and its capacity to generate fluctuations in a purely endogenous 
way. It is to be noted, however, that the cycles generated by the multiplier- 
accelerator mechanism a re  much shorter than 50 years for  reasonable values of 
the unknown parameters. In this section, we propose an alternative dynamic 
mechanism, which is also able to create a long wave, but is situated in the financial 
sphere of the economy. Section 2.1 gives a short description of the model and 
some references to the literature. The bare essentials of the model a r e  analyzed 
mathematically in Section 2.2. We will illustrate the working of the model with a 
simple simulation exercise. 
2.1 Financial Factors in the Long W a v e  
The simple fact that the long wave seems to be typical for  an advanoed capi- 
talist economy already points at the potential importance of the financial s y s t e m .  
More especially, the banking system, being a private business with no policy 
responsibilities, might play an important role. 
The analysis of Minsky (1964, 1975) seems to offer an interesting starting 
point. He agrees with the (almost) universal point of view that the instability of 
investment is the crucial factor for  the unbalanced growth path of the economy. 
Financially, investment can be interpreted as one of the fundamental speculations 
of capitalist society: the entrepreneur is hoping that the future (unoertain) cash 
flows originating from an investment wi l l  be greater than the payment commitments 
due to the liabilities. Moreover, a decision to invest can be considered as a port- 
folio decision because it is a decision to emit Liabilities o r  to  decrease liquidity. 
Investment decisions are dominated on the one hand by the cost of capital and 
credit and on the other hand by the discounted value of the expected yields of the 
capital assets. By its nature, this expected yield is easily influenced by waves of 
optimism and pessimism, causing an exaggerating behavior of investors. Behind 
these changing states of confidence, the degree of fragility of the financial s y s t e m  
is crucial. The system is developing towards fragility as the cash payments 
increase relative to the cash reoeipts and as units possess ever less Liquid assets. 
Indeed, after  a depression and with the beginning of recovery, the supply curve of 
finance is very elastic. The innovative investments a r e  more profitable than 
expected and give rise to an ever growing wave of investment. Internal financing 
is more and more replaced by external financing, and a whole structure of debts is 
built up on one foundation: the prospective yields on investment projects. 
However, the expansion cannot continue. When the first signs of saturation 
become discernible, and competition is growing, it becomes clear that the debt 
structure is based on an overoptimistic evaluation of the yields from investment 
projects. Economic units wi l l  be short of liquid assets, and w i l l  be forced to sell 
more and more assets, because bankers are not willing to grant new credit lines. 
The decline of income and production will confront more and more economic units 
with payment problems. 
Some economic units will not be able to fulfill their payment commitments: 
they will fail. This development can create severe domino-effects, as is wel l  docu- 
mented for the G r e a t  Depression of the 1930s (see e.g. Bernanke 1983). Beuause 
debts are expressed in nominal terms, problems become still more dramatic when 
prices start to decrease. The debt deflation process leads to a downswing with low 
incomes and high unemployment, during which the new recwery  and boom a r e  
prepared. Disinvestment occurs, but the financial position is rebuilt. Expecta- 
tions again become more oonfident as the subjective repercussions of the debt def- 
lation wear off, and new profitable investment opportunities are created by inno- 
vation. 
W e  can add two remarks to this story. In the first place, it  may be dangerous 
to overemphasize the irrational aspects of the banker's behavior and to resort  to 
vague ideas of "optimism" and "pessimism" to explain the turning points. It has 
indeed been argued (by Bernanke 1981, 1983) that the disruption of the financial 
sector by the debt crisis raises the real cost of intermediation between lenders 
and borrowers. Therefore i t  is completely rational for  banks to increase the rate 
that they charge borrowers and to strengthen the conditions for risky loans. . 
Secondly, the preceding story almost exclusively focuses on investment 
behavior by firms. A t  least since the thirties a completely analogous story mn be 
told about consumer expenditure. Here the effect of the financial crisis works via 
the wealth effect in the consumption function and the liquidity effect in consumer 
durable and residential housing expenditures. A convincing illustration of these 
effects as given by Kishkin (1978). 
Of course, w e  are quite aware of the fact that our analysis remains very lim- 
ited and partial. Nevertheless w e  feel that it helps explain at least some features 
of the long wave. In Section 3 w e  will comment on the links between our financial 
model and the real and monetary sectors of the economy. Note indeed that the 
roles of the price system and of the innovation process were only casually men- 
tioned until now. Before we try to  indicate how the model could be improved how- 
ever, let us f irst  deepen our understanding with a mathematical illustration. 
2.2 A Simple Linear Dynamic Illusbation 
In analogy with the popular multiplieraccelerator model we can construct a 
model that illustrates the basic featares of our apporach. We will show that f o r  
reasonable values of the parameters the model generates cycles of about 40-50 
years. 
The basic ingredient of course is an investment function. W e  noted earlier 
that crucial variables here  are the profit expectations and the cost of credit and 
we therefore write: 
where It = investment in period t 
I0  = autonomous investment 
Rt = cost of credit in period t 
P; = expectation of profit in period t 
and al ( < 0) and a2 ( > 0) are parameters. The f irst  term on the right-hand side in 
(1) gives "autonomous investment". Because w e  want to  emphasize that our model is 
only par t  of a larger approach, we explicitly write autonomous investment as a 
function of other (perhaps very relevant) variables 2:. Here the superscript I  of 
course refers to  investment. 
The most difficult variable is the expectation of profit, which indeed is to  a 
large extent a psychologically determined factor. For our purposes, however, w e  
only need to  capture the simple idea that there  may be ''waves" of optimism and 
pessimism, i.e. that a psychological climate in a certain sense perpetuates itself if 
there  are no changes in other variables. A straightforward way of translating this 
argument is to  relate profit expectations to  past investment: 
P ; = P ~ ( $ ) + B I ~ - ~  , (2) 
where @ > 0. Again we introduce a vector of unspecified variables zf to show the 
partial character  of our model. 
The cost of credit is an essential building block of our approach. This cost 
will be influenced by the situation on the capital market and therefore by the rela- 
tionship between saving and investment. There is some indication that one might 
discern a long wave in saving behavior (van Duijn 1983). However, the basic idea 
of our approach is that the difference between the "safe" interest rate and the 
cost of credit for  risky investments also is a consequence of the behavior of the 
economic agents and follows a long-wave pattern. The basic determinant of this 
pattern is the debt (Dt) position of the economy: 
where y > 0. Relationship (3) is convincingly demonstrated for  the Great Depres- 
sion by Bernanke (1983). W e  noted already that the same author argues that (3) 
may follow from perfectly rational banking behavior. 
Finally, w e  write the following equation to  describe the formation of debt: 
where both dl and 62 are between zero and one. The interpretation of these 
parameters is obvious. The fraction of debt repaid each period is given by 1 - dl, 
while d2 gives the share of external financing of investment. W e  argued in the pre- 
vious section that this share  is increasing during the upswing of the  long wave, but 
fo r  the present purpose w e  keep d2 constant as a f irst  approximation. Equation (4) 
is true by definition and i t  therefore is not necessary to  introduce an " a u t e  
nomous" component. 
W e  could analyze the dynamic properties of this simple model as such, but i t  is 
easier to concentrate on the investment equation. Inserting (2) and (3) in (1) 
yields: 
and, transforming (5), and denoting the sum of the f i rs t  three  terms on the right- 
hand side by c O ( z t )  t o  simplify the notation, 
Using (6) to substitute for  Dt and Dt in (4) w e  get, a f t e r  some algebraic manipu- 
lation: 
I t  is now possible t o  analyze the dynamics of investment (and hence of debt and cost 
of credit) in our simple model. To simplify the notation, w e  introduce the following 
symbols: 
Dynamic analysis (see e.g. Chianp 1974) then shows that  (7) will endogenously gen- 
erate a cyclical movement of investment if aZ < 4b. This movement will be explo- 
sive if I b I > 1 and damped if 1 b 1 < 1. The length of the cycle is of course crucial 
to  see whether w e  can generate Long waves with our model. If w e  define 
cos Q = a/2b1" , (9) 
then w e  can derive the length of the cycle as 2x/ Q. 
Let us now apply these formulae fo r  our model. Consider f irs t  the parameters 
in (8b). The coefficient dl is related to  the fraction of debt repaid each period. I t  
is not unreasonable t o  give it a value around 0.90, which would imply that all kinds 
of risky loans have on average a term of 10 years. For our simulation exercises 
w e  assumed dl to be equal to 0.92 (average term of risky loans 12.5 years). The 
values of az and fl depend in our linear model on the units of measurement of 
investment and "expected profitability". For the dynamic analysis, however, only 
their  product matters and i t  can be seen from (5) that this product links present to 
past investment. A s  a f irst  approach, let us put a2@ equal to  1, which means that 
changes in investment have to be explained by the autonomous component and the 
debt position. In that case I b j clearly is smaller than one and the cycle is 
damped. Note in fact that a2@ has to  be larger than about 1.1, if we want the 
movement to  become explosive. 
Let us now tarn  to  the analysis of the length of the cycle. If n e  keep to the 
values assumed fo r  b1 and a26, this length is determined by the product of b2 and 
air. These parameters are crucial in the model and reflect both behavioral and 
institutional considerations. The f i r s t  parameter gives the fraction of debt in total 
financing of investment. For Belgium its average over the period 1964-79 has been 
0.38, but the coefficient will  have another value f o r  countries with a different 
institutional structure. The second parameter is the product of the interest effect 
on investment (a1) and the influence of debt on the cost of credit (7). I t  is difficult 
t o  define a p r i o r i  values for  these paramete but it seems reasonable to locate T the value of the product between 0.01 and 0.05. 
In Table 1 we give the results of a kind of sensitivity analysis and relate the 
length of the endogenously created cycles to the values of 62 and a ly  (given the 
values for  b1 and a2@ mentioned previously). I t  is obvious from the table that a 
long wave of about 40-50 years can be generated by our model fo r  reasonable 
values of the parameters. Note that the length of the wave increases if the frac- 
tion of debt financing becomes smaller. It  decreases with the absolute value of the 
effect of debt on the cost of credit. 
617 62 I 
0.25 
--- 
-0.01 213 
107 OS5O 81  OSy5 i 
-0.02 107 67 
-0.03 8 1  53 
-0.04 67 45 
:: i 
37 
-0.05 59 40 32 
Table 1: Length of Cycle 
I 
The dynamic process is illustrated by Figure 1, where we simulated the model 
f o r  the following values of the parameters: bl = 0.92, 62 = 0.50, a2@ = 1.00, and 
a ly  = -0.04. 
W e  start from an initial stable situation where I = 500, c0 = 125 and there- 
fore D = 3125. In period 5 we give an exogenous shock to  c O ,  raising it to 300. 
The damped cycle of about 45 years can be clearly seen in the figure. First invest- 
ment and debt increase, until debt (and hence the cost of credit) becomes too high. 
A t  that  moment investment starts to  decline and i t  keeps on declining fo r  a long 
period, because it takes time to  return to  a normal level of debt. 
%he interes t  e l a s t i c i t y  of t h e  demand f o r  credit  in Belgium has been estimated t o  be 
about 0.10 ( see  Verheirstraeten 1977, Dombrecht 1979). In 1974 gross  investment was 
about 500 milliard Belgian francs. This f lgore  implles that  f o r  an interes t  r a t e  of la, a1 
would be about minos 5. Total credi t  t o  the private s e c t o r  in 1974 amounted to about 1400 
milllard Belgian francs. (Government debt was about 1200 milllard Belgian francs.) Values 
f o r  7 between, 0.002 and 0.01 seem not unreasonable, a prtotl. The product a17 then is si- 
tuated between -0.01 and -0.05. 

Of course, the model is really very simple as i t  stands now. It is interesting to 
see, however, that even such a simple model is already able to generate the turn- 
ing points of a long wave for empiriccrlly reasonable vcrlues of the parameters. 
On the other hand, because of its damped character, it cannot explain the 
recurrence of the long-wave phenomenon. A t  the present stage of the work, it is 
tempting to conclude that recurrent exogenous shocks a r e  necessary to explain 
the long-waves of the past. Before drawing this conclusion, however, let us first 
see how the dynamic behavior of the model changes if we t ry  to make it somewhat 
more realistic. 
3. TOWAIDS AN INTEGRATED PODEL 
We noted already many times that the final purpose of the research m u s t  be 
the construction of an integrated model. We certainly do not have the pretension 
to c l a i m  that our financial variables a r e  the final explanation for  the phenomenon 
of the long wave. In this section we show the possible relevance of other 
approaches and try to find out how they can be related to the model of Section 2. 
We will treat  innovation, the price system and the multiplier~ccelerator scheme 
successively. 
3.1 Innovation and Our Financial Podel 
In their critical appraisal of the relationship between innovation and long 
waves, Rosenberg and Frischtak (1983) give the following overview of the condi- 
tions under which long cycles become an historical neaessity: 
1) The availability of an elastic supply of inventions, a t  a time when risk- 
return combinations appear propitious for  innovation; 
2) The formation of a cluster of innovations at the base of the upswing; 
3) The reaching of an upper turning point of the technologically driven 
cycle due to increasing macro economic instability, as well as forces that 
deter the introduction of substitute technologies; 
4) The arrival of the economy at a technologically fertile ground, after  an 
appropriately extended period of t ime. 
And in the same paper they also write: 'Technologically driven long waves can be 
made to appear plausible only if macroeconomic factors can be shown to play a 
dominant role in shaping and disciplining the timing of the introduction of innova- 
tions." 
We quote the paper rather extensively because these quotations clearly ill- 
t ra te  that there is no contradiction between our financial mechanism and the inn* 
vation approach. Quite to the contrary, f o r  the innovation theory to make sense 
from an economic point of view, i t  needs some macroeconomic underpinning. The 
dynamics of investment and debt may be an important part  of such a macroeconomic 
background. It is obvious that there will not be many innovations in the upswing, 
because the existing technology is profitable enough. During the downswing no 
oapital is available in our model, especially not for risky innovation investments. 
In the trough, however, when the normal debt position has been restored, the risk 
premium is small and the conditions a r e  almost ideal for  innovation to take place. 
In this description, innovation may seem to play a purely passive role. We can 
give it an active and crucial role in our model, however, if we interpret it as the 
main generator of the exogenous shock; setting the system in motion. Note in this 
respect that the model in Section 2 is damped and can only generate recurrent  
long waves if i t  gets recurrent  exogenous shocks. 
This idea also is illustrated with a simulation exercise. Assume CO follows the 
patterns given by Figure 2. There a r e  some "clusterings" of innovations (in 
periods 4, 19, 40-46, 70 and 85-91), leading to an increase in the autonomous par t  
of investment. For the rest, the system is completely the same as the one leading 
to Figure 1. The new dynamic behavior is sketched in Figure 3: w e  now see indeed 
a recurrent  long wave, as could be expected. 
3.2 Prices in our Financial Podel 
The main defect of the model in Section 2 undoubtedly is the neglect of prices, 
which implicitly are treated as constant. To introduce prices in an  adequate way, 
it seems necessary to work out a monetary sector. Indeed, one could say that  
price changes are induced by the  variable money creation of the banking system. 
Some first  ideas, Largely inspired by Dupriez (1947), are sketched in Delbeke 
(1983). In this paper w e  will  not follow this track: we do not want to explain price 
changes, but only concentrate on the consequences of prices within our  financial 
model. 
Let us therefore postulate the following short-cut expression for  price 
changes: 
where pt refers to the price level. Equation (10) implies that prices increase and 
decrease together with investment. I t  is an easy way to introduce the idea that 
prices increase during the upswing and decrease during the  downswing. W e  now 
rewrite our basic model (1)-(4) as follows: 
Equations (11) and (12) a r e  the same as (1) and (2): we assume that  investment 
decisions a r e  influenced mainly by real considerations. The financial debt, how- 
ever, is expressed in nominal terms: in (13), w e  therefore transform it into real 
terms using our (endogenous) price index. While investment is expressed in real 
terms, the external financing of investment is a nominal conaept. This explains the 
difference between (4) and (14). 
The main purpose of this section is to capture the  idea of debt deflation (see 
e.g. Fischer 1933). During the  upswing prices increase, which makes it more pro- 
fitable to contract nominal debt. Then comes the  (unexpected) downswing, how- 
ever, and prices tend to decrease: this raises the  real value of debt and makes the 
necessary repayments more difficult. I t  may seem that  this explanation does not 
hold for  the  recent  experience. However, W i n g  into account inflationary expec- 
tations during the  upswing, a decrease in the  rhythm of price increases (i-e. fnfia- 
tion) during the  downswing may have the same debtdeflationary effects. 
Model (10)-(14) now is not linear any more. However, simulation will reveal 
its dynamic properties immediately. W e  keep all panmeter  values identioal to 
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Figure 7 
those used in Section 2.2 and start from the equilibrium pr ice  index p =1. W e  give 
the  system the  same exogenous shock, by increasing C O  from 125 t o  300. The 
behavior of the  model crucially depends on the  value we choose f o r  E .  In Figure 4 
w e  give the  resul ts  f o r  ~=0.0003. W e  get a nice long-wave pa t te rn  with a periodi- 
city of 40 years.  Note, moreover, tha t  the  strongly damped cha rac t e r  has  disap- 
peared: t he  long cycle, generated by the model. now is a recu r ren t  phenomenon. 
It  could be  argued, however, tha t  ou r  value of E is  too low, since t h e  variation of 
the  simulated pr ice  index is constrained in the  range 0.78 t o  1.50. 
Raising the  value of E t o  0.0005 considerably increases this  variation: it now 
covers  the  range  0.16 t o  2.04, which seems a be t t e r  description of reality. The 
complete simulation results,  presented in Figure 5,  are remarkable. In t he  f i r s t  
place, we again find a r ecu r ren t  long wave, with a periodicity of about 50 years. 
More interesting, however, is the  shape of this long wave, which has changed 
because of the  nonlinearity in (13)-(14). The waves in Figure 5 have a sha rp  peak, 
but a long trough of about 14-20 years. Again, this seems t o  give a more realistic 
picture of the  historical fac ts  in the Western world. 
These simulation resalts suggest tha t  t he  integration o: a monetary sector  
with our  financial model may be  a very promising t rack .  In t he  f i r s t  place we get a 
be t te r  description of reality.  Moreover, we do not need any exogenous shocks t o  
make the  long wave a r ecu r ren t  phenomenon. This does not imply tha t  t h e r e  have 
been no exogenous shocks in the  past: they obviously have been important. Nor 
does i t  imply tha t  innovation does not play any ro le  in the  .process. N e w  technolo- 
gies determine the  cha rac t e r  of the  upswing and a r e  essential elements in the  com- 
plete model, which also would explain long waves in the  labor market and in con- 
sumption behavior. 
3.3 The Mnltiplier-Accelerator Model 
The multiplier-accelerator model could have been a n  alternative dynamic 
mechanism t o  explain the  phenomenon of long waves. However, we noted already 
tha t  this  mechanism generates  sho r t e r  cycles f o r  reasonable values of the  parame- 
ters. What happens t o  ou r  model if w e  introduce a kind of business cycle? 
To answer this question w e  simulated the  model of Section 3.2 under the 
assumption of a 15-year cycle in cO. After the  initial shock (from 125 t o  300) it 
follows the f oliowing pattern: 
The results f o r  &=0.0003 and &=0.0005 are given in Figures 6 and 7 ,  respec- 
tively. These figures do not give us many additional insights and do not change the 
basic long-wave pa t te rn  found in Section 3.2. However, we get  a more at t ract ive 
picture with accelerations and decelerations of growth along the  fundamental long 
wave-path. 
CONCLUSION 
In this pape r  we have argued that a n  integrated macroeconomic approach is 
necessary t o  understand the  empirical phenomenon of the  long wave. Although the  
construction of a l a rge  model i s  the  ultimate purpose and may be already 
worthwhiie now, simple models may be  useful in the  present  state of the art t o  
deepen our understanding of the basic mechanisms. Of course, such simple models 
can never be rich enough t o  explain the historical facts. They can give some indi- 
cation, however, about the importance of different theories and about the possible 
interrelationship between these theories. Mathematical formalization can be a 
useful instrument to  check for  consistency and to  get some feeling fo r  the empiri- 
cal conditions needed to  generate long waves. W e  have to  make explicit our 
assumptions; both about the structure of the model and about the  values of the 
parameters. In this way, scientific discussion can become more fruitful and less 
speculative. 
We showed that  a simple stock-flow mechanism in the financial sphere can 
generate long waves f o r  reasonable values of the  parameters. If w e  add the  
phenomenon of debt deflation, the  cycles in our model become permanent: their  
periodicity is  about 50 years  and the  shape of the  generated long wave seems t o  
offer an attractive picture of realtty. 
Of course, w e  do not claim to  have discovered the  basic cause of the long 
wave. On the  contrary, w e  think that the  quest fo r  one basic cause is a bad 
research strategy. In the  f irs t  place, many theoretical questions remain open. W e  
completely neglected, fo r  instance, the potential role of relative prices and of 
labor shortages. A model of the  monetary sector  also is lacking. This should 
replace the  primitive solution that w e  now have chosen t o  explain the  behavior of 
prices. W e  also have specified an oversimplified equation fo r  the  expected profi- 
tability of investment: a more complete theory should introduce here  the  notions 
of saturation and of the  life cycle of industries. Another important problem is t o  
determine the exact role of innovation in the  framework. In this respect w e  
argued that it  is  necessary t o  explain the macroeconomic conditions under which 
innovation wil! take place and that  our model can be an important cornerstone of 
such a explanation. I t  stil! is not clear, however, whether innovation is necessary 
t o  generate long waves o r  only colors them. 
In the second place, i t  must be  emphasized that  theory is only interesting 
insofar as it gives a hint t o  understand the  empirical reality. Some indications of 
the possible relevance of our  model are given by Delbeke (1983), who shows, fo r  
instance, a clear long-wave pattern in the Belgian money base multiplier. Yet much 
more work remains to  be done. Fu'ote, however, that theory is necessary t o  guide 
empirical research and that  a carefully specified model is an ideal starting point 
fo r  this research. W e  p l a  to  go further  in this direction in the  near future. 
In fact,  our ambition in this paper has been very limited. In the  f i r s t  place, 
we wanted t o  illustrate that  the construction of simple models may be an interest- 
ing research strategy, which leads t o  consistent thinking and more fruitful discus- 
sions. In the  second place, w e  wanted to emphasize the  potential importance of the 
financial sector  fo r  the  explanation of the long wave. In recent  research,  the 
financial mechanisms and the  interaction between debt, credit and investment have 
been relatively neglected. A macroeconomic framework is necessary, however, if 
we want t o  give an endogenous explanation fo r  the Kondratiev. Only in such a 
framework does it become possible to  integrate different existing theories and, 
more especially, to  formulate the conditions under which the innovation process 
can generate long waves. 
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DISEQUILIBRIUM. INNOVATION. AND PERIODICITY IN ECONOMIC DFYELOPNENT* 
Saiful Islam 
There is, i t  seems to us, 
A t  best, only a Limited value 
In the knowledge derived f r o m  experience. 
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is  new in every moment 
And every moment is  a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been. We are only undeceived 
of that  which, deceiving, could no longer harm. 
[T.S. Eliot in East Coker] 
Disequilibrium is a precondition for  the  existence, orderliness and preserva- 
tion of dissipative structures. Human societies a r e ,  among others, resource- 
converting systems. Human economic activity can also be  described as a dissipa- 
tive system that functions by utilizing information and by the transformation and 
exchange of resources, goods, and services. 
The information content of a dissipative structure changes with time, so that 
such structures a r e  inherently indeterministic. The information content of a sys- 
t e m  at one time is in general insufficient to predict the  state  of the  system at later 
t i m es  (Poincard, 1892). Industrial capitalism is relatively new. W e  a r e  not 
involved with very large time scales in the  study of the  capitalist economies. Since 
our  knowledge about the  exact functioning of a system as complex as an economy is 
~e la t ive ly  meager, i t  would be  unwarranted to predict the  development of the capi- 
M i s t  economies very f a r  in the future. Historical data, however enconrage us to 
predict the short-run behavior of an economy. Careful analysis of such data might 
be useful in understanding the present state of the capitalist economies. But we 
have to keep in mind the warning of Schumpeter (1942): Analysis, whether 
economic o r  other ,  never yields more than a statement about the  tendencies 
present in an observable pattern. And these never tell us what will happen to the 
pattern but only what would happen if they continued to act as they have been act- 
ing in the  time interval covered by our  observation and if no other  factor  
intruded. 
'This work was supported by the following Swedish organizations: the Council for Planning 
and Coordination of Research, the Commission for Energy Research and Development, and 
the Science Research Council. 
Kondratiev (1926) f irs t  observed that from industrial revolution onwards, 
capitalist economies went full cycles in terms of prosperity, recession, depression, 
and recovery in about every 50 years. I have tabulated the Kondratiev cycles 
beiow : 
Name of Cycle Prosperity Recession Depression Recovery 
Textile 1787-1800 1801-13 1814-27 1928-42 
Railway 1943-57 1858-69 1870-85 1886-97 
Electricity/ 
cherni cal 1898-1911 1912-25 1926-39 1940-52 
Control 1953-66 1967-79 1980-89 1990-2000 
Information 
Table 1 The Kondratiev Cycles. 
The last cycle has not yet started. The dates fo r  different periods in different 
cycles may not be exact. It  would be pedantic to enter  into a debate on this issue. 
I t  merely helps us to  see  that  there  is some periodicity in the development of the 
capitalist economies. 
I have named the cycles according to the main source of impulse of that cycle. 
The fourth cycle is the  controls Kondratiev since in this cycle we produce bet ter  
motor vehicles, bet ter  aircraft ,  computers, and spacecraft by learning to  control 
r a the r  complex systems. The fifth Kondratiev will definitely be a cycle of versa- 
tile automatic systems and biotechnology - a revolution in understanding the modes 
of information transfer  and information processing in living and non living systems. 
Capitalism, according to Schumpeter (1942). cannot be a stationary affair. 
From its very nature, capitalism is evolutionary. The main forces keeping capital- 
ism in motion a r e  the  introduction of new consumer goods and the mass production 
of already existing goods. This requires advancement in technology - both emb* 
died and disembodied. 
Capitalists know that  the markets will be cleared only in the short  ran. They 
always have to  keep on guard to introduce new goods o r  utilize new production 
processes. Economic development is thus primarily a process of reallocation of 
resources between industries. This leads to  structural changes and disequilibrium. 
We know from thermodynamics that things happen only in disequilibrium. In 
major economic crises R&D activity increases and/or the firms apply already 
patented technology in production processes. The economy starts recovering. It  is 
not a peculiarity pertaining only to the capitalist economies. All self-organizing 
systems operate in the cycle of becoming, growing, changing and decaying (Prig* 
gine 1980). 
When the demand r ises in an economy working at full capacity, the firms react 
by increasing consumer prices, the proceeds of which a r e  used to crea te  new 
capacity. If the capacity of the economy was low to  start with, it will grow with a 
mild inflation. On the  other  hand, if the economy is already working a t  near  full 
capacity and if the markets are satiated to  a large extent, in the  absence of inn* 
vation, stagnation is the  only viable outcome. 
The reaction of the policy makers in the present stagnation w a s  to reduce the 
liquidity, which in my opinion is wrong. If the liquidity is reduced, the firms react  
by increasing prices and producing less, thereby underutilizing capacity and 
increasing unemployment. Devaluation and trade restrictions will not solve the 
problem either.  It will a t  best prolong the depression, at worst it would lead to 
armed conflicts. When the leaders of the  depressed economies think tha t  the only 
way out of stagnation is t o  invest in the  armament industry, the  tendency toward 
using force increases. Trade restrictions curtail  the exchange of normal mer- 
chandise. For weapons t h e r e  is always a market. I t  is  fo r  this reason tha t  the  
nations should not indulge in t rade  restrictions. Trading in normal merchandise 
should continue even at the  pr ice  of less national welfare in the  sho r t  run, and in 
the  meantime we have to innovate. 
In a book of remarkable scholarship, Mensch (1975) convincingly argues tha t  
the  encouragement of innovation is the  best way out of stagnation. He classifies 
innovation in t h ree  categories: 
(1) Basic Innovation 
(2) Improvement Innovation 
(3) Product Differentiation (Scheininhovation) 
Basic innovations a r e  those which open up a new field of activity and create 
new jobs f o r  a number of people. Nontechnical basic innovation generates new cul- 
tural activity, new types of public administration, and novel social services. 
Improvement innovation in the  industrial sec tor  brings new products into the  
market that  a r e  be t te r  in quality and reliability, inflict less damage on the  
environment, and need less r a w  material and human labor in the i r  production. I t  
remains a seller 's  market because the  consumers want to buy qualitatively be t te r  
products. But a f t e r  tha t  comes a stage when a proauct cannot be made be t te r ,  at 
least not at a price acceptable t o  the normal consumers. This is a consequence of 
the  large-scaie production processes,  which they a r e  difficult to modify. Most of 
the  production processes a r e ,  at least in the sho r t  run, of the  putty-clay type. 
The elasticity of substitution being very low (Hildenbrand 1981, Islam 1980), they 
have t o  opera te  with obsolete technology o r  continue t o  produce goods fo r  which 
the  demand has declined. 
A t  this s tage the  producers  indulge in an  activity classified by Mensch as 
ScheininnovatiolL. Something is packed bet ter ,  given a shiny color. But this  does 
not help. The seller's market has  become a buyer 's market. The market is 
saturated. When the  industry was expanding i t  neglected research.  Now i t  cannot 
break open into a new market. 
In economic c r i ses  goverment should encourage R&D activities. These should 
not only be res t r ic ted  to technical innovation. Tinbergen (1981) rightly points out 
tha t  i t  is  questionable whether only technical innovation can bring about large- 
scale economic recovery. W e  have to, among many o the r  things, innovate in the  
finance sector ,  w e  have to innovate mechanisms tha t  would reduce international 
and intranational disparities. Unequal distribution is a major source of armed con- 
fl icts among the  nations and within a nation. 
W e  need organizational and intellectual innovation tha t  will enable us  t o  avoid 
major economic crisis. Enhanced research  activity is needed in many sectors. Let 
us take the  example of climatology. O u r  knowledge about how the  global climatic 
system wi l l  react to increased industrial activity i s  insufficient (Kandel 1981). 
The Mycenaean civilization is said to have been destroyed by e r r a t i c  climate (Bry- 
son et al. 1974). Homer in the Riad described the  Mycenaean decline as an  act of 
the Olympian gods. Although the  present destructive capacity of the  superpowers 
(and smaller powers) w i l l  make the  Olympian (and the  Himalayan) gods blush, a vast 
amount of money and intellect is being spent t o  increase this destructive capacity. 
If resources were diverted from the  military sector ,  w e  could at least hope f o r  a 
bet te r  and sa fe r  future.  
The best policies to follow a r e ,  in my opinion: 
(1) To lower the  t r ade  bar r ie r ,  so  that  purchasing power can be  generated 
in the  less developed countries. This wil l  speed up the  diffusion of 
modern technology. 
(2) Biotechnology i s  going to be  a major component of t he  next phase of 
development. Most of the biotechnology research  is done t o  produce 
expensive pharmaceuticals. More resources must be allocated to t he  
food and agricultural sector. Better agriculture wi l l  help the  poor coun- 
t r ies  t o  save a considerable amount of foreign exchange needed to  import 
technology. The problem of getting people out of poverty is not how to 
feed them. Poor countries need technology to produce the i r  own food. 
(3) I t  is t rue  tha t  different societies have different capabilities to gain from 
technological development but certain economic activities generate more 
inventiveness (technical and nontechnical) than o thers  in a given society. 
The way to development is to identify and pursue economic activities that  
make people more inventive. 
I have not filled up the row fo r  the fifth Kondratiev in Table 1, anticipating 
tha t  the  present cycle is the  last one. I hope tha t  w e  wi l l  innovate mechanisms t o  
avoid major disequilibria, which, of course, presupposes an equitable distribution 
of wealth and opportunities. Inequality makes the  system not only inequitable but 
also inefficient. I t  is as t rue  of intranational as of international distribution of 
income, wealth, and opportunity. 
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ON THEORY INTEGRATION: TOWARD ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
Gerhard 0. Hensch 
XNTRODUCTTON: WHEE DO WE STAND? 
In Mzrch 1983, I had the  pleasure of meeting with several  of you e i t he r  at the  
Long-Swing Conference in Pa r i s  (organized by the Maison de Science de  1'Homme). 
o r  at the  Growth Cycle Conference in Siena (organized by the  Instituto di 
Economia). W e  should be  grateful to IIASA f o r  bringing both lines of theorizing 
together now, and again h e r e  in Siena. My delight in meeting with you h e r e  again is 
heightened by two facts. 
First ,  the  c i rc le  has  become more representat ive by joining the  representa-  
tives of the  empirico-inductive majority with t he  representat ives  from the  various 
logico-cieductive qua r t e r s  . Into t he  latter group I would count my collaborators,  
Gunter Haag and Herman Wold, and myself. Since I consider us logico-deductive 
types stili t o  b e  a minority in t he  long-swing hypothesis r e sea rch  field, I am partic- 
ularly looking forward to  meeting h e r e  again with Richard Goodwin, the  pioneer in 
the  non linear multiplier-accelerator modeling field, who has  inspired la rge  
numbers of students and textbook wri ters  with his explanations of growth and sta- 
bility as spurts of investment; and with Jay For res te r ,  whose system dynamics 
approach t o  capital  formation still provides the  most d i rec t  method f o r  studying 
long swings from the  phenomenological point of view. Of course,  accelerated 
investment multiplier effects and cumulative capital  formation processes  are con- 
sidered the  c o r e  of dynamic economics by both Western and Eastern mainstream 
economists of neoclassical, Keynesian, Schumpeterian, and Marxian leanings. 
Therefore,  I am especially grateful to IIASA for giving me an opportunity t o  mee t  
with ou r  colleagues from the  Soviet Union. For  us t he  Russian names of Kondratiev 
and Slutzky stand synonymous for both t he  unresolved question of whether long 
waves do really exist ,  or whether long waves are just a statist ical  illusion (a 
Slutzky Effect). Furthermore, it should b e  mentioned t h a t  those of us who work on 
mathematical theory of dynamic economics usually work with t he  classical Russian 
textbooks. They still r ep re sen t  t h e  state of the  art in t he  West. W e  a r e ,  of course,  
curious t o  learn from t h e  disciples of ou r  teachers .  
A second very important fact is  highlighted by o u r  gathering here .  In terms 
of mathematical sophistication and econometric modeling capability, this gathering 
represen ts  a level of achievement comparable to t he  accomplishments of mathemat- 
ical economists in Walrasian and non-Walrasian invisible colleges. In terms of 
pract ical  significance, however, I would l ike to  conclude tha t  we  are  now 
represent ing here a major sect ion of the current  research frontier in dynamic  
economics. 
REFLECTIOKS ON TEIE YlOVING RESEARCR FRONTIER 
My point now is  this. Over t he  last few years ,  several  individuals and 
research  groups in our field have taken an important emancipatory s tep  by 
advancing from the  purely descriptive t o  partly deductive reasoning. These 
r e sea rche r s  have designed and developed a family of par t ia l  models tha t  formalize 
some important aspects  of t he  dynamic economic process. In fact,  t h e r e  exist  s o  
many part iz l  models at this  time tha t  I f e a r  I would miss a few if I t r ied to list them 
now. In o the r  words, our 'long-term research" ("Kondratiev") field has recently 
progressed from a s t a t e  of so-called ezploratory research to t he  advanced s ta te  
of ezplanatory research. In s o  advancing, our small field has  become a co re  area 
of the  much l a rge r  field of disequilibrium dynamics, which has become known in the  
economics profession as Schmpe te r i an  economics. 
I am thus saying tha t  t he  research  f ront ie r  in our field has recently taken a 
jump. For clarification, le t  me briefly s ta te  t he  c r i te r ia  tha t  separa te  t he  
exploratory from t h e  explanatory phase in a r e sea rch  agenda. Exploratory 
research  usually means descriptive, historiographic, empiriceinductive (data- 
driven) work directed at formulations of tentative hypotheses and tentative 
assumptions. Explanatory research  usually means analytical, econometric, 
logico-deductive (model-driven) work directed at mathematical hypothesis testing, 
and that is  where the  research  f ront ie r  stands now. 
Usually, the  phase transition f r o m  t he  data-driven, exploratory r e sea rch  to  
the  modei-ciriven, expianatory resezrch  implies t w o  concurrent  emancipatory 
steps. A t  one end, t he  penetration of a new, largely extended intellectual temi-  
to ry  usually generates accelerated r e tu rns  t o  effort;  and at t he  o the r  end, t he  
competition between alternative. hypotheses, which often took the  form of person- 
alized r ivairy between data-assisted points of view, gives way t o  a nonpersonal, 
formalized simultaneous testing of all model-assisted theories. I maintain tha t  is  
where the  action i s  now, and in future years.  
In o rde r  t o  double-check the  accuracy of this  observation, I should like t o  
invite you to  look around in this room. Here we a r e  in t he  good company of several  
authors  of part ia l  models tha t  f i t  t he  c r i te r ia  of advanced explanatory special 
theories.  Ergo, as a group we undoubtedly have already entered the  analytical 
phase, which consists of testing mathematically formalized hypotheses. 
What will happen during t h e  analytical phase? Judging from the  experience of 
o the r  theory groups, t h e r e  will be a theory evolution from several  specific 
theories toward a few more general theories. In this regard ,  again, i t  seems we 
a r e  r ight  on target .  To see how, take a word from J. Niehans, our colleague from 
Berne, who recently detracted from the  theoretical value of Schumpeter's vision 
by saying: 
'%owever, 'vision' i s  not enough. The essential s t ep  is t o  fonualize i t  into 
an analytical model. This is  what makes the  idea communicable to others ,  
a potential contribution to economic doctrine. Schumpeter w a s  a t rag ic  
figure in the  history of economic analysis because h e  was unable to 
transform his vision of innovation into an  analytical model" (KykLos 1983, 
p. 175). 
Clearly, we a r e  f a r  away from having found a unified, the unified Schum- 
peterian analytical model. All we have is  a family of par t ia l  models; but we also 
have some notions of t he i r  integrability into two o r  t h r e e  distinctive clusters  of 
matching theories tha t  may be regarded as candidates for two or t h r ee  somewhat 
more general theories,  which-to be sure-in t he  end will be distinguished by 
differences in degree of generality, and by differences in degree of usefulness f o r  
specific purposes. 
For example, long-wave theories with built-in gradualism of economic motion 
can be expected to  yield a smaller spectrum of formalizable scenarios than can be 
expected from discontinuity theories with built-in possibilities of saltatism (jerky 
motions). An exarcpie of discontinuity theory is  my Metamorphosis Model. 
For another  example, theoretical approaches and calculation techniques tha t  
allow f o r  a deeper  level of disaggregation wil l  eventually out perform o the r  models 
when the  task consists in analyzing company-level or industry-level developments. 
Since my Metamorphosis Model is  grounded in t he  notion of s t rategic  investments of 
competing firms, i t  i s  able to perform analyses down to t h e  business unit level of 
disaggregation. 
Thus. i t  is  safe  to assume tha t  our theory group will sooner or l a t e r  undergo 
another  phase transition. If t he  research  f ront ie r  keeps moving, i t  will en t e r  the  
instrumental phase. In fact ,  some of the  available models may have already 
reached readiness for venturing into prescriptive activities, such as formulation 
of alternative scenarios, evaluating them numerically, and actually computing 
specific forecasts. 
A t  the  same time, w e  may safely assume tha t  t he  research  activities that  tend 
t o  consolidate t he  explanatory basis of the  whole field will greatly increase in 
importance. For example, model-based assessment of the validity and the  explana- 
to ry  power of alternative part ia l  hypotheses w i l l  become a rewarding activity, 
whereas judgmental statements on the  mere plausibility of special data-induced 
long-swing hypotheses will be found less frequently in t he  scholarly journals. By 
the  same token, systematic model-driven data gathering will continue to  yield 
higher returns t o  scope than what Koopmans calls "measurement without theory". 
Summing up my reflections on the  likely motions of t he  best-practice research  
front ier  in our field during the  years  t o  come, I would like to stress theory utility 
as a separate  issue of validity and reliability. My claim is tha t  post4chumpeterian 
microfoundations (incorporating entrepreneurial  innovation, s t rategic  investment, 
etc.) and post-Schumpeterian macrodynamics will prove very useful to business 
leaders  and policy makers. Currently, t he re  s e e m  t o  exist  only th ree  such 
micro-macro models: t he  Swedish (IUI) model, the  Nelson-Winter Model, and ou r  
Schumpeter Clock model (Mensch et d. 1984). Of course,  these models still have to 
prove the i r  value. Until tha t  has  happened, most mainstream economists would 
probably still agree  with William Baumol's skepticism, 
"Neither Man nor Schumpeter w a s  a narrow specialist. Schumpeter has  
been described (by one who himself has  grounds to claim the title) as 
'perhaps the  last of the  great polymaths1-one of those giant intellects 
whose understanding and erudition permits them to roam wiaely among 
the many disciplines. History, sociology, political science, and o the r  
fields of knowledge all make their appearance in t h e  works of both these 
writers. 
'%ut, perhaps t o  make r o o m  f o r  this  wealth of source materials, they had 
t o  pay a price.  The dynamic systems of t he  Marzists and Schumpeter 
leave us  with a sense of frustration because they are so vague and 
impressionistic. We are left feeling that  the i r  tale might just as easily 
have been given a different ending. Even if we were to  accept  the i r  
premises, w e  are under no obligation to go along with the i r  conclusions!" 
(Baumol 1951, pp. 34-35). 
Therefore, t he  quest f o r  theory utility seems to mobilize forces  that  p re s s  for 
theory integration that  increases predictive relevance. 
RE?+WRKS ON THEORY IhTEGRAlTlN 
At this juncture, I would like to briefly address t he  issues of integrability of 
available special theories of long-term growth and development. In principle, 
integration may t ake  place along the  lines of g rea t e r  explanatory power (general- 
izability), g r ea t e r  computational precision ("parameter accuracyJ1, "predictive 
relevancen-Herman Wold), o r  be t te r  match t o  user  needs. Of course, t he  benefits 
of integration would be  greatly increased if i t  improve theory on two o r  all t h r ee  
of these dimensions. 
I am happy t o  learn tha t  Fornester considers ou r  two theories  as candidates 
f o r  integration. I agree. For lack of specific experimental knowledge, though, I 
cannot now compare generalizability, precision, o r  ultimate utility of t he i r  respec- 
tive individual o r  combined output. But the  prospects are certainly worth explor- 
ing. 
Likewise, 1 am unable now to indicate to you any perceptions I have on ultimate 
integrability and generalizability of o ther  approaches in the  field. 
However, only in r ega rd  t o  my Metamorphosis Model, which is operationalized 
by the  bi-equilibrium approach, can I venture a statement of integrability and gen- 
eralizability. A s  I perceive it ,  i t  is already p a r t  and parcel  of mainstream 
economic theory. 
As I have explained in my bi-equilibriurn paper  (Mensch 1981), 1 consider my 
theory a constructive specification of a general theory of change. My theory of 
disaggtegate discontinuous disequil ibrium dynamics  (4-1) theory) I regard  as 
an extension of t he  formal theory known as (non-Walrasian) General Equilibrium 
Dynamics (GED);  all  i t  takes to integrate my work into the  neoclassical framework 
is t o  remove the  Inada condition of uniqueness. 
The extension of GED then is straightforward. Since GED permits t he  situa- 
tion where both the  equilibrium condition and the  stability condition are violated 
(structural instability), many economic motions then become admissible. Based on 
years  of experience with innovating and planning companies, I postulate tha t  indus- 
t r ia l  companies' investment behavior is bifocal. Consequently, in the  aggregate,  
the  Postulate of Bifocal Investment Behavior leads to a bounded nonequilibrium 
motion of the  whole economic system, such tha t  the  following bistability holds: 
(i) the  economy is always out of equilibrium; t h e r e  exist  two equilibria, so  
the economy is always out of one, and moves relative to both; 
(ii) the  economy moves in both a n  equilibrating and a disequilibrating fashion 
almost all t he  time, usually approaching one while moving away from the  
other.  
This nonequilibrium motion can be  approximated with the  bi-equilibrium model, 
which perceives of the  economic system as shifting back and for th from one equili- 
brium pole t o  the  other.  The shifts from one equilibrium pole t o  the  o the r  may 
occur  gradually, and steadily, as in the  long-wave analogy, o r  they may occur  
discontinuousiy (seldom, but then suddenly), as in my Metamorphosis Model. 
Incidentally, Schumpeter's Process of Creative Destruction (PCD) can now be  
seen as a special case of extended GED. .In terms of qualitative change, 
(i) the  flow of creat ive and destructive effects is (nearly) always imbal- 
anced, 
(ii) economic activities are nearly always both creat ive and destructive at 
the  same time, 
anci the  imbalance in simultaneous creat ive and destructive changes may shift gra- 
dually o r  suddenly. 
Likewise, Forrester 's  capital good -consumption good -capital t ransfer  model 
seems to  m e  a constructive specification of t he  two-sector model of Uzawa (1962, 
1963), from which the Inada condition of uniqueness has  been dropped, with the  
resul t  tha t  capital productivity and capital intensity move over  time as discussed 
by Solow (1963). 
I feel that t h e  bi-equilibrium approximation represents  t he  observable facts 
sufficiently wel l .  In t he  accompanying bi-equilibrium paper ,  in which theoretical 
estimates of US industry data  f o r  1900-34 are compared with observations, an r2 
value g rea t e r  than 0.75 attests to a satisfactorily high explanatory power of the  
Postulate of Bifocal Investment Behavior. Therefore, I am seeing many of our spe- 
cial theories already embedded in mainstream economics. 
Therefore,  I have selected as a concluding remark a quote from Philip H. 
Wicksteed. Wicksteed, like me, wants "...to convince professed students of Politi- 
cal  Economy tha t  any special o r  unusual features  in t h e  system thus constructed 
a r e  not to  be regarded as daring innovations o r  as heresies,  but are already 
strictly involved, and often explicitly recognized, in t he  best  economic thought and 
teaching of recent  years." (Wicksteed 1967, p. 2). 
CONCLUSIONS 
A s  a postscript,  I should like to add to  the  above disclaimer of originality 
another humbling thought. When eight months ago, in Siena, Richard Goodwin and I 
reflected upon the  sno r t  reach  of even the  best known of our  economic theories,  
he  offered a simple and direct  reason: "We do not have what natural scientists 
have, reliable constants to  work with. " 
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ON LONG WAVES IN THE ECONOKY 
SnmrhilrmandLFKI 
1. THE SUBIECT O? sTuDr 
The recent sprand of hng-ave  theories is no doubt due to the inciaanoe in 
the 1970s and 1980s of deeper reosssions, dower growth of productivity, and 
overall shgnation in growth rstes of the capitalist economies. However,  AOnpwuve 
theories should not be used to explain dl major phenomena in the cumant 
economic situation, which is rsther a combhution of c y c l i d  (periodic) pmaasass 
and long-tsm s t n ~ c t d ,  but not necessarily repetitive, crises. 
Thus the energy crisis, which symbolizes the termination of the e m  of cheap 
energy, has no preoedsnt in the S 2 O s  and 1930s (the Ume of the previous Aong 
aepression). It is also a powerful manifestation of the crisis of the ald interne- 
tional economic order, which be- only to our times. 
Another prominent feature of the current long depkon-"fhgfhtion"-is 
not simply a repetition or modification of premious inflations. The upward prioe 
inertia bused in the 01igopolist.i~ stmctrae of the ecanormy is clssrly a modem 
fanture. The new mechanism, which makes reosssion and inflatian appaar sfmP1- 
bneaasly, and feed upon each other, is a h  completely new. 
If one wants to lump together dl stractmal phsnamona, them i t  is mwful to 
treat them as a totality of features and prwsssss chsractsristic of the current 
w e  of the g e d  crisis of capitalism, as a socio aammmic sjabm. 
However, it is possible and neowsery to mptoms  of long& 
periodicity among crmbnt eaommic phsnomona. These relate primarily to oscilAe- 
ti- in overall gmwth rstns af economic output and in t e c h n i d  pmgmss. 
This paper canasntmtes on long fluatrrations in .nrrtaid prod- In 
aUampt.ing to identffy long raavss it takas up such aggregnte indicators as gmss 
domestic product (GDP) or industrial production (IP) where natianal a-ts 
statistics are not available. Ln abmpUng to single out an endopewus mechanism 
of hng-term fluctuations in material production it also tums to indiaators explain- 
ing the behavior of GDP or IP, nsmdy invsstmant, fixed capital stack, the 
oaplhl--output mtio, labor productivity , pmfit and prof ItabiUty. Indimtors of dis- 
trfbution and circrrlstian, such as t ra ie ,  prioss, interest, money stuck, etc., are 
left out intentionally. Grunted that all these prousssss are tmporhnt, r e  proueed 
from an assumptian of primacy of matariai production (af goods and services) and 
of the secondary nature of disttibution and ctrmhtion. 
Let us dhthgukh betweun economic waues and cpciu.  By cycles we denote 
such fluctuations in which the downward movement periodically lsads to crises, i.e. 
absolute contractions of material production for  not less than half a year (in 
monthly o r  quarterly series) and than a year (in annual series). By waves w e  
understand any more o r  less periodic fluctuations of output, which are manifested 
by deviations of growth rates from the trend, but not necessarily by negative 
growth. Thus cycles are special cases of waves. This difference is stressed in 
order  to retain the definition of economic cycles as fluctuations with a periodic 
repetition of crises. Crises are the  constituent phase of the economic cycle. 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF LONG WAVES AND THE CURRENT LONG BECESSION 
Do long waves of 50 years' duration really exist? There is no unanimity in the 
literature ei ther  on empirioal evidence of their existence, o r  on their  underlying 
theory (van Duijn 1983, Forrester 1981, Freeman et (3. 1902, Kuczynski 1980, 
Mensch 1979, Rostow 1900). Neither are w e  aware of convincing arguments for  
their  theoretical impossibility. 
As mentioned above, the contempornry discussion of the subject has been 
revived by the crises of 1973-75 and 1900-82, as well as by the pronounced slow- 
down of economic growth in the 1970s and early 1980s. If, in the history of the 
cycle, one singles out crises that are deeper or longer than their  neighbors, then, 
i t  is claimed, they a r e  the crises of 1872-75, 1929-33, and the two latest cases. 
The approximate distance between them is 45-50 years. 
Such comparisons are very flimsy. "Strong" crises differ substantially in 
depth of contraction. In this respect the crisis of 1929-33 has no historical pre- 
cedent. The crisis of 1872-75 in the USA was weaker than both 1892-94 and 
1907-8; in addition i t  occurred on the crest of a long upswing ra the r  than in a 
downward phase, like 1929-33 o r  presumably 1973-75. 
If one proceeds deeper into the 19th century, one does not find adequate cri- 
ter ia  to choose 1825-26 as the natmal claimant to the role of a 'Xondratiev" 
crisis. Thus such historical comparisons do not look convincing. 
The statistical identification of long waves is not a trivial problem and needs 
refined mathematical methods. 
Most economic series reflect complex movements determined by secular 
trends and various periodic fluctuations, modified by concrete historical condi- 
tions and purely stochastic influences. Methods of separating such heterogeneous 
movements are often intuitive and depend on the subjective approach of the 
researcher. Thus, fo r  example, the notion of the secular trend depends on the 
choice of the mathematical model representing it (stochastic or deterministic), on 
the assumption of how it applies to other movements (multiplicatively or addi- 
tively), on the concrete type of function describing the trend. 
Methods of estimating and eliminating the trend (of which the most prominent 
are least-squares and difference transformations) may influence the remaining 
movements and even distort them. For example, difference transformations of the 
f i r s t  order  which largely eliminate the trend described by a broken line, wil l  also 
increase purely stochastic influences, so  that some systematic movements of aver- 
age duration may become hardly distinguishable. On the  other hand, least-squares 
in the case of an erroneously chosen model may introduce false movements, which 
are not subject to reasonable interpretation. 
The separation of long waves against a background of rising o r  other trends is 
further  impeded by the existence of shor ter  systematic fluctuations. For example, 
the observation of annual statistical series makes it possible, without previous 
transformation, to single out reliably medimxt-length cycles (K. Marx, C. JugLar) of 
8-9 years and short cycles (J. Kitchin) of 3-4 years. Let us'call them respec- 
tively economic (or major) cycles and intarrnadiafe (or additionall cycles. The 
influence of these cycles is so great that longer systematic fluctuations often 
become visaally indistinguishable. 
In order to eliminate high- and medimn-frequency fluctuations one often uses 
such linear filters as moving averages of various kinds. However, in some cases- 
namely, when the d e r s i o n  of long fluctuations is mdler  than or approximately 
equal to the dispersion of shorter systematic fluctuations-the use of averages may 
lead to the emergenae of false waves in the smoothed-out series ( H m e y  1968). 
The use of such f i l t e rs  for dWhg&hing long waves is proper only when fluctue- 
tions are spst8mat.i~ and close to deternritristic. This hppothssis is satisfied for 
most of the series that we have annipzed. 
Taking note of these problems we have used the following m&odology for 
annipzing statistical indimtors: 
(1) We assrrmed that the movement of all indicators is described by multipli- 
cative models with deterministic tFends. 
(2) The deterministic trend is described by an exponential function where 
the ciegree of the exponent is a polynomial of the first or second order. 
If, after eliminating the exponential function, waves were obsmed sub- 
stantially longer than 50 years, then the laUer were eliminated by tri- 
gonometric regression. 
(3) If the residual after eliminating the trend visually showed naves of 40 to 
60 years, then the series nas smoothed out by a 9-year moving average. 
We studied GDP series for the USA (1883-1982), IP series for the USA 
(1864-1982), the FRG (1860-1982), and Japan (1900-1982); and IP and agx-icul- 
tmal production series for the UK (1700-1982). In every csse, except the UK, it 
was possible to disaern a q u c r s i w d i c i f y  o f  about 50 years in deviations from 
the trend. 
We talk about mi-periodicity boause: 
(1) the relative shortness of the series (90 to 120 years) makes it possible to 
identify no more than 1.5--2.0 complete oscillations; 
(2) in the opening parks of the series the movement is practically intiistin- 
guishnble f r o m  the fieaderation of the secular trend; 
(3) the period of oscillation, as m s a s a r e d  by the W o e  between the 
assamed peaks or pplmpsses, changes from period to period and from 
c o m e  to country. 
In the UE: (the only country for which sarias of data on ntatsrisl production 
are available for nearly 300 years) waves in growth rates (of 180 to 
200 yeam' dmation) are cleeriy disaarnible nrcmnd an ashdshingly W l e  set- 
Lar exponential trend of the f i r s t  degree. A periodicity close to 50 years is very 
weak in this w e  and is manifested in deviations from super-Long waves. It wes 
identified by using both high- and low-frequency filters. 
In the past the UK has been the camtry of classic mpitalism, and the analysis 
of its statistics bears conclusions on dynamics of capitalism in general, not just for 
its later, predominantly monopolistic w e  (as in the case of statistics for the 
USA, the FRG, and Japan). Here we clearly observe in the manqjbcfory (pre- 
factory) m o d  (1700-1780) a major  dependence of super-long waves on gronth 
rates of the population, but later on the successive phases of the G w u t  indus- 
Revolution. The upswing in industrial output of consumer goods started in 1780 
and continued until 1860 (80 years),  and in the  output of producers goods i t  lasted 
from 1818 t o  1883 (65 years). I t  is interesting that  the  first general ~ycl ical  
ctisis of 1825-1826 occurred as early as 7 years  a f t e r  the turn of t he  tide in the  
output of means of production. 
In the  USA, the  FRG, and Japan the upswings of the 50-year wave are clearly 
associated with the  massive spread of major technical innovations, leading to a 
complete overhaul of t he  industrial structure. I t  is true tha t  only two such long 
upswings have historically occurred in these countries: the  age of milmads and 
steel (in the  USA also of petroleum): 1870-1910 in the  USA, 1870-1913 in Ger- 
many, 1900--1919 in Japan; the  age of chemistry, electronics, aviation, and in the 
FRG and Japan also of the  automobile and petroleum: 1935-1970 in the  USA, 
1950-1973 in the  FRG, 1955-l975 in Japan. 
As to t he  "great crises", they may have reflected the superposition of three 
shor t e r  waves and of the  downswing in the  long wave. But, obviously, o the r  factors  
have played a major role,  including socioeconomic factors,  i.e. changes i n  the 
production reLations of capitalism. Xn 1929-1933 the  moving fo rce  ams the con- 
flict between the  tendency toward mass production, strengthened by la rge  cor- 
porations, and the unreadiness of the  mass market f o r  mass consumption; and the 
underlying necessity of a transition to government intervention. Xn 1973-1975 it 
was the deep crisis of government intervention caused by stagflation and the 
growth of transnational corporations, and the  underlying necessity of a transition 
to international coordinated economic policies. 
Such transformations cannot be explained only on the basis of long waves in 
economic lffe. They are associated r a t h e r  with consecutive stages and substages 
in the evolution of t he  capitalist system, and these stages do not neatly coincide 
with long waves. 
However, i t  remains true that any long recession accelerates a search f o r  
new forms of capitalist organization, methods of management, forms of relations 
with the working class, etc. Crises in general serve  as accelerators of 
socioeconomic change. 
The identification of two nearly complete long waves does not, however, make 
i t  possible to assert with assurnnae that  the  events of the  1970s and the  early 
1980s a r e  a prelude to a new long upswing in the future. Whether this will in fac t  
occur  - f o r  technological o r  socioeconomic reasons - o r  whether we are in fac t  
observing a transition to a slower secular growth trend, cannot be determined 
without additional qualitative analysis. 
A large a r m y  of fac tors  - economic, social, and polftical - act as deter- 
minants in this case. The c m e n t  period of long recession is characterized by 
increased activity on the  p a r t  of right-wing and conservative forces. The crisis of 
government economic intervention and of the  weLfare state has created widespread 
disillusionment in reformist policies. Mass unemployment and conservative 
economic policies have helped weaken t rade  unions. In a number of countries mili- 
tarism i s  on the rise. The question of how to overcome the long depression is 
acute, and the  suggested approaches are drastically different. 
The mnsewative approach, exemplified by Reaganism and Thatcherism, 
ignores the very existence of the long crisis and puts a n  accent on higher military 
expenditure, and lower social appropriations, stimulating capital investment by tax 
privileges f o r  big business and the wealthier families. In pract ice this policy calls 
fo r  sitting out the crisis, f o r  leaving the  mechanism of the  long recession to work 
its own way. I t  also means avoiding social upheaval by a new rearmament drive and 
more international tension. I t  is a dangerous policy, and will certainly delay the  
oncoming of a new technical revolution. 
The mrmist approach recognizes the-ce &.the crisis, but doas not 
neoassarily consider it Aong-tSrm and structural. It oalls for a return to Keyne- 
sian recipes (in combination with  other theoretical approaches) and coordination 
of national economic policies. But it is hardly implemented anywhere and in any 
way, and in a number of countries has been sabotaged by right-wine foraes. Inter- 
national economic coorchation doas not wark, since the consenmtfves refuse to 
follow this line. 
The progressiwe approach calls f o r  effork to wercome the skuotural, long- 
term, and not simply the cyclical crisis. It suggests stimulating technical p r c ~  
mess, however not of anp kind, but of I a r g ~ a a A e  new directions, which could lead 
the economy on to the road to a near techniaal revolution. It puts an a a m t  on 
measures  to sappcrt investment in creating near ssnplopment, new jobs. It ad- 
cates reallocation of msomaes from armaments to msemrah and development in 
major civilian needs, to the s01ut.h of global problams, such as energy, snviFaa- 
ment, and reducing the between developing and developed countries. It also 
shows the n e o d t y  of social and institutional reforms, dimhi&- the iafluenoe of 
the military-induskid complex and ~ t l a n a l  corpomtious, and the spread of 
demomatic methods of mmaghg the economy. 
Each of these approaches means sbsolutely different directions of socio- 
ecanomic change. The choioe of the direction will deeply affect the outcame of the 
carrent long depression. 
3. A THEOKY OF LONG W A ~ S  
Long-term f l u c t u a t i ~ ~ ~  of material prduction shodd have a material prime 
cause, i.e. a For shartsr  waves such foun&tims are: 
f o r  the intermediate cycle (3-4 y-)-n~ct=tions of commodity inv- 
tories; 
f o r  the economic cycle (8-9 ysars)-fluctuations of fixed capital in pro- 
duoers' dmable equipment; 
f o r  the "ccmstn~ction wave" (18-20 yours)-fluctuations of fixed capital 
in produoers' structaares. 
The common feature in all three is that waves of different darstion are associ- 
ated with the different dmt ims  of n~ctmtians in the various ~omponsnfs 03 nm- 
stanf caHiaZ --commodity inventories or fixed capihl--and that the wave fre-  
quency is in direct carrelation with the speed of Liquidation, d- . . a d  
dcpLetion of such camponents. 
Capitalist production tends to follow profitability. A downtmm in the rate of 
profit w i l l  by neoessity auuse adjustment, including the physiaal and value 
decrease of invsstsd capital. Such adjustments are always painful and vident, 
they are axecuted by cutting off parts of the "aupibl flesh1'--such as the labar 
foroe, as well  as canshnt capital. Thasin lies the matcrFial foun&tion of -die 
ecunomic niscs under capitalism. 
The capitalist firm is first tempted to do away with the easiest parts--sxcess 
inventories and investment in ILoating aupital-which do not need a depreciation 
period. The firm has to nait longer f o r  an opportunity to change equipment, and 
even Aonger for a change in structures, tmnsportation and communications infrss- 
tracture. 
Long waves (of 50 or more y m )  a r e  also associated with the movement of 
capihl. But in this case it is the penend chunqc i n  thc technic& b-e and tach- 
n o b g y  i n  thc economy at large. 
Technical progress is not associated exclusively with the long wave, but has a 
lot to do with the shorter economic cycles as well. 
One should d h b g u b h  between changes in of technology based on 
the same basic discwery (with an avsrage length of 10 years), and the change in 
direcfions of technology. The L a U s r  are implsmenhtions of basic discoveries and, 
when lumped together in a spaoe of a f e w  d e d e s ,  are tantamount to technical 
revolutions on a macroeconomic s d e  (an avsrage length of these in the current 
oentmy is about 50 ysars). One change in direction of bchnobgy d r a w s  a few 
(5 or 6) shorter changes in gemsrations of tedumhgy. 
In the oomse of the major economic cycle with the change of fixed m i t a l  
there occurs, as a ruie, a change from one genenution of technologp to another in 
at laast a number of important, leading industries. However, f r o m  time to time a 
qrrallhtfvely new technology is introduosd, nsar products appemr, and new indrrs- 
Wes are born. A t  flrst, i.e. in their f i r s t  gonerution, their expansion is slow, but 
Later  on it quickly gains speed. In this period, which may take 2 or 3 major cycles. 
Labur pmductivity rises fastet than capital intensity, therefore the oapital-output 
raUo falls and the avaage  rate of profit incramsets. This laps the foundation f o r  a 
long-tern upturn interrupted by relatively weak business reoessions. In the 
coarse of the long upturn there is a general transfontmtion of the economy to a 
new technological base, new kinds of ouLput, and a new interindustry structure. 
However, after a f e w  gensrations of the new technology have been fntroduoed, 
further changes and improvements of the same basic discovery begin to bear 
diminishing economic returns. The rise in ptoductfvity Lags behind mpitni inten- 
sity, the capital-output ratio increases and the avsrage profit rate f a l l s .  The 
aggregate growth of the economy deoelerutes, and the period of the long reoession 
starts. The reguiar business crises b e m e  Longer and deeper. 
Some authors have had dfificuity in finding an endogenous explanation of the 
lower turning point of the long wave. But in fact this is not a great mystery. The 
continuous long-term fall of the avsrage profit rate  causes a speed-up in the 
development of new busic technologid dimrctbns. The lower the rate of prafit 
f r o m  the old technology the less risk there is in introducing basic innovations. The 
first to be implsmonted are those which lad to msi saving, more often Labor cost 
saving but also energy and matsrisls saving. This happens in the w e  of the 
long downturns. For example, the conveyor belt wus first widely introduoed in the 
1920s and 1930s: robots and energy-ving equipment have spread in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. 
New cost-sming technological directions. as such, do not genemte a new long 
upturn. For a whiie they even help usaahte unemployment and dampen effective 
aggregate demand. But step by step old fixed capital is written off, old technob 
gies are rejeoted, skagnant wages and other cost savings help turn the tide in pro- 
fit rates. h o e  these start rising, the signal is given f o r  implsmontiag other new 
technologies, not neoessarily cost saving, as such, but associated with new 
ducts and the creation of new indudries. Then cames the time f o r  a new long 
upturn. 
A t  the macroeconomic level technical revolutions are evidenoed by large 
oscillations in growth rates of fixed capihl, investment, labur and capital prodoc- 
Uvity, the capihl-ouLput ratio, and the rate of profit. Underlying these flucttm- 
tions is the uneven rate and change in direction of technical progress, as it 
applies to production. 
A thearetical explanation of these proaesses has been given by Marx in h s  
KIIpitaL and ~~ of S U ~ L I L S  W u e  ( b h ~  1860-1963), though Idam himself 
could not observe and did not identify long waves. Capitalism, he wrote, has an 
intrinsic law of the tcndarcy of th.e rcrte ofptoflt tc jbU. This is aansed, in the 
final analysis, by a rise in the organic composition of aapihl, i.e. the relation 
between constant and varinble aapital, means of production, and labor foroe. 
Given a constant amount of surplus value the profit rate would tend to fall in the 
long run, since the value of canshnt capital would increase in relation to the w e  
bill. However,  Marr identified a number of countamcting factars, such as an 
increase in the ra te  of surplus value aad. most impaFhnUy, the ecolromy on costs 
of constant capital. These factoFs may bring about long periods when the profit 
rate is stable or wen rises. In fact, Mnrx identified two such periods in England: 
1797-1813 - and from the mid-1830s to the mid-1860s. 
Thus, f o r  all pmctid pmposes, h id  a themetical foundation fo r  under- 
s h d h g  ~~ perodicity in economic behavior under aapitalism. 
4. SO= STATXSTEAL EVIDENCE: LEADING AND LAGGING INDICATOBS 
Let us look a t  statistid evidence related to the osciktay natum of techni- 
cai progress in the capitalist economy. US time series (in real tsrms), 1080-1982, 
have been collected (Kendrick 1961, Knznets 1961, His ta r id  Statistics of the 
United States 1975, Economic Repart 1983) f o r  gross prlvate domestic product, 
man-hours worked in the private economy, gross stoak of fixed capital (excluding 
residential structures), and compensation of employees in the private econamy. 
These have been transformed into series of labor productivity, aapital intensity 
(the capital-labor ratio), the output-capital .ratio, the- profit rate (the 
profit-capital ratio), the share of profits in domestic product, and the 
profit-labor ratio. Al l  series have been smoothed by %year moving averages. 
They a re  plotted in Figtxres 1-5 against their respecUve log-linear trends, while 
in Figures 6-10 they are shown as deviations from these trends. 
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The long wave is evident in all series. but particularly in those directly 
related to labor productivity and the output-capital ratio. 
For purposes of comparing the various series w e  shall distinguish the follow- 
ing four consecutive phases in the long wave. 
(1) upturn: from the time when the deviation upcrosses the trend to the time 
when it reaches its peak; 
( 2 )  dournturn from the peak to the downcrass; 
(3) depression= f r o m  the downcross to the trough; 
(4) recovery: f r o m  the trough to the upcross. 
The reader should be reminded that since there is a distinct upward secular trend 
in most indicators, the downturns and depressions of the long wave do not neces- 
sarily signify absolute decreases, but ra ther ,  as a rule (though with some notable 
exceptions), decelerations of growth. However, when deviations from trends are 
considered, then one can rightfully hlk about d o w n t m  and decreases. In the 
following analysis we use these terms in their  latter sense. 
The two underlying indicators are labor productivity and capital intensity. 
Labor productivity (deviation from trend) was falling at the starting point of 
observation (1893). With variations, including a short-lived 'hump" in the 1920s, it 
continued to f a l l  until 1933. The downcross occurred around 1910, a full 23 years 
before the trough was reached. It started rising in 1935, passed the upcross in 
1953, and reached a peak in 1970. The new downturn did not hit the downcross 
within the period under observation (ending 1978). 
Capital intensity was rising until 1898, and then started a very long fall, inter- 
rupted by relative stability in 1914-25 and a short increase in 1926-30. The secu- 
lar trend line was reached as early as 1914, but a definite downcross occurred no 
earlier than 1936. Capital intensity continued to fall until 1946, long a f te r  the 
depression of the 1920s was over. Thereafter there  was a continuous increase 
uninterrupted at the end of the period. 
A direct comparison of the two indicators shows that labor productivity was 
apparently leading. The lead time at the trough was no less .than 14 years, and it 
may have been as long at the peaks. A combination of both yields another impor- 
tant indicator - the output-capital rat io (or capital productivity). 
Capital productivity followed labor productivity in the long fall from 1893 to 
the end of the 1920s, but thereafter tended to go with capital intensity. I t  reached 
a trough in 1929 (only a few years before labor productivity), but a new peak 
occurred as soon as 1946, a full 24 years in advance. The downcross wad reached 
in 1967, and at the end of the obsened  period (1978) the  deviation of the  
output-capital rat io was close to its previous trough. 
In the long upswing there w e r e  definirely two different periods. In the first, 
labor productivity was on the increase, while capital intensity continued to fall. 
This was also the time of the rapid rise in capital productivity. In the second 
period labor productivity was still on the rise but capital intensity was increasing 
even faster, bringing down capital productivity. 
In the long downturn the f a l l  in labor productivity was more pronounced Lhan 
that in capital intensity, so  that capital productivity declined. However, within the 
long depression phase a period could be observed when changes in labor produc- 
tivity were fairly close to changes in capital intensity, so  that capital productivity 
was relatively stable and even showed a tendency to grow. This is clearly seen in 
the char t  for  absolute values of the output-capital ratio, which even in the 1930s 
w a s  higher than in the 1910s. 
The chart aiso demonstrates the peculiar movement of capital productivity, 
which tended to make small gains in the depression phase, sharp gains in the 
recovery, and then to slowly slide downwards t o w a d s  a new depression. To what 
extent this is true of other countries or of the USA before 1890 remains to be 
explored. 
The movement of the output-capital ratio is t m d a t e d  into the movement of 
the avemge profit rate after adjusting f o r  the share of profits in gross domestic 
product. We are cons idem gross profit (rather than corpoxate profit), which 
includes all non-wage and non-salary factor incomes in the economy, as wel l  as 
depreciation of fixed capital. The gross profit rate tends to follow the 
output-capital ratio with a short lag of 1-4 y m .  The difference is caused by the 
fact that long-term tmalnp points in prdit occur somewhat later than in gross 
product. Compare, f o r  example, the movement of labor productivity and profit per 
m-hour .  The latter continued to rise while the f m e r  was already falling in both 
long downswings observed in the charts. 
A turn in capital productivity and the profit rate tends to take place long 
before serious changes occur in the overall growth rate  of the economy. In 
1898-1907 gross product was in its upward phase, while capital productivity was 
already falling. The downward phase in gross product (1907-1928) started only 
after capital productivity passed its downcrass. In 1928-1935 gross product was 
in depression, whereas the output-capital ratio was showing signs of recovery. 
The recovery in output (1935-1946) coincided with a sharp upturn in capital pro- 
ductivity. The upturn in the economy (1946-1969) went ahead, while the output- 
capital ratio resamd its downward slide. And, finally, the new downturn in output 
(since 1969) came on the heels of a depression on capital productivity (since 
1967). 
On the basis of this experience one would expect a new recovery in growth 
rates of the economy at  large to occur only after a prece- recovery in the 
output-capital ratio. This, then, is the principal indicator to watch in the coming 
Y-. 
5. A HODEL OF THE LONG WAVE 
C a d  relationships between variables described in the preceding section can 
be expressed by the following generalized model: 
where: 
y = growth rate of labor prodoctivity; 
k = growth rate of capital-labor ratio; 
p = growth rate of the rate of profit; 
2 = growth rate of profit created per unit of labor time; 
GI  k ,  2 =changes in the growth rates of y, k, z; 
a, c , e = speeds of reaction, or adjustment; 
b , d ,  f = coefficients. 
Gmwth rates rather than absolute values a r e  used in the model lrminiy f o r  
substantive reasons. All variables show secular growth over the observed period. 
Equations describe deviations f r o m  long-term d-c stability conditions. The 
model thus combinas growth and fluctuations. When expressed in terms of gmwth 
mtes it is rednaed to a linear .differential syst.em, which is sasier  to d y z e  
theoretically. It is obvious that definition (3) holds f o r  small rates of gmwt.h. 
Eqnaticm (1) is derived from the general production function with embodied 
technologid progress. The capital-bproduct eAust.icity of this funation is nor- 
mally smaller than unity. This cantrndicts actual perfa~aranoe, where labor p m -  
ductivity may rise fa- than capihl intensity both in seorrlar trends and in the 
upward phases of the Lang wave. Equation (1) allows for  both possibilities i f  coeffi- 
cient b is not s u b s t a n U y  different from unity. Sinoe b is expected to mpmsmnt 
the mtio between avemge long-tAn?n values of k and y ,  it (in the case of the USA 
f o r  the o b s s r ~ e d  period) should be somewhat higher than 1.0. When y becomes 
larger than bk , ?i is negative, and a downward adjushent of y is affected with 
speed a. 
Equation (2) is a derivation of the invastment function, assmhg a canshnt 
growth ra te  of labor. When the profit mte is shb le  at its long-ts2.m mean (p = O), 
k = l , i.e. capital intensity is moving along its average grawth path. However, 
when the profit rnte is changing, k with a certain lag deviates in the opposite 
direction (d < 0). This looks like a paradox, but it is not. 
Assume that variables a r e  closely following sintmoidal cumes around their 
mean values with k fluctuating in counterphase to p .  But P (the m t e  of profit, 
rather than its peroenhge change) lags behind p by a qaarter of a cycle. When p 
reaches its peak P .is only a t  its upcross. While p is falling P first rises to its 
peak, then f a l l s  back to its downcross. As a result k rises while P is higher than 
avemge, and f a l l s  while P is below avemge. Thus investment per unit of labor 
positiueLy follows the deviation of the mte of profit f r o m  its meen, though it is 
nugat5uely w m e h t e d  with the relative change. 
The negative influenae of p on k has also aerh in  substantive reasons. In a 
long depression, when a negative p is driving down the profit mte, there is both 
involuntary accumulation of fixed capital and inventories, and a strong drive to 
save at the expense of labor - with or without investing in laboxvasving equipment. 
These influenan keep k up. In a recovery more labor is needed in order to fill up 
anutilized oapacity, and k may f a l l  while p is rising. When the profit rate is higher 
than avemge, there is lsss compulsion to save labor, and labor-intensive technolo- 
gies a r e  used more r-y. 
Eqnation (2) is, perhaps, the driving farae of the 1- mve. I t  is cmdal in 
explaining both turning points of the wave: minimmn and maximum. 
Eqnation (4) det.srmines oscillations in the share of profit (surplus value) in 
mtional product. Coefficient indicates the histaFical meem of / c, i.e. the 
relation between the avemge grcwrth mtes of profit per labor unit sad prodno- 
tivity of labor. In capitalist countries I should be either close to ar slightly 
higher than 1.0. 
Definition (3) shows that the avemg,e profit mte is h b l e  in_ the long m i f  
= K ,  and, s inaeg isclose t o e ,  i f c = k .  Itfollowsthat, whenk >y', theprofit 
m t e  is f*. This is just another formulation of Marx's l a w  of the declining p m  
fit mte.  If k < G, however, the countemcting factars a r e  strong, and the o m -  
tion of the l a w  is fmstmted, or "paralyzed", to use Marr's own expression. 
Coefficients b and I thus have an important p o l i t i ~ c a n o m i c  value: b 
governs the dominating trend in the organic composition of capital, and f indicates 
the trend in the ra te  of surplus value. Their product (bf), determines the mode of 
operation of the l a w  of the declining profit rate. 
The dynamic properties of (1-4) a r e  determined by the roots of the charac- 
teristic dlf'ferential equation: 
m z 3 + n z z + q z  + S  i O  (5) 
where: 
To simplify matters assmne that z = .y , so that the share of profit in national 
product is constant. Then the model generates perfodic fluctuations subject to 
conditions: 
- 
c / a  < (b +2)/2;  (6) 
where: 
There a r e  no fluctuations if d > 0, and b is within the expected range 
0 < ; < 2 . However, fluctuations a r e  generated if d is negative, but not too small. 
Thus the importance of equation (2) in generating the long wave receives addi- 
tional support. 
Given these conditions, the length of the wave depends upon the speeds of 
reaction a and c. According to (6) c should not be much larger than a. Assuming 
that they a r e  equal, and that b = 1, (7) becomes: 
A 52-year regular oscillation is generated with coefficient values: 
It is easier to study the properties of the model  when fluctuations a r e  not 
dampened. As seen in Figures 11-12 (representing results of a machine simulation) 
the leading variable is p. Its truning point precedes the change in k in the oppo- 
site direction by 7 years. and 6 years later comes the turn in y . It takes another 
13 years for  p to reach its peak o r  trough. This particular sequence is deter- 
mined by the stmctural equations and does not depend on the initial conditions of 
the simulation. The lat ter  do. of course, affect absolute amplitudes of variables, 
but not relative amplitudes. Thus the amplitude of k is 1.37 larger than that of 
both .y and p irrespective of Mtial conditions. The relative amplitudes a r e  condi- 
tioned by the model ' s  structure. 
Figare II Theoretical model simulation (y and k ). 
F i  12 Theoretical model simulation (k and p ). 
The chart clearly shows that, as expected, k starts falling 7 years after P 
enters its depression phase (i.e. when p is starting to  recover). The Lag is nearly 
as long as the major economic cycle. Thus one should not expect a long-term 
upturn in investment before it is certain that the average rate of profit has defin- 
itely entered its upturn phase. 
Though the peak of k is substantially higher than that of y , the period when k 
is larger than y takes exactly half the wavelength. Xf b were lower (or higher) 
than 1.0, this period would have been relatively shorter (or longer) and at exces- 
sively low values of b and small amplitudes would disappear completely. This is an 
important period, since it means an increasing output-capital ratio, and, other 
things being equaL, a rising ra te  of profit. Taking into account the quarter-wave 
Lag between y ,k and their respective growth rates, the recovery and upturn in the 
model of the output-capital ratio occurs exactly at the time when y is higher than 
its trend and most of it happens while k is high but falling. The upper turning 
point of the output-capital ratio is reached when y enters its depression phase 
and before k starts recovering. The leading force of y which w e  have observed 
statistically, is thus fully reflected in the model. 
The results of fitting the equations are presented in Table 1. OLS was applied 
either to: 
where ut is the stochastic component; o r  to a t w d e p  algorithm. including: . 
Yt =bkt + u l , t  (10) 
yt  41 ' -'U (uI ,~)  + (u) 
In most cases the estimated coefficients w e r e  close to each other for the same 
equation in spite of the different methods used. 
Coefficient b was found to be in the range of 0.6-0.7, o r  much lower than the 
y'/g of 1.5. Large negative values of k in 1933-1944 coinciding with large posi- 
tive values of y have introduced a downward bias. When a dummy variable was 
added for these years, the value of b increased to 0.9. When the equation was 
estimated for shorter (20-24 year) periods, b was found to be in the range of 
1.0-1.5 (excluding the late 1930s and early 1940s). 
The reaction coefficient a ,  which is too small (0.03-0.05) in most estimations, 
increased to a more realistic 0.12 in the dmnmy variant. 
In the investment equation both positive and negative values of coefficient d 
w e r e  obtained. This w a s  not unexpected. However, all variants with positive 
values had to be rejected as they failed to produce fluctuations in complete sys- 
tems. The negative value for d in the third Pariant presented in the table is 0.62, 
which looks too low, especially in conjunction with the large constant 1.96, which is 
higher than the averaqe = 1.6. When fitted for  shorter periods the regression 
invariably produced negative d . 
In the profit equation ( 2 )  coefficient f was found to be positive and in the 
range 1.0-1.1. This result applies also to aLZ shorter periods without exception. 
The reaction speed a ,  which was equal to o r  higher than 1.0 for  1894-1924, fell to 
0.3 in most of the later periods, and also in the entire historical period. Thus, 
while profit was expected to increase slightly faster than prodnct throughout the 
90-year span, it w a s  doing so even more intensively before the Great Depression. 
Perhaps the growth of trade unions and collective agreements brought about the 
short lag which appeared later on. 
Function Coefficients and t-statistics 
b 
4; a b I b 2  . const. R~ F DW 
0.048 0.62 - - 0.97 685 2.3 
(2.1) (6.4) 
0.04 0.74 - - 0.91 419 1.2 
(2.3) (1.4) 
0.033 0.273 -6.76 - 0.95 492 2.5 
(30.9) (2.67) (2.8) 
0.12 0.88 - 0.61dum 0.95 476 2.4 
(18.5) (2.1) (2.0) 
d 
k c dl d2 const. 
0.035 1.54 - - 0.89 347 1.7 
(2.5) (1.8) 
0.035 1.85 - - 0.79 155 0.8 
(17.3) (3.1) 
0.25 -0.62 -0.62 1.96 0.85 158 1.2 
(14.2) (4.6) (4.6) (3.9) 
0.034 -0.15 -8.74 - 0.95 473 2.1 
(35.2) (8.8) (8.5) 
I 
z e fi 1 2  const. 
0.3 1.09 - - 0.18* 17.5* 1.08 
(4.2) (18.3) 
0.6 1.95 1.95 -1.38 0.77 89.9 1.1 
(5.6) (7.8) (7.8) 
0.124 1.05 15.9 0.96 677 1.6 
(17.6) (18.4) (14.6) 
Table 1 Estimated coefficients 
*Equation estimated in 2 steps. R ~ ,  F and DW apply to 2nd step. d m  indicates dum- 
my variable = 1.0 for 1933-44, 0.0 otherwise. 
It was also found that the variables strongly depend not only on factors. but 
also on their first derivatives: 
When both coefficients a t  the factor and its derivative have the same sign (as 
in the case of. the investment and profit equations) the basic underlying functional 
relationship is strengthened and the adjustment lag reduced. When the coeffi- 
cients have different signs (the case of the productivity equation) the movement of 
5 is corrected in the opposite direction and the adjustment lag becomes longer. 
Various combinations of fitted equations were tried. The following model is 
given as an Illustration: 
When solved theoretically zs a differential system, it  yields the characteristic 
equation: 
zmd roots: 
This is equivalent to dvnped fluctuations with a period of 53.7 years. 
However, when simulated as a difference approximation the model produces 
periodic waves of 60 years' duration. Given actual initial conditions fo r  1994 
(y = 1.96, k = 2.63, z = 3.16 and p = 0.57) the  model produced turning points 
which were roughly coincident with some of those observed in the historical period 
(see Table 2). 
Variable k Y z P 
Type of 
Point act. sim act. sim. act. sim. act.  sim. 
npper - - - - - - 1902 1897 
lower 1903 1903 1929 1926 1911 1919 1929 1928 
upper 1928 1933 1951 1950 1951 1949 1962 1957 
lower 1963 1963 - - - - - - 
Table 2 Dates of turning points: actual and simulated 
The simulation w a s  "pure", i.e. i t  contained only one out of three components of tine 
actuai tzajectory - the  endogenous mechanism. The two other  components - exo- 
genous and stochastic shocks - were absent. No wonder that the simulated course 
w z s  in many ways different from the  historical one. 
One possible criticism of the model could be that i t  does not reflect long-term 
fluctuations in suppiy of and demand for product, capital and labor. As M a n  
shrewdly indicated, once capital is  created, i t  introduces potential over- 
prociuction. A s  capitai is accumulated, on the one hand, i t  creates increzsing pro- 
duction capacity which af ter  a while becomes excessive, and, on the other  hand, 
deceierating demand fo r  labor. Zxcess capacity and unemployment have a back- 
ward effect on productivity, capital intensity and the zate of profit. Thus an addi- 
tional loop of long-tern fluctuations emerges, closely tied to the  first. 
It  is possible to  take account of this loop by introducing additional variables 
and modifying the initial equations. The model would grow in size, and i ts  theoreti- 
cal analysis would become more cumbersome. A t  this point it  is  sufficient to 
hclude the  influence of the supply-demand loop as an exogenous force. 
This leads to: 
where: 
u' = rate of unemplopment (exogenous); 
- 
m = index of capacity utilization (exogenous); 
g , A ,  i = coefficients. 
Excessive unemplopment in the depression phase is expected to affect both 
labor productivity and profit created per unit of labor. Labor productivity may be 
maintained and increased though capital intensity is falling. High unemployment 
w i l l  also negatively affect wages and help increase profit created per unit of 
labor. Thus both g and i a r e  expected to be positive. 
The capacity utilization index is known to positively affect capibl  investment. 
Investment booms are triggered when the index approaches unity, and a r e  delayed 
when the index is low, even though profit rates may be increasing. However, the 
investment in the model is per  unit of labor. Thus the influence of m may show up 
only with a lag. 
The introduction of exogenous variables will affect the structmal coafffcients 
and modify the basic oscillatory properties of the model, but more importantly 
adds a snbstantially new component to the movement of Pariables making it more 
complex and closer to reality. 
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TOW- A COMPBEHENSNE THEORY OF LONG WAVES 
Carlota Perez-Perez 
I. THE NEED FOB AN "ENDOGENOUS" TaEORY 
I believe w e  all agree  here  that an appropriate theory of long waves should 
provide an explanation errdogenous to the system. The rea i  problem, however, lies 
in determining precisely which  system i t  should be endogenous to. Clearly, the 
economic subsystem can, fo r  many purposes, be treated as self-contained, because 
of i ts  tremendous amount of internal feedback and self-determination. But ... when 
it  comes to explaining long waves ,  given the considerable transformations they 
imply in all spheres of society, i t  seems to m e  w e  need to step out and take a global 
look at the evolution of the  total sys tem,  with i ts  technological, social and institu- 
tional components in terac t ing  with the economic subsystem. 
2. LONG WAYES BS SUCCESSIYE MODES OF EVOLUTION OF THE TOTAL 
TECHNO-ECONO~C SOCIO-IN-ONAL SYsTEx  
Taking this total view, I would like to suggest that depression in a long- wave 
is a s t r u c t u r d  crisis. It  is not just a halt in economic growth but r a the r  the syn- 
drome of a ser ious  mismatch between the techno-economic subsystem and  the 
socioinst i tut iondframeurork.  W e  are in fact witnessing the reversal of the  posi- 
tive interaction between these two spheres. 
I hold that what w e  are actually measuring,  when w e  detect long-wave 
behavior in economic variabies, is  the increasing degree of "match", in the upsw- 
ing, and of "mismatch", in the downswing, between these two spheres of the system. 
In other  words, depression is  a "shouting" need for full-scale reaccommodation of 
social behavior and institutions, in o rde r  to suit the requirements of a major shift 
which has a l ready  taken place, to a considerable extent, in the techneeconomic 
sphere. The upswing, then, can on ly  be unleashed by appropriate social and insti- 
tutional transformations that will re-establish structural coherence. 
But, why shouid this occur? 
Mainly because the t w o  sets of subsystems, though in permanent interaction, 
nave very different rates of change. 
While economic activity, spurred by profit  and growth motives, can resul t  in 
very n p i d  shifts at the  micro levei, the additive effect of successive and increas- 
ingly massive shifts will only be visible in the  aggregate when change has reached 
crit ical proportions. 
Institutions, on the  o ther  hand. not only come late as regards  visibility and 
awareness of these changes, but also suffer from a high degree of "natural" iner- 
tiz, strengthened by past successes and upheid by vested interests. 
I suggest that  the  type of funciamental shift, which underlies these periods of 
"match" and "mismatch", are successive techno-economic paradigms,  ciiffusing 
throughout the  productive sphere about every 48 to 68 years.  They can be  seen as 
overall technical and managerial revolutions transforming the  "how" and the  
"what" of profitable production, in general, and establishing a new "best pract ice 
frontier". The life cycle of each of these paradigms follows a logistic c m e  ana s o  
does its rate of Ufus ion  across  firms, branches and countries. 
The upswing in the economy is  the steep pa r t  of the  paradigm curve f o r  both 
productivity gains and generalization. I t  i s  stimulated by a whole set of social and 
institutional arrangements, national and international, influencing the  operation 
and evolution of fac tor  and o ther  markets, and designed to suit the  requirements of 
tha t  particular techno-economic paradigm. 
As limits to growth are reached along that  path, a complex set of interactions 
between the technological and economic spheres gradually bring about t he  cry- 
stallization of a new paradigm, which again revolutionizes the  productive system. 
Y e t  t he  social and institutional mechanisms, adapted to t he  now "old" and declining 
paradigm, cannot cope with the  new pattern of investment and the  unexpected 
behavior of most markets, as the new paradigm diffuses. These mechanisms, there- 
fore,  become increasingly powerless and counter-productive. 
That is why depression is a process of "creative destruct ion" not only in the  
economic sphere  but orlso in the social and institutional. 
3. A TECENO-ECONOMIC PARADIGX AS A SYSTlW OF BEST-PRACTICE GUIDE- 
LINES FOE MOST PROFLTABLE BEHAVIOR 
To avoid misunderstandings, let me make c lear  tha t  I am not referr ing just to 
"clusters" of technological innovations, but to  a system of interrelated product 
and process, technical, organizational and managerial innovations, embodying a 
quantum jump in potential productivity f o r  all, o r  most, of t h e  economy and opening 
up an unusually wide range of t r u l y  new investment and profit opportunities. 
Again, when I say "paradigm" change, I mean a radical transformation in the 
prevailing engineering and managerial "common sense" f o r  best productive and 
most profitable practice. 
But. how would this come about? 
The organizing principle of each paradigm can be found in the  dynamics of the 
relative cost s t ruc ture  of all possible inputs to production. In it ,  a particular 
input (or set of inputs), which can be  called the "key factor" of each paradigm, ful- 
fills, f o r  a relatively long period, the  following conditions: 
(a) Clearly perceived low - and descending! - relative cost, 
(b) Apparently unlimited supply (for all practical purposes), 
(c) Obvious potential fo r  all-pervasiveness, and 
(d) A generally recognized capacity, based on a set of related innovations, to 
reduce the cost and change the quality of capital equipment, labor and 
products. 
I say this conjunction of characteristics holds today fo r  microelectronics, 
leading the way towards the  fifth upswing. It held until recently for  oil, which 
underlay the fourth Kondratiev upturn, together with organic chemicals and other  
energy-intensive materials. Before that, for the third Kondratiev, the role of "key 
factor" w a s  played by low-cost steel fo r  the second, by low-cost c o d  and steam- 
powered transportation, and, for  the Industrial Revolution or f i r s t  Kondratiev 
upswing, one might perhaps suggest that the role of 'key factor" fell upon l ow cost 
machine-tending and cotton-growing labor. 
Yet, the new "key factor" does not appear as an isolated input, but r a the r  at 
the core of a system of technical and managerial innovations, some related to the 
production of the key factor itself and others  to i ts utilization. These innovations 
take place through an intensive feedback process, spurred by the decreasing 
capacity of the previous key factor  to further  diminish costs or increase produc- 
tivity and profits. 
Thus, the corresponding techno-economic paradigm emerges gradually, in the 
midst of a world dominated by the old, until i t  clearly appears as the "ideal type" 
of productive organization to take maximum advantage of the particular 'key fac- 
tor", which is becoming more and more visible in the relative cost structure. The 
new paradigm represents  a quantum jump in total factor  productivity and opens an 
unprecedented range of new investment opportunities. It  is fo r  these reasons that  
i t  brings about a radical shift in engineering and managerial "common sense" and 
that i t  tends to diffuse as rapidly as conditions a l low,  replacing the investment pat- 
tern of the old paradigm. 
The full constellation - once crystallized - goes f a r  beyond technical change 
and brings with i t  a restructuring of the whole productive system. Among other  
t h i ~ g s ,  i t  involves: 
(a) A new "best practice" form of organization a t  the f i r m  and a t  the plant 
level. 
(b) A new skill profile, affecting both quantity and quality of labor, with its 
corresponding pattern of income distribution. 
(c) A new product mix, in the sense that those products which make intensive 
use of the low-cost key factor  wi l l  be the preferred choice for invest- 
ment and will, therefore, represent a growing proportion of GNP. 
(d) New trends in both basic and incremental innovations geared to substitut- 
ing relatively high-cost elements by more intensive use of the key factor. 
(e) A new pattern in the Location of investment, as the change in the relative 
cost strvcture transforms comparative cost advantages. 
(f) A particular wave of infrastructural investment destined to provide the 
appropriate externalities. 
(g) A tendency fo r  the  largest firms to concentrate - by growth or divenifi- 
cation - in those branches where the key factor is produced or mos t  
intensively used, which results in having distinctly different branches 
acting as the engines of growth fo r  each Kondratiev upswing. 
To give a brief example, the fourth Kondratiev techno-economic paradigm, 
cow exhausted, w a s  based on low-cost oil and energy-intensive materials and was 
led by giant oil, chemicals, automobile and o ther  mass durable goods producers. 
I ts  "ideal type" of productive organization at the  piant level w a s  the  continuous- 
f low assembly line, t o  turn out massive quantitites of identical units (much of i t  for 
consumers, which w a s  in itself an innovation, considering that  these markets had 
traditionally been covered by smaller and less productive units, except,  of course, 
in the  textile-led f i r s t  Kondratiev). The "ideal typeJ1 of firm w a s  t he  "corpora- 
tion", with a sepa ra t e  and very complex managerial and administrative hierarchy, 
including in-house R&D and operating in oligopolistic markets. I t  benefited from 
economies of agglomeration and required an ever-expanding highway network, 
together with oil and energy distribution systems f o r  energy-intensive production, 
transportation and lifestyles. I t  demanded increasing amounts of middle-range 
specialization in both blue- and white-collar skills. 
Today, with cheap microelectronics widely available (higher with the conse- 
quent low cost of information handling), i t  is no longer "common senseJ' to continue 
aiong the - now expensive! - path of energy and materials intensity. 
The "ideal" productive organization brings together management and produc- 
tion into one single in tegra ted  system (a process w e  might call "systemation"), fo r  
turning out aflezible output of preferably information-intensive, rapidly changing, 
products and services. G r o w t h  would presumably be  led by the  electronics and 
information sectors ,  requiring massive externalities from an all-encompassing 
telecommunications infrastructure, which would bring down to negligible the  cost 
of access f o r  producers and consumers alike. The skill profile tends to change 
from mainly middle-range to increasingly high- and low-range qualifications, and 
f r o m  narrow specialization to broader  and multipurpose basic skills fo r  informa- 
tion handling. Diversi ty andflezibiLity at all levels substitute identity and massif- 
ication as "common sense" best practice. 
4. BELBTIONSXKP BETlKEEN LONGWAVE BEHAVIOR IN GROWTH AND 
TECENO-SCONOMIC PBEBDIGH SHIFTS 
I do hope these merely illustrative examples, sketching some of the  main 
features  of t w o  successive techno-economic paradigms, will heip in bringing to 
light the  amount of innovation thzt  would be  required in government and social 
behavior to adapt to such shifts in productive pract ice requirements. 
A t  the  micro ievei, when you introduce numerical control o r  computer tech- 
nology in a firm previously working with electromechanical technology, i t  i s  not 
possible to r eap  all the  productivity increase potential without transforming the 
whole organization both at t he  plant and the office levels, including extensive 
retraining and redefinition of the forms of interaction. In a similar manner, when 
the  f u l l  constellation of a new t e c h n ~ c o n o m i c  paradigm tends to take over  the 
bulk of production within a society, i t  wi l l  not yield i ts  full growth potential until 
the  socio-institutional framework is transformed to  adapt to i ts requirements. 
In the  previous upswing, a change as profound as massive state intervention in 
the economy, along Keynesian principles, was necessary to unleash the  full deploy- 
ment of the oil based paradigm. 
Xistorically, though not always and not only, these changes have affected the 
specific forms of operation and regulation of t he  various markets (product, labor,  
capital, money) on the  national and international levels; the  organization of the 
banking and credi t  systems; the  relative proportions and charac ter  of public and 
private responsibility in production, distribution and redistribution of income, as 
w e l l  as the corresponding social arrangements; the forms of organization of work- 
ers and major interest groups, together with the legal framework within which they 
operate; the social provision of education and training in i ts  quality, volume and 
the type of institutions in charge of it; the conditions under which inventions are 
generated, protected and traded; the international division of production as w e l l  
as the means f o r  regulation of trade; and last, but certainly not least, the arrange- 
ments for maintaining the  international relative power balance. 
Clearly, such changes cannot, and indeed have not occurred without social 
and international conflict, and they are actually the result of a tremendous amount 
of experimentation. The proposed solutions vary quite widely and, in fact,  as f a r  
as being able to achieve high rates of growth, they can be as different as fascism 
and Keynesian democracy, as w a s  seen in the last Xondratiev trough. The chal- 
lenge, of course is to str ive f o r  appropriate m g e m e n t s  to achieve both 
economic growth and maximum social welfare. Y e t  the outcome will ultimately 
depend on the relative strength, lucidity and capacity to innovate of the social 
forces at play. 
Let us now briefly look at the four phases of the long wave in the Light of 
techno-economic paradigm changes: 
RECoVZRY is the period when favorable social and institutional conditions have 
been put in place to foster the  generalization of the previously crystallized 
techno-economic paradigm. Innovations multiply within the range of applications 
of the paradigm, reaching more and more products, more and more branches and 
even influencing the form of organization of non-productive activities. Investment, 
profit rates and productivity growth a r e  high. 
PRaSPERITYis a period of exceptionally high growth ra tes  resulting f r o m  the com- 
bination of the  final optimization and maximum potential yield of the established 
and, by then, thoroughly generalized paradigm, and the  f i r s t  successful appiica- 
tions of the f i ture  paradigm. The latter generally occur as relatively risky trial 
and error efforts to avoid diminishing returns on more "traditional" investment. 
Other efforts to counter the  reduction of profit margins of those reaching the top 
of the logistic curve may include mergers, acquisitions and whatever forms of 
speculation a r e  found to be attractive in that particular period. 
RTCESSION is the decline of the now "old" paradigm, aggravated by the cross- 
currents  and counter-trends created in most markets by the consequences of the 
new pattern of investment. This new pattern is created both by the appearance of 
many new innovative firms and by the efforts at diversification toward the new 
a reas  on the pa r t  of existing firms. A t  this time, the f i r s t  signs of difficulty for 
fur ther  development of the "new" paradigm are encountered. 
D C P ' I O N  is the exhaustion of the  "old" paradigm but with inertia in i ts  
corresponding social and institutional mechanisms. The latter have become insur- 
mountable barr iers  for the  fructification of the growth potential of the new 
techno-economic paradigm and must b e  transformed. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY. MODELTNG AND POLICY 
Coming to the implications, let me first  of all point out that the hypothesis I 
have presented has the  virtue of being able to incorporate the various theories 
that have been presented here: 
(1) It  is consistent with the hfIT model of self-ordering and excess capacity of 
the capital goods sector. The ezcess would relate to the czpacity to p r w  
duce the  inputs and equipment corresponding to the established para- 
digm, where demand slackens as diminishing returns on investment a r e  
reached. Whereas, a good pa r t  of investment in the capital goods sector ,  
which continues from late prosperity into recession, might in fact be 
oriented toward the neut types of inputs and equipment, whose demand 
cannot grow at the appropriate rate because of institutional and social 
constraints. 
(2) It  is also consistent with the  Mensch approach of "bi-valued technical 
progress", because w e  are witnessing the coexistence of technologies 
belonging to one paradigm. which a r e  reaching their  maximum potential 
through labor-saving improvements, while those belonging to the new are 
being introciuced a t  the basic innovation level. So that  if one were to 
incorporate a third dimension, relating to old-or-new techno-economic 
paradigms, to Mensch's basioor-improvement and process-or-product 
dimensions, his model would still hold. 
(3) It  is also consistent with van Duijn's infrastzvctural long waves by point- 
ing to loss of value of previous externalities and the need to invest in 
creating the  new appropriate networks. 
(4) Finally, i t  is very consistent with the SPRU (Freeman, Soete) approach, 
who also assign a central role to innovation, shifting employment patterns 
and structural  change in industry. Their idea of "technological systems" 
is  also taken up but within the  wider concept of techno-economic para- 
digms. There certainly is f u l l  agreement as to the importance of the 
appropriate social and policy innovations, which Freeman emphasizes and 
m o s t  authors mention more or less centrally in their  conclusions. 
In general then, the implications of what we a r e  proposing are: 
For theory and modeling: 
The need to take the interdisciplinary approach, but short of that, the 
need to introduce the qualitative dimension as a key element in modeling, 
fo r  classifying investment, innovation and employment patterns. This, on 
the hypothesis that  w e  a r e  dealing with quantum jumps and bimodal distri- 
butions. That is, w e  a r e  faced with discontinuity within the aggregate and 
with t w o  divergent sets of techno-economic relationships impinging upon 
one another. 
For policy resuvchs 
The main task would be to identify the specific characteristics, require- 
ments and potential of the new techno-economic paradigm (which is 
already in place to a sufficient degree fo r  recognition), in o rde r  to 
determine the cri ter ia  for appropriate response in terms of social and 
institutional innovations. 
If the  model w e  have briefly sketched is an acceptable approximation to the  
workings of the  system, that would certainly be the path to follow in o rde r  to 
unleash the  fifth Kondratiev upswing. Hopefully, if i t  worked, counter long- 
cyclical policies could be  devised based on "early warning" mechanisms for the 
detection of paradigm shifts. 
EXASTIC MECHANISMS OF INTERCOUNTRY ATTRACTION 
OF LOGISTIC MDUSTEUL GaOWTH 
EmmmmY 
This paper attempts to analyze the mechanism for  the progressive decrease of 
growth time constants for  the penetration of cars in certain countries. The 
phenomenon, clearly illustrated by Marchetti, consists of faster progress to lower 
levels of c a r  saturation in countries that  are later motorized. A mathematical 
analysis is provided to explain the phenomenon. A discussion is given on the possi- 
ble repetition of s i m i l a r  patterns - leading to Third World countries being signifi- 
cantly involved in the next innovation wave. 
Durable goods penetrate the markets of industrial countries increasing their 
quantities following logistic c u n e s .  These S-shaped curves are identical to those 
representing the increase in t ime  of animal, vegetable o r  bacterial populations. 
This had been proved in a large number of cases by Cesare Marchetti. 
For example, the logistic curve of c a r  registration in the United States has 
the equation: 
where F is the  current  fraction of the saturation level. L i s  the current level and 
z is the current  year (date). 
Schmidt and Marchetti (1982) have obsemed that  the penetration rate of cars 
on the market of an industrial country is faster the later that country starts get- 
ting motorized. W e  do not know how to compute a pt ior i  the saturation level of a 
country's car population on the basis of other socio-economic factors. So satura- 
tion is defined empirically as the asymptotic value towards which the logistic 
growth curve is aimed. 
The time taken to go from 102 to 902 saturation, along the logistic curve, is 
termed T, the penetration t ime  constant. For the United Sates T is 79 years. 
Later, other countries have seen their car registrations g r o w  following logistic 
cumes with shorter  and shor ter  t i m e  constants (58 years for  Canada, 47 for  
Sweden, 30 fo r  England and France, 22 for  Italy, 21  for  Germany, 12 for  Japan). If 
w e  call z the year in which the c a r  population was 1% of saturation for  a given 
country, the time constant T decreases regularly as a function of z according to 
the equation 
Marchetti also noted that countries arriving later on the scene reach lower and 
lower saturation levels in terms of the number of inhabitants/car. A t  saturation 
this figure wil l  be: 1.13 fo r  the USA, 2.7 for  France, 3.29 fo r  the UK. 3.21 for  G e r -  
many, 2.85 f o r  Italy and 5.57 fo r  Japan. This suggests that the saturation level is 
very roughly in inverse proportion to the time constant T. 
A possible explanation of this state of affairs is that each country has been 
attracted to follow in the USA's path, the attraction being stronger the  higher the  
level reached by the USA in the year the new country reached an appreciable 
level of car registrations. In this very simple model the current  level 
L ( = F/1+ in the USA plays the role of the constant determining the  elastic 
attraction force. The time constant T plays the role of the period in the ensuiqg 
harmonic motion. The p e r  capita saturation level of each country would play the 
mass role, being attracted elastically with a force proportional to the square of L . 
Since pe r  capita saturation, as noted above, is roughly inversely proportional to 
T, this would suggest that the third power of T is inversely proportional to the 
square of the USA cument level L in the year  the country reaches 1% of satura- 
tion. In other words T should be proportional to the power - 2/3 of the USA 
current level L. Fitting the constant in order  to  minimize the least-squares differ- 
ences indicates that the time constant T is expressed by the relationship: 
The difference between values of T given by equations (2) and (3) is less than 
1% up to about 1974 - af te r  which, anyway, the values of T are so low that they 
appear to bear little relationship to the real world. 
A l l  this ra ther  naive exercise - which results, however, in a strikingly good 
numbers fit  - is intended to stress the point that the perception of saturation lev- 
els reached by leader countries may indeed have an effect on the development of 
follower countries. 
On the other hand, a vast literature indicates that we l l  known prerequisites to 
the development of given industrial sectors and to development per  se, are: 
capital accumulation, possibly replaced by extended credit, 
lively investment in innovative ventures, 
availability of a work force with adequate levels of skill, 
adequate cultural levels of users, 
opening of external markets to integrate the growth of internal markets. 
Marchetti stresses the fact  that durable goods markets are reaching satura- 
tion simultaneously in all industrial countries. This is equated to the filling - and 
consequent closing to new arrivals - of ecological niches. The pattern, however, 
applies roughly only to one quarter  of the world population. The three  quarters  of 
the world which have not taken off on the path to development could represent a 
vast new niche waiting to be filled. They have not functioned as new pastures for  
the expanding species of new industries because of the lack of the prerequisites 
indicated above. This was also true of industrialized countries in the days before 
their development set  in. Decisive unleashing factors may have been: for  England, 
Sir  Francis Drake's plunder of Spanish gold; for  the United States, the steady 
immigration for many decades of millions of trained artisans and professionals. 
Marchetti contends that innovation from previous waves hardly ever is taken 
up again in subsequent waves - even in dlfferent geographical areas. Witness that 
no canal transportation o r  railway networks have been built in this century or 
that, as noted before, the level of cars per  capita at saturation tends to decrease 
monotonically. But the overall picture is f a r  f r o m  clear. Subway systems and elec- 
tr ic  grids a r e  still being built, although they are almost one century old. Further- 
more the elastic attraction mechanisms proposed above can only be analyzed af ter  
they have taken place. Their modeling, as attempted here, is hardly m o r e  than a 
simile, since no cogent reasons are apparent for explaining, e.g., the trend to ever 
lower levels of cars p e r  capita at satamition. 
A consequence of the above is that planning and policy making cannot and 
should not avoid massive recourse to .experimentation and cut and try. This, how- 
ever, should not be done on the basis of documents which have essentially a 
litexary character, as has been customary to date. Plans should be expressed 
explicitly and preferably flowcharted and PERTed. One of the main scopes of the 
exercise would be to define and analyze development mechanisms in order to 
review and rebuild policies adequate to reach desirable ends. 
Three main areas  should be tackled in innovative ways: capital and credit, 
mass  diffusion of culture, migration of populations. 
A t  present the chronic and increasing indebtedness of Third World countries 
points to moratoriums and a stop to further credit as the only feasible way out. 
Many countries need credit just to service credits obtained in the past. A largely 
untapped source of capital may be represented by the exploitation of large renew- 
able energy sources, e.g. hydroelectric. The untapped hydroelectric potential of 
Africa, for example, is memy times larger than all the European electricity 
demand. It could be exploited f i r s t  with direct current  transmission lines many 
thousands of kilometers long, to be integrated later  in a African grid intercon- 
nected to the European system. A mortgage system would then provide ample capi- 
tal to finance development as w e l l  as the practical exploitation of these resources. 
Similar m g e m e n t s  may be reached with other types of natural resources, pro- 
vided modern twls a r e  adequately used for their prospecting and assessment. 
MASS DIETUSION OF CULTUIZE 
The population of a country cannot engage meaningfully in the production and 
in the use of fairly modern durable goods unless its cultural level exceeds a given 
threshold. This threshold can be defined for  the moment only in a fuzzy way. It 
certainly includes elementary literacy for the large majority of the population. It 
certainly does not include any depth of knowledge of the physical world, except in 
very n a r r o w  contexts and for fairly small population subgroups (designers, techni- 
cians). Rising above this threshold appears very probably to be the Largest single 
cause of automatic demographic control. However, i t  w a s  not consciously planned 
by statesmen o r  educators. It just happened, although it was certainly made easier 
by larger and slightly better  school systems. 
It appears, though, that the cultural level reached in industrialized countries 
is inadequate to support the transition to an innovation wave largely consisting of 
information generation, processing and use. In order fo r  the next innovation wave 
to swell and roll on, tools developed in the last wave (TV networks, computers, 
automated teaching aids) w i l l  have to be used in advanced countries to help the 
population rise above higher cultural thresholds. This process should also pro- 
duce the spinoff of defining m a s s  education procedures capable of leading Third 
World population to rise above the f i r s t  threshold. Incidentally modern m a s s  
schooling could w e l l  be a vital new sector for  the next innovation wave. The inven- 
tions of educational TV and of computerized instrvction go back a f e w  decades, but 
have been implemented only very marginally so  far. 
So immigration of professional and skilled workers was a significant force 
behind the development of the United States. In a much slower and disorderly way 
the migrations of people in the Middle Ages produced flows of ideas and knowledge 
finally leading to the Renaissance and to the birth of modern science and technol- 
ogy. Again the positive side effects of these large movements of population were 
not planned. 
A t  present current  means of transportation foster mass travel which. in gen- 
eral, has short duxation, modest effects on balances of payment and no cultural 
effects. Planned mass migration in either direction between North and South could 
transfer: technology, ideas, lifestyles and favor m a s s  diffusion of culture. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is quite difficult to measure cultural levels o r  achievements. It is even 
more difficult to assess their  effects on industry, on the economy, on society. Com- 
mon sense suggests that cultural factors are very relevant for  innovation, 
development and, perhaps, for  survival. Difficulty in quantification should not 
deter  us from trying to design societal systems possibly capable of averting dire 
material and moral risks to society and to individuals. This paper is a modest con- 
tribution in this direction. 
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THE HACEOECONOXK POTENTUL 
Giulter  Eha# 
L INTEODUCTLON 
In the literature several kinds of economic cycles have been identified: Kon- 
drstieff cycles, Kuznets cycles, J u g k  cycles, business cycles. Clearly, in reality 
oniy a superposition of these different cycles can be observed. 
One problem arises from the fact that the economic output seems to depend in 
a nonlinear way on variations of certain input variables. This makes it difficuit to 
separate the effects of various cycles. Another basic problem in research on 
cyclical economic movements is the lack of historical data. Because of the res- 
tricted set of data available i t  is almost impossible to predict the period of the 
Long Waves and the phase of the cycle with some accuracy. Therefore. in the 
present state of the art, i t  seems interesting to gain additional theoretidal insights 
through the construction of simple models. 
Of course, i t  is easy to obtain cyclical structures by writing down a set of dif- 
ferential equations o r  difference equations. However, several nontrivial questions 
arise. What are the initial conditions? What is a reasonable set of pammeters, 
and which values f o r  these parameters must be chosen? How many differential - 
o r  difference equations do w e  have to combine? Are the parameters of the model 
time-dependent and why? 
The observed and m e m u r e d  marroeconomic set of data is the result of a cer- 
tain aggregation of microeconomic variables. On the microeconomic scale the 
decision process of actors (firms, entreprene ms...) is related to the concepts of 
utilities and utility maximizing principles. Since w e  cannot expect to describe the 
individual decisions on a fully deterministic level, a probabilistic treatment seems 
to be adequate. As a consequence the resulting theory should be a stochastic one. 
This means, w e  expect that the theory yields as a main result the evolution of a 
probability distribution over the possible configurations arising in the decision 
process. From such a moving distribution it will then be possible to derive deter- 
ministic equations of motion for  the mean values. A systematic theory fo r  the 
quantitative description of sociological and ecopdt ica l  processes is given in the  
book of Wolfgang Weidlich and Giinter Haag (1983). 
The individual actors of society contribute through their cuitural and 
economic activities to the generation of a general "field" of civilization with cul- 
tural, political, religious, social and economic components. This collective field 
determines the sociopolitical atmosphere and the  cultural and economic standard 
of the society and may be considered as an o t d a t  parameter of the sys t em charac- 
terizing the phuse in which the society exists. 
Vice versa. the collective field strongly influences the individuals in the 
society by orientating their activities and by Mluencing their utilities. One of the 
features of this s o d  of cyclic coupling of causes and effects is that self- 
accelerating as wel l  as self-satmating processes result. In the "normal case" the 
feedback between individuals and the collective field leads to a sushined quasi- 
skable o r  evolutionary phase, i.e. a "self-consistent" collective strncture of 
society. In this case there exists a certain predictability of further development 
because the space of mutually influencing relevant macrovariables is known and 
these macrovariables obey a quasi-closed subdynamics. 
If, however, the control psrameters governfng the dynamic behavior of the 
sys tem attain certain wi t id  v u f w  due to internal o r  external interactions, the 
macrovariables may move into a criticfal domain out of which highly divergent 
alternative paths are possible. In this situation business fluctuations of the 
Schumpeter kind and also smail unpredictable microfluctuations may decide into 
which of the diverging paths the behavior of the society - and also the economic 
subsystem - wiJl bifurcate. 
The hamition from one phase to another (Phase transition) shows that self- 
consistent stmctures are ambiguous in the sense that there may exist several 
stable o r  unstable collective states even under the same external conditions. 
But, as Carlob Perez mentioned "...when it comes to explaining Long waves, 
given the considerable transfol-mations they imply in all spheres of society, it 
seems to m e  w e  need to step out and take a globuf look a t  the evolution of the fofa i  
system, with i ts  technological, social and institutional components intanrcfinq 
with the economic subsystem." 
I t  is the task of this paper to derive a potential function f r o m  the observed 
values of macroeconomic dab. This potential function can be seen as a candidate 
for  these general social and economic fields mentioned above. The parameters of 
the macroeconomic potential w i l l  be determined by a superior principle. A s  f a r  as 
policy research. w e  are saying that the main task is identifying the specific key 
factors (variables) yielding structufal variations in the economic output o r  long 
waves. This can be done in a self-consistent way via a link between the time series 
of the potential parameters obtained in the f h t  step and an appropriate set of 
input variables. 
The significance of certain input variables as w e l l  as their weights describing 
their influence on the potential parameters are found using an optimizing pro- 
cedure. 
The first step, section 2, 3, consists in describing w h a a  w e  a r e  and what w e  
expect, the second step, section 4, aims at finding out the variables relevant to 
explain our  historical - and future way. In section 5 our considerations are 
applied to dab of the FRG and the USA. 
2. DEFINITION OF THE ~ C B O g C O N O ~ C  POTENTIAL 
This section summarizes the concept of a macroeconomic potential and del- 
ineates in some detail its formal definition and determination. Using this 
macroeconomic potential w e  try to  answer several questions. 
Can w e  explain strnctural economic changes by introducing an economic 
potential? 
Now can w e  separate business cycles and structural economic effects? 
1s our economy in a monostable o r  in a bistable situation? 
What is the equilibrium path of our economy? 
Are w e  near o r  in an absolute minimum of this potential o r  in a relative 
minimum? 
Are w e  near a phase transition point of the economy between higher and 
lower levels of the macroeconomic output variables? 
Are w e  in a region where business cycles o r  output fluctuations are 
enhanced? 
What do w e  expect in the future? 
For this afm let us first glance at the net production of Germany, Figure 1 ,  (a) and 
(b). 
P ' i i  1 (a) a d  (b) Index of net-production of FRG, Basis 1970 = 100. 
In Figure l(b), w e  have subtracted the bear trend and observe wel l  definable 
business cycles. On the other hand for certain times the simple cyclical structure 
of the business cycles is dramatically perturbed and we assume that this kind of 
perturbation comes f r o m  structural economic effects, i.e., crisis in the economic 
development influenced by changes of the g e n e d  social- and economic field. 
Regarding Figure 1 ,  one is tempted to interpret these structural effects as 
phase  t ramit ions .  Namely, it looks as if during 1950 and 1965 the trend in the 
FRG was stable and became unstable afterwards leading to an ambiguity of equiii- 
bria. This possible ambiguity in the relation between causing input variables and 
resulting output variables should be included in the definition of their  relationship 
from the very beginning. A relation which can assign to one set of input variables 
more than one set of output variables, however. is typically a nonlimw one. 
W e  exemplify such a nonlinear relation between macroeconomic input - and 
output variables by defining a mcrrroeconomic pofan t id  according to the  followfna 
principks of construdiorc 
1. The potential V(y ,..., y,,cl ,..., cn) is assumed to depend mnllnemrly on 
one o r  several teptesantutive output variables yl,...,yt. Its coeffi- 
cients cl, ..., c, are assmned to be single-valued functions of given input 
variables 4, ..., a,. 
2. The potential is a function of time, since the input variables evolve with 
time. 
3. The potential is meant to describe the  long-term stn~ctmal change of the 
economy but not i ts  short-term oscillations. Hence, its definition must  
imply a filtering procedure which excludes or renders irrelevant the 
short-term motion of input and output variables. 
4. The potential is to be seen as a macroeconomic m e a s u r e  of the  stnrc- 
t u r d  b c J r r ~  o r  i d Q L Q I L E B  of the economy a t  a given instance of time 
during its b n g  tenn evolution. By definition, those values y ,...,y, of 
the output variables which are taken at the minimum (or the minima) of 
V(y l,... ,yt ,cl,. .. . cn ) are values of (instantaneous) structural equiii- 
brium of the economy. Correspondingly, the difference 
is a m e a s u r e  f o r  the degree of economic disequiiibrium at a given time 
generated by the deviations (y y ),. .., (y, y, ) of the output variables 
from their  equilibrium values. 
5 Since the economy tends to udjust itself, a relaxation towards o r  oscilla- 
tions around the  long-term path of the equilibrium values (y 1,, . . . , y, ) is 
to be expected. P e r  definition, the macroeconomic potential is associ- 
ated wlth the mcrcroeccmomic jorcss Fa (y y,) driving the economy 
back into i ts  structural equilibrium 
(The full dynamics of short-term motion must, however, be described in 
terms of microeconomic concepts beyond the macroeconomic potential.) 
The long-term path (y  (t), ...,urn (t)) of the stmctural  equilibrium (or 
equilibria) is not a ptiori known. But the very fact that the empirical 
values of (y l(t),...,y,(t)) perform short-term fluctuations o r  oscillations 
around these equiiibrimn d u e s  leads to the determination of the lat ter  
by filtering out this short-term motion. 
6. Shce  the potential should include a possible ambiguity of equilibria in 
periods of structural change, its mathematical form shodd ailow f o r  
more than one minimum. 
7.  The simplest specification of the macroeconomic potential adopted hen- 
ceforth consists in choosing o m  representative output variable only and 
a potential form allowing for  one o r  two minima. Later the coefficients 
(potential parameters) a r e  assumed to depend on certain input variables 
4 (t ),...,nA (t). 
Proceeding as required in the definition w e  use the simplest model for the 
macroeconomic potential which is rich enough to explain the historical facts 
For given potential parameters p and q the equilibrium values ye, a t  which the 
potential has its extremum (its extrems) are defined by 
This cubic equation can have one o r  three real solutions in dependence on the sign 
of the discriminant 
For D > 0, (2.4) has one real solution comespanding to one minimum of the poten- 
tial. while for D < 0, (2.4) has three real solutions comesponding to a potential 
with two minima and one maximum in between. The maximum belongs to an unstable 
equilibrium point. 
While in case (a) only one equilibrium state (minimum of V) is present. a tzan- 
sition f r o m  a one minimum to a two minima form of V can occur in case (b). This 
transition describes a change of the economy f r o m  a more stable Eo a less stable 
stmctnre. since the availability of two minima instead of one means an ambiguity 
and uncertainty with respect to finding a macroeconomicaily consistent state of 
s tmctmal  equilibrium. The "phase transition" f r o m  a monostable to a bistable 
potential occurs at a M i C i d  point p 3, and q =q, defined by D =0 o r  more 
expLicitly 
If w e  compare (2.3) w i t h  the Bi+quilibrinm model proposed by Gerhard Mensch 
(1981) w e  find 
Therefore w e  may expect a high correlation of these quantities. On the other 
hand, this approach here generalizes the ansatz of Mensch, since p and q can be 
Figare 2 (a) and (b) The shape of the macroeconomic potential f o r  different signs 
and magnitudes of the potential parameters p and q . (a) p > 0, q > 0. (b) p < 0, 
q >o.  
functions of a set of input variables as w e  shall see below. Also the economy is 
treated as a dyncsmic system here. Hence. the Bi-equilibrium model is incor- 
porated completely. The Ume series of the potential parameters pt,qt are 
obtained by a superior principle from the empirical data. How this works, w e  shall 
see in the next section. 
3. DETEEMNATION OF TEE POTENTUL PAEUHE3EBS PBOP ESPIEUCAL DATA 
The fuily explicit specification of the macroeconomic potential necessitates 
the determination of its parameters p ,q. W e  proceed along the Line of the poten- 
tial construction principles mentioned above. especially points 3 and 5. The 
assamption is that the stroctaml dynamics of the empirical output variable y w i l l  
perform short-term fluctuations o r  oscUlations in a macroeconomic potential 
created by a general social- and economic field. 
Step 1 
A representative output variable is chosen, fo r  which empirical values y t  for  
the years t =I,. . . , T are available. The linear trend (or nonlinear trend) is sub- 
tracted and the variable is scaled to have standard deviation 1. 
Step 2 
The time series of the potential parameters pt ,qt (t =1.Z,.. ., T) can now be 
determined by the requirement that the macroeconomic potential describes the 
dynamics of the output variable y in a fixed time interval M =Za+1 as precisely as 
possible. Since a discrete set of empirical values of y t  (t=1,2, ..., T) is used, the 
equation of motion (2.2). (2.3) yields a difference equation instead of a differential 
equation. 
To exclude or render irrelevant the short-term motion. the filter length M 
shouid be of the order of the duration time of the business cycles. 
More explicitly pt and qt are found by the requirement, that the functional 
Gt b t  *qt) 
be minimized. This procedure leads to the two linear equations in pt and qt 
from which the result 
qt = *tF +wt  
with the abbreviations 
and 
is easily derived. If the economy always is in a quasi-equilibrium state, the two 
terms 
cancel. These terms therefore yield the difference between a quasi-static 
approach and the dynamic approach. 
SteP 3 
Using the parameters pt .qt for  t =l,2,..., T the time-dependent macroeconomic 
potential can be set up according to (2.3) 
which yields the macmconornic force (2.2) 
The str?lctural equilibrium values of the economy yet a r e  now determined by the 
condition that according to the definttion of the potential the macmconomic force 
vsnishes 
It depends on the criterion D > 0 o r  D < 0 whether one o r  two minima are found a t  
time t .  
Correspondingly, the degree of economic disequilibrium at time t 
generated by the deviation (yt - vet) of the oufiput variable f r o m  their equilibrium 
vaiue can be computed. 
Step 4 
The underlying dynamic process (2.2) can also be used for  predictive pur- 
poses. A dynamic forecasting of the output variable y caused by structural 
effects yields 
However, we must always bear in mind that short-term fluctuations and business 
cycles are eliminated. Therefore, a total prediction of the macroeconomic output 
variable y has to take into account the short-term cycle effects (Schumpeter 
cycles), too. 
I think it is worthwhile to emphasize the joint work of Mensch, Weidlich and myself 
on the subject of business cycles in the book: Weidlich. Haag (1983). 
4, THE DEPENDENCE OF THE POTENTUX. P- ON CERTAIN INPUT 
VAEUELES 
In this section w e  mahe a f i r s t  step towards a theoretical derivation and 
explanation of the coefficients pt and qt. It may be promising to anaiyze the 
correlation between the potential parameters pt,qt and possible relevant input 
variables n, , a = 1.2,. . .A creating the dynamic stmcture. Then the foilowing 
standard method can be applied: let p (t ),q (t ), t = 1,2, ... ,T be the empirically 
determined potential parameters according to (3.3). (3.4) and let 
R, (t ),a = 1.2,. . . A be properly standardized empirical macroeconomic input vari- 
ables net of linear (or nonlinear) trend with time, in the time interval t =1,2, ..., T 
under consideration. A tentative thearetical hear relation between the potential 
parameters and the input variables can then be assumed: 
Between the empirical potential parameters p c ( t  ),qc (t) and its themretical 
expression (4.1). there w i l l  exist a random deviation 
The qp(t),nq(t) have to be minimized by an optimal choice of the coefficients 
a a in (4.1). The principle of the least smn of squares then yields 
with 
The evaluation of (4.3) leads to the set of hear equations for the a, .  b ,  
where 
and 
The correlation coefficienb r ( p  th .p ) and rq (q th ,qe ) can be used as a m e a s u r e  (X for the agreement between p ( t )  and p* ( t )  as w e l l  as between qth ( t )  and qe (t). 
Also the signficance of certain input variables can be. tested proceeding in this 
m y .  
Concrete choices of the input variables can now be made in order to test their 
significance and influence on the macroeconomic potential. Candidates for 
relevant input variables n,(t) a r e  - total investment. investment structure, 
number of working hours, energy consumed, birth- and death rates, technological 
innovations... (see also Casetti 1981, Delbeke 1981, Dendrinos 1981, Forrester 
1977, Reeman et aJ. 1982, Kleinknecht 1981, Mandel 1980, Mensch 1979, Nijkamp 
1982, Wilson 1981). 
5. TEE HACBOECONOIQC POTENTUL OF THE F'EtG AND THE USA 
In this f inal  section w e  demonstrate some aspects of the numerical evaluation 
of the model. For the empirical analysis w e  consider the economy of the Federal 
Republic of Gennany (FRG) in the years 1950 to 1981 (Figures 3-6) and the econ- 
omy of the United States of America (USA) in the years 1948 to 1979 (Figures 7-10). 
W e  chose as representative output variable the net production of the FRG and the 
USA standardized and net of trend. Since the dmation time of business cycles is 
about 4 to 5 years a filter length of M = 5 years seems to be adequate to exclude 
o r  render irrelevant the short-term fluctuations. Let m e  present only a few 
r d t s  without going into deeper interpretation. This w i l l  be done in detail in our 
book Mensch, Haag and Weidlich, The Schnmpeter Clock, forthcoming with Bal- 
linger, Cambridge, Mass. 
Figure 3 shows the macroeconomic potential of the  FRG. The solid lines 
represents the observed tfme path of the net production. During 1950 to 1965 the 
economy moves in a monostable smooth potential (post w a r  tfme, 
Wirtschaftswrmder), while afterwards the strnctural situation becomes much more 
complex and bistability occurs (1969 to 1975 Flatterkonjunktur). Phase transi- 
tions can be identified from Figure 6 in the years 1967-68. (high -> low), 1970-71 
(low -> high) and 1974-75 (high -> low). Comparing the o b s m e d  path of the pro- 
duction with the macroeconomic driving force (Figure 5) the h c t u r a l  phase 
transitions can be explained. Nevertheless, !t is worthwhile to emphasize that 
phase transitions (in the bistable region) can be triggered by business-cycles. 
Business  cycles must  not be neglected if w e  want to understand our  position today. 
In Figure 6 the potential parameters p ,  q for  the FRG are shown. Towards a 
better understanding of the dynamics of p ,  q an analysis according to Section 4 
seems to be adequate. Thiswill be done in our book mentioned above. 
Compared with the FRG, a totally different behavior is m e t  with the 
macroeconomic potential of the USA in Figure 7. Since, according to Figure 8 the 
potential parameters p,q of the USA move f o r  a long period of time in a critical 
region, business fluctuations are much more enhanced compared with the FRG. 
The ~ c t u r a i  force of the USA shows enhanced oscillations between 1948 to 
1960 with a period of 2 years. These short-time oscillations are afterwards (1960 
to 1972) damped out and cycles of about 4 to 5 years occur. 
Figures 7, 10 also demonstate that there was a structural economic problem 
in the USA in th3 years 1958 to 1964 which cannot be observed in the FRG at that 
time. In contrast to the FRG, the structural potential of the USA shows bistability 
in the years 1948 to 1965. 
Phase tmmsitions in the bistable region of the potential a r e  again triggered 
by the business cycles. 
In Figure 10 the  potential parameters p ,  q for the USA are depicted. The 
structural variations of p , q should also be analyzed according to Section 4. Since 
it is reasonable to assume that the same socioeconomic interactions a r e  responsi- 
ble for the macroeconomic potential the same set of input variables should be 
relevant. This provides a further test of consistency of the model. 
4 
T i  3 The mn~loacondc potential of the PRG. 
Figure 4 Panmeter space of p .q. Bistable Region. 
Figure 5 Macroeconomic force of the FRG. 
Figarc 6 Potential parameters pt and qt of the FRG. 
F i i  7 The aacroeconomic potential of the USA 
Figum 0 Parameter space of p , q . Bistable  Region. 
Figure 9 Macroeconomic force of the USA 
Figure 10 Potential parametem pt and pt of the USA. 
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LONG WAVES IN A W E B  CO- 
JobaxmXillmdorkr 
The Study Group for International Analysis, STUDIA is working on long-term 
mechanisms of societal development. The investigations a r e  based on a wealth of 
empirical data including not only economic and technological variables but also 
so-called ' sof to variables like measures of motivation, sociepsychological vari- 
ables, indicators for the quality of the family, etc. The results of the investiga- 
tions build a framework for the understanding of various issues and for condi- 
tioned forecasts. 
h the question of strnctmal change we arrived a t  the issue of long waves in 
the societal .development. To this issue STUDIA has three approaches: 
Oscillations f r o m  growth reducing (self-inhibiting) factors: 
t A saciepsychological feedback system; 
Main-Plane-Analysis of differential equations and turning vectors. 
A combination of these three approaches leads to a new understanding of the 
interrelationships between 'hard' and 'soft' variables in long waves. 
In Schmnpeter's approach to the problems of long waves, innovations play an 
important role. H e  stated that the beginning upswing is characterized by new 
technologies. Mensch observed clusters of innovations, which support 
Schumpeter's hypothesis. The call f o r  new technologies becomes now very common 
as the only possibility f o r  a new upswing and the preconditions for innmtions  a r e  
a question widely discussed. 
In our approach we understand economic development as a collective learning 
process: inventions and their applications in innovations a r e  results of this learn- 
ing process. In this context this paper is concerned with the questions: What a r e  
the economic circumstances fo r  the necessity of new technologies? Where a r e  the 
limits for the old technologies? Where a r e  the roots of the creativities for new 
technologies? Investigating these questions w e  find also new insights into mechan- 
isms leading to long-term oscillations. 
In the first chapter a scope of this learning process on the base of marginal 
prodnctivities is described. Starting from empirical observations which show that 
on the one side the marginal productivity of Labor is deciding for  the competitive- 
ness in industrial countries and that on the other side the marginal productivity of 
labor is closely connected with innovations, i t  can be shown that innovations 
govern the worldwide distribution of labor. For this reason industr iahed coun- 
tries are forced to innovations. Until now innovations have been understood in a 
ra the r  m w  technical sense. In the second and the followJlg two sections i t  is 
shown that noneconomic factors influence negatively the economic efficiency and 
achievement of the indnstrialized countries and that  this leads lmder certain cir- 
cumsbnces to oscillations and a downswing. To minimize this downswing i t  is neces- 
sary to extend the concept of innovation beyond the pure economic and technical 
field. Here w e  need new paradigms. 
CHANGE. MARGINAL PBODUCTMTY AND CHANGING ==A- 
TIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOB 
In a study f o r  UNIDO 'Future Strnctnral Changes in Austrian Industry' (STUI)IA 
Research Report to UNIDO 1979) STUDIA found that since the mid-seventies com- 
petitiveness in indnstriallzed countries is determined no longer by capital intensity 
alone but rather by a high qualification of labor. The qualification of labor was 
measured as marginal prodnctivity of Labor derived from sectoral production func- 
tions (Millendorfer 1977). 
Three categories of marginal productivities w e r e  quantified: total marginul 
productivity of labor, the marginal productivity of labor without higher education 
and the marginal productivity of labor with higher education. The relations 
between the three categories of qualification of Labor differ f r o m  branch to 
branch; the functions of the three categories are different. The total marginal 
prodnctivity of labor is deciding f o r  the development of the economic branches. 
Forecast of Sl'UDIA on this base f o r  a l l  branches were fully verified later. 
In the research repor t  it was shown that the qualification of labor is the 
higher the earlier the stage is which the respective learning technology has in the 
product cycle. An early stage in the product cycle is based on innovations. So w e  
can say that since the mid-seventies innovations are the deciding precondition fo r  
competitiveness in industrialized countries based on a high qualification of labor 
and/or on a high marginal productivity of labor. 
Developing countries have better  comparative advantages in the late stage of 
the product cycle with relative low marginal prodnctivity of labor. O u r  empirical 
investigations show that the international distribution of labor changed in this 
direction with an increasing gap of qualification of labor between industrialized 
and developing countries. Details about the impact of qualification of labor in the 
process of economic development can be seen observing the two components: 
The marginal productivity of labor without higher education, it means the 
qualification of the manual labor of the skilled workers at the machine, which has 
been very important for  the economic development until the mid-seventies is now 
less important than the other component described below. I t  is only in f e w  
branches (e.g . furniture) essential for competitiveness. 
In m o s t  branches the marginal productivity of higher education is not only 
important fo r  competitiveness but contributes, in addition, essentially to the 
economic development of a whole region (Millendorfer 1983a). W e  interpret these 
empirical observations so, that the external components of the societal 
P i  1 Fulfilled Prognosis - Abscissa: forecasts on the basis of marginal pro- 
ductivity (qualification of labor); Ordinate: actual development of employment. 
Source: "Future Stmctural Changes in A u s t r i a n  Industry," STUDIA-Report to UNI- 
DO, Vienna 1979. Bmnchss: CH - Chemical. GL - Stone, glass; H - Wood; KL - 
Clothing; MA - Machinery; NA - Food, Luxury food; P - Paper; T - Textile. 
informations processing of a f i r m  plays an important role in the learning processes 
in the economic environment of the firm. In the c m e n t  situation of dramatic 
structural changes these learning processes are of a vital significance. They 
teach to find and apply new societal paradigms from which new technologies can be 
derived; the term technology understood in the widest sense of the word implying 
not only technical but also societal inventions, e.g. a new efficient style of manage- 
ment (Millendorder 1983b) o r  the optimal adaptation of new technologies to the 
societal demand. Even more as the inventions and technical development of new 
technologies the adaptation of new - and some of the old - technologies to the 
societal demand according to quite new paradigms is the. most  challenging task in 
this time. 
S m m a r h h g  w e  can say that due to the changes in the international distribu- 
tion of labor the industrialized countries experienced a reduction of their  growth 
rates becase of losses of market shares in the routine technologies. Therefore 
they are forced to innovations. In this situation it is an essential additional fact 
that even now the fruitfulness of the existing paradigms of the economic- 
technological development arrived to an end due to growing negative impacts and' 
that these negative factors lead under certain conditions to a downswing which can 
be understood in the context of long waves This is shown in the following chapter. 
OSCILLATIONS FROX GROWTH EUXDUCING FACTORS 
A research order  of the Institute of World Economics, Kiel about institutional 
determinants of economic growth (Millendorder 1980) led in the f irst  step to an 
empirical investigation of the relationship between growth rates dy / tit / y and 
GDP per  capita y . 
W e  have observed in various cross sections negative correlations between 
these two variables. 
Describing mathematically this relationship (compare Millendorfer 1982) w e  get 
the following equation: 
Equation (2) is a Bemoullian differential equation with the  solution 
This is the logistic c m e  with the ceiling y, = (a / b ) "  . The term by in the 
expression ( a  -by) in equation (2) can be interpreted as a factor linearly growing 
with y and with a negative impact to growth. W e  call it a growth reducing factor z .  
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Now w e  can ask if there exist more than one growth reducing factor. In our 
empirical inquiries w e  have found various variables z z 2 ,  23 ,. ..negatively c o m b  
Aated with the growth rates. If w e  combine these factors in a function 
g (zl,  z 2 ,  z3,.. .) w e  get  a better explanation of the decrease of the growth rates. 
Equation (2) now can be rewritten as: 
W e  call the function g(z1z2z3 ) as growth reducing function. I t  is important to 
analyze the form of this function. because on one side the analytical farm of this 
function decides about the dynamic behavior of the societal system. On the other 
side the farm of dependency of growth reducing factors from GDP p e r  capita (y ) is 
deciding for  future economic development. 
If the growth reducing function is linear, e.g. if 
and the growth reducing factors z l  , z2  , 23". depend iineariy on y 
then w e  still have the Bermnllian equation: 
and as a solution the above mentioned logistic curve. 
If the growth of the growth reducing factors depends on the time integral y 
then w e  have a case of Volterra's differential equation which has as a solution 
cyclic oscillations o r  waves. 
Equation (2) is wel l  founded on empirical data for  OECD countries. V e r y  high 
significance is obhined if the zc are variables describing: undue expansion and 
bureaucratization of the public sector, too big units I-aied in an excessively cen- 
tralistic way, too much levelling, sinking moral standards, disturbance of the 
equilibrium between the relation to things, to human beings and to sense. 
The other question whether the growth reducing factors depend on the 
GDP/cap.(y ) according to equation (6) o r  equation (8) is not very clearly answered 
by the empirical obsemtions .  Some of the variables are more o r  less positively 
correlated w i t h  the GDP/cap according to equation (6). Other variables follow in 
their growth ra ther  equation (8). Both relationships are not very significant. In 
the first case the solution of the Bernouliian differential equation would be a 
logistic curve, in the second case the solution would be cyclic oscillations. 
According to the empirical observations of the dependency of the growth reducing 
factors zc on y and / ydt a mix of the two cases seems to be m a s t  probable. 
In any case the political conclusions are similar. In the f irst  BernoulLian case 
the ceiling of the logistic curve indicates an end of the fruitfulness of the old 
paradigms of the former period, a new upswing is only possible on the base of new 
pamdigras. In the second case the downswing of the oscillation is caused by the 
same reasons; only the anticipation of the new paradigms of the coming upswing can 
reduce the downswing. In addition in this case the impact of the growth reducing 
factors m u s t  be diminished by investments f o r  this purpose. This new farm of 
investment leads also to returns ff the costs f o r  diminishing the growth reducing 
factoFs are smaller than the  gain due to improved efficiency. 
Summarizing w e  can say that w e  have empirical evidence that growth reducing 
factors contribute to the decline of economic growth. Investigating details of the 
process w e  arrived at differential equations. The form of the solutions is deter- 
mined by the form in which the growth reducing factors depend on the level of 
economic performance o r  on the time integlal of wealth. In the lat ter  case w e  
have oscillations. 
Somebody asked m e  in this Conference ff I am fo r  o r  against long waves. I 
would say I am certainly against long waves but our empirical observations and 
their theoretical interpretations show that w e  cannot escape f r o m  the problems 
caused by negative factors which lead to a ceiling o r  to a downswing five o r  six 
decades af ter  the last downswing of the first crisis of the world economy. For 
applied systems analysis the question of long waves is not so much a theoretical 
issue but ra the r  a challenge to the practical economic problems w e  have to cope 
with. 
In a quite new field where there  is no mature theory, we have to be carefui in 
deriving a hypothesis f r o m  empirical data. The best way to cope with this diffi- 
cuity is a redundancy in an abundance of empirical observations. Here a difficult 
questions arises: How to handle the mass of dab. W e  developed a new formal 
method of multivariate analysis, the Main-Plan A n a l y s i s ,  which facilititates the  
theory building on a large empirical data base.P;he resulk of M-P-Ardysis plot- 
ted graphically show clearer  the relationships between hard and soft variables. 
Long arrows represent variables which a r e  explained with a high correlation by 
the  eigenvectors of the plane. If t w o  long vectors are parellel then they a r e  
correlated. Three long non p a d l e i  vectors a r e  in a muitiregressional relation- 
ship. Short vectors have bigger residuals to be explained by variables usually not 
in the plane. Knowing this f o r m a l  relationship i t  is possible to derive from the  
' ~ - p - ~ n a l p i s  can be dsscrtbod from t w o  apptaachss, f a c t o r  a n a l p i s  and Choleaky- 
factorlmtion.  Factor a n a l m s  and M-P-Analpla am looking f o r  (n-k)  dimonstonal 
s p a e s s  in tho n-qmce .  M-P-Analpis Umlb tho  dlmenslon (n -k) to 2 o r  3 and is looklng 
for  dit ierent  2 o r  3-dimonslonal spa-. Each space or main-plane explains a subgroup of  
t h e  whole samplo of variables. This  wbgroup and t h e  interrelat ions of samples in i t  can be 
understood a s  lasuss, it raeana as subproblem. Cholssky-factorleation transionnu the  
correlation matr ix  to find sub-l lutricw along t h e  diagonal o f  a matrix, a l e  M-P-Analms 
does not  t n n s t o r m  t h e  whole correlation matr ix  but u l c u l a t e a  t h e  eigen-valuea of  mb- 
groups o f  interdependent variables. Advantages o f  M-P-Analms: The r m l b  plotted 
graphically atimalak t h e o w  building; a v e v  f l ex ib le  s t s p - b y s t e p  approach in a dlalogue 
wlth t h e  computer; wall dalinbd level8 of  sfgniflcance (MLllendorfer 1983.). 
main-plane heuristic hypothesis with a high probability not to be falsified in 
detailed investigations. On this basis interesting mechanisms between soft and 
hard variables were found. 
There are different main-planes which are related to certain issues: One main 
plane is related to the issue policy and social psychology, another to the issue of 
economy and institutional structures. etc. The investigation of the relationship 
between the main planes needs special studies on the basis of canonical come& 
tions. In addltion M-P-Analysis can be used for  the empirical estimtion of the 
parameters of differential equations without strong theoretical preconditions, sim- 
ply putting in the computer variables and their integrals and derivations. PFellm- 
inary formal results are differential equations of the second order  which leads 
under certain conditions to oscillations. These differential equations have until 
now only numerical solutions; STUDIA is still working to get differential equations 
with explicit solutions. 
M-P-Analysis is also used in studies to understand the details of the interrela- 
tionships between the hard variables and the soft variables and especially the 
interrelationships between the different soft variables. An interesting detail are 
vectors turning in a main plane during 20 years. 
The following figores show possibilities for  empirical estimation of parameters 
of differential equations and turning vectors. 
A first hypothesis to understand this formal result of turning vectors is that 
the content of government activities and the reasons for  divorces have changed: 
government activities which supported the families and their  q d t i e s  became 
more and more an obstacle in the fifties. On the other hand the divorces are now 
more and m o r e  influenced by this changed f o n n  of government activities. An 
interesting possibility is to analyze in this way oscillations of the form of govem- 
ment activities in long waves. The tmning vector of divorces leads to another 
issue described in the following chapter. 
A macropsychological investigation of the situation of the family in Europe 
(STUDIA 1977) led by the use of factor analysis to an indicator for  the quality of 
family. This indicator is with a time-lag of 25-30 years negatively correlated with 
the achievement motivation-index of David McClelland. This index depends accord- 
ing to David McClelland on the quality of family. So w e  have a negative feedback 
and something like a control circuit with a delay of 25-30 years. Such a control 
circuit should have oscillations with cycles of 50-60 years. The following Figure 8 
gives insights in details of of sociopsychological feedback system. 
The feedback system in the centre of Figure 8 works in the sequence: (high) 
quality of family --, (high) achievement motivation -+ (high) systems performance 
--. dominance of the system over the human area -+ decreasing quality of family --. 
decreasing achievement motivation... The feedback s y s t e m  has a delay of 25-30 
years. This delay could be understood as something Like an anthropological con- 
stant caused by interrelationships between genemtions. The delay leads to cycli- 
cal oscillations with a length of 50-60 years. 
Figures 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) show the empirically observed relationships in the 
feedback system: 8(a) the positive relationship between per  capita income and 
achievement motivation three  decades before and 8(b) respectively 8(c) the nega- 
tive relationship between quality of family and achievement motivation three 
P i  3 Turning vectors in the main plane 1. Main plain 1 describes the issue 
government activities and sociopsychological determined behavior patterns. An 
interesting not expected detail is, that some  vectors in the plane a r e  turning: in 
the 50's government activities and an indicator for the  quality of family were near- 
ly parallel and the vector of divorce had the opposite direction. In the following 
decades the vectors of government activities and divorces turnes in an opposite 
direction so that now government activities and divorces are nearly parallel. 
Figarc 4 Main Plane with the issue economy, economic growth, bank dynamics, big 
units, etc. The various variables are interdependent. The kind of linear depen- 
dency is expressed in the direction of the arrows. The degree of dependency is 
shown by the length of the arrows. The main plane contains also y (GDP p e r  capi- 
h) and integrals and derivations of y . Transforming the arrows into equations w e  
obtain cliff erentiai equations. 
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Figure 5 Figures 5a. 5b, and 5c show the empirically observed relationship in the 
feedback system: 5a the positive relationship between per  capita income and 
achievement motivation three decades before; 5b and 5c respectively the  negative 
relationship between quaiity of family and achievement motivation three decades 
before respectively per  capita income at the same time (two efficiency zones). 
aecades before respectively per  capita income a t  the same time (two efficiency 
zones). 
Existence of such oscillations was already suggested by the negative correla- 
tion between McC1elland8s achievement motivation indices for 1925 and the differ- 
ences between these indices for 1925 and 1950. This observation can be ade- 
quately described using differential equations. 
Another empirical sapport for the existence of such oscillations come f rom 
Marchetti. He observed cycles of suicides with a length of 54 years (Marchetti 
1983). Suicides are correlated with divorces as Diirkheim discovered with investi- 
gations on the base of individual data. With country comparing investigations w e  
found also a positive correlation between suicides, divorces and the indicator for  
the quality of family. If one of the variables oscillates the other variables should 
also do so. So Marchetti's obsemation fits very w e l l  in our framework of oscilla- 
tions. 
In this framework the concept of desublimation is also integrated: The quality 
of family is negatively correlated with romiscuity and positively with sublimation, 
it  means - according to Freud's thesisiP- with high creativity. Therefore w e  have 
to expect from our sociopsychological feedback system not only oscillation of 
achievement motivation but also oscillations of creativity. 
This interrelated framework of long waves in the living area caused by a 
sociopsychological feedback system and the turning vectors in the main plane I 
opens a new approach to undershnd economic long waves in a larger context. One 
important link between the two long wa.ves comes f r o m  the relationship between 
creativity and innovations. 
Schmnpeter's description of the upswing of the long waves with new technolo- 
gies does not explain why these innovational upsurges occur a t  all and why the 
length of the cycle is between 50 and 60 yesrs. If we find that our sociopsychologi- 
cal feedback sys tem mentioned above- is connected with the cycles of innovations 
then w e  learn something about the reasons of the innovational upsurges and the 
length of the cycles. 
A t  the present state of the art w e  cannot reject the hypothesis that oscilla- 
tions of creativity and achievement motivation contribute to the innovational waves 
with the same length of the cycles namely around 60 years. 
Maybe the future empirical investigations falsify one o r  the other part  of the 
outllned sociopsychological feedback system; w e  are sure that the basis of our 
framework w i l l  hold especially the hypothesis that the length of the long waves is 
determined by something like anthropological constant - based on interrelation- 
ships between genelations. 
INNWATION. c B e B . m  AND SWLIKATXON 
In the Conference 'Toward Explaining Economic Growth' in Kiel  1980 Lord 
Vaizey asked an interesting question to this h e :  Is Freud's thesis that subllma- 
tion is a precondition for cultural creativity also true for all kinds of creativities 
including creativity for technical and economical innovation? (Millendorfer 
1983b). To answer this question it is necessary to have a m-e for sublimation, 
or for the lack of subLimation ('desablimation'). In the understanding of Freud sub- 
Limation means that sexual tribes a r e  under moral control. The opposite is 
b next section. 
desublimation due to promiscuity as it grew strongly since the early seventies. 
STUDIA developed an indicator fo r  desubllmation (Millendorfer 1979). This 
enables us to answer the question of Lord Vaizey. A comparison of the indicator of 
desublimation with growth rates shows a negative correlation. Even more impor- 
tant is the relationship with the two components of growth namely extensive and 
intensive growth. While extensive growth rates show no correlation intensive 
growth ra tes  correlate negatively with desublintation (Figure 6). 
Intensive growth rates are caused by a more efficient use of the factor input 
due to technological progress. I t  means mainly due to innovations based on 
creativity. So w e  can interpret our  obserrmtions as an empirical support f o r  a 
positive answer to the question of Lord Vaizey. 
All this may sound very strange, but it is typical f o r  the paradigms of the end- 
ing period that human factors were neglected in economic considexations. The 
problem is also in our situation: W e  m u s t  understand economy looking beyond econ- 
omy in a comprehensive holistic approach. In our holistic approach detailed inter- 
disciplinary studies a r e  interrelated and build together a framework fo r  under- 
standing of long-term societal mechanisms. In. this sense it is interesting to see. 
that the point 2 is a part of point desubllmation is one component of the growth 
reducing factors 'sinking moral standards' and contrfbutes as such to the oscilla- 
tions. On the other side it is connected with the mechanism described in the previ- 
ous section. 
COrnMMG THE TaEGE AETBOACHES 
Combining the results of the three approaches w e  can say that all explana- 
tions of long waves must not neglect the interrelationships between the economic 
and technological variables which a r e  usually investigated and the soft variables 
describing sociepsychological and institutional circumstances: e.g. Schumpeter's 
description of long waves with the innovational upsurges cannot explain, why these 
occur in cycles of 50-60 years. If w e  introduce our  observation of the feedback 
system, we can explain the length of the cycles. In addition w e  understand p syche  
logically the states of the sys t em in which inventions as a consequence of 
creativity and innovation as a consequence of achievement motivation emerge: 
creativity and innovation have strong roots in the living area,  described by our 
soft variables and their  mechanisms. The length of the cycle in the feedback sys- 
t e m  is determined by something Ute anthropological constants governing the 
dynamics of the interrelations between generations. In addition to this under- 
standing of the length of the cycle w e  can use the oscillations of creativity and 
achievement motivation in the socio-psychological cycle to understand the oscilla- 
tions of inventions and innovations. If inventions have something to do with 
creativity and innovation with achievement motivation then w e  can extend the 
approaches f o r  the explanation of long waves: w e  introduce in addition to the 
economic and technological variables our soft variables and have a more general 
picture of the process (Table 1.). 
CONCLUSIONS 
If the outlined mechanism of long waves including hard and soft variables is 
close enough to reality then w e  can say that the length of the cycle is determined 
by something Ute an anthropological constant. It means  that w e  have no 
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Figure 6 Freud's Hypothesis: Demublimirmtion - A Growth Reducing Factor. 
Desubllmation as a growth reducing factor. Note that there is no relationship 
between extensive growth and desubllmation and a negative correlation between in- 
Lensive growth and desubllmation. This can be interpreted with the help of Freud's 
hypothesis that sublimation is the precondition of creativity and our interpreta- 
tion that creativity causes a new technological progress and efficiency. 
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Table 1 Hard and Soft Variables In the Long Wave 
instrumental variables, no poLfticai tool to change the length of the cycle. But 
what w e  can do is to minimize the amount of the downswing by anticipating the corn 
ing upswing. In other words: There is no chance to continue the old paradigms of 
the ending period but if w e  understand the new paradigms w e  can minimize the 
problems of the change f r o m  one period to the next period. In the following con- 
tures the principles of the coming npswhg a r e  outlined. They are based on 
analysis (Mfliendorf er st rrL. 1978) and discussed in many conferences (Mfliendorf er 
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THE HUMANE-ECONOMICAL PBINCIPLE 
The disturbance of the equilibrium mentioned above is characterized by an 
overemphasis on things, compared with the importance of man. If w e  consider the 
boundary condition of a necessarily rising importance of msn and certain 
phenomena that could already be observed in the beginning of the seventies. the 
necessity of a new understanding of economic principles becomes clear. The l a w  of 
maximization of output with a minimum of input stays unchanged. The significance of 
the output has to be considered anew though. In times of a bottleneck in material 
goods output meant an  increase of material products. Today the question concern- 
ing output has to be asked once more in those coontries which are not suffering 
from the shortage of material goods any more. This wi l l  lead to a concept of 
higher quality of life gnaranteed by the equilibrium of the relationships between 
things, man and sense. I t  requires a new attitude, that  critically investigates value 
and importance of a given product according to i ts  application in the sphere of 
life. The value of a product then Is as high as i t  helps the consnmer to create a 
sphere of life more valuable. According to the theory of the marginal utility the 
price of the product is defined to be the added improvement of quality of the 
sphere of life divided by the added increase of input of material goods and ser- 
vices: 
P = prices 
V, q u a l i t y  of sphere of life 
I, =input of economic sector into the sphere of life 
This principle, though it looks so t h e o r e t i d ,  has already been adapted to 
practical applications. Changes in urban pLanning a r e  a vivid example. Ten yesrs. 
ago towns w e r e  understood to be systems whose functioning could be optimized by 
separating the spheres of life. Consequently emphasis was put on solving the pmb- 
lems of traffic, which enjoyed highest priority. Contrary to all technocratic plan- 
ning, spherw of human dimensions have succeeded in the last years to grow more 
and more, e.g. the pedestrian zones. They not only have become centers of a new 
urban life, but also even centers of economic success. 
To generalize the problem we should stress the urgent need of "pedestrian 
zones" in all fields. Pedestrian zones in management are organizatory structures 
that  present only a dynamic framework fo r  the essential: the human activities in 
groups that can be overlooked. Pedestrian zones in science wi l l  replace the usual 
monstrous conference by work-intense conferences that do not lose survey, as 
happened in our conference. Pedestrian zones in the medical field replace the 
treatment of so-called 'cases' in enormous factories of health by a concept of the 
patient as a human being. Many more examples can be given. 
Another consequence rising from the humane-economical principle, which 
already has been quite fruitful, can be seen in various sectors: There is a definite 
trend, though, t o w a r d s  a consnmers creativity. This new trend has become most 
obvious by the erpansion of the 'do-it-yourself-sector' . Firms which are in charge 
of preparing this sector revive even in todays economic recession: they are pro- 
ducers of a l l  kinds of hobby implements and semi-prepared products. Information 
services for hobby craftsmen are only starting to develop. 
Revalorization of the sphere of life compared with the field of production and 
the exact inversion of the positions that were held by the so f a r  dominating struc- 
tuml sphere and the sphere of M e  are the essential points in the hamane-economic 
principle. I t  w i l l  not do any harm to the world of structure o r  the field of produc- 
tion, if this new trend is recognized and taken into consideration. The example of 
the hobby craftsmen mentioned above shows how activities that would cause added 
costs in the production process are shifted from the field of production to the 
sphere of life where they a r e  carried out most willingly. This diminishes the costs 
and often customers are willing to pay even more, if they are given the opportunity 
to be creative. 
TEE PRKOELTY OF IKKATEEUL PACTOBS WEE HATEEIAL PACTOBS 
The inquiries of STUDIA mentioned above have made obvious that from about 
the mid-seventies onwards competitive strength is not so much gained by the inten- 
sity of capital but by qualification of labor. The qualification of labor before and 
af ter  the actual act of production. e.g. the social information processing, has 
prior  significance. SKJDIA has just completed a study of regional comparisons for 
A u s t r i a ,  which shows, that  the external communication of establishments plays the 
major role. The task of the external communication of establishments is to adapt 
the technical production to the economic environment. The economic environment 
is constituted by the intermediary sphere that encloses the mutual relations 
between producers, as w e l l  as by the field of final demands, which implies the rela- 
tionship to the consumers. The adaption to the economic and social environment is 
a collective learning process leading to social inventions. 
The application of microelectronics is a vivid example to demonstrate the 
importance of social inventions. Text-processing machines can be brought into 
action in various ways: They may be installed in a central office for typists o r  in a 
secretary's office of each referee. In between these alternatives there may exist 
a third solution, namely to install a central bureau for  tasks that appear occasion- 
ally. Each of these solutions natmally has different hmnan and social conse- 
quences. The f irst  example wffl lead to an alienation between referees and typists, 
the second one gives the typists a chance to use the time saved by the aid of the 
machines for creative secrehry's work according to the i r  personal disposition in 
n a r r o w  contact with the boss. 
From this i t  follows that the hardware and the technical software which is 
strongly connected with the hardware are not sufficient in themselves, but that it 
is furthermore important to consider the social softamre brought about by the 
social modifications and inventions which inevitably take place, when new technolo- 
gies are introduced. Changes are inevitable, the way these changes are taklng 
piace is not predetermined, as shown in the example above. Normative decisions, 
which are independent of the technology, are necessary and only they w i l l  bestow 
technology with a kind of social significance, which then can be understood as 
being a positive o r  negative contribution to social develuprnent. 
A very different way where the principle of priority of immaterial factors 
applies can be seen in the development of long-lived goods. The past epoch has 
developed a 'throw-away-technology', which led to an extensive use of r a w  ntateri- 
als and energy. Considering the limitation of the planet, this 'throw-away- 
technology' cannot be continued, but can be modtfied by production of long-lived 
goods. Longevity of goods is attainable by solid workmanship and qualified labor, 
by repairing-possibilities that are built-in by the designer, like in the 'modd- 
design', by a pleasing design, that outlasts the short-lived fashions, and by antici- 
pation of a possible technical progress by help of modern principles of design, 
which would allow to invest further modernizations and modifications by exchang- 
ing parks of the system. The new principles of construction require the immaterial 
factors: creativity, initiative, qualification of labor, and reduce, by help of these 
immaterial factors, the exploitation of the material factors: energy and r a w  
materials. Energy that w a s  wasted so fa r  by producing 'throw-away-goods' could 
be saved and could serve us as one of the greatest resemes of energy in industri- 
aiized counttles. 
FINELY STBDCTUEED FOBHATIONS RATHER THAN GIGANTOUNU 
One of the growth restraining factors mentioned above: units of exaggerated 
size, press hard on the industrialfied countries, as can be seen with the so called 
'ill giants', many great enterprises which a r e  more and more running into trauble. 
This causes an increasing decentralization of the enterprises and the stressing of 
the importance of small and independent establishments, which are forced by the 
market forces to work with higher efficiency. Not the rejection of big firms on the 
whole is necessary, but a rejection of the overemphasis of big units by means of an 
ideological 'economy of scale'. A new outline concerning the division of work 
between big and small units becomes apparent, which defines the big units to be the 
infrastructure for smaIl, independent units of high efficiency. The task of big 
units will be to coordinate the production of the small units: they w i l l  have to spe- 
cialize in this function. Interesting new trials that tend in this direction are fol- 
lowed up, for example, by the Venture Capital firms. 
The size of firms has been overemphasized not only for  reasons of organiza- 
tion; technical reasons were of importance, too. One paradigm of the old, vanish- 
ing technologies represented the one-way direction of the stream of materials, 
starting f r o m  the extraction of mineral r a w  materials up to the deposition of 
refuse implying all the growing problems that were caused by garbage. This para- 
digm can be changed by introducing recycling methods, though not as a single, but 
as a series of recycling as can be learned from natnre. It is not enough to let. 
recycling come up incidentally, they have to be considered right from the begin- 
ning of design. The kind of refuse w e  have to cope with nowadays is a sheer by- 
product; in future times me wi l l  have to consider it  already during the period of 
design in a way that w i l l  gnarantee the best use of it. This requires a cooperation 
that covers many sectors, since refuse will hardly be used by the branch that p m  
duced it. 
The design of products with the understanding of their piace in the extensive 
recycling-process surely is a fascinatfng task. Nature by its innumerable overiap- 
ping cycles that do not leave any refuse, has solved this task perfectly. Natnre 
should be the model for a new technology. 
CO- AND TOTALITY 
If we apply the principle just discussed to the problems of the organization, it 
will require a maximum of autonomy and freedom of decision making for small units 
which can be overlooked. This requires a way of thinking connecting highly spe- 
cialized knowledge with the ability of understanding of how his own special branch 
fits into the wider context. It  coincides with the old principle of 'universita8, e.g. 
an extensive comprehension not limited to one single discipline. The objection 
near a t  hand, which makes a point of the fact that Alexander von Humboldt's time 
has passed, is cynical, since not very much has been invested so far to create the 
facilities that would lead to comprehensive understanding. 
History of science has always been developing through phases, both analytical 
and synthetic. In ancient Greece speciaLists of parsbola, hyperbola, ellipse and 
circle have each devoted a lifetime to their specfallzed field. The invention of 
conic sections comprised all these fields in a new way of understanding. Further 
developments like the curves of derivatives in analytical geomeky have made it 
possible to master intellectually all partial fields after  a couple of months of 
high-school study. Systems analysis is about to develop such 'conic sections' for 
all possible fields and is starting to be quite successful, connecting thereby a l l  
sorts  of different disciplines. Practical needs of economy call for despecializa- 
tion. The higher a managerial position, the more comprehensive his horizon! The 
most extensive know-how of a ffrm is shaped by the understanding of its ability to 
solve problems, not to be a producer of bits and parts. According to a firm's self- 
nndemhnding of its ability to solve certain problems, certain tasks follow that will ' 
make the production of certain appliances and parts necessary. Firms that want to 
be successful have applied this concept for  some time and they have achieved a 
great flexibility in the way they solve problems. This ensures a possibility to sur- 
vive even in an economic environment radically changing. 
The problem a firm is solving is always a part of a more extensive sociological 
problem and is finally part  of the more extensive problems of man, which can be 
indicated by the question: Where do w e  come f rom,  where do w e  go to?! In a paper 
prepared for the Helsinki Conference about human factors in management it was 
shown that morals - to talk in an engineer's term - a re  somewhat similar to a fac- 
tor of production of a higher derivation. They take over the inner control in a 
decentralized style of d i n g 8  where social control is fainting. Since morals a r e  
not to be proved by economical m-es alone, the necessity of arrangement with 
morals leads the manager onto fields that have been taboo so f a r .  This alone is a 
proof of the dramatic change of paradigms for  times to come. New strategies out- 
lined in this paper and new learning-processes will characterize the future 
development. The twofold task of learning-processes will be to define the new stra- 
tegies in every detail and to develop completely new technologies according to. 
these new strategies. The understanding of new technologies is not limited by the 
sheer technical developments in the physical sense. They have to be understood in 
the sense of social inventions as well. The creative force of social inventions will 
concentrate first and foremost on the organization of learning processes, 
processes of the kind we just experienaed during this Conference. 
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ON THE STATISTICbI, IDENTIFICATION OF LONG WAVES 
H e n a a n  Wold 
A t  this IIASA meeting Dr. Gerhard Mensch gives an  exposition of 'The Schum- 
peter  Clock", which is funciamental work of his own and joint work with his team of 
collaborators. Dr.  Mensch invited me to the conference he organized at Berlin, 
March 3-4, 1980, to present my PLS (Partial Least Squares) method f o r  the estima- 
tion of Path Models with Latent Variables (PMLVs). Since then w e  have been c o b -  
bomting on the adaptation of PLS estimation to the Schumpeter Clock. My IIASA 
Collaborative Paper "Systems Analysis by Partial Least Squares" gives an  over- 
view of the PLS approach to PMLV (Wold 1983). The present paper repor ts  briefly 
on the status of the  PLS approach to the Schumpeter Clock. 
The Schampeter Clock belongs to the problem area of the 'long waves" known 
as Kondratiev waves. As illustmted in Figure 1 the  Kondratiev waves are cyclic 
variations over time of production, employment, prices, investment, and other 
economic variables. In the  present paper the  consecutive long waves are denoted 
by W1, W2, ... and the  in-between periods by B1, B2, ... 
Figure 1 Long Cycles in the  Variation Over Time of Economic Variables: Kondra- 
tiev Waves. Conceptual Sketch 
Dr. Mensch's Schmnpeter Clock is a theory in two par ts  or phases: the  first 
par t  models a wave in the  two dimensions of industrial employment and investment; 
the  second p a r t  models an in-between period. 
The first part  is a bi-equilibrium model: A fundamental innovation brings an 
expansive stage in industrial production with increasing capital investment and 
increasing employment; as demand expands the production is rationalized, which 
brings increased capital investment, brings a gradual change f r o m  increasing pro- 
duction, employment and investment to a capital-intensive stage with increasing 
prodnction and investment, but decreasing employment. The first part  of the 
Schumpeter Clock thus is a model for one single long wave in the two dimensions of 
industrial investment and employment: let me call it a Mensch wave. The Mensch 
wave thus has two "equilibrium" o r  "stable" stages, f irst  an expansive stage, and 
then after  a vacillating phase a capital-intensive stage. 
The Mensch wave model is a full-fledged nonlinear model in terms of the three 
variables labor, capital and production, a model that includes theoretical specifi- 
cation of the model and empirical estimation of the parameters; see G. Mensch, K. 
Kaasch, A. Kleinknecht and R. Schnopp, 1980. The key feature of the model is 
structural change. The shift f r o m  expansive to capital-intensive stage in a Mensch 
wave constitutes a change in the economic structure, an instability with fmportant 
implications that break away f r o m  classical and neoclassical economic theory. The 
shift of the two "equilibrium" stages is discontinuous in the same sense as in Rend 
Thorn's catastrophe theory. 
The circles in Figure 2 illustxate the bi-equilibrium first part  of the Scham- 
peter Clock model. There a r e  three variables directly observed over time t .  
namely Labor Lt , Capital Ct , and Production output Pt ; an oblique linear transfor- 
mation of Lt and Ct gives Extensive investment Et and Intensive investment J t ;  
denoted 4 the modeled production is obtained by solving the equation 
the difference o r  distance between observed and modeled production is Pt - 4 ;  
the two parameters of the oblique transformation f r o m  L and C to E and J are 
determined so as to minimize the distance Pt - X t  in the sense of Least Squares. 
The equation has either one real root o r  three real  roots; there are two  cases of 
one real root, the case of three real roots is intermediate, and the two one-real- 
root cases define the two equilibria of the model. computation in the first part  of 
the Schumpeter Clock model thus proceeds in three stages: f r o m  L and C to E and 
J ;  f r o m  E and J to X; and third, the least squares minhization of the distance 
pt -4. 
To quote f r o m  Dr.  Mensch's paper at this meeting, the model in Figure 2 has 
been applied to real-world data for an entire industry, be it the total industry of 
the nine OECD countries, o r  the industry of a separate countrJt. 
Splitting up the industrial data into data for separate industrial branches, the 
bi-equilibrium model can be applied to each separate branch. The splitting into 
branches will however make the model very unstable. Hence it is desimble to use 
a holistic approach, making a joint analysis of the separate branches. 
As illustmted by the squares and circles in Figure 2, PLS modeling allows such 
a holistic approach. With total industry split into five branches, the squares illus- 
t rate the branch values of Lt , Ct , and Pt , whereas the circles the industrial totals 
of Lt, Ct, andPt.  
The ensuing nonlinear genemlht ion of the basic PLS algorithm has been the 
aim of the joint work by Dr. Mensch and myself since 1981. Our design of the non- 
linear PLS algorithm is iterative, and each iterative step proceeds in t w o  
sequences of substeps, the first f r o m  L and C to P ,  the second back f r o m  P to L 
and C. Thus f a r  w e  have tested the nonlinear PLS algorithm on simulated data with 
Figure 2: Graphic Illustration of Gerhard Mensch's Bi-Equilibrium Model. Only 
Circles: Original Version with Directly Observed Variables. Circles and Squares: 
PLS Version with Variables Directly Obsemed (Squares) and Directly Observed 
(Circles) 
varying degrees of "inter-branch noise". Next on our agenda is to apply the  PLS 
algorithm to real-world branch data. 
The modeling with variables directly and indirectly observed, variables mani- 
fest and latent, can be expounded by the old proverb: "He doesn't see  the forest 
f o r  mere trees". In terms of a PLS model the forest is a latent variable, and the 
trees are the manifest indicators of the. latent variable. There are models fo r  the 
forest, and other models fo r  the  trees. PLS models both the  forest and the  trees. 
More precisely, the PLS algorithm models the endogenous manifest variables, and 
PLS at the same time estimates the case values (the values fo r  each t )  of the latent 
variables. 
PODEL FXALIJATION 
There are two main types of model evaluation: (1) hypothesis testing, and (ii) 
standard e m r s  f o r  the  estimated unknowns. 
PLS modeling is sob ject to hypothesis testing by Stone-Geisser's test f o r  
predictive relevanoe (1974); see H. Wold (1982). Spaaking generally, the SG 
(Stone-Geisser) test criterion 8' is an R' evaluated without loss of degrees of 
freedom. 
John Tukey's jackknife standard errors (1958, 1977) a r e  obtained as a by- 
product of SG testing; cf. H. Wold (1983). 
In contrast to KL, (Maximam Likelihood) model evaluation, the SG test and 
Tukey's jackknife a r e  distribution-free, and require no assumption about indepen- 
dent observations. 
In consequence, the SG test; the jackknife, and PLS modeling have the same 
wide scope relative to ML modeling. 
C l a s s i c a l  standard errors are  liable to underestimation because of the 
assumption of independent obsemations. To quote f r o m  a recent study the classi- 
cal standard errors are subject to substantial underestimation, often by 502, 1002, 
o r  more; see R. BergsMm and H. Wold (1983). 
ML methock provide asymptotic shtistical inference, asymptotic f o r  large 
samples. In contrast, the SG test and the jackknife are applicable also to fMte 
samples; see H. Wold (1980, 1983). 
This last point is of crucial importance in models that involve strocturd 
change. Thus in the Schurnpeter Clock, again with reference to Figure 1 ,  the con- 
secutive parts of the model f o r  phases W1, Bl, 142, etc., can be tested sepamtely. 
EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC PLS dLGOmTHM 
The basic PLS algorithm is l i n e ;  an exampb is given by Figure 2 if w e  omit 
Xt and q3,  and assmne that Pt is linear in Lt and Ct . The model in Figure 2 is a now 
linear generalization, where the latent variables El,  Jt, and & constitute a 
hierarchical level above Lt and Ct . 
Reference is made to three other genemkatians of the basic PLS algorithm' 
which greatly extend its scope in theory and practice: 
(1) The basic PLS algorithm is designed for scalar data, and can be adapted 
to categorical data and contingency tables; see J.-L. Bertholet and H. 
Wold (1981, 1983). 
(2) The basic PLS algorithm is design& f o r  one-my observation of the vari- 
ables, observing be i t  over time o r  a cross-section. As shown by J.-B. 
Lohmaller by ingenious use of lCronecker products (1981, 1983) the PLS 
approach extends to two-way observation of the variables, be i t  observa- 
tions over time and a cross-section, o r  over two cross-sections. 
(3) The basic PLS algorithm is designed for models where the latent vari- 
ables form a c a d  chain sys tem.  The PLS approach extends to models 
where the latent variables form an Interdependent 0) system; in such a 
case the estimation combines the PLS algorithm with my Fix-Point (FP) 
method f o r  estimation of ID systems with directly observed variables; see 
B.S. Hui (1978,1982). For the FP method, see H. Wold (ed. 1981). 
In his recent important monogrsph Dr. M. Lbch (1983) has (I) shown that my 
FP method for estimation of ID systems can be interpreted as a method for estima- 
tion of linear RE (Rational Expectation) models with one period lead in the future 
expectations, and (fi) extended the F method to RE models that involve several 
leads in the future expectations. 
In these RE models ail variables are directly observed. Dr. L6sch invites us 
to estimate RE models with latent variables, using a combination of the PLS algo- 
rithm with his generalized FP algorithms. 
SOKE OBSEEZYATIONS ON THE LlXUTS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Contribution to the Diurarrion 
Possibilities for 1M-w Long-Wave Behavior 
Discussions of governments' potential role in mitigating the causes of long 
swings in industrial activity ought to be mindful of the gap between academic exer- 
cises in policy design and the realities of policy implementation. To ignore the 
veritable chasm between what a government should do in the best of all worlds and 
what it  can do a e c t i v e l y  in a world suffused with second- and third-best choices 
means to overrate the possibilities of "industrial policy", whatever that much- 
abused term may imply in the way of actions by the state. 
As several discussants have already pointed out, we have recently learned a 
lot about the limitations (failures?) of Keynesian and Monetarist recipes in allevi- 
ating the industrial economies' current malaise. How can w e  be sure that other 
recipes will  be any more successful? 
Let  me mention a number of reasons for my skepticism: 
(1) The "political cycle" in modern democracies almost ipso f a d o  forces 
upon elected officials a planning horizon that is too short for any serious 
attack on structnral problems. 
(2) Even if far-sighted legislators w e r e  to design such an attack, its long- 
term execution would have to rely on a bureaucracy, a powerful and arti- 
culate interest group whofe motivations and resulting actions may in the 
end have little to do with the pursuit of clearly-pronounced legislative 
goals (Peirce, 1981). 
(3) Decisions about industrial policy involve, explicitly or fmplictly, the cen- 
tralized picking of "winners" and 'losers" among sectors. Past experi- 
ence suggests that this also means a centtr3ization of mistakes. There 
is no evidence to suggest that legislators, o r  their agents, are any less 
fallible than "private" decision makers, except that the errors of the 
latter remain diffused and a r e  therefore less likely to do long-lasting 
harm. 
(4) In the case of the United States, at least, the existence of lobbies and 
pressure groups is bound to divert industrial policy in non-ptimal direc- 
tions. As Professor Raymond Vernon has so  aptly pointed out, "the Amer- 
ican political process almost guarantees that the decisions w i l l  be made 
not on economic grounds" (Business Week, June 30, 1980; emphasis 
mine). 
(5) Economic systems have shown themselves extremely resilient (and inert)  
vis4-vis active, interventionist government policies that try to  "lean 
against the wind". On that  count alone, the  record of industrial policy in 
stimulating sectoral growth, alleviating structural unemployment, and 
reviving stagnating regions has been less than enviable. 
Of course all policy recommendations involve nonnative issues, and therefore 
vaiue judgments. I t  would seem to me, however that such judgments should be 
informed by our experience with the limits of government policy. 
Under the circumstances, it may be more fruitful to ask what cument policies, 
rules, and institutions stand in the way of a more vigorous global recovery. Pro- 
tectionism, about whose detrimental effects there  appears to exist almost unani- 
mous agreement, provides but a starting point fo r  such questioning. 
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ITALIAN MULTIBEGIONAL D E X E W P m  LONG WAVES AND BEGIONAL TAKEOFFS 
Giuliann Bianchi, Stefano r-nli.ri-B-uti, and Gi- Utinti 
i. PxExIsE 
Some provisional results of the present step of IRPET1s research stream 
about multiregional differentiations of Italian development a r e  presented in this 
paper. This research stream aims at identifying evidences, patterns, causes and 
effects (relevant to regional poLicy making of the rather diversified behavior 
Italian regions have so f a r  displayed, particnlarly in terms of the different, both 
quantitative and qualitative. reactions to the impact of international and national 
processes and policies. 
Previous steps have been: 
(i) empirical investigations into regional paths of industrial growth since 
the beginning of this aentmy (IRPET and SEI, 1978) and into comparative 
regional development (Casini-Benvenuti, 1980), both leading to asaertain- 
ment of the existence of a number of very distinct regional development 
models; 
(ii) an attempt to formulate intemegional Interdependencies of lbcany 
analytically, by means  of a bi-regional, Tuscany-Rest of Italy input- 
output model (a module of the IRPET regional model system for impact 
analysis and policy evaluation: Martellato, 1982), which confirmed that 
the "two regions" react quite differently even to tbe same impad; 
(iii) a critiaal rethinking about fundamentals (appropriate m e a s u r e s  and spa- 
tial units, nature of driving facbrs ,  growth mechanism) for analyzing the 
'tndtiregionallty" of Italian development (Becatm and Bianchi, 1982). 
It must be stated however that provisional resalts hereafter presented will 
deal mainly with shaping research hypotheses given that the present step of this 
research stream is still at its very beginning. 
The authors of the present paper, not being "tenuredn long wavers but simply 
regional analysts, would wish not to miss the opportunity of the "Long Waves M e e t -  
ing" for receiving - hopefully - some useful criticism and advice for the continua- 
tion of this work. 
2. INTEODUCING TBE HYPOTHESES 
It is sufficient just to cast a glance a t  1981 Census data (Table 1) to ack- 
nowledge interregional differentiation of Italian development. It is apparent that 
such differentiation follows a more complex pattern than the simple dualistic 
scheme of North-South (Southern regions being the seat of I M h n  historical back- 
wardness). 
Table 1: Levels of Industrial Development in Italy (1981) 
Region Tobl Empl.2 hd.Empl. 
Pouulstion Total Emul. 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia RoIMgna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
hiarche 
Lazio 
A b m o  
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
S = g e m  
Nevertheless the recognition of this complexity was, in Ihly ,  a "strenuous" 
feat of research which took some fifteen years. S&sndard economics and econom- 
ists were reluctant to accept the anomnly of the unexpected steady m w t h  of the 
central-north-esstern regions (Figure 1) which took place after the Second World 
War, especially during the 50s and the 60s. 
This was due to the fact that those regions were not only - at the W i n g  
point - f a r  less endowed with productive and social fixed capitals than the regions 
belonging to the so-called ''Industrial Triangle" (Liguria, Piedmont, Lornbardy) but 
had also been even less favored - during the period - by public policies, which 
had mainly been directed to the 'Triangle" (in terms of support to prfvate indrrs- 
try) and to the South (in terms of direct public investments: heavy industry and 
in.€ rastructares). 
So, the anomaly to be explained was two-fold: the growth of cenM-north- 
eastern Regions despite the lack of sbndard prerequisites and the lack of growth 
in the Southern regions despite considerable investments. 
Finally, however, this reality succeeded in being ratified by academic 
research, on the one hand, owing to the efforts of research workers who were less 
inhibited by standard theories, and on the other hand and much more so, due to the 
outstanding performance of the Center-North-East Italy economy which was also 
given the specific name: 'Third Italy". 
Figure 1 Regional Waves of Ihlian Development 
Indeed, not even the 'Three Italies" model represents and interprets Italian 
multiregionality exactly. Taking into consideration the 1951-77 period and the 
peculiarities of regional development, it has been proved (Casini-Benvenuti, 1980) 
that Italian regions can be c b i f i e d  into nine clusters (according to different 
development phases), throngh which regions move if the perlod is split into sub- 
periods (1951-63; 1963-70; 1970-77). In addition it has been suggested (Becattini 
and Bianchi, 1982) that this chssification m&ht vary considerably if different spa- 
tial units and time-periods were assmned. 
Anyway, it is true that whatever classification schemes are adopted the mal- 
tiregional differentiation of Italian development does exist not only in terms of dif- 
ferent forms, structures and levels of growth but also, and more significantly, in 
terms of very diversified regional behavior with regard to: 
- structmal change so f a r  undergone (which enable the identification of 
declining, post-industrial, early mature, and backward regions, as w i l l  be 
seen later on); 
reactivity to short term cycle shocks. 
Natumlly, when searching f o r  an explanation of regional behavior differen- 
tials it is neaessary to look into economic structure disparities among the regions". 
(mix anci specirrrimtion of productions, indudrhdkation levels, peculiar patterns 
of industry location and of production processes). But this recalls, macroscopi- 
cally, the region "families" respectively belonging to each one of the 'Three 
Italies" and hence the times of their industrial take-off, remembering that the 
regions of the "First ItalyJ' (the 'TriangleJ') developed before the Second World 
War; the regions of the 'Third Italy" developed after the Second World War; the 
regions of the "Second ItalyJ' (the South, more o r  less) have not yet developed. 
Figure 2 displays "short waves" of I M h n  regional indusfrid growth, thus 
clearly distinguishing the 'Triangle" from the 'Third ItalyJt and the South. 
On these grounds it seem worthwhile to look for an explanation for the dif-. 
ferent regional behavior looking at the differences in time of the regional take- 
offs. These a re  the reasons why, moping f r o m  analysis of the multiregionality of 
Italian development, we have met, bottom-up, the broader theme of Long Waves, 
normally felt as " fa r  away" regional analysis. 
S. THIRD WAVE UPSWING (1892-1929) AND XULTIEEGIONAL 
D E Y E L O m  OF ITALY 
By common consent, Italy's take-off (1894-1913) is locatad in t h e  wlthin the 
third Long Wave upswing (Rostow, 1978; van Duijn, 1983), which approximately 
comesponds to the upturn phase of the third Kandratiev. Driving foraes of the 
take-off have been identified in heavy (iron and steel) industxy growth and rail- 
road investments. 
If we assume a convenient time period (1881-1911) arormd the Italian gmwth 
peak and measure the country's development by means of new industrial employ- 
ment create in that period and within each region, i t  is easy to assess that Italy's 
take-off is generated by and is made up ofthe take-off of the regions which consti- 
tutes the "Industrial Triangle" (Table 2). 
Investigation into the causes of the development of these regions and of the 
missed opportunities of development of the others is the subject of a vast and 
rather sophisticated literature of economic history. O u r  task here is just to try 
and test whether the working hypothesis (to be examined more thomghly with 
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Figun 2 Indnstrielization Pattern of the Italian Regions 
TABLE 2: New Employment 1881-1911 
Industrial triangle 85.2 
Other regions 14.8 
further research) about meaningful relationships between Long Waves and regional 
t akmf f .  on one side, and differentiated regional behavior, on the other, makes 
sense o r  not. 
In order t o  explain why and how national economies brought about their initial 
'%ig spurt", theory and history of economic development make vast use of concepts 
such as: prerequisites (Rostow), endogenous social and cultural factors (Hirsch- 
mann). economic and noneconomic preconditions (Kuznets). Other authors (e.g., 
Gerschenkron, 1965), while warning about the risk - inherently implicit in every 
attempt to explain successive events through previous ones host hoc, propter hoc) 
- of circular reasoning (e.g. to assume ez-ante as driving seators, those sectors 
you know ez-post have developed), yet do not cease to use the concept of "prere- 
quisites". 
However, our task is not to explain the national take-off, which w e  assume as 
given. W e  have to assess why certain regions participate in and contribute to the 
national t a k m f f ,  whereas other regions do not. Therefore it seems to be more 
appropriate for  our purposes to adopt the notion of "original characters", i.e. 
main features of the various regional situations before the development process 
had started. 
In other words, our idea (even if it is here ra ther  roughly expressed) is that 
it is the interplay of socio-economic structural characters (which are ,  to some 
extent, me asumfJle), regional (both formal and informal) institutions and local 
"social culture" that selects Regions more apt  and/or r&dy to grasp the  oppor- 
tunities of the international Long Wave and national take-off. 
Though bearing in mind the crucial role played by "soft" characters (institu- 
tions and social culture), within the l imits  of this simple numerical exercise, w e  can 
only deal with measurable "original characters", as f a r  as they are represented by 
indicators listed below (most of them a r e  also more o r  less "proxies" of what has 
been termed as "prerequisites", "endogenous factors", etc.). 
So, in this analysis the following variables have been chosen: illiteracy rate, 
child mortality rate, number of university teachers, number of newspapers and 
magazines, railways and roads, bank deposits, weight of light and heavy industry, 
the ratio between male and female workers in industry, and income distribution. 
These variables, by means of factorial analysis, have been grouped into two 
main components (Table 3): the first one identifies a sort  of 'latent modernity", in 
%he definition of  "social culture" w e  adopt is t h e  followlng: "Xnmledge and f a i t h  welded 
together  i n  a basic doctrine which is prmmnt in a l l  t h e  var ious  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  every indivi- 
dud, whatever h i s  o r  her  place i n  s o c i e t y .  This  culture is inhibitory, and is ref lected i n  
t h e  structure of t h e  economy and o f  s o c i e t y ,  that  is t h e  whole s y s t e m  of ins t i tut ions  i n  
which a r e  embodied, whether i n  legal o r  customary form. t h e  principles informing t h e  
behavior of the  population, and a l so  i n  t h e  moral and pol i t ical  philosophy, a t  varous levels 
of elaboration, but always f l t t i n g  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  s o c i a l  c lasses ,  which is used t o  jus t i fy  
and defend that  structure." (A Bertolino, CoqmuzCae tnternaztonde e svUuppo 
econ-ntco, Firenee, La Nuova Italia, 1961). 
the sense of potential reactivity ~i the regional system to exogenous shocks; the 
second one identifies a factor related to infrastructure equipment. 
Table 3 Main Saturation Coefficients - 1881 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Light industry 
Heavy industry 
Male/Female 
Illiteracy rate 
Railways 
Roads 
Deposits 
Child mortality rate 
University teachers 
Newspapers 
Interest and Rents 
Prof its 
Independent work income 
Variance explained 
According to the values of the two factors in each region the following points 
can be made: 
(1) There is great disparity between the central-northern regions and the 
southern ones in terms of 'latent modernity" but not in terms of "infras- 
t ructure equipment"; 
(2) Within the f irst  group of regions, however, the 'industrial Triangle" is 
not so privileged with regard to the two factors (Table 4). 
So the regression analysis between the industrial growth (measured in 
terms of new employment p e r  1000 inhabitants in the period 1881-1911) and 
the above mentioned factors shows that only the factor  1 has a significant 
positive relationships with the dependent variable. 
where the figures in brackets r e fe r  to "t Student" value. 
Summarizing, the ability of the regions of taking the opportunity of a 
world upswing seems to be related more to  social and c u l t d  features than to 
strictly economic ones. 
Hereby stems the suspicion that  the  unexplained residual of our  indica- 
tors' variability might be attributed to policy influence. Policies cannot gen- 
erate upswing even if they can delay its effects in terms of take-off. But poli- 
cies can greatly affect spatial distribution of a given take-off: an example of 
this is that  Tuscany 'hissed" the opportunity of the Italian take off, despite 
the fact that the Region "appeared to be a suitable site fo r  a process of 
Table 4 Regional Values of the Factors - 1881 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abruzzi Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
industrialization as intensive ... as that which occurred subsequently in areas 
such as Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria" (Becattini, 1979). And this was due, 
mainly if not only, to the anti-industrial attitude of the Tuscan ruling class. 
During the  next downswing (1929-1948) of the same Long Wave no new 
regional take off occurs, according to the "general rule" for  national take- 
off, whereas the new developed regions (the 'Triangle") reinforced their  
position, thus increasing interregional disparities (Table 5). This looks like a 
confirmation, at a regional scale, of the hypothesis which says "after a coun- 
t ry  has taken off, i t  will be less affected by the next downswing" (van Duijn, 
1983). 
4. HULTIREGIONAL DEYELOPXXNT IN ITALY DURING THE FOUETH 
LONG WAVE UPSWING (1948-73) 
The sophisticated debate about Italian economic growth within the fourth 
world Long Wave has been copious and comprises many different interpreta- 
tions of the causes and characters of the rapid postwar growth. A common 
feature is that most of the authors emphasize the role, among the external 
factors, of an increasing demand of durable consumer items. However w e  a r e  
not going to enter into the debate; our aim is to observe that the reaction of 
Italian economy to this external push was, once again, spatially differentiated 
even if this time there was a wide process of industridhation almost every- 
where. 
So, during this world upswing, the take-off of the new regions became the 
driving force, together with the oldest industrialized regions, of Italian 
economic development. With the only exception of Liguria (in a declining 
phase) all the central-northern regions have created a large amount of 
further employment, but differently from the previous upswing, now the most 
dynamic regions are Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria and Marche. 
T a b l e  5 Regional Levels of Indus tdza t ion  Level 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abruzzi Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Table  6 New Employment - 1951-81 
Region Employees X 1.000 
inhabitants 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Rorngna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abruzzi e Molise 
Campana 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicflia 
Sardegna 
Given the external push of an increasing consumer demand the debate 
has concentrated on the internal factors that allow the single region take-off. 
The main factors identified in literature a re ,  generally, related to the 
economic conditions (in the sense of pre-existence of an industrialization pr* 
cess connected with the  agricultural crisis), but also social and cultural fac- 
tors  that define a sort of entrepreneur ability have enough room in these 
interpretations. 
Therefore the  variables w e  now consider are related to t he  phenomena 
already analyzed in the  previous upswing with the  addition of t he  social stra- 
tification aimed at detecting a s o r t  of 'latent entrepreneurship". 
The factorial analysis enables the  identification of two main factors  
(Table 7) :  
The f i r s t  one identifies a cluster of variables which are related to a 
previously reached industrialization level, and so this fac tor  scores 
high positive value in the  f i r s t  take-off regions (the Industrial Tri- 
angle); 
The second one identifies social and infrustructural conditions f o r  
industrial development, t he  "latent capability"; according to Table 8 
this fac tor  is mainly present in the  Centrai-North-Eastern regions. 
Table 7 Main Satmation Coefficient 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Light industry 
Heavy industry 
Mechanics 
Railways 
Deposits 
University teachers  
Newspapers 
Agr. bourgeoisie 
Ind. bourgeoisie 
Illiteracy rate 
Roads 
Child mortality rate 
Z of explained variance 66 21 
The regression analysis shows tha t  only this second fac tor  has a signifi- 
cant relationship with the  industrial growth measured. as in the  previous 
period, in terms of new employment p e r  1000 inhabitants between 1951 and 
1981. 
The ro le  fac tor  2 plays in explaining variability fits in very w e l l  with 
what w e  know about development models of the  'Third Italy" regions. 
The ' latent entrepreneurship" within the  rank and file of agricultural 
independent workers ("sharecroppers") and craftsmen (both accustomed to 
production and market decisions) w a s  one of t he  most powerful forces of t he  
peculiar industrialization process which took place in those areas. Differ- 
ences among regions are not insignificant, but t he  common features  are more 
relevant: industrialization driven by a multitude of small firms, operating in 
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T a b l e  8 Regional Values of the Factors - 1951 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abruzzi e Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
light industry sectors markedly export oriented, with very specialized pro- 
duction cycles, and spatially arranged in specialized networks of industrial 
units, thus generating terr i torial  systems (recently termed as "industrial dis- 
tricts"), which produce remarkable flows of economies, external to  the single 
firm and even to  the  industrial sector, but internal to the "sectoral-social- 
territorial" network (IRPET, 1975; Bagnasco, 1977). 
As our  data series include the period af ter  1973 the ("oil crisis" nor- 
mally assumed as the starting point of a new downswing), it is worthwhiie to 
stress the  excellent performance of these regions during the current  down- 
turn, as compared with the behavior of the other regions. Let us  derive from 
this a f e w  brief remarks. 
Flexibility and external economies of small business systems are of 
course more appropriate than rigidity and scale economies of large plants for  
competition in increasingly unstable international markets. However, the 
small business model should no longer be interpreted as an accident in the 
history of development nor as a temporary production expedient to cope with 
"nervous" markets. As i t  has been proved the "model of decentralized, flexi- 
ble production, based on general purpose machines and skilled workers" can 
also be correctly regarded as a possible historical alternative to mass pro- 
duction by means of Large factories (Sabel and Zeitlln, 1981). 
Finally, i t  should be pointed out that van Duijn's hypothesis seems to 
receive new support from the  evidence that: regions which took-off within 
this Long Wave have been less affected by the last downswing than regions 
which took off before (or have not been affected a t  all). 
5. THE H U L ~ G I O N A L  DEYELOPHENT IN A SECULAR PEESPECTIYE: 
AN ATTEMPT AT GENERALIZATION 
The different behavior patterns of the Italian regions during the up and 
downswing of the last 150 years may suggest that each region has i ts  own 
development path. 
-4ctually, the data  seem t o  underline the  existence of a common growth 
,pat tern in terms of industrialization f o r  all of them even though each of them 
has i ts  own peculiarity in terms of the s tage o r  level reached. This evidence 
suggests tha t  one should endeavor t o  make the  research  hypothesis more gen- 
eral. 
For this purpose a function, which is appropriate  f o r  the  regional and 
national data  observed, has  been worked out. This functional representation 
permits: 
t he  evaluation of secular  movements of Italian development from a 
multiregional view point; 
some tentative interpretations based on functidn parameters  and 
limits. 
The actual evolution of the  industrialization process  in t h e  regions 
appears  t o  follow five different stages within the  analyzed period: 
a decline in total  industrial employment in the  less structured activi- 
t ies occumed mostly in the  female labor  forces  of the traditional 
sec tors  and w a s  caused, generally, by the  market opening up; 
the  stagnation of industry before the  actual take-off; 
the  rapid growth starting from the  take-off; 
a reduced employment increase during the  industrial maturity; 
the  decline in a "post-industrialized" economy. 
The logistic function, often used f o r  this kind of phenomena, does not 
allow us t o  include the  f i r s t  and the  last stage of t he  industrialization process,  
so  w e  have used a similar function which is able to  introduce these five stages. 
So w e  have adapted a function with these features: 
where the  th ree  parameters  F, b and u point out: respectively, the  long- 
period level of industrialization, the  rapidity of growth, the y e a r  in which, 
a f t e r  the  take-off, t he  growth rate began t o  decrease. 
The function (1) f i ts  in very well  with the  observed data  of t he  Italian 
regions, with few exceptions, as the  Theil index shows (Table 9). 
The estimated functions point out the  existence, within the same period, 
of regions at different stages of growth, and w e  can observe also how the  dif- 
f e ren t  take-off period seems to influence the  long-term level of industrializa- 
tion. 
By analyzing the  values of the  parameters and, as a consequence, the 
behavior of the regional curves w e  may identify four  main clusters of regions 
(see Figure 2): 
the  oldest industrialized regions (Liguria) now declining t o  a low 
industrialization level (152 industrial workers p e r  1000 inhabi- 
tants); 
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Table 9 Parameters of Estimated F'unction 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abruzzo 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
ITALIA 84.2 2.20 126.7 968 
the  oldest industrialized regions (Piemonte and Lombardia) in post- 
industrial maturity with a high long-term industrialhation level 
which has already been attained; 
the "second-comers" regions in a phase of early maturity, with no 
growth of industrialization at a lower level than the previous ones 
(Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche); 
regions of miscarried development (Campania, Calabria, Sicilia), 
whose long term industrialization level w i l l  remain, in any case, very 
low. 
6. OUTLINE OF THE EYPOTHESES 
The two final decades of the present century seem to put a "ceiling" on 
regional growth, in terms of industrialization levels, according to the implicit 
rule "the earlier the  tak-ff, the  higher the  level". 
Should this statement be true (but w e  are somewhat doubtful), two conse- 
quences would follow (about which w e  are even more hesitant): 
entire regonal trajectories through tak-ff4evelopment-maturity 
would be contained within the  present Long Wave whose limit would 
act as a "wall" against possible fur ther  regional growth; 
thereafter ,  trajectory lengths, being given the ending point (dies 
ad quem), would only depend on the starting point (dies a quo: 
tak-ff date). 
This "ceiling and wal l"  hypothesis would match - too attractively! - the 
idea that  the current  Long Wave downswing will close the whole "hypercycle" 
consisting of the  four Kondratievs. 'Though this be madness, yet the re  is 
method in it": indeed, authoritative scientists have asserted "we are the  
witnesses of the transition from a growth economy to an equilibrium economy" 
so that "future historians will divide the economic history of man into three 
major periods: the pre-industrial period, the industrialization e r a  and the 
post-industrial period". 
Even though our aim is not to project the regional curves mechanically, 
we can however, observe that, at the national level (Figure 2), but also in 
many regions, the maximum level of industrialization has already been 
reached o r  near about to be reached, and so the effects of the industrializa- 
tion era seems to be exhausted. Starting from this hypothesis we can assmne 
that the opportunity of profit of the "new" Long Wave (if any) should be 
located where the environment appears more favorable for  innovations. 
For this purpose a new factorial analysis on the main regional charac- 
teristics in 1981 has been worked out, by inserting, with the old variables, 
new ones probably linked to this "potential reactivity" to innovations (private 
and public expenditure research and professional training courses). 
The results of this factorial analysis (Table 10) confirm that a factor 
"propensity to innovations" appears to exist and that its spatial location 
would, again, discriminate between Central-Northern regions and the southern 
ones, even if within the first group the new relevance of Emilia Romagna sets 
the decline trend of Liguria (Table 11). 
Table 10 Main Satmation Coefficients - 1981 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Metal and mechanical industry 
Light industry 
Letteracy level 
Roads 
Deposits 
University teachers 
Theatrical events 
Professional training courses 
Child mortality ra te  
Scientific research 
Z of explained variance 
7. P'INALREWllRKs 
First of all, the limits of our preliminary findings m u s t  be clearly pointed 
out. Some of these h i t s  s t e m  f r o m  analysis criteria. In our view the most 
crucial questions are: 
Which a re ,  actually, the infmnational systems? Elsewhere (Becattini 
and Bianchi, 1982) we questioned whether Italian administrative 
regions a r e  true systems, arguing that "daily-urban-systems" hold 
more neat system requiskes (boundaries, feed-back mechanism, 
observable behavior); 
Table 11 Regional Values of Factor 1 ('Tropensity to innovation"?) 
Piemonte 
Lombardia 
Veneto 
Liguria 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Abrvzzi e Molise 
Carnpania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
How does growth diffuse. interregionally, during the  second bunch 
of regional t a k m f f s  in Italy? Does i t  really proceed from a 
"center" (which is seen, at the  same time, as geographical industry 
location and t h e  ideal place of capitalistic accumulation) towards its 
"periphery"? o r  i s  i t  not r a t h e r  a much more complex movement of 
local entrepreneurship upsurges? 
To what extent did .the nonmeasurable original charac ters  (local 
institutions and social culture: Ort- und Zeitgeist) affect t a k m f f  
dynamics and still influence regional behavior? 
Some o the r  l imi t s  s t e m  from interregional interdependencies. Given a 
certain "amount of growth" historically available f o r  a certain country how is 
i t  distributed among t h e  regions? On one hand, t h e  problem looks as risky as 
the chicken-and-egg question: the  "amount of growth" historically available 
fo r  a certain country is the  amount the  country i s  able to capture according 
t o  its original characters;  but t he  country's endowment of original charac ters  
is t he  synthesis of t he  regional endowments.. . 
On t h e  o the r  hand, t h e  problem challenges researchers  to distinguish 
sharply between the  original charac ters  of t h e  country which derive from the  
regional ones and the  original charac ters  of t he  country as a whole (mobility 
of productive factors,  labor  f i r s t  of all, through regional boundaries provides 
an example of this). 
I t  i s  enough - w e  hope - to suggest t ha t  the  authors of this paper  are not 
so candid as to believe tha t  regional development processes might be 
represented by means of a simple function. Nevertheless what w e  do really 
believe i s  tha t  regional behavior and differences in t i m e  of regional take-off 
are meaningfully related and tha t  a closer acquaintance with multiregionallty 
of Italian development will demonstrate it. 
Secondly, w e  would dare to say tha t  some hypotheses have not been con- 
t rasted by preliminary findings so f a r  achieved, s o  tha t  i t  would s e e m  
worthwhile to go into them more deeply with fur ther  research.  
(i) Spatial effects of Long Wave impacts are relevant to multiregional 
analysis, namely in order  to explain the coexistence, within the same 
country, of regions at different phases of development; on the other 
hand, little attention has been devoted up to now to this aspect of 
multiregional analysis: not surprisingly, if - as Pollard complains - 
"the regional element has been neglected in the past" also in the 
field of history of industrialization, despite the fact  that "industrial 
growth is essentially a local ra ther  than a national affair". 
(ii) The balance "public policies ve rms  market forces" in affecting spa- 
tial distribution of Long Wave impact effects should be accurately 
assessed over different upswings; for  instance, one may wonder why 
public policies in Italy s e e m e d  to be fairly effective in locating spa- 
tial effects of the t a k ~ f f  during the early years of industrializa- 
tion (when public intervention was quite limited), whereas are 
market forces, beyond doubt, to drive the process during the post 
Second World W a r  upswing, despite the  massive State capital invest- 
ments. 
(iii) The less negative impact of downswing on a country which has taken 
off during the precedent upswing has been verified also at a 
regional scale. 
On the contrary, even i t  if is quite appealing, the "ceiling and wall" 
hypothesis deserves to be carefully tested not only on the ground of empirical 
data (which suggested the hypothesis) but also, and f irst  of all, taking into 
account 
(a) the industrial-post-industrial transition ("ceiling and wall" s e e m  to 
limit only levels of industrialization - nothing can be said about 
growth driven, e.g. by service sectors) and 
(b) the  interplay between international-interregional division of labor 
(potential increases of "mature" sector employment can be captured 
abroad: for  instance by less developed countries). 
Thirdly, and finally, w e  would attempt to d m w  some hints f r o m  previous 
discussion, mainly addressed to policy making. Of course, one must be aware 
of the dramatic disparity between the epoch and world dimensions of operat- 
ing processes, when Long Waves are the subject, and the  very limited regional 
powers. However w e  feel there  is room for  action. 
I t  is true that national economic policies seem to shut themselves up in 
very narrow horizons as f a r  as they are mainly concerned with the illusion of 
recovering lost conditions of steady growth by controlling inflation only by 
means of controlling labor costs and public expenditure. 
But i t  is only a supplementary difficulty fo r  the regional policy-makers: 
yet, w e  repeat,  there  is room for action. Even at regional scale if the chal- 
lenge is to create and to enhance a climate favorable for  innovation through 
"active public policy", "creative management", "political innovations" 
(Forrester, Reeman). 
Guidelines for  regional policies are virtually compulsory and are neces- 
sary so as to refrain from scattering human and monetary resources on a lot 
of irrelevant projects in order  to concentrate them in critical mass available 
for  truly relevant policies aimed at: ' 
improving existing endowments of natural resources and human capi- 
tal; 
reducing external diseconomies, stemming from insufficient public 
services and from the scarcity of social fixed capital (infrastruc- 
ture), which heavily affect economic performance of the regional 
system as a whole; 
creating appropriate tools for  understanding the R&D demand impli- 
cit beneath the present state of productive sectors in order to pro- 
vide efficient linkages with R&D supply (in other words: public and 
private sectors need less bureaucratic staff and more "intelligence 
units "). 
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LONGTEKK ECONOMC F'LUCTUATIONS: A SPATIAL VJEW 
Peter  Nij- 
INTBODUCTION 
In recent years, the issue of qualitative and structural changes in dynamic 
systems has increasingly received attention in the social sciences. Differential 
topology, polyhedral dynamics, singularity theory, bifurcation theory and catas- 
trophe theory are some of the mathematical representations of the increased 
interest in the qualitative aspects of evolutions of complex systems (cf. Cas t i  
1979). 
Especially if a system is driven by mutually conflicting forces (e.g., differ- 
ences in short-run and long-run adjustments, opposite interest groups, etc.), the 
behavior of normally continuous and stable models may exhibit various perturba- 
tions (including shocks). Smooth transitions may evolve into sudden changes due to 
rigidity in adjustment processes, inertia in decision-making, o r  different time 
paths (e.g., slow and fast dynamics) of components of interdependent systems. 
Changes in the qualitative structure of complex systems can thus hardly be studied 
by means of conventional algebraic tools, so that there is a need fo r  models deal- 
ing with structural  dynarmics. 
Structural dynamics has to be distinguished f r o m  constrained dynamics (see 
Nijkamp and Schubert 1983). Constrained dynamics is a feature of a system in 
which the time dimension plays an intrinsically important role in the evolution of 
response o r  control variables without however affecting the structure of the sys- 
tem itself (in the sense of changes in the formal linkages between systems com- 
ponents, in structural parameters, o r  in the impact pattern of t i m e  itself). Struc- 
tural dynamics, on the other hand, m e a n s  that a dynamic system is not only showing 
a shift in response o r  control variables, but also in the parameters and relation- 
ships defining its structure. In such cases, not only the stability of equilibrium 
points in the system may be affected, but the s y s t e m  as a whole may exhibit a new 
topology of systems trajectories (cf. Dendrinos 1981, Haag 1983, Nijkamp 1982a, 
and Wilson 1981). 
Systems characterized by structnral dynamics may lead to unstable behavior, 
especially if the parameters of a (usually non-linear) dynamic system reach a criti- 
cal limit, beyond which the system displays a different set of structural relation- 
ships. 
The present paper wil l  address the issue of long-term spatial fluctuations, 
with a special view of urban systems. Attention will be paid to various theories on 
spatial dynamics and long-term fluctuations, particularly those which are able to 
generate o r  to explain structural changes. 
In this paper, f luctuat ions will be used as a general term to indicate any 
long-term trajectory of a dynamic system. Consequently, fluctuations may include 
discontinuous shocks, oscillatory behavior such as smooth periodic cycles and 
stable random variations, and even chaotic fluctuations. Fluctuations may be 
regarded as a more general evolutionary pattern than cycles (periodic and stable 
fluctuations) and waves (regular economic oscillations with regular time intervals). 
Two classes of explanations may be distinguished that  aim at providing more 
insight into spatial dynamics: 
Theories that explain structural changes in a spatial system (a city, a 
region) on the  basis of a t e -  factors outside the  spatial system itself. 
Theories that  explain structural changes in a s y s t e m  on the basis of 
in ternal  factors  causing a shift in the systems structure. 
Both classes w i l l  be dealt with in this paper, but f i rs t  a concise overview of some 
major contributions to the field of spatial (notably urban) dynamics will be given. 
SO= THEORIES ON SPATIAL DYNAMICS 
Regional and urban systems appear to pass through complicated development 
processes caused by structural dynamics and urban-regional-national interrela- 
tionships. Such turbulent movements reflect in each stage the interactions of dif- 
ferent  dynamics with both multiplying and dampening effects, as w e l l  as thresholds 
of system responses. The identification of key variables and regularities in com- 
plex dynamic spatial systems is essential fo r  planning and adaptive management. 
Such a research issue is not only of theoretical relevance, but has also a pro- 
found practical meaning. For instance, in the  past decades spatial discrepancies 
between regions in Europe have tended to increase r a t h e r  than decrease; some 
areas (the Ruhr area ,  the  greater Paris region, the  Dutch Rimcity) have become 
bet ter  off compared to other  areas (e.g., the  Italian Mezzoogiorno, Ireland). Simi- 
lar developments can be  observed at an intranational level, where sometimes the 
discrepancies between cities and regions are growing, though interregional 
discrepancies may decline. The same remarks can be made regarding industrial 
evolution in the  past decades: several industrial sectors (e.g., textile) are almost 
dying, whereas others  (e.g . , micro-electronics) are flourishing. Consequently, if 
w e  measure the  evolution of variables (e.g., production growth, productivity rise, 
demand for Labor) at a nution& level, w e  are only observing the top of the ice- 
berg and do not get adequate insight into the underlying mechanisms which act as 
driving forces fo r  the whole economy. Only by means of a more detailed analysis of 
regions, cities and sectors,  w e  may arr ive  at more fruitful insight into the causes 
of stable growth in some areas,  cyclical movements in other  areas o r  even stable 
stagnation in others. 
A concise overview of a selected set of spatial dynamic theories may illustrate 
the previous remarks. Eight contributions will be  dealt with here, viz. Thomas 
(1972), Wed (1977), Jacobs (1977), Norton (1979), Van den Berg, et al. (1981), 
Allen (1981), Wilson (1981), and Nijkamp (1983). A m o r e  extensive review of 
theories on spatial dynamics can be found in Nijkamp et al. (1983). 
77mrnrrs has made a study of urban fluctuations, mainly in American cities. 
Taking fo r  granted a Schumpeterian view, he concentrated mainly on the  urban 
impacts of immigration before World W a r  11. He w a s  able to show the  presence of 
wave-like fluctuations in these cities, caused by waves or urban immigration flows 
having an impact on the construction, building and housing sector. This close link 
between urban fluctuations and economic growth ceased after  World W a r  II due to 
more severe restrictions on urban immigrants to the USA. 
Red has made a profound study of the evolution of (mafnly industrial) cities 
with particular emphasis on cumulative and circular feedback processes. Growth 
of industries and growth of population appear to interact with  one another, while 
scale and agglomeration economies and regional export orientation (via economic 
base multipliers) favor spatial (especially urban) economic growth processes. 
These processes are in turn induced by technological innovations. Therefore, 
adoption and diffusion of innovation is of crucial importance f o r  spatial dynamics. 
Red has demonstrated that both Western Europe and the USA exhibit industrial 
evolution and spatial growth patterns, in which a multiple-nuclei structure (includ- 
ing spatial interactions) caused by innovation diffusion and improved comrnuniua- 
tion infrastr?lcture leads to integrated spatial-urban growth process. 
&cobs has explained urban fluctuations f r o m  shifts in the variety of functions 
(e.g., living, working, shopping, recreation) in a city. In her  view an optimal urban 
diversity should exhibit a great deal of dlfferent functions, a variable age struc- 
ture of buildings, a good accessibility of urban amenities, and a satisfactory spa- 
tial concentration of the urban inhabitants. An optimal diversity may lead to an 
efficient use of urban amenities, while Lack of diversity may cause a downward 
spfral movement of cities. On the other hand, if a city has too many attractive 
functions, a self-destruction leading to congestion, environmental decay and end- 
less h d - u s e  competition may take place, a t  last in a f ree  market system. 
Norton has examined urban life cycles in the USA. He claimed that stagnation 
o r  decline of older cities may be caused by a compact land we pattern, a strong 
social and ethnic segregation and an inadequate tax base (through which rich peo- 
ple are leaving the city). In his view, modern cities have a higher growth poten- 
tial, as they are more spacious, less segregated and more tax-efficient. The weak 
base of older cities is even reinforced due to their industrial orientation which 
originated already in the last century, so that these cities could not compete with 
m o d e r n  cities mainly based on the tertiary and quaternary sector. Thus lack of 
innovative forces has caused the decline of older urban areas in favor of modern 
cities. 
Van den Berg et aL. have also made an attempt at studying spatio-temporal 
development processes of urban agglomerations. In their view an urban 
agglomeration is made up of two subareas, viz. a core (center) and a ring (fringe). 
Then spatio-temporal processes can be observed and analyzed via the diverging 
evolution of both the core and the ring, as both subareas display dlfferent growth 
rates. This leads to a phase-wise growth process: urbanization, suburbadzation, 
desurbanization and re-urbanization. Such fluctuations for  urban agglomerations 
appear to emerge in many countries. 
RUen at aL. have studied spatio-temporal growth processes by means of 
models  for  human settlements and structures as dynamics of self+rganizing sys- 
tems. Special emphasis has been placed on non-linear dynamic models which w e r e  
able to generate structural changes. In doing so, links to decision-making, 
behavioral spatial interaction patterns and multi-level structures have been taken 
into consideration. Such models  served to provide analytical insight into the 
motives and impacts of transportation, migration, employment and growth in spatial 
economic self-structuring processes. By means of simulation experiments, the 
economic resurgence and fluctuation (including cyclical processes) could be imi- 
tated. These m o d e l s  were mainly based on attraction and repulsion effects for 
urban agglomerations (including bottleneck factors). 
Wilson has made several contributions to an analysis of spatio-temporal 
growth processes, in which the notion of structural change plays a crucial role. He 
has also built a dynamic model encompassing employment, housing and retailing, 
mainly based on a Lowry-type of approach. Consequently, i t  is assumed that urban 
inhabitants orient their  residential choice decisions toward the labor market, 
while retail facilities follow the demand for  services. Due to non-hearities in 
these dynamic models (in a difference equation form), complex dynamic evolutions 
of the spatial system may emerge (inter aLia oscillations and bifurcations). 
Nijkamp has studied the evolution of a spatial s y s t e m  f r o m  the viewpoint of 
(dynamic) production theory. The production generated in a certain spatial system 
is assumed to be the result of a combination of productive capital investments, 
infmstructure investments (in a broad sense), and investments in innovation. On 
the basis of an  optimal control model, the fluctuation in the system at hand can be 
reduced by choosing the appropriate controls in terms of savings rates for  the 
respective categories of capital investments. 
The conclusion f r o m  the previous concise overview is that a unifying theory 
for  spatio-temporal dynamics is still lacking. Though i t  has often been indicated 
that  technological innovation is a key factor fo r  such dynamics, hardly any attempt 
has been made t o  treat innovation as an endogenous impulse in spatio-temporal 
growth processes. Some examples in a spatial context however can be found in. 
Andersson (1981), Batten (1981). Dendrinos (1981), and Isard and Liossatos (1979). 
I t  is evident, that  especially in the context of the 'long wave' debate an endogenous 
treatment of technology is of utmost importance. 
The foregoing eight contributions to spatio-temporal dynamics may be sum- 
marized in a table indicating whether (1) innovation is regarded as a key factor for  
spatio-temporal growth, (2) the analysis is - at least in principle - able to gen- 
erate fluctuations, (3) bottleneck factors in spatio-temporal growth processes are 
taken into account, and (4) a formal dynamic model has be used. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
authors innovation fluctuations bottlenecks dynamic model 
Pred x x 
Thomas x x x x 
Jacobs x x 
Norton x x x 
van den Berg 
et al. x x 
Allen et a1 x x 
Wilson x x x 
Nijkamp x x x x 
Table 1 Typology of theories on spatiotemporal dynamics 
THE LONG WAVE DEBATE 
In the present section, a concise overview of the long wave debate will be 
given, in order  to build a bridge between spatio-temporal growth theories and long 
wave theories. 
The past decade has been marked by a diversity of structural economic 
changes (including spatial dynamics). Clearly, shocks and perturbations are no 
new phenomena in the history of the world, witness the l o w  lasting debate in 
economics on cyclical growth patterns, and in particular long wave patterns (see, 
for instance, Adelman 1965, and Schumpeter 1939). 
In the past decade, there has also been a revival of analytical contributions 
to the analysis of long-term economic fluctuations, so as to provide contemporary 
explanations for  the emergence of profound changes in the Western economies. 
The present economic stagnation, the uncertainty regarding the supply of natural 
resources, the gap between the Western and the Third world, and the unsatisfac- 
tory control of our economies have induced a new interest in theories and methods 
concentrating on long-run dynamics. 
The issue of long-term fluctuations (including perturbations, balanced growth, 
unstable equilibrium trajectories, spatio-temporal discrepancies, etc.) has led to a 
renewed interest in Kondratieff's theory on long waves (see also Clark, et al. 1981, 
Delbeke 1981, van Duijn 1979, Freeman, et el. 1982, blandel 1980, and Rostow 
1978). Kondratieff's theory takes for  grunted that the long-run fluctuations of a 
f ree  market system can be chmcter ized  by regular cycles of approximately 50 
years, marked by five stages: t a k ~ f f ,  rapid growth, maturation, saturation and 
decline. 
Despite the abundance of llterature on long waves, there is not very much 
empirical evidence regarding the existence of long waves in the history of Western 
economies. Only a f e w  attempts have been made to satisfactorily demonstrate the 
existence of regular long-term cycles. In addition, 'proofs' for  the existence of 
long waves have usually been based on price data, so that biased conclusions a r e  
most llkely to emerge. Consequently, apart  f r o m  Schumpeter (1939), in the past 
most economists have regarded long waves as exceptional cases of economic 
dynamics (cf . Mass 1980). 
In recent years however, new attempts have been made to find a more 
rigorous empirical basis for  the long wave hypothesis (see, for instance, Clark, e t  
al. 1981, Kleinknecht 1981, and Mensch 1979). It is clear that the identification of 
long waves requires a very extensive data base, which is not available in many 
countries (see Bieshaar and Kleinknecht 1983). 
An additional problem is cawed by the question whether o r  not a l o w  wave 
pattern is the result of mdogmous forces within an economic system. 
Endogeneity of long waves requires a theory, which is able to explain the state of 
the economy at each phase of a long wave (such as prosperity, recession, depres- 
sion o r  recovery) f r o m  economic and technological conditions f r o m  previous 
stages. In this regard, it is a fundamental isme whether the level of a lower turn- 
ing point and its subsequent upswing can be explained f r o m  technological progress, 
innovation and economic conditions during the preceding downswing of the econ- 
omy. It is evident, that in this respect endogeneity of technology is a basic issue 
(see Heertje 1981). 
Another evident problem in l o w  wave research is the identification of the 
timespan of the cycles. In the economic lltemture, several cyclical patterns have 
been distinguished, such as Kondratieff cycles (40 to 50 years), Kuznets cycles (15 
to 25 years), Juglar cycles (5 to 15 years) and business cycles (up to 5 years). The 
real-world pattern of economic evolution is evidently based on a super-imposition 
of all these cycles, so that it is extremely difficult to identify one specific class of 
cycles (though temporal cross-spectral analysis may be a helpful instnrment in this 
respect). 
Given the economic stagnation in many countries it is no surprise that a 
Schumpeterian approach to long wave analyses has gained much popularity, though 
i t  has to be added that Schumpeter's writings on innovation, market structure and 
industrial concentration a r e  not always clear (see also Dasgupta 1982, Futia 1980, 
Loury 1980, Rosenberg 1976, and Von Wei-cker 1980). In addition to 
Schumpeter's approach, various alternative explanations have been given to the 
long wave phenomenon, some of which may be speculative due to lack of satisfac- 
tory data. Only a concise overview of various alternative modes of thinking will be 
given here. 
monetary theories: based on an inverse relationship between exploita- 
tion of new gold fields and price level (Dupriez 1947). 
resource fheories: based on long-term international fluctuations caused 
by variations in the supply of food stuff and r a w  materials (cf. Rostow 
1978). 
inertia fheories= based on rigid adjustment patterns of agricultural pro- 
duction to industrial inputs, so that industrial expansion leads to excess 
demand and thus high profits in the agricultural sector: the rBSnlting new 
investments in the agricultural sector may lead to overproduction and 
lower prices for agricultural products, so that then the industrial sector 
may expand due to low prices for  inputs from the agriculture sector, and 
so forth (cf. Delbeke 1981). 
competition fheories: based on a free-enterprise system, which leads to 
an acceleration and deceleration of capital accumulation and hence to 
varying profit rates; a downswing of the economy (with declining profit 
rates) may be coped with by means of more efficient technologies, capital 
saving innovations o r  wage declines (cf. Mandel1980). 
capital theories: based on cyclical movements of capital costs, invest- 
ments and economic growth, caused in te r  d i a  by indivisibilities, thres- 
hold effects and long gestation periods of productive capital; examples of 
such over- and underinvestments situations can be found in vintage and 
puttyclay models (cf. Clark 1980, Graham and Senge 1980, and Heertje 
1981). 
acceleration theories: based on multiplier and acceleration mechanisms 
caused by discontinuous capital stock adjustments precluding smooth 
adjustments, so that a fine tuning does not take place (cf. Forrester 
1977). 
innovation theories: based on laok of adjustment (or lack of diffusion) 
of innovations to structural economic changes (cf. Clark, et al. 1981, 
Kleinknecht 1981, and Mensch 1979); this issue will be further taken up 
in the next section. 
STRUCTURAL CEANGES IN SPACE AND TIHE 
The above mentioned theories on long waves have one feature in common, viz. 
the emphasis on structural changes in the economy. They offer however, different 
explanations for  long-term economic fluctuations. In almost all theories one 
important element is missing, viz. attention for  the element of space both as a driv- 
ing and a constraining factor for  economic dynamics. I t  has already been demon- 
strated in section two that various theories on spatial dynamics have been 
designed, although only a few of them take into consideration the explanations 
developed in the long wave debate. I t  may therefore be meaningful to indicate the 
extent to which spatial dimensions a r e  present in the above mentioned seven 
theories on long waves. The following spat id  levels may be distinguished: global, 
national and regional/urban. By classifying these theories according to the spatial 
scale assumed in each of them, the following typology can be obtained (see Table 
2). 
I 
spatial dimension 
theories global national regional/urban 
monetary x 
resowoe x 
inertia x x 
competition x x 
capital x x 
acceleration x x 
innovation x x 
Table 2 Spatial Typology of Long Wave Theories 
As mentioned above, space may be a driving force of economic development, 
as i t  may shape the conditions under which an accelerated growth may emerge (for 
instance, the forward and backward accessibility of the port of Rotterdam). On the 
other hand, space may also act  as a constraining factor hampering the t akmf f  of 
economic growth (for instance, the unfavorable physical conditions and poor 
accessibility of the region of Calabria in Southern Italy). 
In general, one' may argue that structural changes in a spatial economic sys- 
t e m  are related to two phenomena: 
unsafiszrU:tory threshaid vrrlues, which preclude an area from reaching 
a take-off stage for  economic development (e.g., bad climatological con- 
ditions); 
constraining botueneck factors, which hamper a further economic 
development of an area  due to Limits to growth (e.g., congestion). 
Both threshold values and bottleneck factors are closely W e d  to innovation and 
to public policy, so that in the context of this article on economic fluctuations in 
space and time i t  is necessary to pay more specific attention to both innovation 
and public policy. 
INNOVATIONS AND SPATIAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
In the recent literature, innovation is regarded as a key factor for  economic 
dynamics. Innovation w i l l  be conceived of as a phase-wide process of research, 
development, application and exploitation of a new technology o r  organization (cf. 
Haustein, et al. 1981). This distinction into phases is useful, as usually invention, 
adoption and use of a new finding do not take place simultaneously, in ter  &a due 
to market structures, patent systems, monopoly situations, lack of information o r  
lack of diffusion (see Brown 1981, Davies 1979, and Rosegger 1980). Usually a dis- 
tinction is made between barsic innovations (new products, new industries) and pro- 
cess innovations (new processes in existing industries). Especially basic innova- 
tions a r e  assumed to take place periodically and cluster-wise and hence to lead to 
long-term economic fluctuations. 
In recent years, innovation research has increasingly concentrated on (disag- 
gregate) behavior of individual firms, as one has increasingly become aware of the 
fact  that basic innovations a r e  taking place in a few industries located at specific 
places (cf. Kleinknecht 1981. Kahdavi 1972, and Nijkamp 1983). Especially on the 
basis of micro-oriented research, the driving motives of innovations and the 
impacts of innovations (e.g., labor saving o r  capital saving technology) can be 
identified (see also Kamien and Schwan 1975, and Kennedy 1964). 
Basic innovations are generally assumed to cause cyclical economic develop- 
ments (growth + saturation + recession). In this regard, two different viewpoints 
may be distinguished: 
the depression-trigger hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that the 
struggle for  survival necessitates firms to adopt radical innovatdons 
leading to radical changes (Mensch 1979). 
the denrand-puU hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that a change in 
structural economic conditions emerges from drastic impacts from the 
demand side (final and intermediate products): the market determines 
the success of innovations (Mowery and Rosenberg 1979). 
Translation of the above mentioned ideas to a multi-regional system implies 
that the development pattern of a spatial system depends on the innovative poten- 
tial of the regions o r  cities at hand (cf. Malecki 1979), as the competitive position 
of regions and cities determines their market share in the national o r  interna- 
tional economy. Consequently, product cycle theories and regional development 
theories may be - to a certain extent - s i m i l a r  in nature. The relationship 
between innovative capacity of a region and its market share in a national o r  
international economy is represented in Figure 1. The shape of this curve is 
codetermined by the region's competitive power, by its use of R&D investments and 
its market potential (cf. Schmookler 1966). 
In this respect, it may also be meaningful to pay some attention to growth pole 
theory. This conventional regional development theory regards polarization 
(scale advantages, interindustrial input-output linkages, and technological innova- 
tion) as a necessary condition for an accelerated growth process in a particular 
location, especially because a diffusion of growth impulses from propulsive to 
other sectors wil l  favor an integrated regional development (see Nijkamp and Pae- 
linck 1976). 
It  should be noted however that in growth pole theory innovations a r e  mainly 
regarded as exogenous tools for obtaining an accelerated growth, while in the 
Schumpeterian viewpoint innovation is regarded as an endogenous tool in a free- 
enterprise economy, so that fluctuating economic growth patterns may be 
expected. Despite these differences, innovation may be regarded as a key factor 
in spatial and sectoral development processes (see also Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, 
Mansf ield 1968, and Nelson and Winter 1977). 
PUBLIC POLICY AND SPATIAL ECONOIQC DYNAHICS 
Public policy may have a twofold impact on spatial economic dynamics, viz. by 
creating a breeding place for innovations favoring an accelerated growth in space 
and t ime  (Rosenberg 1976), and by providing the public overhecrd capital (infras- 
tructure) that is necessary for  a balanced development (Nijkamp 1982b). Both ele- 
ments will briefly be discussed here. 
regional 
market 
share 
I 
regional innovations share 
F i  1 Trajectory of Regional Market Share and Innovations Share 
A breeding place poLicy assumes adequate educational facilities, communica- 
tion possibilities, market entrance, good environmental conditions, a good social 
climate and a satisfactory locational profile (cf. Olson 1982). The existence of 
breeding places favoring innovative activities also indicates that monopoly situa- 
tions and industrial concentrations (including patent systems) are often character- 
ized by a higher technological and innovative potential (e.g., in the field of elec- 
tronics, petrochemicals and aircraft), although it has to be added also that small 
firms tend to be an increasing source of various innovations, for instance, in the 
area of microprocessors (see Rothwell1979, and Thomas 1981). 
Government policies aiming at stimulating the innovative potential may thus 
concentrate on two fields, viz. direct subsidies on innovation research o r  indirect 
creation of innovative breeding places (for instance, by m e a n s  of local technology 
transfer centers). The concept of a breeding place can also be identified in the 
above mentioned growth pole theory, in which innovative behavior and geographi- 
cal diffusion and adoption of innovations play a crncial role. Whether o r  not 
growth pole policy as a spatial development policy in many countries has been 
marked by spatial economic fluctuations is still an open question, witness the 
debates in the literature on the existence of 'a clean break with the past' in 
regard to spatial and urban development trends (see among others, Berry and Dah- 
mann 1977, Vining and Kontuly 1977, and Gordon 1982). 
A pubLic overhead policy aims at providing a region o r  a city with all neces- 
sary public endowments that serve to enhance the development potential of a 
region or city (cf. Hirschman 1958). Examples of such infrastructure capital are: 
roads, railways, ports, electricity plants, water purification plants, mass tlansit 
systems, and the like. The implementation of such public overhead investments may 
lead to dmstic changes in a spatial system. For instance, the invention and use of 
steam engines in the past century o r  the exploitation of mass transit systems in our 
century has had deep impacts on urban and regional growth patterns. Past evi- 
dence shows that innovative behavior, public infrastructure investments and spa- 
tial economic dynamics a r e  strongly interrelated phenomena. This notion is also 
reflected in the dif'fusion process of innovations: many new inventions emerge in 
major agglomerations (with a great deal of public overhead capital), while often 
the actual adoption of these inventions may take place somewhere else (e.g., in 
low-wage peripheral areas). 
The impacts of regional public policy (both breeding place policy and public 
overhead investments policy) on the  market share of the  region at hand can be 
represented by m e a n s  of the following figure (Figure 2). This figure reflects again 
the notion that competitive power in a spatial system is a major determinant for  
(un)stable growth  processes. 
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Figure 2 Trajectory of Regional Market Share and Public Policy 
Combination of Figures 1 and 2 leads to the evident conclusion that  innovation 
policy and public policy require a fine tuning in order  to be fully effective. Spa- 
tial economic fluctuations may be induced o r  stimulated in case of a lack of coordi- 
nation between these two policies, so that innovative potential. agglomeration size, 
regional locational conditions and intensity of infrastructure policy are simultanb 
ously determining the  strnctural economic change of cities and regions. 
In the literature on agglomeration economies i t  is  often suggested that  large 
scale industrial concentrations and city size favor innovative ability due to higher 
productivity, more business diversification and better  breeding ground fo r  t e c h n e  
logical progress (see Alonso 1971, Carlino 1977, Kawashima 1981, Nelson and Nor- 
man 1977, and Thompson 1977). Malecki (1979) however has recently demonstrated 
that the innovative potential of traditional large agglomerations is declining, so 
that apparently innovative activity is suffering f r o m  diseconomies of size (cf. also 
Sveikauskas 1979). Due to filtering down effects caused by agglomeration 
diseconomies, the innovative capacity of economic centers may be affected and 
moved to other areas,  as soon as a critical bottleneck level (8.g.. congestion) in 
the initial center has been reached. In this regard, w e  may re fe r  back to the 
above mentioned notions of threshold values and bottleneck factors. 
A SIMPLE PODEL FOR ENDOGENOUS UINGTEBH SPATIAL FLUCTUATIONS 
The evolution of a spatial system may exhibit a balanced growth, but also a 
wide variety of unbalanced growth processes (characterized by cycles o r  pertur- 
bations). As indicated in a previous section, in the recent past various models gen- 
erating spatial dynamics have been developed. 
In the present paper, a simple model for  analyzing spatial structut-al changes 
wil l  be developed. A central concept in this model is made up by a so-called 
quasi-produdwn jbnction. A quasi-production function is a generalized produc- 
tion function, which - in addition to traditional production factors such as produc- 
tive capital, labor and land-use - also incorporates infrastructure capital (or 
public overhead capital) and R&D (or innovative) capital (see Biehl 1980, and 
Nijkamp 1982b). Infrastructure capital - as a complement to private productive 
capital - serves to enhance the  efficiency of entrepreneurial activities, while 
R&D capital (both private and public) aims at favoring the innovative potential. 
Then the following quasiproduction function for  a certain area (region o r  city) may 
be assumed: 
where: 
Y = regional share  in the national production 
C = regional share  in the national directly productive capital 
S = regional share  in the national social overhead capital 
R = regional share  in the national R&D capital. 
By assuming a Cobb-Douglas specification. one may rewrite (1) as follows: 
where the parameters @ , 7  and b reflect  production elasticities. These elasticities 
are assumed to be positive on the range (pn,?) .  pn reflects a minimum 
threshold leuel of the regional production volume which has to be reached before 
a self-sustained growth will  take place, while ? reflects a bottleneck leuel (or 
maximum capacity level), beyond which congestion factors lead to a negative mar-  
ginal product. Consequently, the  following conditions hold: 
i f y s p n  , then @ , y , b = O  (3) 
i f y r ?  , then @ , 7 , b s O  
By assuming now a t imdependent  quasi-production function, the shifts in the 
regional share  of the national production volume can be written as: 
AY, = ( p e t  + 7 S t  + b $ ) ~ t - ~  
with: 
and: 
The economy reflected by (4) will exhibit a stable growth path without structural 
changes within the range (ymin , F x ) .  The lower limit Fn is in the present con- 
text of innovation and capacity limits less interesting, so  that w e  will focus our 
attention mainly on the effect of the bottleneck value 7. 
This bottleneck value reflects congestion phenomena due to too high a concen- 
tration of productive capital in a certain area leading to diseconomies of scale, 
environmental decay, and inefficient land use. Beyond Fax, each additional 
increase in C wi l l  have a negative impact on the regional production share. Such a 
situation of a negative marginal product of capital can be represented as: 
where represents the (fixed) production elasticity of C on the range 
(9" , ?) . Consequently, the adjusted production elasticity has become a 
time-dependent variable. S i m i l a r  relationships may be assumed fo r  yt and bt, so 
that substitution of fit  , yt and bt into (4) yields the following result: 
with: 
fi  =BEt +?Zt + 8 i t  
Ft may be regarded as the ra te  of ctlange in the original quasi-production function. 
Relationship (10) is essentially a Volterra-Lotka-type model, which has often been 
used in population biology, fo r  instance, to describe predator-prey relationships 
(see Goh and Jennings 1977, Jeffries 1979, Pimm 1982. and Wilson 1981b). This 
model in difference equation form has been applied in the past decade among oth- 
ers by May (1974), Li and Yorke (1975), Yorke and Yorke (1975), Dendrinos and 
M W y  (1983), and Brouwer and Ni jkamp (1984). 
Relationship (10) has some interesting features. May (1974) has shown that 
models of this type - despite their mathematical simplicity - may exhibit a remark- 
able spectrum of dynamical behavior, such as stable equilibrium, stable cycles, 
stable cyclic oscillations, and chaotic trajectories with a-periodic (but bounded) 
fluctuations. The behavior of such a model is dete-ed by the initial conditions 
of the system and by its growth rate (depending on Yt), but in principle this model 
is able to generate a wide variety of dynamic growth patterns. Consequently, in a 
spatial context long-term fluctuations depend on the initial values of a spatial sys- 
t e m  and on its growth rate (which is codetermined by the production elasticities of 
production capital, overhead capital and R&D capital). 
The growth rate however, is a time-dependent variable, which can also be con- 
trolled by (private and public) policy measures. If the model is used in the frame-, 
work of optimal control theory, generalized geometric (signomial) programming 
algorithms can be used to identify optimal controls (see Duffin and Peterson 1973, 
and Ni jkamp 1972). 
A next step may be to introduce an additional relationship for  R&D invest- 
ments, given the assumption that R&D may serve as a tool to remove bottlenecks 
(the so-called depression-trigger hypothesis). Then w e  may hypothesize the fol- 
lowing relationship, as soon as an area  has reached its critical bottleneck level 
FX. 
where 4 is the ra te  of change in R&D capital beyond the  value V. Substitution 
of (12) into (10) yields: 
with: 
The lat ter  relationship is a nested dynamic model. This model may exhibit even 
more complicated dynamic growth patterns, depending on the superimposition over 
two dynamic phenomena. The perturbations caused by the bottleneck factors may 
be neutralized o r  reinforced by R&D investments, depending on the fine tuning of 
new technology investments and spatial fluctuations. 
The foregoing model can also be extended with spatial interaction effects, and 
savings consumption and effect, so that also the demand-pull hypothesis can be 
incorporated in this spatial systems model. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-linear dynamics appear to be able to generate complex dynamic trajec- 
tories fo r  structural changes. The Volterra-Lotka-type models a r e  able to incor- 
porate some important key factors (innovation, public overhead investments) which 
act  as driving forces for  a spatial system. Furthermore, such models allow the 
study of conditions under which a stable equilibrium may emerge. Thus, long-term 
economic fluctuations (including long waves) can be studied on the basis of fairly 
simple notions based on a conventional production theory. The analysis described 
in Section 5 has also demonstrated that long waves are not a necessary 
phenomenon, but may emerge under certain specific economic and technological 
conditions in a spatial economic system. 
Finally, it  should be noted that various research questions have been left 
open in the present paper: 
policy conflicts emerging from multiple areas linked together in multi- 
level spatial systems (see Nijkamp 1981); 
detailed analyses of various sectors in the spatial sys t em at hand, for 
instance, in the field of energy, housing, transportation (see Van Lierop 
and Nijkamp 1983); 
qualitative impact analysis due to intangible societal effects of techno-\' 
logical innovation on a dynamic spatial system (see Nijkamp, e t  al. 1984); 
integration of disaggregate dynamic behavior (of individuals, groups o r  
sectors) and global dynamic behavior of the system as a whole, for 
instance, by means  of event-history analysis (see Hannan and Tuma 1984); 
integration of dynamic entropy theory, the theory of self-organizing sys- 
tems and tensor analysis in a long wave context. 
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COKMENTS ON TOPICS 1 TO 5 

COKKENTS ON TOPIC I: THEORIES OF THE LONG WAW 
Jacob J. van Duijn 
If there  is  a long wave in economic activity, i t  is likely that  many economic 
variables a r e  affected by it. Economic growth rates might display a wave-like pat- 
tern,  but so could industrial production growth rates ,  investment growth rates ,  
employment rates ,  capacity utilization rates ,  prices, interest rates ,  profit rates,  
wage rates, money growth rates ,  innovation rates ,  etc. Worker militancy, w a r  
activity, political attitudes, o r  even climates might also vary over  time in a wave- 
Like fashion. Obseming recurrent  waves of some 45 to 60 years '  length in a multi- 
tude of socioeconomic variables does not, however, give a direct  insight into what 
ultimately causes these waves. I t  is  up t o  the  students of the  long wave t o  look f o r  
the  underlying mechanisms. Engaged in this process they run into chicken-and-egg 
questions: is the falling profit  rate the cause of a downturn, o r  the result  of it? 
Does innovation follow investment activity, o r  does innovation have to come f irs t?  
A t  this point in time there  is  disagreement among economists about a lot of 
things. I t  is quite easy to l ist  ten o r  even more causes of the depression. Depend- 
ing on whether one asks a neoclassicist, supply-sider o r  long-wave economist, dif- 
ferent  causal factors  wil l  be given. Even long-wavers, however, do not agree. 
They see a wave, but disagree on when the last downturn started, what caused it, 
and when it  will end. 
I t  is unlikely tha t  the theoretical issues concerning the  long wave wil l  ever  be 
resolved. Economists still disagree on the causes of the previous Great Depres- 
sion. Within the  current  group of long-wave researchers ,  however, there  seems to 
be some consensus growing. The following list of theories might therefore suggest 
more disagreement than actually exists at this moment. 
I would argue that  at least five groups of theories could nowadays be dis- 
tinguished: 
(I) Investment theories (Fores t e r )  
(II) Schumpeterian innovation theories (Freeman, Mensch, van Duijn) 
(III) Pr ice  theories (Rostow) 
(IV) Marxist theories (Mandel) 
(V) Social s t ructure theories (Gordon)' 
'The names associated here wl th  the various theories s e rve  only as indications o f  the  
If w e  would also want to include the prewar literature, other groups of 
theories would have to be added: notably the monetary theories, w a r  theories, and 
agricultural theories. These are not adhered to any more - not in a narrow sense, 
that is. I w i l l  now briefly describe the various theories, and see to what extent 
they are compatible o r  incompatible with each other. 
(I) INYE- THEORIES 
When dealing with cyclical fluctuations i t  is quite natural to take investment 
behavior as the ultimate cause. Many cycle theories do, and all major cycles w e  
know of (Kitchin, Juglar, Kumets, and Kondratiev) can be  and have been theoreti- 
cally explained as resulting from the fluctuations in a particular investment 
category: inventory investment in the case of the  Kitchin cycle, investment in 
machines and equipment in the case of the Juglar, investment in buildings to 
explain the Kuznets cycle, and infrastructural investment to account for  the Kon- 
dratiev wave. Kondratiev himself sought for  a clue to the long wave by pointing at 
what he called investment in "basic capital" (railroads, bridges, roads, water- 
works). I too, tend to  give great significance to the role of infrastructural invest-, 
ments (industrial complexes, harbor complexes, road systems) in explaining fluc- 
tuations of the long-wave type. 
The interesting aspect of the contributions made by Forrester et UL. is that 
they can generate long waves by specifying investment behavior, in general, 
without exclusively relying on capital goods of long duration. Forrester et UL. 
divide the economy in two sectors: the capital goods sector  (mining, construction, 
steel, heavy equipment, and other basic industries) and the consumer goods sector. 
If the demand for  goods and services increases, the consumer goods sector must 
expand its capacity. But to supply this capacity, the capital goods sector must 
expand its own capacity. Since it has to  acquire capital goods from itself, there  is 
"self-ordering". 
Forrester et al. would argue that the boom of the 1950s and 1960s started 
with this self-reinforcing feedback. In order to  satisfy demand from the  consumer 
goods sector and to rebuild its own infrastructure, the capital-producing sector 
had to expand beyond the long-run needs of the economy. Thus, towards the end of 
the 1960s, excess capacity began to develop in the basic industries. 
Note that Forrester et UL. do not need fluctuations in the rate of innovations 
in order to  generate long waves. A constant rate of growth of consumption demand 
will do. However, in more recent publications the group has recognized that  the 
long wave influences the climate for  innovation and that a certain bunching of 
innovations may in fact occur. 
various groups of people involved in long-wave research. Forrester i s  seen as  represen- 
tative of the MIT group, which also includes researchers such as  Graham, Senge, and Ster- 
man; Freeman leads a group of economists at the University of.Sussex (including Soete, 
Clark, and Dosi); Meinkneht has been an associate of Mensch's; while Cordon has done work 
with Bowles and Weisskopf, and with Edwards and Reich. 
(II) SCanmaPETERIAN INNOVATION THEOEUES 
Schumpeter, although not being very specific himself about the  "swarm-Like 
appearance" of innovations, has inspired a number of scholars to fur ther  explore 
the  notion that  a bunching of major innovations could be  the  cause of observed 
alternations in rapid growth and slow growth of industrialized economies. 
There is no doubt that  Gerhard Mensch has given the  main impetus to the 
renaissance of Schumpeterian models f o r  economic development. By being the  f irs t  
to rethink the swarming hypothesis, he has drawn both praise and criticism. 
It is clear to all Schumpeterian long-wave researchers  that  technological 
change does not proceed at an even pace. They all recognize that upswings of the 
long wave involve an explosive burst of growth in a number of major new industries 
- industries that  incorporate the advances of modern technologies. I t  is also 
clear that the  transition from upswing to downswing may be related to a lessening 
of the growth potential of the  innovations that  carr ied the  upswing phase. 
The main debate, however, has been on the  lower turning point of the  long 
wave. Does depression in itself stimulate the  introduction of new basic innova- 
tions, as Mensch has argued, o r  is some form of technical recovery necessary 
before entrepreneurs adopt and implement the new technologies that  are avail-,, 
able? The latter position has been defended by Schmwkler. This position would' 
require an "outside" force to engender the  lower turning point of the  long wave. 
This force could be replacement investment. In this view the investment and inno- 
vation theories would be complementary. 
Another issue concerns the nature of the  bunch of innovations that  give r i se  
to the  upswing. In Mensch's original work the  suggestion was made that  this bunch 
could consist of various, totally unrelated innovations, which somehow were driven 
by the same forces of economic depression. C a s e  studies of particular innovations 
have made clear that  a more detailed look is  necessary. Industry life cycles 
should be taken into account, as wel l  as the  nature of innovations (product versus 
process innovations as a f i rs t  subdivision). It is  clear that  macroeconomic condi- 
tions have an impact on the propensity t o  innovate, but long-wave depressions 
could not act as the  sole force influencing this propensity. 
A third issue in the debate between the  Schumpeterians concerns the  impor- 
tance of the introduction of innovations vis-a-vis the  diffusion of innovations. 
Freeman et al. have repeatedly pointed out that, while the moment of introduction 
of an innovation is of significance, i t  is  the rapid diffusion that causes the  11pswing 
of the long wave. 
I myself have found the concept of S-shaped growth to be extremely helpful 
fo r  understanding the  role of innovations and of investment in the  long-wave 
growth process. In my view innovation theories cannot do without a consideration 
of the  investment demand generated by new, innovative industries. Conversely, 
investment theories that  disregard the role of technological change - both in the  
field of product innovations and of process innovations - cannot fully explain the  
process of long-term economic development. 
(IJl) PEUCE THEORIES 
A great  deal of confusion about the long wave is  caused by the fact  that  two 
distinct kinds of long cycles seem to exist. There is  a price cycle and there  is a 
production cycle. The two are not the same, but they are usually mixed up. The 
most important modern theory on the  long wave in prices has been developed by 
W.W. Rostow. Rostow has argued that  trend periods, o r  Kondratiev cycles, as he 
has interpreted them, were caused primarily by periodic undershooting and 
overshooting of the dynamic optimum levels of capacity and output for food and 
r a w  materials in the world economy. 
Deviations of actual from optimum capacity a r e  caused by three distinctive 
characteristics of major investment in foodstuffs and r a w  materials: 
(1) a recognition lag - the lag between the emergence of a profit possibility 
and the investment decisions designed to exploit it; 
(2) a gestation lag - the lag caused in part  by large prior infrastructure 
outlays before production can begin; 
(3) an exploitation lag - the lag between the completion of the investment 
and its maximum efficient exploitation, often involving large domestic o r  
international migration. 
In agriculture and r a w  material production, these lags a r e  longer than in 
manufacturing. In the former, productive capacity increases discontinuously in 
large, discrete steps and these increases involve long time lags. Protracted 
upward shifts in the relative prices of basic commodities act  as the catalyst that 
sets in motion the expansion of productive capacity. However, this expansion 
overshoots the dynamic optimum level. The subsequent period of decline in rela-: 
tive prices of basic commodities leads to an investment decline. Demand for basic 
commodities continues to grow in response to population growth and the trend 
expansion of industry, and the neglect of investment ultimately causes a reversal 
of the relative price movements when surplus capacity has been worked off. A new 
round of expansion of productive capacity follows. 
Rostow's theory produces a long-wave chronology, which is quite different 
from those of other researchers. Whereas most economists, whether they have a 
bent for the long wave o r  not, would consider the 1933-1951 interval and the 
post-1972 ye- a s  belonging to a downswing period, Rostow argues that these have 
been upswing ye-, because the price level of r a w  materials and foodstuffs w a s  
rising. Conversely, the 1951-1972 period w a s  a downswing period in Rostow's 
theory, a s  the "basic sector" prices were going down slightly. 
It is interesting to  note that Rostow, who has been one of the exponents of the 
'leading sector" concept, finds himself in a different camp than those Schumpeteri- 
ans who see the long-wave upswing phases a s  carried by the same leading sectors. 
Rostow recognizes that one of the outstanding characteristics of leading sectors is 
that they incorporate the major technological changes of the time; yet he arrives 
a t  a different periodization. 
The answer to this seeming contradiction is that Rostow regards the 1950s and 
1960s a s  an extension (interrupted by the Great Depression and the Second World 
War) of the set of technologies that created the upswing of the first decades of the 
20th century: electricity, new chemicals, and the internal combustion engine. It 
w a s  the postwar shift in the terms of trade in the industrialized countries that 
favored this extension. 
I find i t  difficult to agree with Rostow on this point. While the automobile com- 
plex surely was a leading sector in Japan and Western Europe after  the Second 
World War, the synthetic fibers, artificial resins, electronics and aircraft indus- 
tries were definitely based on technologies that were not available before the 
1930s. Even so, I find Rostow's explanation of long-term price fluctuations as the 
result of output and capacity changes in the "basic sectors" of the world economy 
very appealing. It would seem, however, that his cycles a r e  different from the 
ones studied by other long-wave theorists. 
(IV) UARXrST THEOEUES 
The long wave can be said to  have been discovered by Marxists. Parvus 
(pseudonym f o r  A.I. Helphand) was the  f irs t  in line, followed by the two Dutchmen, 
van Gelderen and de Wolff. Kondratiev, however, noted the very non-Marxist 
implications of the long-wave theory. It  is  not surprising, therefore, that  Mandel, 
the  most prominent modern Marrist who has dealt with the  long wave, does not see 
this wave as a true cycle, but as a series  of interruptions of the  secular decline in 
the  rate of profit. Each upturn of the long wave is therefore explained with the 
aid of noneconomic factors, such as w a r s  of conquest, extensions and contractions 
in the  area of capitalist operation, class struggle, revolutions and counterrevolu- 
tions, etc. Thus the  upturn a f t e r  1940 is  explained by Mandel by "the historic 
defeat suffered by the  international working class in the  1930s and 1940s". 
While Mandel needs outside forces to explain the lower turning point of the 
long wave, his explanation of the  upper turning point would allow us to classify his 
theory in the  group of investment theories. He also recognizes that  an upturn, 
once i t  has set in, sets the  stage fo r  a technological revolution. Both elements of 
the investment and innovation theories of the  long wave are therefore present in 
Mandel's interpretation of it. 
Starting with the  exogenous shock, Mandel's long wave develops as follows: 
Environmental changes cause a "sudden" upturn in the rate of profit. The increase 
in the rate of profit causes an upsurge in the rate of capital accumulation. This 
allows fo r  a technological revolution, which, by itself, gives an additional spur to 
the  rate of profit. Economic growth leads t o  strong increases in employment, 
strengthening labor and flattening out increases in the rate of surplus value. 
C l a s s  struggles and international competition intensify. Credit explosions are 
necessary to maintain growth. The rate of profit starts to decline, owing to the 
disappearance of technological rents  (and presumably also to  previous overaccu- 
mulation of capital). Monetary instability increases. Rates of investment decline. 
A search f o r  new ways to reduce labor costs develops. The sharpened crisis of 
capital valorization spreads into prolonged social and political crisis. A t  this point 
a new exogenous shock will be  needed to reverse this pattern again. 
(V) SOCIAL STEUCTUBE THEORIES 
Most long-wave theories are economic theories. Some long-wave theories are 
also "economic" in the  sense that they do not at all consider the "noneconomic" 
consequences long waves might have. It  is probably fa i r  to say that long waves 
might have a multidimensional character  whatever the  ultimate causes might be. 
Economic as wel l  as other aspects of the  long wave m e r i t  attention. 
In the social s tructure theory of the  long wave developed by Gordon and oth- 
ers ,  social structure comes f irs t  and economic behavior is  seen as largely deter- 
mined by a particular social structure. Periods of boom are the  product of the 
success of a social s tructure in facilitating capital accumulation. However periods 
of prosperity contain endogenous contradictions that  ultimately bring prosperity 
to an end. The ensuing crisis is  a period of instability that  requires institutional 
reconstruction f o r  renewed stability and growth. The resolution of this period of 
crisis involves certain unpredictable political elements. Therefore, just as in 
Mandel's theory, exogenous events may also play a role in the transition from one 
period of prosperity to another. In the  work of Gordon, Edwards and Reich the  
connections between long waves and social structures of accumulation are summar- 
ized in a series of propositions: 
(1) A period of expansion is built upon the construction and stabilization of a 
favorable social structure of accumulation. 
(2) The favorable institutional context fo r  capital accumulation generates a 
boom of investment and rapid economic activity. 
(3) The success of the capital accumulation process pushes investment to the 
limits that are possible within the social s tructure of accumulation. Con- 
tinued rapid capital accumulation requires (among other  changes) ei ther  
a reproduction of the  conditions existing at the  beginning of the  boom o r  
a transition to a new organization of the labor process and labor mark- 
ets. The initial conditions are difficult to reproduce, and needed reforms 
are not easily achieved. 
(4) Accumulation slows and the  period of stagnation is entered. Attempts to 
alter the  institutional structure are met with opposition, especially in a 
stagnationary context. 
(5) Economic stagnation promotes the fur ther  dissolution of the  existing 
social structure of accumulation. 
(6) The restoration of the possibility of rapid capital accumulation during an 
economic crisis depends on the  construction of a new institutional struc- 
ture. 
(7) The internal content of this institutional structure is  profoundly but not 
exclusively shaped by the character  of the class struggle during the 
preceding period of economic crisis. 
(8) The new social s tructure of accumulation is  virtually certain to differ 
from its predecessor, thereby generating a succession of stages of capi- 
ta l ism.  
(9) Each stage of capitalism is  likely to feature a long period of expansion, 
then a subsequent long period of stagnation. 
The theory of Gordon et rrl. may be seen as complementary t o  the  economic 
theories of the long wave, both Mamist and non-Marxist. Mamists of course have 
traditionally paid attention t o  underlying social structures, but, according to Gor- 
don et al. insufficiently so. While the  social structure theory may overemphasize 
the role of institutional factors a t  the expense of the traditional economic ones, 
combining the  two groups of theories could produce a r i che r  view of the  changes a 
capitalist society goes through in the course of a long wave. I t  also could provide 
a bet ter  insight into the  conditions that  have to be met before an economy can 
make the transition from depression back to prosperity. 
COMKENTS ON TOPIC 1: THEORIES OF THE LONG WAVE 
Eevold Ik EPtm 
The hypothesis that  presupposes the existence of 'long cycles" presumably 
possesses certain analytical merits. It  permits us, in particular, t o  discern more 
distinctly certain features in the  development of technical progress and economic 
growth over comparatively long periods of time. A t  the same time, certain 
theoretical schemes of long cycles tend excessively t o  generalize elementary tech- 
noeconomic processes and overlook the  concrete historical forms of their  
development. The volume and quality (in particular, the comparability) of statisti- 
cal information accumulated to this day inhibit a rigorous and exhaustive verifica- 
tion of the hypothetical role of long cycles in various spheres of economic 
activity. Apart from that, there  exists the problem of overinterpretation. 
One approach t o  long-cycle studies takes into account the fact  that  the 
developed market economy is marked by various types of fluctuational movements. 
Man showed that,  as the capitalist machine industry emerges on the historical 
scene, various fluctuations come to be dominated by a regular alternation of 
recessions and upswings on a macroeconomic (national and, since the  latter par t  of 
the last century, also international) scale. This process w a s  later called a regular 
"business cycle". 
The cyclical crises1 already have a century-and-a-half history. In the  1960s 
and early 1970s some economists doubted whether these uniformities would retain 
their  validity in the  second half of this century (see, e.g., Is the Business Cycle 
Obsolete? New York: Wiley, 1969). Today, however, such doubts are expressed 
more rarely, owing partly to the  recessions that  occurred in the  mid-seventies and 
early eighties. 
The two latest comparatively acute and long recessions and the  slack cyclical 
upswing between them have again drawn the economists' attention to the  possible 
impact of the  low-frequency oscillatory component. Under these circumstances 
the  absence of comparative analysis of regular business cycles and long waves 
seems t o  be one of the  most surprising features of the present "boom" in the  long- 
wave theories. Although various theories and models of regular cycles and long 
waves frequently employ the  similar "building blocks" (the overestimation of future 
'liere and elsewhere the terms "cycle" and "cyclical" are used to describe s regular busi- 
ness cycle. 
demand by capital goods producers, regular overaccumulation of capital in the the 
form of plant and equipment, the multiplier-accelerator interaction), long-wave 
theoreticians unfortunately very rarely analyze the  specific conditions under 
which the above-mentioned factors generate not only business cycles but also long 
waves. 
The assumption concerning the interaction of regular business cycles and long 
waves seems to be especially important. Is i t  justifiable to believe in simple 
"mechanical" interference of autonomous fluctuations with different parametric 
values (frequency, amplitude, etc.) o r  are the real processes more complex 
because of the multiform interdependence of these economic processes? The fol- 
lowing presentation contains a brief treatment of this subject. 
Deviations are being accumulated in the course of business expansion that 
ineluctably cause unfavorable changes in the movement of the size and rate of pro- 
fit. A t  a certain stage in this process the changed relationship between current 
expenditures and prices reduces the output in several industries. All conflicts of 
capitalist production manifest themselves in regular economic recessions, but not 
all of them can be resolved, albeit temporarily, in each recession. In the course of 
a cyclical recession, the "clearing out" of conditions fo r  a new wave of capital 
accumulation can rarely be sufficiently complete, especially in the case of a com- 
paratively shallow recession. Conditions are being periodically shaped for  a 
cumulative ("transcyclical") development of certain processes restraining growth 
of the rate of profit. These transcyclical processes are usually manifested in 
various spheres: perhaps they are directly connected with specific long-term 
regularities of capital accumulation. 
The role of the long-wave generator is most  frequently ascribed to "swarming" 
of technical innovations. One can hardly neglect of the role of this factor. Y e t  
Marxist theory, which considers the development of productive forces to be the 
primary factor of social dynamics, emphasizes the influence of existing 
socioeconomic relations on technical progress. The treatment of each cluster of 
innovations as an exogenous generator of long-term fluctuations leaves the main 
questions concerning the nature of long waves unanswered. The progress of both 
fundamental science and research and development seems to be much more steady 
than the diffusion of these innovations. The inculcation of the most important 
technical innovations and their  impact on economic activity are influenced by 
several factors, such as the structure of the market and the market situation, 
relative prices, interest rates,  business expectations, e t ~ . ~  The favorable condi- 
tions for  more o r  less intensive modernization and/or renewal of productive capa- 
cities and for  especially rapid growth of new industries arise during every cyclical 
expansion. 
The transcyclical accumulation of unfavorable conditions manifests itself in 
the "feedback" - that.is,  the consequences of a comparatively more intensive and 
long economic growth following upon the preceding rising wave of low-frequency 
fluctuations. For example, at the given level of technical and economic develop- 
ment, a situation may arise under which the market demand has been "saturated" 
by the output of major traditional industries, while the spasmodic expansion of the 
consumption of natural resources runs against i ts  limits.3 In recent years, such 
'1t is qui t e  probable, f o r  example,  t h a t  t h e  s lowed  growth r a t e  o f  w a g e s  i n  t h e  s e v e n t i e s  
and e a r l y  e i g h t i e s  (or  e v e n  t h e i r  reduct ion drop),  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  sharp  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  in- 
terest r a t e ,  h a v e  narrowed t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of t echn ica l  p r o g r e s s  and l imi ted  t h e  dissemi-  
nat ion of cap i ta l - in tens ive  innovat ions .  
3 ~ n d i c a t i o n s  of p a r t i a l  s a t u r a t i o n  or l i m i t s  of supply  o f  some  r a w  m a t e r i a l s  do  n o t  and can- 
n o t  mean, o f  course ,  t h a t  t h e  individual 's  r equ irements  i n  some  commodit ies  have  been ful-  
ly met ,  o r  t h a t  some  na tura l  r e s o u r c e s  h a v e  been exhaus ted .  
oscillatory contours have also involved direct and reverse connections between 
economic growth and increasingly acute ecological problems. 
Hence i t  i s  possible to suppose that  the structural distortions and the growth 
constraints accumulated during several cycles cannot be eliminated by more o r  
less prompt market reaction. The crisis brought about by the cumulative movement 
of these processes i s  the crisis of the entire s tructure of established 
socioeconomic relations. I t  can be overcome by restructuring economic forms of 
resource allocation and management, a certain redistribution of functions between 
private business and the state, and changes in the system of the international divi- 
sion of labor and in the performance of the national economies. These processes 
have always required a more o r  less prolonged time and have been expressed in 
forms that are exceedingly painful for  the bulk of the population. 
The general worsening of the overall economic growth conditions tells 
directly upon the scale and forms of the investment process: the growth rate of 
aggregate investments tends to slow down and in some cases a tendency is  felt for  a 
decreased rate of investment profitability. These changes would occur in the  form 
of a gradual growth in the investment risk. A sector  of the  economy marked by an 
intensive accumulation of nonresidential structures and business equipment may 
shrink from one cyclical upswing to another. There is a shallow decline in the riskl 
discount multiplier and in the "usual" discount rat io (parameters affecting invest- 
ment decisions), which accompanies transition to the cyclical upswing. All this sig- 
nificantly weakens the 'latent" energy of cyclical upswings and prepares condi- 
tions for  longer economic recessions. An analysis of the empirical material that  
encompasses long periods can show that  rea l  accumulation belongs to those 
spheres in which low-frequency fluctuations perhaps stand out in especially bold 
relief. A t  the same time, the slowing down of the economic growth rates is seen 
during transcyclical growth in the number of unemployed and a gradual increase in 
the average duration of unemployment. 
In the prewar period many authors believed that  'long waves" were most 
clearly seen in the movement of prices and interest rates,  and in fact they deduced 
the decreasing phase of these waves from a long drop in prices. The experience of 
postwar years has shown that  such notions (at least in their  earlier forms, which 
implied a drop in the absolute level of prices) have not stood the test of time. On 
the other hand, some features of the transcyclical accumulation of unfavorable 
conditions can be traced here, too. 
Thus, the relevant estimates can show that the decreasing phase of low- f r e -  
quency fluctuations is, more often than not, characterised by the transcyclical 
growth in the dispersion of relative prices and sharp leaps in interest rates. In 
this century one could also observe a fastly growing amplitude of exchange-rate 
fluctuations during these phases. A gradual "shaking" of the structure regulating 
cornmodity-money circulation and capital movements further  intensifies economic 
instability . 
Thus, the relevant estimates can show that  the  decreasing phase of low- 
frequency fluctuations is, more often than not, characterized by the transcyclical 
growth in the dispersion of relative prices and sharp leaps in interest rates. In 
this century one could also observe a fastly growing amplitude of exchange rate 
fluctuations during these phase. A gradual "shaking" of the structure regulating 
commodity-money circulation and capital movements further  intensifies economic 
instability. 

COKMJ3NTS ON TOPIC 1: THEORIES OF THE LONG WAVE 
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE ECONOXIC LONG WAVE 
Jay W. Forrester. A l a n  K. Graham. Peter M. Senge,  and John D. Sterman 
THE GOAL OF THEOKY BUILDING 
The proper goal of long-wave theory building is the  integration of the various 
hypotheses and theories that  have emerged in recent  years. The question facing 
long-wave theorists should not be 'Which theory is correc t  (to the exclusion of all 
others)?" but "How do the  mechanisms described by the  theories interact, amplify 
one another, and contribute t o  the long wave?" 
How, then, can long-wave theories be classified? We believe the  th ree  most 
important categories in a taxonomy of long-wave theories are: 
(1). Endogenous versus Exogenous explanation 
(2). Structural versus Correlative 
(3). Disequalibriurn/dynamic versus Equilibrium/static 
The most important taxonomic distinction to  be made is  whether the theory pro- 
vides an enciogenous explanation of the long wave. An endogenous theory explains 
the long wave as the result of the interactions of components of the system. An 
endogenous theory explains how the long wave can arise without exogenous driving 
forces. An endogenous theory wi l l  explain how the small, random shocks that  con- 
tinuously bombard the economy, such as w'eather fluctuations, can trigger the 
latent long-wave behavior of the system. An endogenous theory wi l l  explain the 
upper and lower turning points of the long wave as the natural consequence of the 
continuous evolution of the  system. In an endogenous theory there  is no need to 
explain the turning points of the cycle as the result of a particular exogenous 
event. 
In contrast, an exogenous theory is one in which the long wave is  the result of 
a fluctuation in a variable that  is  itself outside the  boundary of the theory, and 
therefore unexplained. The 19th century sunspot theory of the  trade cycle pro- 
vides an example. An exogenous theory is  unsatisfying as i t  really begs the ques- 
tion: it  does not explain why the external variable fluctuates with the appropriate 
period. An exogenous theory ignores the effect of feedback from the system to the 
driving variables. An exogenous theory cannot be used to  assess policies that  
might feed back and affect the driving variable. Exogenous theories tend to  be 
monocausal. They tend to  emphasize one half of a feedback loop which, if fully 
taken into account, would help explain the benavior of the exogenous variable a s  
an endogenous reaction to the r e s t  of the system. 
A second important taxonomic distinction is the structural and behavioral 
realism of the t!!eory. A long-wave theory, indeed any theory of economic dynam- 
ics, should properly portray the physical structure of the  system and the 
behavioral decision rules used by the actors. By structure is meant the stock- 
and-flow relationships that define the accumulation and movement of people, capi- 
tal, goods, and so  on. A good theory will distinguish physical stocks of labor, capi- 
tal, materials, technology, etc., f r o m  parallel stocks of money, net worth, orders, 
and so  on. 
A good theory will portray the decision rules used by the actors in the  system. 
Economic decisions are made in an environment of uncertainty, with limited, often 
biased and distorted information, under pressure of time, by human beings with 
limited information-processing capabilities and imperfect mental models of the sys- 
tem.  A theory of the  long wave, and of economic dynamics in general, must not 
presume the actors are able to find the global optimum of the system, have perfect 
informztion, perfect  knowledge of the system structure, o r  the ability to anticipate 
infallibly the consequences of current  actions. 
Likewise, a good theory will not rely on historical correlations between vari-' 
ables. Theories based on historical correlations are only valid if tine underlying 
structural relationships continue t o  hold. I t  is obvious that correiative theories 
a r e  of little use in evaluating policies that may carry the system t o  a new operat- 
ing region. A proper theory must generate and explain both the correiations that  
a r e  observed and the  changes in the correlations that  may ar ise  over the course 
of a long wave. A good theory will explain the so-called "structural changes" that 
a l te r  historical correlations. 
The third important distinction is the  dynamic nature of the  theory. The long 
wave is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon. A proper theory should portray 
the processes by which the  system adjusts to shocks. Theories of the long wave, 
and of economic dynamics in general, must not presume that equilibrium exists or 
is stable. The process of equilibration should be modeled. How do actors  perceive 
and react  to  imbalances? What constraints, delays, and misperceptions may 
prevent a swift and smooth adjustment t o  equilibrium? 
The development of an endogenous structural theory demands a broad scope 
that crosses disciplinary boundaries. Developing an endogenous theory requires 
an eclectic method, both to model the interactions and to verify the results empiri- 
cally. 
THE NATIONAL MODEL, 
Since 1975 the  System Dynamics National Model has been the vehicle for the  
development of an endogenous structural theory of the long wave. The National 
Model also generates other  important modes of behavior including the  4- t o  7-year 
business cycle, an intermediate cycle of approximately 15-25 years, and monetary 
inflation. 
The mechanisms responsible for the business and intermediate cycles have 
been identified and are distinct (see Topic 2). The business cycle is primarily the 
result of inventory and employment interactions. The intermediate cycle is pri- 
marily the result of attempts to balance the mix of capital and labor as factors of 
production. The difference in period arises f r o m  the differences in the relatively 
shor t  time required to adjust inventories and change employment compared with 
the  longer time required to acquire and depreciate capital and alter the  mix of 
factors.  
The long wave ar i ses  through different mechanisms. There seem to be several  
important channels tha t  contribute to the  genesis of t he  long wave. The most 
important of these are discussed below. 
Self- Ordering 
The National Model distinguishes producers of capital  plant, equipment, and 
basic materials such as steel from o the r  firms in the  pr ivate  sector .  The capital  
producers differ from other  sectors  because of t he  existence of " se l f~ rde r ing" .  
In o r d e r  t o  expand capacity, producers of capital  plant and equipment must o r d e r  
additional plant and equipment from each other .  In the  aggregate,  the capital- 
producing sector acquires capital from itself, hence self-rdering. 
S e l f ~ r d e r i n g  creates a number of positive feedback loops. If the  demand fo r  
plant and equipment expands, the  capital  sector must expand capacity. To do sois 
more o rde r s  fo r  plant and equipment are placed, fu r the r  swelling the  demand f o r  
capital and reinforcing the  pressure  to expand. In addition to this accelerator 
mechanism, a variety of disequilibrium effects ar ise ,  creating a number of addi- 
tional positive feedback loops tha t  contribute t o  the  strength of self-rdering: 
(1). Rising o rde r s  deplete t he  inventories and swell t he  backlogs of capital- 
sec tor  firms, leading t o  fu r the r  pressure  t o  expand and still more ord- 
ers. 
(2). Rising backlogs cause average lead times to rise. To ensure an  
appropriate  rate of capital acquisition, firms must o r d e r  new equipment 
fu r the r  ahead, fu r the r  swelling the  o r d e r  rate f o r  capital. 
(3). Rising o r d e r  rates and backlogs cause an  expansion of employment, 
reducing unemployment and eventually tightening the  labor market. 
Wages then r i se ,  encouraging the  substitution of capital f o r  labor  
throughout t he  economy anti augmenting capital  demand still more. 
(4). Rising demand causes capital pr ices  t o  r ise ,  raising profitability and the  
ability t o  attract investment funds. Existing firms expand, and new firms 
en te r  t he  capital  sector ,  fur ther  boosting demand. 
(5). Rising employment and output swell aggregate income, stimulating aggre- 
gate demand. Firms throughout the  economy then grow, causing the  
demand f o r  capital  to rise even more. 
Though all sectors of the  economy are linked t o  one another  to some degree, self- 
ordering i s  strongest in t he  industries tha t  produce capital plant and equipment, 
.basic industries such as steel,  and o the r  heavy industry. Like the  o the r  sectors of 
the  economy, these industries can produce the  business and intermediate cycles, 
and, in the  absence of s e l f ~ r d e r i n g ,  would exhibit periodicities of roughly four  
years  and twenty years. The net  effect  of the  positive feedback loops c rea ted  by 
self-rdering, however, is to destabilize the  mechanism tha t  c rea tes  the  intermedi- 
ate cycle, stretching out the period and increasing the  amplitude. 
Self-raering causes the capital  sec tor  to overexpand in response t o  an 
increase in orders .  For example, at the  end of a long-wave downturn the  capital 
stock of the  economy i s  old and inadequate. To provide f o r  long-run replacement 
and growth and t o  rebuild the  capital stock t o  appropriate  levels, t he  capital sec- 
t o r  must expand beyond the  long-run requirements. Once a capital expansion gets 
under way, the self-oraering loops amplify and sustain i t  until production catches 
up to orders, excess capital is  built up, and orders begin t o  fa l l .  
A t  that point, the self-ordering loops reverse: a reduction in orders  fur ther  
reduces investment, leading to  a contraction in the  capital sector's output, fol- 
lowed by declining employment, wages, aggregate demand, and output. Capital p r e  
duction must remain below the level required f o r  replacement and long-run growth 
until the  excess physical and financial capital is depreciated - a process that  may 
take a decade o r  more owing t o  the long lifetimes of plant and equipment. Once the 
capital stock is  worn out, investment rises, triggering the next upswing. 
The positive loops created by self-ordering operate through many channels, 
including capital demand, growth expectations, inventories and backlogs, prices, 
labor markets, financial markets real interest rates ,  and aggregate demand. The 
net effect is t o  significantly amplify the strength of the  basic self-ordering loop. 
Though all of these channels are portrayed in the National Model, simple models 
that include only the  most basic self-ordering feedbacks can generate a robust 
long wave. Self-ordering is  therefore a sufficient cause of long waves. For more 
information on the self-ordering mechanisms, see  Sterman (1983). 
R e a l  Interest Rates  and Prices  
Self-ordering, though i t  may be sufficient t o  generate the long wave, is  not 
the only mechanism at work. Another major mechanism that  w e  believe contributes 
t o  the  long wave revolves around the dynamics of real  interest ra tes  and prices. 
Historically, long-wave expansions have been periods of low o r  even negative 
real interest rates ,  especially in the  la ter  pa r t  of the expansion. N e a r  the peaks, 
real interest rates have risen sharply and remained at high levels through the 
downturns and into the depression periods. In the current  long-wave downturn, the 
high level of rea l  interest r a t e s  has been blamed on restrictive monetary policies. 
Y e t  the National Model generates the  same historical pattern (low, then sharply 
rising real interest r a t e s  over the long wave expansion, peak, and downturn) 
without a tightening of monetary policy. 
Early in the long-wave expansion, the demand fo r  goods and especially capital 
is growing, putting upward pressure on prices. As prices rise, the real interest 
r a t e  falls, encouraging still more investment. The resulting expansion in invest- 
ment demand and the demand fo r  assets such as land and housing puts further  
upward pressure on prices, and the  resulting increase in inflation fur ther  reduce 
real interest rates. During the  downturn, the process reverses. As demand for  
capital, land, housing, and other  assets f a l l s  (because of the buildup of excess 
capacity), prices soften and inflation subsides. Real interest rates therefore rise, 
discouraging investment still further,  creating still more downward pressure on 
prices, and reinforcing the  r i se  in real interest rates. 
The argument above depends on a lag between a change in inflation and the 
response of nominal interest rates. If nominal rates rapidly adjusted to inflation, 
then the rea l  r a t e  would remain quite stable and the  process described above 
would be weak. The historical evidence verifies that  nominal interest rates do not 
immediately adjust to changes in inflation, but r a t h e r  lag significantly behind (see 
Senge 1983). To see why nominal interest rates lag-behind inflation, consider the 
situation at the  beginning of the expansion period of the long wave. Demand for  
capital and goods is rising, and beginning t o  push up prices. A t  the same time, the 
borrowing needs of the economy expand, bidding up nominal interest rates. The 
pressure on interest rates and the pressure on prices ar ise from the same source 
- the surge in investment and consumer demand during the  long-wave expansion - 
and therefore move roughly in phase. Real interest ra tes ,  however, are the  level 
of nominal interest  rates less the  fractional rate of pr ice  change. Price change 
(inflation) reaches i ts  peak when the  pressure to  invest is highest, while pr ices  
and nominal interest rates reach  their  peaks later ,  nea r  the  peak of the  long wave, 
when the pressure t o  invest has been dissipated. The result  i s  that  nominal 
interest rates lag inflation significantly. Thus during the  long-wave expansion, 
nominal rates rise more slowly than inflation, leading to low real interest  rates. 
Near the peak of the long wave, nominal rates again lag behind declining inflation 
o r  deflation, leading to a sharp  increase in real interest rates. 
Simulations of the  National Model show these positive feedback loops can be 
powerful destabilizers of the  economy and help contribute to t he  self-sustaining 
nature of the long wave by substantially amplifying the  basic self-ordering 
processes described above. 
D e b t  /Def la t ion  Spiral 
Another major process tha t  w e  believe contributes t o  the  long wave, closely' 
related to the behavior of real interest ra tes ,  lies in the  dynamics of debt and 
aggregate prices. 
A t  t he  end of a long-wave downturn, debt levels and aggregate pr ices  are 
relatively low, the  result  of liquidation and price cutting in the  face of unemploy- 
ment and idle capacity. A s  t he  expansion phase gets under way, firms, particularly 
in the capital sectors,  expand their debt levels in o rde r  to  finance the  expansion. 
Debt relative to  GNP rises and, as the  money supply expands, so  too do aggregate 
prices. Expansion of debt i s  "justified" because vigorous growth, high rates of 
capacity utilization, high profitability, and low real interest r a t e s  all encourage 
expansion of external financing. 
Toward the  later years  of the expansion, investment in capital begins to  soften 
as excess capacity develops. The upward momentum of pr ices  and money growth 
may then trigger a continuing expansion of debt through speculation in land, 
stocks, collectibles, o r  o ther  assets. Near the  long-wave peak, overcapacity 
deveiops and investment falls, depressing employment and aggregate demand. With 
declining income, debt  service ability falls, and bankruptcies increase. The grow- 
ing debt burden depresses aggregate demand and prices soften, fu r the r  squeezing 
debt service ability and forcing additional liquidations. 
During the  long-wave downturn, debt i s  Liquidated and prices typically fall. In 
such a debt/deflation spiral,  as described by Irving Fisher, defaults and liquida- 
tions reduce the  stock of money, squeezing nominal incomes and wealth, forcing 
fu r the r  cutbacks in aggregate demand and fur ther  pr ice  cuts. These then fur ther  
reduce the debt service ability of firms and households, leading to still more 
defaults and liquidation. In the  extreme, the debt/deflation spiral can cause the  
collapse of t he  banking system and international t rade,  as occurred in the  1930s, 
and as i t  threatens to do s o  today. Whether the  liquidation is orderly o r  whether i t  
takes the  form of bankruptcies and defaults, possibly leading to a panic, cannot be 
predicted in advance. The greater the  degree of speculation during the expansion, 
the  more likely is a panic during the  downturn. 
Analysis of t he  National Model shows the  debt/price dynamics to  be  powerful 
contributors t o  the  long-wave dynamics. Like the real interest rate dynamics, 
these positive feedback loops fur ther  amplify the  self-ordering loops, contributing 
t o  the  persistent nature of t he  long wave. More work needs to  be done to  identify 
effective policies t o  aver t  a debt/deflation spiral. The interactions of the price 
changes induced by the long wave with the inflation caused by monetization of 
government deficits should also be examined. 
Technology and Innovation 
The Nationai Model has demonstrated that  the long wave can arise even when 
the level of technology is constant and the rate of innovation zero. Nevertheless. 
interactions between the  long wave and innovation s e e m  t o  be quite important. W e  
believe that the long wave influences innovation and technology. Simple models 
have shown that the long wave can generate a 50-year cycle in basic innovation 
even when those innovations do not feed back to affect the economy and the  long 
wave. The bunching of innovations can thus be explained as the result of entrain- 
ment of the  innovation process by the long wave. 
The long wave creates a shifting historical context for  the implementation of 
new inventions. The long wave is characterized by the  buildup, overexpansion, and 
relative decline of the  capital-producing sectors of the  economy. Midway into q 
capital expansion, opportunities become poor for  applying new inventions that' 
require new types of capital. The nation is  already committed to a particular mix 
of technologies. The environment greatly favors improvement innovations over 
basic innovations. During a long-wave downturn, opportunities fo r  basic innova- 
tion gradually improve as old capital embodying the technologies of the  preceding 
buildup depreciates. N e a r  the trough of the wave, there  are great  opportunities 
fo r  creating new capital embodying radical new technologies. The old capital base 
is  obsolete, bureaucracies that  thwarted basic innovation have weakened, many 
companies committed to producing old types of capital are bankrupt, and tradi- 
tional methods a r e  no longer sacrosanct. 
Thus the long-wave theory emerging from the  National Model suggests that 
basic innovation will be depressed during the long-wave expansion and stimulated 
during the depression periods. Note that the peak in innovation under this 
hypothesis would occur about when the capital stock reaches its minimum. The low 
point for  the capital stock may be as long as a decade after the peak in output, a s  
a result of the  long lifetime of capital and infrastructure. Improvement innova- 
tions, in contrast, will be  favored during the upswing of the cycle, a f t e r  the new 
basic technologies have been introduced. 
Though innovation is not necessary to explain the  long wave, there  is little 
doubt that  innovation has a strong influence on the technologies that  characterize 
each long wave. Each long wave seems to  be centered on a particular ensemble of 
basic technologies, including particular forms of energy, transport,  communica- 
tions, and materials. These ensembles evolve synergistically and, like species in 
an ecosystem, compete against other  candidates fo r  a limited number of available 
niches. 
The impact of technology and innovation on the long wave itself, on its 
strength, period, and character ,  remains less certain. Much work needs to be 
done to  examine how innovation might feed back and affect the other  mechanisms 
that c rea te  the  long wave. Cdn fluctuations in innovation amplify the long wave? 
Can policies directed a t  stimulating innovation shorten the  depression period o r  
reduce the amplitude of the long wave? These questions remain, so  far ,  
unanswered. The proper framework fo r  addressing them is an endogenous theory 
of innovation and technological change coupled to the other  mechanisms capable of 
generating the long wave. 
Political and Social  Values 
Substantial evidence exists that political and social values in Western nations 
fluctuate with the period and phasing of the economic long wave. During periods of 
long-wave expansion, m a t e r i a l  wants are satisfied, and social concerns turn to  civil 
liberties, income distribution, and equity. During the later phases of the expan- 
sion, foreign policy concerns predominate. As the expaxision gives way t o  decline, 
conservatism grows, and social c o n c e r n  re turn  to material needs. Economic pol- 
icy takes center stage in legislative agendas. During the downturn, the accurnula- 
tion of wealth becomes the overriding concern, at the expense of civil rights legis- 
lation and equity. The most dramatic example of this cycle is, of course. the rise 
of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. The recent  conservative turn in many Western 
nations is also consistent with the current  long-wave downturn. 
We believe the variation of political values is the result of entrainment by the 
economic cycle. I t  is quite natural to emphasize material needs during depression 
periods. People find i t  easier  to be charitable and to extend the  rights and 
privileges of society during good economic times when incomes are rising than in 
times of economic retrenchment and depression. 
A s  in the case of technology, the effect of social value shifts on the  severity 
and length of the long wave remains terra incognita. The connection between pol-' 
itical values and international conflict may be especially important here,  espe- 
cially in view of the theories that  relate w a r  to the long wave. Long-wave research 
should broaden the boundary of analysis to include the effects of the  long wave on 
international relations, including trade, debt, foreign aid, and conflict. 
THE SELF-SUSTBINING NATUBE OF THE LONG WAVE 
The business and intermediate cycles generated by the National Model are 
damped cycles. Small, random shocks trigger somewhat i rregular  cycles with 
average periods of about four years and twenty years, respectively. In the 
absence of such shocks, the cycles slowly die away. The tendency to oscillate is 
latent in the structure of the economy. The role of random shocks is to t r igger the 
inherent, oscillatory tendencies, just as a rocking chair struck at random will 
oscillate at a characteristic period determined more by the nature of the rocking 
chair than by the  nature of the shocks. 
In contrast, the long wave tends to be a self-sustaining cycle, which, once set 
in motion, grows in amplitude up to a limit. The cycle then persists with a roughly 
constant amplitude. The tendency to oscillate ar i ses  from attempts to correct 
imbalances in the capital stock in the face  of long delays in acquiring and eliminat- 
ing capital. The tendency of the cycle to grow derives from the unstable positive 
feedback loops surrounding self-rdering. Various nonlinearities, such as limita- 
tions on the labor supply o r  diminishing returns to  capital, constrain the amplitude 
of the cycle. 
Like the shor ter  cycles, however, the long wave generated by the National 
Model is influenced by random shocks. The randomness causes individual long 
waves to differ. Randomness causes the period of the cycle, i ts amplitude, and 
particularly the  severity of the downturn period t o  vary from cycle to cycle. Such 
variability is consistent with history. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
represents one extreme - a single, sharp downturn followed by a long depression. 
In contrast, there  w a s  no single cataclysmic collapse during the long wave down- 
turn of the 1870s to  1890s. Between 1873 and 1897 there  were three great  
depressions in the  USA, each of which w a s  one-quarter to one-half as severe  as the 
Great Depression of the  1930s. The variability of t he  long wave from cycle t o  
cycle implies i t  is  hard, if not impossible, to predict the  exac t  course of the  econ- 
omy through the  long-wave transition. Nevertheless, l ike t he  rocking chair  s t ruck 
at random, the  fundamental cha rac t e r  of t he  long wave is  determined b y ,  the  
endogenous s t ruc ture  of t he  economy and not by the  random shocks. 
The long wave is  a complex phenomenon. I t  presents  a different aspect  from 
each angle. Y e t  it is  a systematic phenomenon with identifiable causes. The 
theories and hypotheses that have emerged in the past decade should not be viewed 
as competitors. Most likely all are c o r r e c t  in t h e  sense tha t  they all identify a 
piece of t he  long-wave puzzle. The goal f o r  theory building in t he  fu ture  should be 
the  integration of t h e  various theories into a "grand unification theory" of long- 
term economic dynamics. An open-minded, eclectic, yet  methodologically rigorous 
approach is  required. W e  believe tha t  system dynamics offers  one such methodoll 
OgY. 
COMMENTS ON TOPIC 1: THEOEKES OF THE LONG WAVE 
C h r i s t o p h e r  Freeman and LUC Soete 
'%conomists set themselves too easy a task if in tempestuous seasons they 
can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again." 
(J.M. Keynes, 'Tract on Monetary Reform", 1923) 
Long-wave theories originally developed from a combination of casual, empiri- 
cal observation and attempts at statistical analysis. Many authors before the First 
World W a r  had pointed to an apparent tendency fo r  certain long-mn statistical 
indicators of the economy to show a long-wave pattern (on the early history of 
long-wave ideas, see in particular, van Duijn 1983). In particular this applied to 
prices and interest rates but trade statistics and production statistics were also 
cited by these early authors. Some historians simply adopted the long-wave ideas 
as a convenient form of historical periodization. 
A t  one level the debate on long waves has simply been a prolonged contr* 
versy about these statistics. One school of critics has simply and consistently 
maintained that the statistical evidence is inadequate to  support any well founded 
belief in the existence of the phenomenon (see, for  example, Petzina and van Roon 
1981). On this level i t  is extremely unlikely that the debate will ever be finally 
resolved. The retrospective reconstruction of historical time series is an art 
ra the r  than a science and i t  is extremely unlikely that i t  will ever be achieved to  
everyone's satisfaction. Even if i t  were, this would not refute the standpoint that 
four "waves" o r  "cycles" are too few on which to build any firm foundations, since 
each one has its own unique features. N o r  would i t  dispose of the controversy 
about the incidence of w a r s  and civil w a r s  and their influence on the long-term 
trend of prices, interest rates,  production, trade, and investment. Nevertheless, 
the refinement of the relevant statistics and the prolonged controversy about sta- 
tistical techniques have made an important contribution to the wider debate, by 
compelling the various participants to take some account of the need to relate any 
theory to  the real movements in the world economy. 
The wider debate assumes the existence of a long-run phenomenon worthy of 
some investigation and research. A s  the minimal level, i t  takes the agnostic stand- 
point of van de r  Zwan (1979) and speaks only of successive major structural crises 
of adjustment in the economy, without making any specific assumptions about long- 
wave movements or about their periodicity. More commonly i t  assumes that, at 
least in some countries o r  in the  world economy as a whole (with national varia- 
tions), t he re  has been a discernible ebb and flow of economic activity over  periods 
of approximately half a century. These fluctuations are believed to be  of suffi- 
cient interest to justify a special type of explanation, differing in important 
respects  from conventional short-term o r  medium-term business cycles analysis 
(the so-called Juglar cycles). 
Interest in this approach has quite naturally increased because of t he  simple 
fact  that the recession in the  world economy in the  1980s had proved to be  more 
serious than any o ther  since the 1930s. This fact  would in itself guarantee that  
some attention would be  given to comparisons between these two periods. Simply to 
understand more thoroughly just why the  big postwar boom was so  prolonged and 
growth rates s o  high, and to understand why this growth gave way to stagnation and 
depression is, in itself, an  important task fo r  social science. 
Attempts have been made to clarify long-wave theories in various ways, fo r  
example, according to the theoretical paradigm in economics, character is t ic  of the 
authors. One could distinguish a category of monetarist theories (Dupriez), of 
Marxist theories (van Gelderen, Mandel, etc.), of neeKeynesian theories, of 
Schumpeterian theories, and s o  forth. The difficulty with this type of classifica- 
tion is that  t h e r e  are many hybrid theories and some tha t  do not easily fall into an?. 
particular classification, such as those of Rostow and van Duijn. Nevertheless, 
classification in terms of theoretical paradigms becomes particularly important, 
where policy measures are being considered (see Topics 4 and 5). 
Perhaps the  most interesting recent  attempt to classify long-wave theories 
was that  of Delbeke (1981). He distinguished between theories according to  the  
emphasis placed on particular factors  of production o r  inputs into the  economic 
process: capital, labor,  r a w  materials, and entrepreneurship. Although starting 
from completely different ideological and theoretical standpoints, Mandel and 
F o r e s t e r ,  according t o  Delbeke's analysis, s h a r e  a common central  emphasis on 
the  process of capital accumulation and the  ro le  of profitability in this process. 
The uneven development of t he  capital goods sec tor  of the  economy and of t he  con- 
sumer goods sector ,  respectively, plays an important p a r t  in the  models of both 
these theories. Both stress the  long-term nature of this process in which the  capi- 
tal goods sector  is driven t o  overexpand its capacity in o r d e r  to satisfy both its 
own requirements f o r  expanded reproduction and those of the  o the r  sectors of the  
economy. The ultimate emergence of surplus capacity and the  erosion of profita- 
bility in the  capital goods sector is an  important phenomenon f o r  both F o r e s t e r  
and Mandel in the  transition of the  long waves from boom t o  recession and depres- 
sion. Keynes also emphasized this aspect  of the problem in his discussion of the  
collapse of the  American boom in t h e  1920s. 
However, a f t e r  attempting this classification, Delbeke concluded tha t  in real- 
ity the  various theories w e r e  more complementary than might appear  at first sight. 
He pointed out tao that  such authors as Rostow and van Duijn synthesized several  
theories in a somewhat eclectic way. 
Judging from the  evidence of several  international seminars held in the  last 
few years,  a more meaningful breakdown between various long-wave theories might 
be between the  new-technology theories and the  rest. The new technology theories 
derive from Schumpeter's original interpretation of Kondratiev cycles (Schum- 
pe te r  1939) in which he  emphasized technical and social innovation as the  engine of 
mowth. According to his theory, t he  process of economic growth is not simply 
accompanied by the  introduction of new products, processes and systems, but is 
driven by the  opportunities fo r  more profit  and markets associated with such 
innovations. This strong emphasis on the  ro le  of technology i s  rejected explicitly 
by such authors  as Mandel (1981) and F o r e s t e r  (1981), who regard  i t  as a form of 
"technological determinism", o r  as an overestimation of the  ro le  of innovative 
entrepreneurs.  Critics of the  Schumpeterian approach, from Kuznets (1940) to 
Rosenberg (Rosenberg and Frischtak 1983), whilst often sympathetic t o  the idea 
that  the introduction of major new technologies might very wel l  bring about per- 
turbations of various kinds in the economy, have nevertheless insisted that 
s t ronger  evidence w a s  needed, as wel l  as a more convincing theoretical explana- 
tion. 
Since the  appearance of the  work of Gerhard Mensch in 1975, various 
researchers  strongly influenced by Schumpeter have attempted to respond to this 
challenge. This has stimulated an important debate on the  timing of t he  appear- 
ance of various radical innovations and the  role  of d-on of such innovations 
in Schumpeterns "swarming" of investment behavior. Most authors  now seem to 
agree tha t  i t  is the  massive investment associated with the  widespread diffusion of 
new technologies that  alone could give r ise  to major fluctuations in the  economic 
system. 
Freeman, Clark and Soete (1982), in their  study of unemployment and technical 
innovation, attempted to  demonstrate a link between diffusion of new technologies, 
the  growth of new industries, the  pat tern of investment, and changes in the  demand 
for  labor. In the  early stages of a new technology the  pat tern of growth is oft%& 
r a t h e r  labor-intensive, because of t he  lack of standardization of components, 
materials, and design, and the  absence of any capital goods industry able to supply 
new types of equipment. As the  technology takes off, and the  new industries en ter  
the stage of rapid growth, capital-saving innovations may be exceptionally impor- 
tant. A s  the technology matures, the  increment in employment associated with each 
new vintage of investment tends to diminish, with economies of scale, standardiza- 
tion, and an  increasing concentration on factor-saving technical changes to offset 
the pressure on profit  margins. In the  development of satisfactory theories of any 
cyclical o r  wave-like phenomena the key problem relates to the points of i n f l e o  
tion: Why does boom give way to  recession and depression? Why does the  economy 
emerge from a trough to  a period of recovery and boom? 
In their  apporach to the problems of the  transition from boom to recession, 
most neo-Schumpeterian authors  sha re  a common recognition of the  ro le  of declin- 
ing profitability, originally emphasized by M a n ,  in relation to the  ordinary busi- 
ness cycle and incorporated by Schwnpeter as a central  feature of his theory. 
This erosion of profit margins is attributed by neo-schurnpeterians (with varying 
degrees of emphasis) to four  main factors: 
(1) The increased competition associated with the  intensive "swarming" and 
'%andwagon" process of t he  high boom period. 
(2) The pressure on input costs associated with these same swarming 
processes and the  rapid expansion of the  economy generally. Many 
authors  stress labor  costs, but material costs and energy costs also fig- 
ure prominently in some theories. 
(3) The tendency to approach saturation levels a f t e r  a prolonged period of 
expansion with respect to  some markets. Most authors recognize that  
this is not necessarily a long-wave phenomenon and tha t  t he re  i s  consid- 
erable variation between different products. van Duijn (1983, chap. 11) 
has clarified this point particularly well .  Pasinetti (1981) introduced the 
notion of a specific pat tern of demand associated with each long wave. 
(4) The tendency t o  approach technical limits and scaling-up limits as t he  
potential productivity and o the r  gains of any new technology are more 
fully exploited ("Wolff's Law"). 
In addition to these phenomena, Gerhard Mensch also stresses the tendency for 
entrepreneurs to move from basic product innovations to product differentiation 
(Scheininnovationens) and minor improvement innovations. 
The explanations advanced by ne-Schumpeterian theorists for the loss of 
impetus in any major period of expansion appear to offer a plausible explanation 
of the change in the economic climate from the late 1960s to the 1980s. Nor a r e  
they wholly inconsistent with the theories and explanations advanced by more 
orthodox economists. The latter, however, place f a r  greater stress on such "exo- 
genous" factors as the 1973 and 1979 OPEC oil price rises, on persistent inflation- 
ary pressures within the system, and on the monetary policies adopted by govern- 
ments to combat these pressures. 
However, it is when the analysis moves to the trough of the long wave that 
more substantial differences emerge. 
In an important original contribution to the recent London seminar on 'Techn- 
ical Innovation, Design and Long Cycles in Economic Development", Carlota Perez- 
Perez (1983)' emphasizes the importance of a good "match" between the technolog- 
ical "style" o r  "paradigm" of a long wave and the socicdnstitutional environment. 
Depressions, in her  analysis, represent periods of mismatch between the emerging 
new technological paradigms (already quite well advanced in the previous long 
wave) and the institutional framework. The widespread generalization of the new 
technological paradigm throughout the economic system is possible only after  a 
period of change and adaptation of many social institutions to the requirements of 
the new technology. Such institutional change includes the education and training 
system, the stmctures of firms and management behavior, the prevailing pattern 
of industrial relations, the capital market and financial system, government insti- 
tutions and policies, the pattern of public and private investment, and the interna- 
tional framework within which international trade takes place, flows of interna- 
tional investment occur, and technologies a r e  diffused on a worldwide basis. All of 
these were relatively well adapted during the period of high boom in the 1950s and 
1960s to the requirements of the rapid adoption of the mass production technologi- 
cal style based on very cheap energy (especially oil) and energy intensive materi- 
als, and the Tayloristic assembly line production engineering approach. However, 
these same institutions that were rather well adapted to that mature technological 
style a r e  rather ill adapted to the requirements of the new technological para- 
digm, associated with microelectronics and information technology. It may prove 
difficult to make this social adaptation, a s  it w a s  a t  one time in the 1930s and 
1940s, o r  in the 1880s and 1890s, when other new technological styles were 
involved. 
Giovanni Dosi (1975) has pointed out that there is in any case reason to 
expect periods of mismatch between the science-technology system, the 
socioeconomic institutions, and the political and legal framework. This arises from 
the simple fact that both science and technology develop a t  least in par t  as a 
result of autonomous internally driven processes, which a r e  only indirectly 
affected by the demands of the economy. This applies of course most of all to fun- 
damental science, but it also applies to radical new technologies. The political and 
social framework on the other hand, within which enterprises develop and exploit 
new technologies, responds to somewhat different pressures and because of differ- 
ing timelags and the prolonged rigidities sometimes affecting social institutions, 
there may very well be protracted periods of social turmoil before any degree of 
correspondence is re-established. 
- - 
' ~ n d  also, of course, i n  her contribution t o  t h i s  Conference. 
COlMENTS ON TOPIC 1: THEORIES OF THE LONG WAVE 
Hans H. GI' 
GROWTEI MODELS 
I t  may be  worth while t o  discriminate between theories of economic develop- 
ment - which a r e  essentially growth theories - and theories of fluctuations of 
economic development. Long-wave theories  clearly belong t o  t he  latter. But the  
f i rs t ,  t he  pure  growth theories,  are not irrelevant in the  case where t h e  exo- 
genous variables of traditional growth models cause long waves of economic 
development, b e  i t  through fluctuations of the i r  own o r  through upper  and lower 
ceilings in t he i r  development. If such is t he  case, all those sources of economic 
growth (and the i r  change over  time) succinctly described by Schumpeter at the  
end of his c a r e e r  become relevant: physical environment, social organization, pol- 
itics, technology, "human material", and t h e  "national spirit" (in t he  sense of pre- 
valent attitudes). And i t  should be s t ressed tha t  most of these exogenous factors  
of economic development themselves again are dependent on economic development 
(which may give i t  a Marxist twist. But economic evolution as the  prime mover of 
human history may be  a hypothesis tha t  today at least economists are happy t o  
think about). 
With respect to Schumpeter's "most familiar" determinants of economic growth 
i t  may be  generalized tha t  if t h e r e  are n factors ,  economic and non-economic, mak- 
ing up fo r  growth, only a few of them a r e  important, at any point in time. What i s  
more, t he  "important factor"  mix may change over  time. Looking into this n- fac- 
tor approach, the growth models hypothesis becomes more complicated. The n fac- 
t o r s  can only influence growth significantly if they are scarce;  t he  important fac- 
t o r s  should be  different from the  o the r s  because they are more scarce: highest 
possible growth rates of economic welfare can obviously only be achieved when the  
marginal contribution of each of t he  fac tors  t o  economic growth is  t he  same. Dise- 
quilibria occur  when some factors  have a higher marginal contribution than the  
o thers  - only then i s  t h e  "important factor" approach promising. 
Some theories  rely,  f o r  whatever reason, more o r  less on the  principle of 
dialectic development. Hegel, and in his wake M a n ,  believed tha t  human history 
w a s  moving along a n  upward t rend  with fluctuations around it. This process would 
be finished when, finally, the best conditions of human (and governments') 
existence were realized. Hegel himself, a f ter  receiving a generously paid profes- 
sorate in Berlin, declared the Prussian state to be the  final and perfect stage of 
development and thus the dialectic process was finished for  his part. M a n  also 
thought that one day - which he  hoped to live through - af te r  a worldwide 
upheaval of the suppressed masses Communism would set an end to the inherently 
antagonistic development hitherto experienced. 
Of course, neither Hegel nor Marx thought about Kondratiev waves of 
economic development. Indeed the falling rate of profits w a s  regarded to be a 
trend phenomenon ra the r  than a cyclical one. But the dialectical idea itself should 
spell cycles when translated into economics; this is reflected in the crisis of capi- 
talist development as seen by Man. 
Other theories of the long wave are either tailor-made o r  they can be made to 
fit into the long-wave explanation. A s  concerns the latter one may quote Hayek 
with his analysis of the central role of private property rights (and of the family). 
The Hayek long-wave hypothesis would be that in t i m e s  when property rights (the 
family) are protected by government growth conditions are good, and vice versa in 
times when this is not the case. This looks like a very interesting variant of long- 
wave theories because evidence strongly confirms - at least in cross sectiod- 
analysis - that countries with less property rights perform significantly less w e l l  
than the others. Examples abound. 
SHOCIZS AND OVERPEODUCTION 
Another set of explanations at first glance seems to be highly mechanical. 
They suggest that 
exogenous shocks lead to fluctuations of the population and these fluc- 
tuations echo with diminishing force every generation o r  so  until super- 
imposed by a new shock (August, LZisch), 
a more o r  less systematic overestimation of future orders by capital 
goods producers, together with increasing saturation of demand, pro- 
duces long waves (Spiethoff, Forrester). 
As regards the latter,  systematic maldisposition on the par t  of entrepreneurs in 
the  capital goods sector (or in any other sector) as a result of a long-term r ise  o r  
decline in unfilled orders is implausible on two grounds: First, why do 
entrepreneurs not learn from experience (are there no feedbacks?), and second, 
what about the price mechanism - does i t  not have compensatory effects? I t  can 
also be argued that overcapacities (and too f e w  capital) are ra the r  a continuous 
phenomenon in the growth process. Industries, o r  parts  of them, come and go. 
Those going necessarily pass through a stage of overestimation of future demand 
and of corresponding overcapacities. A long-wave theory should ra ther  explain 
why d l  entrepreneurs in the capital goods sector (incidentally, most of them pro- 
duce capital goods, consumer goods, and primary goods at the same time - why 
should they err only with regard to capital goods?) make wrong forecasts and why 
they do not evade on world markets. 
MONETARY THEORIES 
Some theories may be labeled "monetary". One is related to the 
Friedrnan/Schwan analysis of the monetary history of the United States (espe- 
cially concerning the years 1930 and 1931). Though Medrnan/Schwan do not have 
a long-wave concern, "their" hypothesis would say that sudden and unpredictable 
contractions in the supply of money cause depressions; consequently, the ensuing 
upswing is due to  rectifications of past e r r o r s  in monetary policy. 
Another hypothesis possibly helping to explain long waves, which, according 
to Tinbergen, can be labeled "monetary", is the original Kondratiev idea of gold 
field discoveries. Two strands of thinking may be identified: one is that  movements 
in the stock of gold lead t o  movements in the stock of money, which again leads to 
movements in the price level. 
The question arises, however, what w e  mean when dealing with long waves. In 
our opinion, long waves in the  price level are per se of no particular interest - 
what matters, a f ter  all, is  fluctuation in real terms. Only when prices are causing 
the real world to fluctuate do they matter; and this can hardly be the case with 
regard to  price levels but r a the r  with regard to relative prices. Therefore, the  
gold discovery hypothesis should be broadened - which actually can be done - to 
incorporate the influence of increased gold stocks on relative prices. 
Another problem inherent to  this hypothesis is that  gold discoveries may turn 
out to be highly stochastic. It  is  hard to  conceive stochastic events to produce 
long waves of economic growth (unless the echo principle is considered to  be 
relevant). 
The other  line of thinking is  closer to Kondratiev who maintained that  during 
a long-run development cycle investment activity eventually wanes because bor- 
rowed capital becomes scarce and expensive. Gold discoveries can then - just like 
Pigou's real balance effect - lead to  an increase in savings in the supply of capital 
via a r ise (in the real value) of the money stock. Long-run profit expectations 
thereby rise, investment activity becomes more buoyant, and upswing ensues. 
INNOVATION 
A name very often mentioned is Schumpeter when i t  comes to  explaining long- 
run fluctuations of economic development by innovative activities. Quite in line 
with his conviction of 1912 ('Theorie de r  wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung"), namely 
that man makes history, Schumpeter s a w  the preconditions fo r  an acceleration in 
economic growth in the cumulative appearance of entrepreneurial pioneers who 
carry out innovations. In the course of the upswing, the  pioneers are followed by a 
growing number of imitators; this finally leads to boom-like excesses, followed by 
an enduring decline in economic activity. 
Since this approach is  not easily converted to a simple "change in investment" 
hypothesis it  is hard to  test empirically. How do w e  measure the importance of an 
innovation? Are there  accidental factors which are also important? - this would 
serve to refute the innovation hypothesis (Tinbergen). 
Incidentally, looking at past development, an important innovation has been, 
e.g. airplane traffic, o r  nuclear energy o r ,  these days, microprocessors. But were 
these not - excepting the latter - economic flops, unable to  ca r ry  the economies? 
And microprocessors: will they really serve to  cure  the  employment problems the 
world is facing today? Lots of people doubt that. In general: the innovation 
hypothesis does not help much in predicting economic performance due to the 
problem of identifying basic innovations and their "time of departure", and due to 
the ever-present possibility of labor-saving innovations. 
SINGULAR EVENTS 
Singular events hypotheses a r e  also often discussed as explanations for  
growth fluctuations. Wars, revolutions, and price shocks are mentioned in this 
context. It  may be doubted, however, whether such events can serve as an expla- 
nation of more o r  less regular patterns - if these patterns really exist, that is; if 
not w e  need not look for  explanatory hypotheses. Moreover, singular events may 
turn out t o  be endogenous t o  economic development. 
In the following w e  introduce the  ideas underlying our own work on long waves 
of economic development. 
A s  distinguished from the explanatory approaches of Kondratiev, Spiethoff!. 
and Schwnpeter, long-term fluctuations in investment activity can also result from 
systematic price distortions and rectifications on product and factor markets that  
directly impinge upon prof i t  expectations. Growth-constraining distortions can 
ensue, for  example, from an increase in the  degree of monopoly on product and 
factor markets, o r  from carrying the protection of economically weak industries, 
regions, o r  groups of persons too f a r .  There is no lack of indicators that  growth 
regarding price distortions has developed on the product and factor markets of 
numerous countries fo r  quite some time. In this regard, particular attention has 
been focused on the substantial increase in labor costs, on rising protection in 
international trade, and on the  surge of unproductive transfers. 
The basic problem of every theory of long swings consists of explaining why 
the  agents in the model react t o  changes in market signals only with a long lag. 
Starting from the observation that common interest organizations (organized spe- 
cial interest groups) a r e  common features of economies, the basic idea behind our  
approach is that  institutions - in contrast t o  individuals - reac t  only slowly and 
sluggishly. I t  seems to us that  this is the actual cause of long-run fluctuations in 
growth. 
The hypothesis of institutional sluggishness in reacting to market signals can 
be justified on various grounds: 
One cause lies in the life cycle of organizations. If the  need f o r  a collec- 
tive representation of individual interests arises, it takes time - not 
least because of the f r e e  r ider  problem - until the common interests a r e  
organized. Further time passes until new organized interest groups have 
penetrated into the  political arena against the  resistance of already 
established interests. Once they have gained their positions, they will 
defend them as long as possible, even if the  original interests have 
ceased to exist. 
A further  cause fo r  the sluggishness of public and private institutions 
can be seen in the nature of bureaucracy. Organizations possess an 
inherent interest to expand their  field of activity as f a r  a s  possible. The 
older and larger  organizations become, the  longer and more tenuous the 
' ~ x c e r ~ t  from Cllsmann et al. (1983). 
communication channels between the organized and the  organizations, be 
i t  because the  individual no longer counts fo r  much, be i t  because of 
' 'bureau~c1er0~i~ ' ' .  
Enduring, counterproductive behavior of organizations, particularly of 
public administration, may also be based on a self-escalating process of 
societal misinterpretation of market signals. ensuing (counterproduc- 
tive) intervention, and renewed misinterpretation of ever  more ominous 
market signals. 
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Figare 1 On the  theory of long waves in economic development. 
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A diagrammatical representation of the  basic s tructure of this mechanism 
might clarify our approach. The right-hand side of Figure 1 describes that 
pa r t  of the mechanism coming from organizations with an  interest in raising 
product prices o r  reducing factor  prices, o r  grea ter  t ransfer  payments. The 
f i rs t  set will usually be composed of business interests; the second set will 
contain organizations of employees o r  pensioners and the like. Adjustment 
processes occur slowly insofar as they depend on collective decisions, quickly 
insofar as they depend on individual behavior. The diagram is  restr icted to 
the  basic principles of the long-term interrelationship. Thus, foreign 
economic relations, fo r  example, have not been explicitly shown, although 
they play a ro le  at all the  levels mentioned. Also, the  existence of feedback 
effects between all the  elements of the scheme can be surmised. The 
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interrelationships between government activity and fac tor  and product mark- 
e t s  seem to  be of particular importance, because significant retarding ele- 
ments may be found above al l  in government influence. This holds, e.g., if 
firms call f o r  - and receive - public assistance when competition pressures 
rise.  On the  o the r  hand, labor  unions might attempt to pass on increased 
taxes in collective bargaining agreements. 
The scheme can be described as follows. Let a disturbance impinge on 
the  initially existing equilibrium growth path (all public and private organiza- 
tions that  are required in such a situation, o r  are.compatible with it ,  exist). 
The disturbance may appear  on the  level of the "organized particular 
interests" perhaps because certain interest groups have gradually acquired 
monopoly power. This wi l l  have consequences on fac tor  markets (in the form 
of persistent upward cost pressure,  for  example); on product markets (in the  
form of supply restrictions, fo r  example); o r  in the  field of governmental 
activity (in the  form of subsidies, f o r  example). In whatever way the  tenden- 
cies toward monopolization change, from an  overall economic point of view, 
incentives will change: 
(a) Insofar as incentives deter iorate  - as in the case of persisting 
upward cost pressure - investment activity abates  and productioh- 
declines (relatively). If, on top of that, t he  government gives in to 
the  demands of organized interests and voters  f o r  compensating 
action - such as partial  o r  sectoral employment guarantees, subsidi- 
zation of private activities, o r  expansion of social services - it wil l  
often aggravate the  overall economic decline and intensify the 
downswing. The longer the contraction continues, the more those 
interest groups which were the  original source of t he  disturbance 
lose power. This may result  from the  progressive circumscription of 
the  interest  groups, financial resources in the course of the  
economic decline, o r  because members more and more lose the i r  
trust in and the i r  loyalty to the i r  organizations. Thus, i t  would 
appear  t o  be  in the  organizations' self-interest t o  learn from the  
experience of t he  contraction and r e s t r i c t  the  struggle over  distri- 
bution. Changes in societal beliefs - t he  Zeitgeist - push in the 
same direction. These can even end the  decline on their  own if in 
the course of revolutionary developments the received social frame- 
work i s  burst  asunder. Removal of the  original disturbance tends to 
reduce costs relative to returns fo r  the producers. 
(b) To the  degree that  individual economic agents' profit expectations 
are raised (in the shor t  run) by cartelization of important product 
markets, a long-run contraction can be  initiated as well .  The cause 
f o r  this may be  seen in the  tendency of a cartel to opt fo r  the  beaten 
t rack  internally, and t o  discriminate against outside producers (and 
individual car te l  members) by securing i t s  position domestically and 
abroad. Especially user  industries a r e  weakened by cartel prices. 
These, in turn, will combine in o rde r  to  receive protection against 
outside competition. The same complaints can be  expected from the  
cartels supplying industries, as their  sales decline, as w e l l  as from 
all others  who have to finance the  protection. Supply reductions 
spread throughout the  economy; the  production s t ruc ture  gets 
frozen in. In the  long run, t he  cumulative group egoism on the 
entrepreneurial side tha t  drives the  economy into the  downswing is 
broken by the  always existing, steadily growing danger of outsiders. 
Since no one wants to be  thrown out of business, outsider competi- 
tion leads to a renewed increase in investment and production. 
In both cases  a new upswing begins. With the increasing duration of t he  upsw- 
ing, more and more scarcities appear  on product and fac tor  markets, which 
encourage monopolistic tendencies. The same social and institutional inertia 
that  was effective during the  downswing now prevents t he  interest  groups 
from reacting to  the i r  newly acquired power by rapidly changing the i r  
behavior, still marked by the  last crisis. 
In i t s  core ,  o u r  explanatory approach is  endogenous even if exogenous 
disturbances a r e  not ruled out. 

COMKENTS ON TOPIC 2: IDENTIFICATION OF LONG WAVES 
Jay W. Forrester. Alan I!L Graham. Pe ter  M. Senge. and John D. Sterman 
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF EMPIRICAL VERlFICATION AND TBEORY 
In studying the long wave, a s  in studying any phenomenon, it  is impossible t o  
divorce the interpretation of data from theory. Reliably distinguishing different 
cycles in available historical statistics is difficult if not impossible unless one has 
a w e l l  developed structural theory of the causes of the long wave. A t  the  very 
least, one's basic theoretical ideas define what variables one examines and what 
patterns in those variables seem significant. Koopman's classic paper 'measure- 
ment Without Theory" argued persuasively that meaningful measurement can rare ly  
be made in the  absence of a theoretical framework. Moreover, to the extent that a 
well developed theory exists, empirical observation becomes more focused and 
potent. One of the primary reasons the long wave has had relatively little impact 
in the field of economics is  the absence of a persuasive theory of its causes (e.g. 
Gordon 1981). The diverse empirical data that have been presented a s  evidence 
for  the long wave will remain of minimal scientific value until such theories are 
developed and convincingly brought into context with the data. Likewise, policy 
prescriptions based on the  long wave will not be taken seriously until persuasive 
theories a r e  developed. 
The idea that  theory is  always a t  least implicit in data analysis contrasts shar- 
ply with the  view that  statistical techniques should be used t o  'let the  data do the 
talking". For example, spectral analysis and econometric tests are often proposed 
as methods to detect cycles o r  test hypotheses independent of prior  assumptions 
o r  theories. Such a view of statistical techniques is not correct ,  e i ther  philosoph- 
ically o r  practically. 
The practical problems a r e  obvious. There have been a t  most four cycles of 
the long wave. Many more would be required to generate statistically significant 
estimates of dominant periods, to establish leading and lagging indicators, and to 
estimate the means and variances of variables over the cycle. However, the 
failure to identify a significant cycle of 50 years obviously does not show that  such 
a cycle does not exist. Worse, there  are only a handful of economic t i m e  series  fo r  
which measurements have been made over the past two hundred years. Moreover, 
these data are not necessarily the most relevant f o r  testing hypothesized causes of 
the long wave. For example, one major class of theories of the long wave involves 
capital overexpansion. The most useful data to test this theory would be long-term 
time series for  production, capital stock, employment, price, return on investment, 
capacity utilization and similar variables for  the capital producing sector  of an 
economy. Such data a r e  difficult to  assemble even fo r  the period after the  Second 
World War, because national income accounts and o ther  available data a r e  not 
aggregated along the  lines most useful fo r  the theory. D a t a  fo r  the entire indus- 
t r ial  era a r e  even less available. 
The long-term time series  that  do exist a r e  generally aggregate figures, such 
as the wholesale and consumer price indices, interest rates, and GNP. Such data 
provide only weak evidence for  the long wave, as one would expect, given the 
diversity of behavior modes that influence historical change. Many researchers 
have turned to other  empirical sources to corroborate specific long-wave mechan- 
isms. Thus, innovation theories of the long wave have benefited from numerous his- 
torical studies of basic innovation; studies of value change have drawn on content 
analysis of political tracts. 
Y e t  even if adequate data were available, purely empirical analysis would not 
be  sufficient to  identify the  long wave and distinguish i t  from other  modes of 
behavior. One may fail t o  locate a strong 50-year cycle in a given time series  even 
though such a cycle in fact  exists in the  real economy. For example, historical data 
fo r  US consumer prices from 1800 suggest a strong 50-year cycle with peaks exa: 
cerbated by the w a r s  of 1812, 1860-1865, and 1915-1918. Yet, the 50-year cycle 
has been swamped in the  past twenty years by accelerating inflation caused by 
government deficit financing. Unless one has a prior  theory to aid in disentangling 
such dynamics, statistical techniques such as spectral analysis can be misleading. 
Similar problems attend the use of correlative techniques such as 
econometric estimation. There are many facets to the long wave: i t  affects a wide 
range of economic variables, innovation, technology, and even political values. 
There s e e m  t o  be several distinct mechanisms that  are sufficient to  create the  long 
wave o r  that  can amplify it. These mechanisms may have the  ability to  generate 
oscillations independently with periods of roughly 50 years. In the  same way that 
individual firms in the economy oscillate in phase to  crea te  the business cycle, so  
the various mechanisms behind the long wave become entrained into a single cycle. 
Entrainment of various mechanisms implies that  i t  is difficult t o  sort out cause and 
effect from empirical data. A s  Phelps-Brown (1972) puts it, "running regressions 
between time series is  only likely to deceive". Even where data are adequate, the 
correlative techniques fail t o  identify the  causes of so-called "structural changesJ1 
that  alter the correlations. Such "structural changesJ' may in fact be caused by 
the  long wave. The development of stagflation in the 1970s is  a prime example. 
THE CHBLL&NGE OF IDENTIFYING LONG WAVES 
The fact that  meaningful empirical verification of long waves requires a 
theoretical context is both encouraging and discouraging. I t  means that  the  task 
of historical identification is much more demanding than statistical analysis alone. 
However, i t  also suggests the  possibility of much grea ter  payoffs through integrat- 
ing theory development and historical analysis. But if a purely statistical 
approach to empirical verification of long. waves is not possible, how can long 
waves be identified? What is the  role of formal statistical techniques? 
To verify the existence of the long wave i t  is  necessary (1) to develop a model 
o r  theory that generates the long wave and distinguishes it  from other  modes of 
behavior such as the business and Kuznets cycles, and (2) to develop confidence 
that  the model accurately reflects reality, both in i ts  s tructure and behavior. 
A proper model of the long wave will have several key characteristics. I t  will 
provide an endogenous explanation fo r  the long wave and other  relevant modes of 
economic behavior. There should be f e w  if any exogenous variables and certainly 
no exogenous variables with cyclic characteristics. The model should be a struc- 
tural theory of the  economy with a realistic portrayal of decision making. The 
theory should explain how the decisions of individuals, firms, and governments 
interact to  produce the long wave and other  dynamics. I t  should generate the 
macrobehavior of the  system from assumptions about the  microstructure, not from 
correlations of economic aggregates. 
Since 1975 the  development of an endogenous structural theory of economic 
dynamics has been a major goal of the System Dynamics National Model project. 
The National Model has been used to investigate a number of economic dynamics 
including the business cycle, inflation, the  energy transition, and the  long wave. 
Early work showed the  economy capable of generating several oscillatory 
modes. The characteristic period of the  oscillations depends on the length of the 
delays and adjustments involved in each mode. The 4- t o  7-year business cycle w a s  
found to be caused by interactions between inventory management and employment 
policies. The average period of about 4 years is the  result of the fairly short  t i m e  
required to  acquire labor, to  build up inventories, and t o  form expectations of 
future demand. The National Model also generated a 15- to 25-year cycle similar to 
the construction o r  Kuinets cycle. The intermediate cycle ar ises from the 
attempts of firms to balance the mix of capital and labor in production; the  roughly 
20-year period is due t o  the  delays in acquiring and disposing of capital plant and 
equipment. The long lead time and lifetime of capital compared with the delays in 
acquiring and discharging labor account for  the long period of the  cycle relative 
to the  business cycle. The long wave arises through different mechanisms. There 
seem to be several important channels that  contribute to  the  genesis of the  long 
wave. These a r e  discussed under Topic 1 and include capital self-ordering and 
debt/price dynamics. 
The identification of these cyclical modes in a model is a relatively straight- 
forward task. The mechanisms responsible fo r  each cycle can be isolated and 
their  contribution to  each particular mode identified through controlled experi- 
ments on a model. A variety of analytical techniques to establish the contribution 
of a variable o r  causal link t o  any given mode are available t o  complement the 
experimental approach. 
Once the  modes generated by a model a r e  identified and the mechanisms 
responsible fo r  each understood, how can the  existence of these modes in the  rea l  
economy be verified? It  is  here  that formal statistical techniques can be most use- 
ful.  A structural model should generate the  s a m e  type of data as the  real system. 
The output of a model should have the  same statistical character ,  generate the 
same spectra, correlations, and "structural changes" as the real system. Thus the 
proper role f o r  statistical techniques in the identification of long waves is  to test 
whether theories of the  long wave can endogenously produce data with the  same 
characteristics as the r ea l  system. 
Synthetic data experiments are most useful here. For example, the National 
Model generates three  distinct cyclical modes: the business cycle, the  intermedi- 
ate cycle, and the long wave. To test a model against the empirical data, one 
should examine the  spectra of the  model-generated data to see how well they 
correspond to the  actual spectra. If a model generates data with the same statisti- 
cal properties as the  actual system, and if the  mechanisms responsible f o r  model 
behavior are understood and accepted, then the  model provides strong evidence 
fo r  the existence of the  modes in the real system. 
Similarly, one should not attempt to identify the long wave o r  other  cyclical 
modes by examining correlations between the independent and dependent variables 
of model equations. Rather, one should see if model-generated data reveal the 
same correlations (or lack of correlation!) a s  the actual data. Likewise, model- 
generated data should show how, over the course of the long wave, historical 
correlations shift. The shifting relationship between inflation and unemployment a s  
expressed in the Phillips curve provides a good example. The National Model does 
not contain an equation that directly relates inflation t o  unemployment. Y e t  the 
Model generates the same type of correlation between inflation and unemployment 
a s  is seen in the  actual data. Further, the  Model shows how that  correlation shifts 
as the economy moves through the expansion phase of the  long wave and into the 
downturn. 
Naturally, one would not expect a model to reproduce the  exact path of 
economic variables over t ime. Peculiarities of historical circumstance, local vari- 
ations, and other  sources of noise will cause a model to differ from history on a 
point-by-point basis, in the  same way and for  the  same reasons that each long wave 
is different. The important comparison is between the  statistical properties of the 
actual and model-generated data. 
A second major type of empirical corroboration involves explaining a comple& 
set of conditions that  arise simultaneously as the  economy enters  a particular 
stage of the long wave. Such a set of conditions might be called a syndrome, analo- 
gous t o  the use of the term in medicine. For example, the National Model generates 
a set of conditions a t  the peak of the long wave that have emerged in advanced 
economies in the  past ten to twenty years, including: 
Increasing capital intensity 
Replacement of labor by capital 
Declining capacity utilization 
Rising unemployment 
Increasing severity of business cycles 
Deepening depression of capital and related basic industries 
Slowing inflation 
High real interest rates 
Declining re turn  on investment. 
These conditions are often viewed as unrelated o r  the result of exogenous influ- 
ences such a s  the OPEC, foreign competition, and so  on. The National Model shows 
them to  be a related set of symptoms arising from the mechanisms that c rea te  the 
long wave. The fact that  a single dynamic theory internally generates such a large 
number of the conditions observed in reality is  a powerful corroboration of the 
long-wave theory- The interrelationships among a complex set of variables can be 
understood in terms of a single unifying theory. Historical analysis into conditions 
during similar phases of past long waves should be performed t o  further  develop 
confidence in a model's ability to generate realistic economic behavior. Such 
analysis, relying a s  i t  must on the tenor of the  times as expressed in legislative 
agendas, the business and popular press, and social action, will be primarily quali- 
tative. The development of such qualitative corroboration would provide a power- 
ful complement to the  formal analysis of model behavior. 
A broad spectrum of data has been developed that  suggests the existence of 
the long wave. Y e t  the scarci ty of standard economic variables over  a suitable 
range limits the possibilities fo r  identifying long waves through empirical means 
alone. Acceptance of the long wave can only proceed as a causal theory of the 
long wave is developed. Theory and empirical work must now walk hand in hand. 
The goal of long-wave theory should be  the development of an  endogenous struc- 
tural explanation f o r  the long wave. The mechanisms responsible f o r  the  long wave 
must be articulated and distinguished from those responsible for  o the r  modes of 
behavior. The goal of empirical work should be the comparison of the actual data 
with the data generated by the theories. Only when a theory of the  long wave can 
generate data with the  same statistical charac ter  as the  real data will the long 
wave gain credence as a phenomenon worthy of scientific study o r  as a basis fo r  
economic policy. 

COMMENTS ON TOPIC 2: IDENTIFICATION OF LONG WAVES 
H a n s  H. G1isman.u 
DEFLNITIONS 
Before considering the  problems associated with identification of Kondratiev 
like cycles as opposed t o  Kitchin, Juglar o r  Kuznets cycles, one should discuss 
which indicator i t  is tha t  w e  talk about. Kondratiev w a s  mainly concerned with 
price movements, o thers  concentrated on sectoral  output, o r  on innovation cycles, 
o r  on investment. 
Since economics is concerned with the  well-being of people the  ups and downs 
of economic activity analyzed should be as comprehensive as possible; in o the r  
words, i t  is economic welfare, usually approximated by the social product, that  
matters. The rate of unemployment, which is often mentioned in this respect ,  seems 
to be  second best t o  the  social product because i t  does not incorporate labor  pro- 
ductivity; a low degree of unemployment may only indicate that  t he re  is substantial 
'hidden" unemployment, i.e. very low levels of marginal labor productivity. Price 
movements per se do not exhibit anything about welfare o r  about t he  development 
of welfare, and the  same holds t r u e  f o r  innovation, o r  sectoral  development pat- 
terns. 
With regard  t o  social product the  very nature of the long wave indicates tha t  
i t  is not short-run problems of capacity utilization but r a t h e r  the development of 
production potential which should be  analyzed. This again poses some problems 
since the  capital stock and its development can only be  of relevance insofar as the 
profitable capital stock is concerned. Capital stock statistics only provide f o r  
technical information on how much could be  produced if pr ices  would not matter. 
Here again the  concept of measuring social product becomes important because it 
seems to be  the  best approximation fo r  identifying tha t  p a r t  of t he  capital stock 
which under present - o r  cur rent  - conditions is economically efficient. And if 
the  social product is a good proxy one may in fac t  neglect tha t  i t  is the  capital 
stock which plays a decisive role. The question of course remains how to identify 
long-run ups and downs of economic activity from short-run disequilibria. 
 IDENTIFICATION^ 
The long-run development of the social product can be described by a growth 
path beset by wave-like movements of various frequencies and amplitudes. In 
order  to see whether there  are long-run cycles that can be made visible to the 
observer w e  adopted and, to our belief, improved Kondratiev's procedure. First, 
detrending the time series data (the exponential trend proved to be superior to 
the linear trend in terms of statistical fit) made i t  easier to detect deviations in 
the pattern of development. Second and simultaneously, smoothing the t ime  series 
data with 9-year moving averages w a s  thought to serve f o r  depressing any 
shorter-run cyclical movements. Calculating the difference between the moving 
average and the (hypothetical) trend value as a percentage of the trend value 
indeed did exhibit a long-wavelike pattern. Now i t  may be surmised that  every 
cycle of the long wave has its own peculiarities that make the average growth per- 
formance different from other cycles. Therefore a dummy variable w a s  intro- 
duced, first, in the trough exhibited according to the above-mentioned procedures 
one and two. In case this dummy turned out to be statistically significant, differ- 
ences between moving averages and the new trend w e r e  calculated. If then the 
trough changed, the dummy variable was shifted along the time horizontal to this 
newly found lowest point; in most cases the initially discovered trough w a s  thus. 
reinstalled. For all those countries where more than one trough existed, another 
dummy variable w a s  introduced; the procedure then applied w a s  the same as before 
with the f irst  dummy. 
I t  can be argued that  such a procedure leads to  misinterpretation of the long 
wavebecause 
the results of detrending depend on the phase within which observation 
starts and ends, 
the beginning and end of cycles should be the inflection points instead of 
troughs, and 
detrending plus smoothing procedures produce wave-like patterns; the 
long waves are artificial. 
The first two points s e e m  to be w e l l  taken. Since one never knows anything con- 
clusive about the economic situation at the start and at the end of the observation 
period, the peaks and troughs can deviate from the "real" ones; this argument is 
all the more relevant the shor ter  the time series is. 
Taking the second argument, one should indeed aim at identifying inflection 
points of long-run development. Empirical research, however, in general is r a the r  
crude. The only regular phenomenon in social product time series is that they are 
too irregular for identifying inflection points. Smoothing does not help that much. 
Thus, one has to  contend with troughs and peaks. 
A s  regards the Slutzky effect i t  may be added that all other smoothing pro- 
cedures applied in the case of Germany by and large gave the same results. M o r e  
over, w e  also tried some spectral and correlation analyses. It turned out that the 
growth fluctuations observed by the above procedures were most probably not 
artificially constructed because 
(1) the moving average did definitely not induce cycles of about 40 years' 
length, and 
'see also Clismann et al. (1981). 
(2) the detrending method should not have "approximately enforced such 
cycles". 
The spectral analysis, however, did not come to  a positive (or negative) answer 
regarding the  existence of long waves of economic development; the reason given 
was that one needs constant phases for positive identification as w e l l  as longer 
observation periods. And neither did our theory suggest constant phases nor 
could this, be expected, owing to  the two world wars in between the data. 
PROBLEMS 
Proving causalities and refutation of hypotheses pose some wel l  known prob- 
lems, especially in the social sciences. These problems a r e  aggravated when 
analyzing causes of long waves of economic development. For instance, how can one 
deal with leads and lags between endogenous and exogenous variables? Since w e  
a r e  concerned with long-run behavior, leads can tum out to really be lags and vice 
versa. 
Also, whereas w e  normally have means of statistical analysis t o  indicate the. 
quality of a hypothesized relationship w e  have almost nothing of that so r t  with 
respect t o  long waves. Even the case of the long wave itself is not easily made, let 
alone the case of its determinants. Maybe some day data will be comprehensive 
enough fo r  us to  apply some variant of spectral analysis (allowing, however, fo r  
changes in the phases), but w e  all shall be dead by then. 
Problems sometimes accumulate. To give an example: the hypothesis has been 
advanced that the intensity of distributional conflicts together with inherently 
sluggish reactions of organized interests leads to  long-run ups and downs of 
economic activity. But there  a r e  lots of organizations and lots of conflicts all the 
time. Choosing wage conflicts since they bear  heavily on profit expectations, what 
is the  appropriate measure of these distributional conflicts? Considering that "too 
high" wage increases negatively affect profits and thus probably expected profit 
and that  "too low" wages work in the opposite direction, the real wage position 9 
should give a good proxy fo r  the  intensity of distributional conflicts (other factors 
being equal). But again the real wage position is  not simply exogenous t o  economic 
development. W e  all know, fo r  instance, that productivity depends. among others, 
on the employment situation (increasing unemployment leads statistically to pro- 
ductivity increases a s  long as marginal labor o r  firms exist first). The real wage 
position under these circumstances~indicates possibilities fo r  wage increases in 
the depression period that, a t  the  given level of employment, do not exist. The 
good times, on the other  hand, a f t e r  fu l l  employment is reached, pose no problems; 
however, before the  full employment situation productivity increases are 
"underestimated" and the possibilities for  wage increases a r e  relatively high. 
Taken together, causality often has to go a long way - from real causes to 
their  proxies until measuring problems blur the  picture - before tentative results 
are obtained. Similar problems apply when trying to take account of government 
intervention o r  of the  degree of international integration of an economy. 
A s  regards a "single, all-encompassing model" for  explaining long cycles, such 
a model should be  
2 ~ h e  real wage position indicates changes in the distribution of additional rnacroeconornic 
income between employees and employers. I t  i s  measured by comparing the overall produc- 
tivity increase (corrected, among other things, for terms of trade effects) with real wage 
increases. 
(1) principally endogenous - that  is, without the need f o r  initial pump prim- 
ing like Schumpeter8s clusters of innovation o r  like Mande18s "system 
shocks", and 
(2) based on the ability of individuals to  learn from experience; i t  should 
also 
(3) incorporate the essentials of an  economic model. 
The last point is to remind us that  i t  is  profit expectations of one kind o r  the other  
that  rule the world and that  changes in relative product and factor  prices and the 
reaction to  such changes play a significant (though often neglected) role  in a 
nation's development. To be sure,  the problems involved in producing such a model 
increase with these standards. 
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COXKKENTS ON TOPIC 3: THEOBY TE-G AND INlXGMTION 
Jay W. Forrester. Alan K Graham. Peter I1L Senge. and John D- S t e m  
THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED THEOKY 
Research over the past decade has shown that  the re  a r e  many facets to the 
long wave. A growing body of theory and evidence suggests that the long wave 
affects a wide range of economic variables, innovation, technology, and even polit- 
ical values. The long wave is  clearly not a monocausal phenomenon. 
Yet, until now, the majority of long-wave theories have stressed a single cause 
o r  a small set of causes. Each theory tends t o  focus on one pa r t  of the social, 
technical, and economic system without justifying why a particular mechanism is 
more important than others. The goal of theory building must now be the  integra- 
tion of the various theories that have emerged in the past decade. The mechanisms 
proposed in each theory must be evaluated in a common framework, their  interac- 
tions analyzed, and their  relative contributions to  the  long-wave syndrome esta- 
blished. 
An integrated theory of the long wave wi l l  have several key characteristics. 
It  should be a formal model so that all assumptions are made explicit and so  the 
conclusions can be reproduced, tested, and extended by others. I t  should be an 
endogenous explanation of the long wave, generating the long wave through the 
interactions of individuals, firms, and governments. I t  should be a structural,  
causal theory, not a correlative one. I t  should realistically portray the  decision- 
making capabilities and decision rules of individuals and organizations. I t  should 
be a dynamic theory, and must not presume the economy is  in a state of equilibrium. 
Finally, i t  should generate o ther  important modes of economic behavior and distin- 
guish them from the long wave. 
A STBATEGY FOR THEORY INTEGRATION 
The major theories of the economic long wave are not mutually exclusive. 
Consider, f o r  example, the  capital overexpansion theory developed at MIT and 
Mensch's depression-trigger theory of basic innovations. The MIT theory asserts 
that  the long-wave decline arises from overbuilding of capital. Under this theory, 
a sustained upturn can only come when the imbalances created by excess physical 
capital and debt are corrected. Mensch's theory asserts that depressions bring 
forth new basic innovations, which make a new expansion possible. Both theories 
may be  co r r ec t  insofar as they identify mechanisms tha t  opera te  in real life. Both 
can be integrated into a broader  theory tha t  could se rve  w a basis f o r  assessing 
the i r  relative capabilities t o  explain past long waves and f o r  identifying policies to  
influence fu ture  behavior (see below). 
The system dynamics methodology originally developed at MIT can  play a vital 
role  in integrating diverse theories,  testing their  explanatory power, and develop- 
ing more effective policies. System dynamics provides a general framework fo r  
translating verbal  theories into formal dynamic models, a set of guidelines f o r  for- 
mulating models tha t  realistically represent  the  physical structure and decision- 
making rules  of systems, and a set of computer simulation procedures  f o r  testing 
the  internal consistency ,and realism of those models. System dynamics is espe- 
cially suited f o r  testing w e l l  developed qualitative theories. The method i s  not lirn- 
ited by available quantitative data. The ability to por t ray  "soft" variables is espe- 
cially important in studying the  long wave because of t he  diverse manifestations of 
the  phenomenon and the  paucity of long-term economic, technical, and social data. 
Although the methodology i s  still evolving, particularly in t he  areas of behavior 
analysis and validation of complex nonlinear systems, i t  appears  to be  the  most 
advanced tool fo r  the task of testing alternative long-wave theories. 
There are two primary ways in which system dynamics can aid the  developmenb 
of an  integrated theory of the  long wave. 
The National Model 
The National Model project  at MIT has been the  vehicle f o r  the development of 
an  endogenous s t ruc tura l  theory of the  long wave. The Model provides a r ich,  
detailed description of the  microstructure of the  economy. I t  generates  a wide 
range of economic dynamics including the  long wave, the business cycle, a n  
approximately 20-year intermediate (Kuznets) cycle, and inflation. I t  has been 
used t o  examine energy-economy interactions over  the  long term. 
The National Model comes closest, at present,  t o  an  integrated theory of the  
long wave. The long wave in the  Model a r i ses  through a variety of distinct mechan- 
isms (see Topic 1). The Model shows how these mechanisms interact  and amplify one 
another. The Model has  been used t o  identify a wide range of distinct feedback 
channels that  contribute t o  the  long wave. For example, one of the  important 
causes of the long wave is capital self-ordering. Self-ordering stems from the  fac t  
tha t  the capital plant and equipment sec tor  of the economy, in the  aggregate,  ord- 
ers and acquires capital from itself. Thus a n  increase in o r d e r s  f o r  capital is 
amplified by the needs of the  capital sector itself, leading eventually t o  capital 
overexpansion. But t he  Model has  shown how self-ordering creates a variety of 
additional positive feedback loops tha t  fu r the r  amplify the  basic self-ordering 
mechanism. These include the  response of firms to rising lead times, the  buildup of 
growth expectations, and the  behavior of labor  markets, prices,  credi t  markets, 
and aggregate demand. 
Thus the National Model has  already resulted in an  integrated theory of the 
long wave in the  sense tha t  t he  Model identifies numerous specific feedback struc- 
tu res  that  contribute to t he  cycle. Through controlled simulation experiments and 
analysis of the  Model, the  contribution of each mechanism t o  the  overall  behavior 
can be  evaluated. 
However, though the National Model i s  quite large, i t  does not yet  contain all 
the causal mechanisms tha t  have been advanced as theories of the  long wave. In 
particular,  t he re  is as yet  no s t ructural  representation of the  innovation process 
o r  technological growth. Elaboration of the Model to examine these hypotheses is 
planned. Nevertheless, the Model at its present stage of development allows test- 
ing of a wide range of theories of the long wave and provides a powerful basis for  
identifying alternative patterns of behavior in rea l  economies. 
The Role of Small Models 
The advantages of the  National Model are i ts wide bound- and the  rich 
detail in which economic behavior is represented. However, the complexity of the 
Model makes i t  difficult to explain and explore the individual mechanisms that con- 
tribute t o  the long wave. There is a need for  a portfolio of simple models t o  aid in 
identifying and understanding particular mechanisms behind the long wave. Such 
models will be especially important in communicating the  long-wave theory to the 
broader community of economists and policy makers. 
Several such models have already been developed. Sterman (1983) develops a 
simple model that shows how capital self-ordering can cause the long wave. The 
model shows how the long wave arises from the interactions of the investment decit 
sions of firms in the capital-producing sector. More important, i t  shows, through a' 
variety of simulation tests, that the decision rules of individual firms a r e  rational 
and appropriate. The demonstration that the long wave can ar ise  even when indivi- 
dual actors  are behaving rationally is crucial if the long wave is t o  be accepted as 
the consequence of common, everyday decisions and not as an art i fact  o r  aberra-  
tion. 
Simple models can also help establish the relative importance of various 
theories of the long wave. For example, the Sterman model shows self-ordering is 
a sufficient cause of the long wave. In particular, the model shows the long wave 
can arise with technology held completely constant. Y e t  many theories focus on 
innovation and technology a s  key causes of the long wave, and data on basic inno- 
vations show a clear long-wave pattern. Work in progress has shown that it  is pos- 
sible to  integrate the self-ordering theory with Mensch's depression-trigger 
theory. A simple structure to  portray the process of invention and innovation, as 
described by Mensch, w a s  incorporated into the model. The results show that the 
long wave generated by self-ordering can cause long cycles in the rate of basic 
innovation even when the invention rate is  constant. Thus a straightforward 
experiment demonstrates that  the economic cycle can entrain the process of inno- 
vation, confirming the earl ier  hypothesis of F o r e s t e r  (1977) and Graham and 
Senge (1980). The next step is  to  test whether the long wave in innovation can feed 
back and amplify the  long wave. 
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN AN INTEGRATED THEORY 
The development of an integrated theory that meets the requirements 
described above is not easy. The process of building confidence in such a theory 
and in the mechanisms responsible fo r  its behavior is complex, time consuming, and 
inherently subjective, as is building confidence in any scientific theory ( F o r e s t e r  
and Senge 1981, Bell  and Senge 1981). As the long wave is a many-faceted 
phenomenon, so  the testing procedure must be open-minded and eclectic. 
There are several classes of tests to which a model of the long wave must be 
subjected. These tests a r e  much broader than the usual statistical tests of 
goodness of fit. One class of tests concerns the adequacy of model structure. A s  a 
theory of human behavior, the microstructure of a model should be compared with 
available information on decision making. Such information wil l  be primarily quali- 
tative, but a model that  fails t o  account for  the information-processing capabilities 
and decision rules of individuals is not a good theory. Such tests can d r a w  on 
direct observation as wel l  as a large and growing literature on cognitive capabili- 
ties and heuristics, organizational structure, and behavioral economics. 
Another class of tests concerns the robustness of the behavior. A model of 
the long wave should be subjected to  a series  of "extreme conditions" tests. A good 
theory wil l  be robust in the sense that  the behavior of every decision rule and of 
the  model as a whole must make sense even in extreme, ahistorical conditions. The 
determination of robustness is primarily a matter of experimentation and logical 
analysis. A model that  fails extreme-conditions tests cannot be trusted fo r  policy 
analysis o r  projections of future conditions that  may c a r r y  the  system into a new 
operating regime. 
Still another class of tests addresses the  adequacy of the behavior of a model. 
It  is here  that  the  statistical techniques can be most useful. Testing the  adequacy 
of behavior is more than comparing the behavior of a model against history on a 
point-by-point basis. There is  little reason to expect a close match between modei- 
and data on a point-by-point basis. Social systems are constantly bombarded by 
noise. These s m a l l  random events have a strong influence on the  exact path of the 
system through time. The business cycle, for  example, is  a damped mode that 
requires the continuous bombardment of smal l  random shocks to  stay alive. The 
exact path of such a mode is  inherently unpredictable, though its average period, 
amplitude, phase relationships, and so  on are r a the r  stable. A good model should 
generate data with the  same statistical character  as the  real data. The role of sta- 
tistical tests is  to  examine the  ability of a model to  generate, fo r  example, the  
same spectra, correlations, and phase relationships as the  real data (see Topic 2). 
s- 
The difficulties in the  development and testing of an integrated theory of the 
long wave are great. Y e t  the  likely results justify the investment. These results 
include consensus concerning the  existence of the  long wave, the  primary mechan- 
isms responsible for  the  long wave, and the  response of the economy to  various 
policies. The tools exist and need only be applied in a spirit  of cooperation. 
COMMENTS ON TOPIC 4: POSSIBILlTIES FOR INFLUENCING LONGWAVE BEHAVIOR 
Jay W. Forrester. Alan K Graham. Peter M. Senge. and John D. Sterman 
A discussion of influencing long-wave behavior in t he  next few yea r s  should 
s t a r t  by identifying present  economic circumstances and t h e  cur ren t  state of 
analytical methods. Where are w e  in t h e  economic long wave? What is t h e  present  
condition of national economies? What are t he  dynamic considerations when one 
t r ies  to  intervene in an  oscillatory mode of a system? Is knowledge of the  long- 
wave syndrome now sufficient t o  prescr ibe action? What a r e  t h e  hazards in taking 
action on the  basis of par t ia l  o r  incorrect  interpretations of the  long wave? How 
can effective policies be  identified? What are promising directions to explore in 
coping with pressures  from the  economic long wave? 
THE PRESENT POSITION IN THE LONG WAVE 
W e  believe tha t  t he  long wave i s  an  economic process tha t  is  endogenously 
generated within industrial economies. The long wave i s  a complicated syndrome of 
interrelated forces  and symptoms tha t  cause a massive fluctuation of physical cap- 
i tal  accompanied by changes in debt, prices,  unemploymant, and interest  rates. 
The last expansion phase spanned the  th ree  decades from 1945 to t he  mid-1970s. 
The peak has  been reached and passed in t he  last decade. W e  are now entering the  
downturn phase. Major stresses of t he  downturn are now becoming visible, but t he  
stresses have not ye t  become grea t  enough to c o r r e c t  t h e  economic imbalances. 
The next 1 0  t o  15 yea r s  will be  one of the  recurr ing "Great Depressions" tha t  
occur  at intervals of 40 to 60 years.  In t he  depressions, old capital  plant i s  worn 
out and depreciated, distortions in relative pr ices  are realigned, debt is paid off 
o r  defaulted, and a new pa t te rn  of living and a new technological infrastructure 
emerge. O u r  challenge i s  to adopt policies tha t  will make the  transition smoother. 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF A DOWNTURN 
A t  t he  beginning of a major long-wave downturn, industrial economies are in 
t he  strongest condition they have e v e r  been, and at t he  same time they are so 
highly s t ressed and imbalanced tha t  in t he  past  t he  strengths have not been har- 
nessed effectively. The problems lie not in the  real ,  physical aspects of an  
economy, but instead in the financial, attitudinal, and institutional aspects. 
A t  present, as w e  pass the peak following a long-wave expansion, all produc- 
tive capabilities are at the highest level they have ever been. More than ample 
capital plant exists; in fact, most industries have excess capacity. Labor is more 
available than at any time in the last three  decades. Productivity is the highest i t  
has ever been, even though i t  may no longer be rising as rapidly as before. More 
housing is in place than ever before. The stock of consumer durables is at i ts all- 
t i m e  peak. The industrial economies are in the best physical condition they have 
ever achieved. Based on the state of the real  economies, as distinguished from the 
nominal and financial economies, the t ime following a peak in the long wave should 
be our closest approximation to a golden age. This is the  time toward which civili- 
zations have been striving. W e  lose sight of the fact that  the process of building 
capital plant and building consumer durables and housing should not itself be our 
goal; instead, the goal should be a high standard of living made possible by having 
the capital plant and goods and housing in existence. They are now in existence. 
So, what keeps us f r o m  taking advantage of the near-utopia that has been 
achieved? 
During the expansion phase, economic systems have developed severe imbal- 
ances. The situation is like the physical stresses that build up at a geological fault. 
before an earthquake. The depression periods are Like the earthquakes that 
release the stresses and bring the system back into internal balance. But can w e  
not understand the nature of the economic stresses w e l l  enough to find ways to 
reestablish balance without an economic cataclysm? 
A t  the end of a capital-investment boom, capital plant in the economy has been 
overbuilt. The excesses can reach 30 percent o r  more of the total capital plant. 
Eventually, the excess is perceived and new construction declines drastically. 
Several imbalances arise from the overexpansion of capital plant. 
First, the capital-producing sectors have temporarily completed their mission 
of building up the economy and their full capacity is no longer needed; the result is 
unemployment radiating from the capital-producing sectors. 
Second, the existing plant itself represents an oversupply of production capa- 
city for  consumer goods and services with a resulting downward pressure on prices 
and revenues. The expansion of capital plant had been accompanied by accumula- 
tion of debts to  pay for  the plant; and falling revenues erode the ability to meet 
interest and debt repayment. 
Third, real interest rates rise because prices f a l l  relative to nominal interest 
rates; and debts become more burdensome. Prior  to  the peak in the long wave, 
rea l  interest rates tend to be low o r  negative, especially when measured by com- 
paring nominal interest rates with the inflation rate of physical assets such as 
land. The result is such an imbalance in relative prices that, in the United States, 
farmland prices have risen some three  times more than wages and consumer 
prices. The same tends to be true for  the price of housing. Physical asset prices 
have been driven up because physical assets were seen as a hedge against infla- 
tion. Now, with deflationary pressures emerging, such high asset prices become 
unsustainable, and foreclosures begin on mortages that were contracted at the 
peak prices. 
Fourth, the period of economic expansion w a s  a time of apparent excess 
demand. Prices could be raised to cover costs, so that managerial discipline 
relaxed and institutions became inefficient and developed excessive overhead. 
Now in times of economic stress, the excess white-collar employment is being 
corrected at the very time that alternative jobs are no longer being offered. 
DYNAMIC C ONSIDERATXONS 
We see the economic long wave as endogenously generated, and furthermore 
as an unstable mode of behavior. By unstable, w e  mean that the long wave fluctua- 
tion tends to  increase in amplitude until i t  is limited by nonlinearities in the sys- 
t em.  An unstable, growing mode is especially persistent and difficult to deal with. 
One characteristic of a persistent mode is the long transient response that  will fol- 
low a policy change before the  system settles to  its new pattern of behavior. The 
transient can easily last fo r  most of a f u l l  cycle, and, fo r  the long wave, this can 
m e a n  several decades. Another way of describing the  slow response is in terms of 
the system states that  must be brought to  a new relationship t o  one another. Those 
system states have reached their  current  values a s  a result of a decades-long p r w  
cess of gradual accumulation. Realigning those system states is inherently slow. 
The relevant system states fo r  this discussion include the  capital plant in the p r w  
duction sectors, the  labor in the  capital-producing sectors. and the  debts that 
have been built up in the  expansion process. These are out of balance with the 
other  par ts  of the economic system, yet can be changed only slowly o r  by catas- 
trophic, uncontrollable means. 
W e  should not expect a quick and painless recovery from the  long-wave pres- 
sures. On the other  hand, there  is every reason to  believe that policy choices 
exist that can influence the degree of difficulty that will be encountered. 
IS KNOWLEDGE SUFFICIENT TO CHOOSE CORRECTlYE POLICIES? 
A s  this is  being written in May 1983, i t  seems that  not enough is now known 
about the economic long wave to  justify unequivocal recommendations of correc- 
tive action. There are diverse and unresolved hypotheses as to the cause of the 
long wave. Until a comprehensive theory of how the long wave is generated has 
been reasonably widely accepted, policy recommendations run the  risk of making 
matters worse r a the r  than better.  
But the situation is changing rapidly. The System Dynamics National Model 
endogenously generates an economic long wave that  combines and unifies many of 
the long-wave theories that have been proposed. Furthermore, the behavior of 
the National Model agrees with and explains a wide range of symptoms and behavior 
that  are now being experienced in the world's economies. The National Model has 
only recently reached this point of development. Interpretations of behavior a r e  
taking shape rapidly but are not yet complete. In a f e w  months there  should be a 
much better  understanding of the forces involved in the long wave. Even more 
important, persuasive explanations should emerge for  identifying which policy 
changes would have low leverage and be of little value, which would be counterprw 
ductive, and which could have a favorable influence. 
HAZARDS IN CHOOSING POLICIES 
The history of choosing economic policies by intuition, debate, and political 
compromise is not encouraging. Failures in economic policy-making arise not from 
bad luck, but instead from the  very complexity of economic systems and from the  
inability of the human mind to  solve the behavior of high-order nonlinear dynamic 
systems. Several kinds of hazards lie in the path of choosing economic policies. 
First, a very high percentage of the policies in any system, perhaps as high as  
98 percent, have very low leverage f o r  affecting behavior. Worse, symptoms of 
difficulty usually point to those policies with l ow leverage. An overwhelming frac- 
tion of political and managerial effort  goes into debating policies tha t  matter very 
little. From such concentration on unimportant policies a r i ses  much of the  public 
frustration with governmental ineffectiveness. Examples are evident as w e  look at 
various countries in the present economic climate. Many different policies are 
debated and tried, and governments and managers rise and fall, yet .unemployment, 
inflation, declining industries, and foreign exchange imbalances continue. Among 
ineffective alternatives, t he  choice matters very little. 
Second, a policy change often leads to a reversa l  of desirability between the  
shor t  run and the  long run. A policy tha t  is good fo r  t he  shor t  run is likely t o  p r e  
duce undesirable consequences in the  long run, and vice versa. Many people do 
not recognize the  likelihood of such a reversal.  Furthermore, the  shor t  run can 
usually be perceived more clearly than the long run and seems more persuasive, s o  
the  tendency is to choose immediate advantage, with the  result  that  unfavorable 
forces accumulate and eventually become dominant. In many ways, ou r  present 
economic dilemma is  the legacy from several decades of maximizing the  nea r  term 
at t he  expense of the  more distant future. That future has now arrived. 
Third, not only are t h e r e  few high-leverage policies, but the  nature of thosy 
policies is usually not correct ly perceived. Often, t he  high-leverage policies go' 
unrecognized, are not even debated, and are not used in the  search fo r  be t te r  
economic conditions. Even worse, when high-leverage policies are used, they a r e  
often pushed in the  wrong direction. An example i s  found in the  attempts of 
governments, even now, t o  encourage more capital investment at a time when the  
primary cause of economic difficulty is excess physical plant. 
Fourth, t he re  is a tendency to overreaction. Symptoms of trouble build up 
without restraint  until they become politically overpowering. Then, at about the  
time that those trends would have ended anyway, grea t  counterpressure i s  brought 
to bea r  with the  resul t  tha t  the  reversal  is accentuated and the  opposite extreme 
is intensified. W e  may be seeing such an overreaction with respect  t o  inflation. 
The long-wave process creates inflation at the end of the expansion phase, with a 
self-correcting, internally generated reversa l  into deflation as t he  depression 
phase unfolds. But the anguish of inflation at the  end of this last expansion gen- 
erated strong political pressures in some countries to counteract inflation at t he  
very time that  the  normal internal processes of the  economy were beginning to 
move into deflation. As a result ,  the  disruptive effects of deflation in pr ices  and 
wages at a time when people a r e  trying to repay large debts may have been made 
more serious. 
ARRIVING AT CORRECTIYE POLICES 
W e  propose to use the  National Model to a r r ive  at those high-leverage poli- 
cies that  can be  brought to bear  on the  cur rent  downturn in the economic long 
wave. The Model now represents  a good basic theory of how the  long wave is gen- 
erated. Some additional work is needed to consolidate the  insights that  have been 
accumulating, t o  bring into perspective within the  Model the  various partial  
theories of the  long wave that  have been proposed by the  many people working in 
the field, and t o  identify the  principal causal mechanisms in contrast to more minor 
accentuating mechanisms. 
From a consolidated understanding of the long-wave mechanisms will come the  
ability to identify the influence of various policies, and the direction in which each 
should be moved. Work t o  date  suggests some of the directions in which to look, 
but without yet the  clarity o r  persuasiveness that  would justify specific 
recommendations. 
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS 
I t  should be  possible to  deal with a downturn in the  economic long wave at t w o  
different levels - t o  alleviate the  impact of the  dislocations and to reduce the  
severity of downturn. 
With respect  to alleviating dislocations, t he re  f i r s t  needs to be a public and 
political recognition of t he  economic processes that  are at work. If the  long-wave 
syndrome of interlocked symptoms is understood, actions suggest themselves that  
are quite different from those that  might result  from different interpretations. 
For example, if economic difficulties are interpreted as indicating only a severe 
but ordinary short-term business cycle recession, then an inappropriate short- 
term focus might be adopted. The short-term response would lead to assisting the  
unemployed in waiting f o r  the i r  jobs t o  reopen; but if jobs in the  capital-producing 
sectors are not going to re turn  fo r  one o r  two decades, such action t r aps  a gen- 
eration of people as wards of the  government r a t h e r  than helping them move intq 
o ther  opportunities fo r  contributing to the well-being of society. On the  other' 
hand, if cur rent  economic difficulties are interpreted as permanent, and the re  are 
indications tha t  such an interpretation is beginning in some quarters ,  then despair 
may lead to social breakdown and political pressures severe  enough to increase 
the  risk of another major w a r .  
A t  the  least, a c lear  public understanding of t he  long wave should help in 
dispassionately interpreting cur rent  events. I t  would be  understood tha t  difficult 
circumstances should not be  blamed on any single segment of society. The prob- 
l ems  were not caused by labor,  o r  management, or government, or by a part icular  
political party,  o r  by the  banks, or by foreign governments. Instead, difficult cir- 
cumstances would be seen as a consequence of the  actions tha t  everyone supported 
at the time they were taken. When the  overexpansion w a s  under way, everyone 
wanted more credit ,  more economic growth, more office buildings, more factories,  
more government expenditure, lower interest rates ,  and more education leading to 
more white-collar jobs. Furthermore, if t he  long-wave downturn is correct ly per- 
ceived, t h e r e  will be an understanding tha t  the  period of turmoil and readjustment 
has always been and will be  of limited duration, and that  t he  most constructive 
course of action i s  to alleviate immediate personal hardship while working f o r  the  
brighter  tomorrow tha t  i s  sure to come. 
Beyond making t h e  best of a difficult situation, t he re  i s  good reason to believe 
tha t  wise policy choices can alter the  course of events, probably not to a smooth 
and stress-free utopia but certainly to a less traumatic transition than if counter- 
productive policies are inadvertently adopted. And the  danger i s  grea t  that  coun- 
terproductive policies will be forced by political pressures if t h e  true nature of 
the  dynamics of the  long wave i s  not correct ly perceived. 
Desirable policies must start from a recognition of present imbalances, and 
the  probability tha t  past  t rends may suddenly reverse  to opposite and equally 
undesirable extremes. Unemployment in many present capital-producing sectors i s  
probably permanent. Little new capital plant will be needed in the  next 15 years,  
and, when i t  i s  time t o  rebuild, the  technological mix will have changed so tha t  the  
nature of capital plant will be different, industries will have moved to different 
locations, and the  skills required will be  different. A s  another example, t he  basis 
f o r  paying back debt i s  being undermined, and be t te r  ways than inflation or default 
should be sought fo r  bringing debt back into balance with prices,  revenues, and 
production. 
Reversal of past inflationary trends is entirely possible. Some countries are 
now pleased that inflation is declining, but severe deflation is becoming a growing 
threat.  Our work suggests that  one can have a physical depression, that  is, high 
unemployment and unused factory capacity, with ei ther  deflation o r  runaway infla- 
tion. Under present economic circumstances, the middle ground of constant prices 
tends to be an unstable equilibrium - a ridge from which there  is a strong ten- 
dency to slide in one direction o r  the  other. A promising direction of search is fo r  
a combination of fiscal, monetary, and banking policies that  can sustain public pur- 
chasing power and prices without allowing fur ther  debt accumulation o r  inflation- 
ary money creation f o r  speculative investments. 
Promising opportunities fo r  policies t o  alleviate the  severity of the  long-wave 
downturn are beginning t o  emerge. Further consolidation of the  theory of how the 
long wave functions should reveal still more possibilities. The immediate future 
promises rapid development of be t ter  insights in t i m e  t o  improve economic pros- 
pects for  the next decade. 
COHHENTS ON TOPIC 4: POSSIBILITIES FOR INFLUENCING LONG WAVE BFZUVIOR 
Christopher F r e a a a n  and Luc Soete 
Within such a framework of analysis i t  is possible to begin to map out tentative- 
policy objectives for  countries at the trough of a long wave. Carlota Perez-Perez 
(1983) points out that  Schumpeter himself did not develop such an analysis; despite 
his frequent emphasis on the importance of organizational innovations and the 
wider sociopolitical framework, s o  f a r  as long cycles are concerned his theory was 
rather limited to more narrowly economic factors. This meant that he  tended to 
regard depression as a "pathological" and unnecessary deepening of recession and 
scarcely considered what types of government action were needed to stimulate 
recovery f r o m  depression, although he  did ra the r  reluctantly and belatedly admit 
the need fo r  such intervention. His generally hostile stance to Keynesian 
economies (for example, in his vitriolic review of Keynes ("General Theory")) did 
not predispose him to consider the possibility of neKeynes ian  countercyclical 
policies in a long-cycle sense. Indeed he regarded the growth of government 
intervention and regulation, whether f o r  Keynesian o r  other reasons, with consid- 
erable distaste and although he  was resigned to the prospect of a general drift  
toward socialization (Schumpeter 1943) this was not a welcome prospect fo r  him. 
Keynes (1936) himself, although writing his major work during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, did not take up either the notion of Kondratiev long 
waves, nor its Schumpeterian variant. Nevertheless, the  remedies that  he recom- 
mended were sufficiently drastic to cause a major rupture in the  theoretical para- 
digm of neoclassical economics and (later) in the governmental policies and institu- 
tions of most capitalist economies. Essentially, he recommended the  "socialization 
of investment" without public ownership. This meant that  the  state should assume 
responsibility for  the  overall level of activity and employment within the economy, 
since in his view the unaided private market mechanism, and in particular the  rate 
of interest, could not be relied upon to bring about any sustained economic revival 
of growth. 
Although he  died in 1946, Keynes was in many ways the  architect of the  "good 
match" between social institutions and the new technological paradigms that  pre- 
vailed in the  fast-growing industries of this postwar boom. As  Carlota Perez-Perez 
has emphasized, the  mass  production of consumer durables and vehicles could 
flourish within a Keynesian sys t em of demand management, which both stimulated 
the necessary scale of investment directly o r  indirectly and permitted the neces- 
sary growth of the mass  consumer market, including credit systems, for  the  huge 
range of new products. The favorable international framework, too, owed much to 
Keynesian inspintion. The new international financial institutions and the new 
postwar approach to development and international trade, although falling short of 
what Keynes himself had hoped for, did nevertheless provide a much more favor- 
able environment for  the rapid growth of the world economy. 
Quite apart  from the monetarist counterrevolution, another problem con- 
fronting contemporary Keynesian theory and policy making relates to its failures 
to come to terms with the technological element in economic development, both at 
the national and the international level. For Keynesian macroeconomic theory it 
makes very little difference which a r e  the fast-growing, new industries and which 
are the declining o r  stagnant industries. I t  is aggregate demand which matters and 
the changing composition of demand and supply is of little significance. In terms of 
the neo-Schumpeterian theory that has been discussed, however, it matters enor- 
mously which are the emerging new technologies and industries because the social 
institutions that most favor their development and diffusion may be very different. 
The conditions that w i l l  prove m o s t  favorable to the achievement of the full 
potential of the microelectronic information revolution can as yet be only dimly 
disaerned. But i t  is evident that they wil l  involve big changes in management sys- 
tems, in communication systems, in industrial relations, in the mode of delivery of 
many services, in the pattern of public investment, in the education and training 
system and much else. None of the dominant theoretical paradigms. be they mone-' 
tarist, Keynesian, o r  Marxist, have addressed themselves to these questions, 
although they are among the most important issues from the standpoint of putting 
the world economy back on to the path of high and sustainable rates of economic 
growth. 
From a neo-Schurnpeterian standpoint (although as w e  have seen. Schumpeter 
himself w a s  reluctant to pose the issues in this way) the problem is one of govern- 
ment policies that will encourage a new wave of public and private investment, 
involving the rapid worldwide diffusion of the new technologies. Policies to be 
avoided are those which inhibit o r  prevent this diffusion process, for  example by 
reinforcing outdated institutions and procedures appropriate to an older techno- 
logical paradigm. Policies to be researched, developed, and applied would be 
those which enable social institutions to be adapted to achieve the  maximum gain 
from the new technologies with the minimum social costs. The nature of the new 
technologies is such that the participation of the work force in the implementation 
of technical change is likely to become an increasingly important issue in this con- 
text. The preservation of hierarchical Tayloristic division of labor and manage- 
ment systems is likely therefore to constitute a particularly important social prob- 
lem over the next decmde o r  two. 
It is still a m a t t e r  of controversy among n d c h u m p e t e r i a n s  as to what bal- 
ance of public and private investment will be most conducive to the resumption of 
high growth. As in the 1930s, there  is a very wide spread of political alternatives 
on offer, ranging from privatization of the existing public sector, through an 
extension of public sector investment in the new technologies, to full-scale sociali- 
zation. 
This raises the question of the relationship between long waves and Marx's 
"materialist conception of history". In terms of this paradigm, depressions may be 
seen as a particularly vivid manifestation of the tension between "prodnctive 
forces" and the "social relations of production" within which these productive 
forces have been growing and changing. Marx (1859) suggested that as it becomes 
increasingly apparent that the existing "relations of production" had become a 
"fetter" on the growth of the productive forces, then this would lead to the revolu- 
tionary reconstitution of society at large (or to the common ruin of the contending 
classes). 
During the deep depressions (of the 188Os, 1930s, 198Os), Marxist theorists 
have been divided on each occasion between those who tended to regard the crisis 
as the "Final Crisis" of capitalism, from which the only exit was a socialist revolu- 
tion (the so-called "breakdown" theories) and those who, while regarding the 
socialist exit as the most desirable, nevertheless recognized that the capitalist 
system was capable of finding solutions to the problem of renewed growth through 
a variety of institutional and legal changes that would at some time permit the 
resumption of growth of the productive forces. Lenin was one of those who always 
insisted that ideas of an inevitable breakdown were misconceived, and that solu- 
tions within the framework of an essentially captiallst social order w e r e  always 
possible, repugnant though such solutions might appear to socialists. His work on 
Imperialism, the Highest Sfage of Cbpital ism (Lenin 1915) may be regarded (with 
hindsight) as a study of ways in which the institutional framework of capitalism was 
modified during the crisis of the 1880s and the 1890s to permit the upswing of 
growth of the "Belle Epoque" in the period leading to the First World W a r .  

COMMENT ON TOPIC 4: POSSlBIllTLES FOR INFLUENCING LONG WAVE BEEIAVIOR 
Tonmum0 Sinibaldi 
If we look at the composition of the gross investment in the Europemn'. 
Economic Community in the seventies w e  find that about 40 percent was in home 
building, 5 percent in agriculture, 25 percent in industry (including the energy 
sector), and the residual 30 percent in transportation and other public and 
private services. We can find also that the percentage of investment in industry 
was much larger (more than 30 percent) in the sixties and that  it was constantly 
declining during the seventies. 
In Europe, as is w e l l  known, the level of population is now stationary and the 
phenomenon of great  internal migration has practically stopped. Also the  demand 
fo r  a "second home" shows a tendency to decrease. In brief, we shall not need 
many new homes in Europe in the next decades. Also we shall not need new high- 
ways, new refineries, new steel plants, new basic plants. The construction of these 
plants has required in the sixties and in the seventies a large share of the total 
industrial investment in Europe (in Italy about 40 percent). In short, it is ra the r  
difficult to answer the question: In which sector shall w e  invest in the years to 
come? 
I t  is not appropriate to give the standard answer that  one should invest in 
electronics, telecommunications, etc. In fact, the order  of magnitude of previous 
investments was so large that they cannot be replaced by investments in electron- 
ics o r  telecommunications. 
On the other hand, our governments w i l l  be probably capable of avoiding deep 
crises: it is reasonable to suppose that the Keynesian lesson has been learned. So 
w e  can expect to maintain in the  coming years a stationary level of income, at 
least. Furthermore, the consumption function has had very stable trends fo r  
decades. Someone has even recognized stable secular trends. Consequently, also 
saving wffl remain at the present levels. In other words, we could have in the next 
decades a mctural excess of saving with respect to investment opportunities. In 
this situation the real interest r a te  could decrease until zero and, why not, to 
negative values. All this wil l  occur, naturally, if g o v e m e n t s  will not adopt, as it 
happens for  instance in Italy, a policy of financing current consumption with sav- 
ings. 
In the last chapter of the General Theory, Keynes came to conclusions which 
a r e  now par t  of our cultural background. However, many other things that he said 
have been forgotten or ,  a t  least, a r e  not so  universally known and appreciated. I t  
is relevant to note that Keynes did not give to the latter less importance than to 
the former. In particular, Keynes asserted that there is no structural and per- 
manent reason why capital must be a scarce resource. He recognized that in his 
time capital was a scarce resource but that in the future it could not be neces- 
sarily so. Are w e  now in this situation? Or, in other words, are w e  likely to have 
real interest rates below zero for a long time? 
If it is so and, above all, if this expectation grows and persists for a long 
period many things could change. Throughout the world engineers and economists 
of big corporations a r e  making calculations on investments and returns. These 
people are all "spiritual sons" of Keynes, who was the first to clarify the concept 
of marginal efficiency of capital and who gave the tools to measure it. In this kind 
of calculation the leading criterion is to select projects of investment on the basis 
of high rates of return and short payback periods. 
A long-period expectation of negative real interest rates could upset this 
situation: investments that give returns in years f a r  ahead and/or investments 
that may give small returns but for long periods of b e  become in this perspective 
more interesting than investments that have a short economic life. Upon reflec- 
tion, all this may imply a return to the original meaning of the word investment. 
When the ancient Romans built their roads and aqueducts o r  when the Floren-'. 
tines began to build their cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore (it took two hundred 
years to build it) they certainly were not looking for short payback periods o r  
high rates of return. In spite of this i t  is ra ther  difficult to affirm that Roman 
roads o r  aqueducts were bad investments. 
Are w e  going back to such a situation? Is an era coming for industrialized 
countries in which cathedrals wi l l  be built? These a r e  the questions that I pose to 
myself and to you. 
COKKENTS ON TOPIC 5: NATIONAL ANTI REGIONAL ASPECTS 
Jacob J. van Mfi 
(I) THE CIRCLE OF INDUSTRIBLIZED COUNTBIES AND TZIE OUTSIDE WORLD 
1. Long waves originate in the industrialized world as a whole 
Long waves a r e  a truly international phenomenon. There are various reasons 
f o r  this: the interconnection of countries through international t rade  is the  most 
important. The markets f o r  many products have become world markets. Steel is a 
world market commodity, and s o  a r e  rubber,  oil, and many o ther  products. If world 
t rade  declines, as in 1982, the  shipping and shipbuilding industries suffer, all over 
the  world. It cannot be said that  long-wave upswings and downswings originate in 
one particular country, and spread to the rest of the world from there.  Whenever 
industrial production takes place on a world scale excess capacity will develop for  
the  industrial world as a whole; saturation of demand will be noticed everywhere. 
Improvements of communication and transportation infrastructure will  mean a 
fur ther  integration of the  world economy, and this would imply that  long waves will 
become stronger, and not weaker, over  time. 
Of course there  may be  slight differences in the  timing of upswings and 
downswings. The propensity to innovate may not be the  same in all industrialized 
countries; the  climate fo r  innovation may also differ between countries. As a 
result  some countries will benefit more from the diffusion of innovation than from 
their  own introduction of innovation. In principle, however, a pool of technologi- 
cal knowledge becomes available for  all advanced countries to d r a w  from. 
2. The nonindustrialized countries are affected by long waves through 
their participation in world trade 
The world economy can be divided into a number of blocs: the  OECD, the com- 
munist bloc, the oil exporting countries, and the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries. Among the la t te r ,  the  new industralized countries (NICs) are a distinct 
category. 
I t  is probably f a i r  to say that  the rhythm of the  world economy is determined 
in the industrialized countries of the  OECD bloc. The centrally planned economies 
of the communist bloc have maintained a rapid growth pace a f t e r  the Second World 
War, and have suffered less from cyclical fluctuations, but i t  appears  that  they 
have not been able to stay clear of the problems of stagnation that have beset the 
OECD countries. One reason for this is the international trade between the two 
blocs. Another may be that the centrally planned economies too encounter prob- 
lems of saturation and excess capacity. 
Recent history has made clear that the oil-producing a s  well as  the developing 
countries a r e  very much dependent on the growth impulses emanating from the 
other blocs. With the exception of the MCs, their industrial base is still too small 
to generate their own growth. 
9. World economic recovery depends on the long-wave recovery in the 
indnstrialized countries 
One consequence of the foregoing argument is that world economic recovery 
will have to originate in the industrialized countries. If these countries recover, 
on the strength of innovation and investment demand, the rest  of the world wil l  
benefit. In this respect it is of importance to point at the current debate regard- 
ing the position of the Third World. Should their economies be supported through 
a massive transfer of funds from the North to the South, o r  should preference be 
given to the recovery process in the North? The long-wave view suggests that the 
recovery process in the industrialized countries should not be impeded by a lack 
of capital; yet it  is also clear that i t  is necessary for the Third World countries to 
have sufficient purchasing power to engage in trade with the industrialized coun- 
tries. World economic recovery, however, cannot be generated by a transfer of 
funds to the Third World alone. 
4. Innovation diffuses from core to periphery 
One of the findings of the innovation literature is that innovations tend to 
spread from their center of origin - which is usually in the most advanced 
economies - toward the peripheries of the industrialized world. This process 
occurs within countries and therefore has relevance for regional economic policy 
within a country; it  also occurs within larger entities. Thus innovations have 
spread from the United States to Western Europe, and from Western Europe to 
Southern Europe and North Africa, but also from Japan to other countries in East 
Asia, and so on. - Through the adoption of modern technologies, the NICs have in 
fact entered the circle of industrialized countries. I t  is likely that a new-long 
wave upswing phase will see the arrival of a new set of MCs. 
(IL) LEXDERS AND FOLLOWERS 
1. Early Entrants and Latecomers 
The diffusion of industrialization over countries has followed a particular pat- 
tern. The industrial revolution spread from Great Britain to the rest  of the 
western world, but geographical proximity to Britain proved to be no guarantee 
for  quick adoption of the new technologies, witness the late industrialization of the 
Netherlands, vis-6-vis the early industrial development in Switzerland, in timing a 
close second to Britain. 
In the economic-historical l i terature i t  is common to speak of the four "core" 
countries - Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. These were the 
early industrializers, countries whose "take-ff" occurred before the  depression 
of the 1870s. To a large extent they represented the industrialized world of the 
19th century, together accounting f o r  almost 80 percent of world manufacturing 
output in 1870 and still over 70 percent in 1913 (Table 1). The other  early 
entrants were two s m a l l  European countries - Switzerland and Belgium. 
Table 1: States in World Manufacturing Output 
Period USA UK Germany France Russia Others 
Source: Folke Hilgerdt, 
I n d u s t r d i z a t i o n  a n d  Foreign P a d e ,  League of Nations, 1945, p. 13. 
In Table 2 I have listed countries in the order  in which they industralized tak- 
ing Rostowian takeoff  periods as the beginning of industrial development I realize 
that  such an order  cannot be established unequivocally. 
Industrialization has often come in spurts, and the question then is  which start 
w a s  the true take-off. For some countries historians disagree on the timing, a 
result of the (necessarily) qualitative nature of the concept of "take-off" as 
developed by Rostow. Sweden's take-off period, fo r  instance, is considered to  
have fallen between 1868 and 1980 by Rostow himself. Other authors, however, 
have noted a considerable slowdown in Swedish economic development a f t e r  1875, 
which w a s  followed by a new outburst of growth only af ter  1892. Other European 
countries had similar experiences. They all experienced railroad expansion 
between 1840 and 1870 (a development often seen as the  single best measure of 
take-off). but then suffered from the Great Depression of 1873-1895 before 
growth accelerated again towards the end of the  century. 
The important lesson of Table 2 is that  take-offs are most likely to take place 
during long-wave expansion phases. In Europe the growth spurts to which I 
refer red  above coincided precisely with long-wave expansions. Checking the 
countries listed in Table 2, w e  see that  fo r  only a f e w  of them take-off occurred 
during a downswing period: France and Belgium, and Brazil, Argentina and Turkey. 
However, one has to  add then that  the  f irs t  long-wave downswing may have been 
only a downswing in prices, not in industrial production growth. Cotton textiles 
were followed by railroad expansion without a long depression in between. France 
and Belgium did develop on the  strength of the  same revolution upon which Great 
Britain took off. In the  case of Turkey one should realize that much of the Turkish 
take-off occurred during an international economic upswing. 
It  is f a r  from surprising that  country takeoffs  should coincide with interna- 
tional long-wave expansions, fo r  most countries depended to  a grea ter  o r  lesser 
extent on export expansion fo r  their  takeoffs .  The domestic markets often were 
too small a basis, especially fo r  the  smaller countries. This w a s  true in the  19th. 
century, and this is equally true today. For now i t  means that  the  circle of indus- 
trialized countries will only be enlarged if there  is to be a fifth long-wave expan- 
sion, during which other  less developed countries can try to copy the  success of 
the present NICs, whose n a m e s  can be found at the  bottom of Table 2. 
TABLE 2 Long-waves and take-off dates 
1st long-wave Great Britain 1783-1830 
upswing Switzerland 1798-1835 
1782-1825 
lst long-wave France 1830-1870 
downswing Belgium 1833-1860 
1825-1845 
2nd long-wave Germany 1840-1870 
upswing United States 1843-1870 
1845-1872 
2nd long-wave 
downswing 1 1872-1892 
3rd long-wave Japan 
upswing Russia-USSR 
1892-1929 Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
I ~ Y  
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Austria 
3rd long-wave Argentina 1933-1950 
downswing Brazil 1933-1950 
1929-1948 Turkey 1933-1961 
4th long-wave Mexico 1940-1960 
upswing India 1952-1963 
1948-1973 China 1952-1967 
Taiwan 1953-1960 
Iran 1955-1965 
Thailand 1960s 
South Korea 1961-1968 
Sources for take-off dates: 
Switzeriand: B .N. Biuccti, The Industrial Revolution in Switzerland, in C .M. Cipolla 
(ed.), ZRe Emergence of i n d u s t r i d  Societies, Fontana Economic History of Eu- 
rope, 1973, pp. 627-655. 
Belgium: W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 2nd edn., Cambridge 
University Press, 1971. 
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark: L. Jiirberg, The Nordic Countries, in C.M. Cipolla 
(ed.) , ZRe Emergence of indus t r ia l  Societies, pp. 375-485. 
Netherlands: J.A. de Jonge, De Indust r ia l i sa t ie  in Nederland tussen 2850 a 
2924, SVN, 1976. 
Austria: E. M k ,  Zur Genesis d e r  Schumpeterschen Theorie in d e r  Wirtschaftli- 
chen Entwicklung, in On Pbtitical Economy a n d  Econometrics, 1965, espr. pp. 
370-371. 
All other  countries: W.W. Rostow, h e  World Economy, Macmillan, 1978. 
As a general reference I used 1.Adelman and C.T. Morris, Patterns of Industrializa- 
tion in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: A Cross-Sectional Quantita- 
tive Study, in P. Uselding (ed.), Research in Economic History Vol. 5, JAI Press, 
1980, pp. 1-83. 
Table 2 of course represents a highly simplified picture of industrialization. 
I t  does not indicate which path of development will  follow once the  first ,  and criti- 
cal, jump has been made. Each industrialized country has followed its own course 
- the  paths of Great Britain and Switzerland, to name just two countries with com- 
parable starts, have been widely different. There are no standard models of 
development, although i t  is  tempting to look f o r  common features in the patterns 
that  emerged a f t e r  take-off. 
2. After a country has taken off, it will be lm affected by the next long- 
wave dmmmring 
There is  one possible relation between industrial development and long waves 
I should like t o  point at. Assuming that  take-offs are indeed most likely during a 
long-wave upswing, w e  may also assume that  a country that has just taken off will 
be less affected by an ensuing long-wave downswing. The growth of its still young 
industries may carry a country through depression, which is  f i rs t  of all an interna- 
tional phenomenon. Only when a country has adopted the  world pool of technolo- 
gies and caught up with more advanced nations w i l l  i t  settle into the  international 
wave-like rhythm of growth. Thus Great Britain never suffered from a "first long- 
wave downturn", the  United States g r e w  through the depression of the  1870s and 
1880s, the Scandinavian economies were expanding despite the  Great Depression of 
the 1930s, and NICs such as South Korea and Taiwan are among the  fastest growers 
of the 1970s. But Britain did not escape slowdown a f t e r  1872, and the USA suffered 
its greatest setback a f t e r  1929. In our  times the older countries have done much 
worse than the  latecomers. W e  are somewhat hesitant ourselves about the merits 
of this hypothesis. Y e t  w e  feel that  the  way in which a country is affected by an 
international depression and its age as an industrialized nation are not unrelated. 
3. Location in space does not provide a clue to explaining which countries 
will be the next to take off 
Table 2 provides no guidance as to which geographical a r e a  should industrial- 
ize when. The very different economic histories of the European nations illustrate 
that  diffusion of industrialization does not take place smoothly over space. In Ros- 
towian terms the actual hopping-around process should be explained by pointing at 
the  different preconditions f o r  take-off, as they existed in the  different nations. 
These conditions, r a the r  than location in space, should provide clues f o r  which 
group of nations wil l  constitute a next bunch of entrants. 

COldYENTS ON TOPIC 5: NATIONAL AN EEGIONAL ASPECTS 
Jay W. Forrester .  Alan K Graham. Peter M . S e n g w d  John  D. Staman 
IMPACT OF THE LONG WAVE 
W e  believe t h e  long wave is endogenously generated within industrial 
economies. Every industrialized nation has the  potential to generate the  long 
wave. A variety of distinct causal mechanisms contribute to the  genesis of the  
wave. Prominent among these mechanisms is capital self-ordering, which resul ts  in 
the  buildup of excess physical capacity during the  expansion phase of the long 
wave. Another is the  interaction of pr ices  and debt, which causes prices  t o  fluctu- 
ate over  the  long wave. Simulations of the  National Model show that  t he  existence 
of the long wave is not affected by variations in most of the  technical, demo- 
graphic, o r  institutional character is t ics  of the  economy. 
While each nation has i ts  own individual characteristics,  in terms of the  basic 
causes of the long wave, t he  developed nations are more similar t o  each o the r  than 
they are different. Capital goods have approximately the  same lifetime and rela- 
tion t o  work force. Nations sha re  much the  same science and technology. People 
have about t he  same lifetime and career length, and so  on. Even if the  industrial- 
ized nations were totally isolated from one another,  one would expect the i r  long 
waves t o  be similar in period and amplitude. Individual character is t ics  and histori- 
cal circumstance, varying from nation t o  nation, would. however, cause the  timing 
and exact course of events to differ. One nation might be  at the  peak while 
another  w a s  at t he  trough. and still another part-way into the  expansion. 
But nations are not isolated from one another. Foreign t rade  and financial 
flows. migration, military and political affairs,  and even flows of news and informa- 
tion couple nations together. Individual long waves become entrained into a single 
long wave, each nation experiencing a variation on a global theme. If one's trading 
par tners  are suffering from overcapacity and slack demand, exports  will suffer  
and capacity utilization and employment at home will drop. Foreign t r ade  in effect 
ensures that  excess capacity occurs  in all economies at about the same time. For 
example, Japan and Europe have been hard-hit by US economic troubles because of 
t he  lower-than-expected US demand f o r  automobiles, steel, and o the r  imports. Thus 
the  USA has exported some of i ts  overcapacity. 
Most theories of the  long wave suggest tha t  a Third World country without a 
substantial capital infrastructure would not generate a long wave internally. But 
strong linkages of the  Third World to the  industrialized nations, through debt, 
trade. aid, and s o  on, ensure tha t  these nations will also be  entrained in t he  long 
wave. Few countries will be immune f r o m  the economic difficulties of the next ten 
years. 
Not all nations o r  industries will be hit equally hard. Nations that rely 
heavily on production of capital goods wi l l  be the most seriously affected. And 
nations whose major industries wil l  be diminished by technological change wil l  also 
experience more problems than most. The steel industry will never regain its 
former role in the economy because goods such as cars and bridges now have a 
lower steel content. Likewise, farmbelt unemployment in the 1930s, already 
depressed by low prices, w a s  exacerbated by mechanization. The reverse is also 
true: industries whose product demand is increased by technology will do better  
than most. In physical terms, American Telephone and Telegraph grew steadily all 
through the 1930s. Today, some computer companies may do the same. 
GUIDELINES FOR POLICY DESIGN 
Most policies designed to mitigate economic hardship evolved as weapons to 
fight the short-term business cycle. With an average period of three  to  seven 
years, the business cycle receives the most attention because i t  is the most visible 
of the basic dynamics generated by modern economies. But the long wave is a 
behavior mode entirely different than the business cycle. The time horizons and 
magnitudes involved are much greater. Most important, the causes of the long 
wave are distinct from the causes of the business cycle. Effective policies t o  cope 
with the long wave should be expected to be quite different from policies that have 
evolved to deal with the business cycle. 
In a business cycle downturn, workers who are laid off can expect t o  re turn  to 
the same job and factory in a f e w  months. Unemployment insurance is a useful 
buffer to tide these workers over until business picks up again. But in a long-wave 
downturn, many jobs, especially those in the capital-producing sector, will never 
return. Unemployment insurance is then insufficient. Retraining and relocation 
programs may help, but when jobs a r e  scarce throughout the economy, they may 
simply shuffle people around without substantially increasing employment. 
Likewise, stimulating an economy that is underperforming by boosting exports 
may mitigate the effects of a business cycle recession. But in a long-wave down- 
turn, the attempt of every nation to boost exports and res t r ic t  imports can lead to  
protectionism and a t rade w a r  that could substantially amplify and prolong the 
downturn in a perverse "tragedy of the commons". Financing the imports of Third 
World nations during a business cycle recession is a legitimate financial tool, bor- 
rowing against revenues that will return when business picks up again. But as a 
tool to  mitigate a long-wave downturn, foreign loans easily become de jcrcto subsi- 
dies. Such loans can easily be used to offset a weak economy and finance current  
consumption, thus maintaining imports, instead of fostering investment in sustain- 
able sources of income and employment. 
The developed nations cannot depend on foreign trade as a policy tool to blunt 
the impact of the long wave. The Third World should not follow policies that hinge 
on the economic health and goodwill of their trading partners - both will be in 
increasingly short  supply. W e  believe i t  is possible to design policies that can 
work wel l  not only fo r  one nation, but can work we l l  for  all nations. Indeed, in the 
end, these are the only policies that can work. 
For example, w e  believe that the long-wave peak and downturn are times of 
excess physical production capacity. Effective policies will create and sustain 
pressures to gradually reduce the excess capacity and liquidate the excess debt in 
an orderly manner. Policies that attempt to stimulate the economy will be counter- 
productive. For example, in a time of excess physical capacity, an across-the- 
board investment tax credit will either be ineffective o r  worsen the overcapacity. 
Simulations of the National Model suggest the following components of a stra- 
tegy to mitigate the effects of the long-wave downturn. The results are prelim- 
inary and more work is needed. 
Appreciation of Time Delays 
An important component of effective policy for  the long-wave downturn is a 
proper appreciation of the delays involved. The long-wave downturn is a t i m e  of 
excess capacity. Economic health cannot return until that excess is eliminated. A 
decade o r  more may be required to eliminate the global excess because of the long 
life of capital. Governments and central banks must be prepared fo r  an extended 
period of financial stress. Lenders m u s t  be prepared fo r  much higher fractions of 
nonperforming assets for  much longer periods. For example, though world output 
in the previous long-wave downturn peaked in 1929, defaults on international loans 
did not peak until 1935. In 1929, the consensus was that there  would not be a major 
international lending crisis. Public and government awareness of the t i m e  
required to correct  the problem can help prevent panic, maintain morale, and 
foster programs aimed at causes ra the r  than symptoms. 
Maintaining the Financial Systems 
The financial systems of many countries are overextended and increasingly 
disaster-prone. Long-wave downturns have often triggered financial panics in the 
past. Vigorous action now by each country to stabilize i ts  financial system should 
be beneficial over the next f e w  years. 
Preventing Deflation 
During the 1930s, US legislators attempted to prevent deflation by enacting 
price controls. Such controls were generally ineffective. Some economic histori- 
ans believe that the deflation could have been retarded by vigorous action by the 
central bank. Others believe that fiscal policy represents greater  leverage. 
Model simulations suggest that monetary and fiscal policy may play an important 
role in controlling the inflation-deflation process and the  amplitude of long waves. 
Discouraging Saving 
With an excess of physical capital, long-wave peaks and downturns have been 
marked by little new physical investment and frequent bouts of speculative invest- 
ment. During a long-wave downturn, there  is little need for  saving in the aggre- 
gate. In fact,  simulations suggest that attempts to save during the  long-wave down- 
turn a r e  an important factor in the collapse of aggregate demand. This leads one 
to question the recent changes in US tax and pension laws designed to encourage 
saving. 
 voidi in^ Subsidies 
Rather than attempt t o  subsidize industries with excess capacity, government 
policy should attempt to sustain the  pressures that  will shift resources f r o m  the  
redundant industries t o  the production of needed goods and services. Subsidies to  
boost demand in the old product lines of failing industries should be avoided, as 
they merely prolong the  misallocation of resources. If political pressure mandates 
action, then subsidies for  conversion to new products, retraining, o r  public works 
such as energy conservation are preferable to price supports and other  costly and 
counterproductive attempts to re turn  to the 1960s. 
sKlmwEY 
The discussion above suggests two conclusions. First, the  long wave is a 
separate mode of behavior from the  business cycle. Extreme caution is required 
in applying policies adopted during gentler t i m e s  to the long-wave downturn. 
Second, the policy implications that  emerge from consideration of the long wave 
are sometimes quite different from the conventional wisdom. If advocacy of such 
policies is to be effective, a formal model may be necessary. Through a formal 
model the complex interactions among capital, employment, prices, and debt can be 
integrated with sufficient clarity, consistency, and persuasiveness to  provide a 
basis for  consensus. 
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COMMENTS ON TOPIC 5: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS 
Christopher Freeman and Lru: Soete 
There is probably broad agreement amongst most  long-wave writers that long 
waves relate in the first instance to the capitallst, w o r l d  economy, although some 
writers have also included socialist countries (Pasinetti 1981). A s  Schumpeter 
(1939) himself pointed out: "Capitalism itself is, both in the economic and sociolog- 
ical sense, essentially one process, with the whole world as its stage" (p.666). 
Kuczynski (1978) has dated the emergence of a world capitalist economy around 
the mid-19th century: "since about 1850 there has existed a capitalist world econ- 
omy in the true sense of the word, the world economy has come to predominate 
over national economies. This predominance first became evident during the world 
economic crises of 1857" @.El). The precise timing of the establishment of a world 
capitalist economy is largely an academic question. Many economic historians and 
development economists have emphasized that even in preindustrial commercial 
capitalism, trade and financial exchanges between Europe and its colonies were 
sufficiently significant to warrant its description as a world capitalist economy. 
The increase in worldwide international trade, investment, and financial flows 
is however a distinct feature of the industrial era. In contrast to the preindustrial 
e r a  these international flows, particularly those emerging from the technologically 
leading countries, were generally based on a significant "technological advantage" 
which would take the form of more cheaply produced goods o r  new commodities. 
While such trade flows had significant disruptive effects on many of the importing 
countries, the overall long-term effect resulted in a more interwoven world (capi- 
talist) economy where each country's long-term cycle became increasingly depen- 
dent on the world economy's long-term movement. 
Marxist theory and dependency theory have tended to emphasize the extreme 
difficulty facing peripheral countries as they attempt to break out of the depen- 
dency situation. The monopolistic advantages associated with technological 
leadership, cumulative R&D, static and dynamic economies of scale, and unequal 
distribution of bargaining power are indeed considerable barriers to overcome. 
The dramatic trade-disruptive effect in many European countries related to 
Britafn's early technologiaal trade advantage over the first and second Kondra- 
tiev, led, however, to a quite distinct international feature of Long waves; that of 
the crucial importance of the import of foreign technology and the interrrcrtiohcrl 
diffusion of technology for  autonomous "national" growth and technologiaal leap- 
frogging. The crucial point about this feature is that it  is only indirectly related 
to the overall long-wave up- and downswings. I t  is primarily the result of an inter- 
nal. country-specific autonomous growth process nourished by the existence of a 
technological gap with the world technological frontier where the technological 
gap can be thought of as a "pump of diffusion", to.use Gomulka's (1971) terminol- 
ogy. The implications f o r  the long-wave debate of this international technology 
diffusion feature are important. Freeman at uL. (1982), fo r  example, point out that 
i t  is primarily this autonomous growth feature which obscures much of the long- 
wave evidence, based as it generally is on individual country evidence. 
A sM1a.r point is made by van Duijn (1983): "National economies have their 
own 'life cycle of development'. Depending on their take-off date, countries may 
perform strongly during depression or they may do ra the r  poorly during a long- 
wave expansion. In the world economy as a whole, the effects of ext ra  rapid and 
ex t ra  slow growth canoe1 each other out, but the fundamental causes of long waves 
remain. Over the years, basic innovation M e  cycles become international 
phenomena. " (pp.140, 141). 
This points again to the overriding importance fo r  the long wave debate of the 
''d-on" process rather than the mere occurrence or frequency of innova- 
tions. Whereas the innovating country will try to prevent the competing away of its 
international technology monopoly position, in the long run it will probably f a i l  to. 
maintain continuous technological leadership. Imitators will appear, the returns 
to the technology will fall, and radically new technologies including ''new techno- 
logical paradigms" may emerge. While these wil l  probably otiginate from within 
the technologically leading country, the infetrrcrt national diffusion in these coun- 
tries may be hampered in various ways, with the new technology competing to some 
extent on disadvantageous terms. Thus previous investment outlays in the older 
technology, the commitment to the Latter f r o m  both management and the skilled 
labor force, and even the "development" research geared toward improving the 
existing technology, might w e l l  hamper the diffusion of the major new technology to 
such an extent that i t  will diffuse more quickly elsewhere, in a country uncommit- 
ted, both in terms of actual production, organization and investment, to the old 
"technological paradigm". Furthermore, these traditional economic factors 
retarding diffusion might be further  exacerbated by institutional retardation fac- 
tors. which might in the case of a new technological paradigm be as severe f o r  the 
technological leader as fo r  Late industrializers. 
In relation to microelectronics, f o r  example, Soete (1983) emphasizes partic- 
ularly thct the newly industrializing countries may derive benefits f r o m  the low 
capital cost of the new technologies and their potential for small-scale applica- 
tions. He also stresses the possibility of removing some of the human skill 
bottlenecks that have arisen in relation to other technologies in the developing 
countries. 
However, the scale of international indebtedness, the slowdown in the growth 
of world trade, the severe disequilibrium in international payments associated with 
technological competition, and the increased instability of exchange rates are all 
phenomena pointing to the need for a new international economic framework 
appropriate to the need of worldwide expansion in the remaining years of the 20th 
century. The Brandt Report and many other  studies have pointed to the acute 
social and economic problems of the Third World and the necessity of new initia- 
tives to confront these problems adequately. 
The development of such an international framework f o r  expansion may prove 
to be the most  difficult challenge confronting the world economy if there is to be a 
fifth Kondratiev upswing. The technology itself is more international in scope and 
requirements than anything that has preceded it, but the national boundaries of 
decision making, the intensified international competition, the growth of 
protectionism (which has always accompanied the downswing of a Kondntiev), the 
reemergence of Cold W a r  attitudes and politics, and the persistent failure of the 
North-South dialogues all serve to emphasize the great difficulties of reestablish- 
ing a new and more favorable international economic and political framework for  
expansion. Such a framework must in any case take into account to a f a r  greater 
extent than previous arrangements the importance of rapid international diffusion 
of technology and the need for  cooperation between the various political blocs in 
the world. 
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ORAL COMMENTS 
Hans H. Gli?anann 
On Theories of the Long Wave 
Presenting a workable hypothesis of the  long wave means explaining past 
events o r  predicting future events according t o  a combination of general rules  
("theories") and actual conditions of the  period analyzed. I t  does not mean p r e  
ducing curves - l inezr o r  not, logistic o r  not - tha t  f i t  the  past behavior of some 
endogenous variabies. To give 9n exampie: looking at the  stock of money in Ger- 
many since 1850 reveals,  a f t e r  some recalculations in o r d e r  t o  assimilate the  zig- 
zag of the  r ea i  world t o  the  more harmony-oriented eyes, a relatively smooth cycli- 
cal  movement; no ot'ner indicator provides such a good statistical fit. But what fol- 
lows from this? To make a long s tory short:  nothing. The general Goethean notion 
tha t  money matters is not a sufficient substitute f o r  a long-wave hypothesis. 
Thus, i t  may well be  tha t  expianation of past developments is different regard- 
ing, say, 1930 and 1980; i t  may be, f o r  instance, that  in 1930 the artificial  shortage 
of money suppiy in the  United States  led t o  bankruptcies of banks and firms and 
thereby t o  too few investments undertaken and, not least, t o  unemployment because 
wzges did not (or  could not) adjust fast  enough. Via international t r ade  and inter- 
national movements of factors  of production and through international linkages in 
the  trading system these US developments spread all over  the world. In 1980, on 
the  o ther  hand, money supply w a s  ample; rates of inflation r a t h e r  indicated an  
abundant stock of money. The hypothesis has been advanced tha t  the slowdown of 
economic activity in the  1980s has r a t h e r  been due t o  exploitation of monopolistic 
conditions on fac tor  markets, resulting in unemployment because monopolies by 
the i r  very nature tend t o  employ less fac tors  than otherwise would be employed. 
Another hypothesis has been tha t  the  significant increase in government consump- 
tion during the 1970s led to  unemployment because of a corresponding decrease in 
investment opportunities and because government consumption by itself does not 
breed additional means f o r  fu r the r  consumption. 
A second point I should like t o  make r e f e r s  t o  my written statement on the  
theories of the long wave (see P a r t  11). 
If the notion is co r r ec t  that  growth cycles a r e  caused by bottleneck factors  of 
development, and tha t  these fac tors  can differ f o r  each cycle o r  each phase of a 
cycie, then differences among expianatory approaches may to  a certain extent be  
due t o  changes in growth conditions. Tneories stressing the  ro le  of investment (or  
of certain types of investment), of innovations (or  of entrepreneurial  talents), of 
raw materials, of changes in the  material infrastructure ,  may all be  compatible in 
the  case where t he  bottleneck fac tors  change. However, i t  i s  hard  to distinguish 
such "explanations" from random events; refutation of hypotheses i s  impossible 
when incidental conditions are turned into explanations and theory is  neglected. 
Therefore,  i t  seems advisable t o  formulate a theory of t he  long wave according t o  
t he  refutability rule. W e  have t r ied  to do exactly this  by re fe r r ing  to the  role of 
relative prices. For example, no matter whether bottlenecks are artificial  (as in 
t he  case of monopolistic behavior of groups or of governments) o r  "natural" (as in 
the  case of lagged adjustment to sudden and unexpected changes of important vari- 
ables), t he  bottlenecks are concomitant with an  increase in t he  relat ive pr ice  of 
t he  bottleneck factor ;  this  again provokes incentives to overcome shortages.  This 
i s  why finally and in t h e  long run  past  bottlenecks disappear. 
Third, a long-run development hypothesis ha s  t o  lay ground f o r  the  
phenomenon of slow adjustments, o r  else t he  question would remain unanswered why 
peopie do not cope with bottlenecks immediately. Here  is  where metaeconomic 
developments become relevant.  W e  have argued tha t  long react ion,  lags are mainly 
due to counterproductive behavior of public authorit ies and t o  t he  inherent slug- 
gishness of institutions (organizations). 
On Possibilities for Influencing Long-Wave Behavior 
Let me please try t o  r eph ra se  t h e  long-wave theory in such a way as t o  a r r i ve  
at some policy conclusions. 
Long waves of economic development can also be  interpreted as t he  outcome 
of a weakening o r ,  r a t h e r ,  of a blocking of homeostatic conditions - conditions of 
negative feedbacks, thz t  is ,  which keep systems from exploding or imploding. In 
economics the  p r i ce  mechanism keeps a society from overdoing anything in any 
direction; as a matter of fact ,  this i s  why I do not think tha t  Jzy For?-esterfs 
"unstable wave" (in the  sense of steadily increasing amplitudes of t he  wave) is 
rezlly a long-run phenomenon. Because of t he  pr ice  mechanism economists should 
b e  particularly aware of nomeostasis. 
Blocking of homeostatic conditions does not come naturally. N o  entrepreneur ,  
no monopoly, and no t r a d e  union will achieve this  end, unless equipped with govern- 
mentzl force.  Such a blocking needs official authority t o  initiate and substantiate 
i t  via laws and regulations. 
Now, people pay politicians and public administrators t o  produce public goods 
(like internal and ex te rna l  security) - goods tha t  normally do not pay t o  b e  pro- 
duced privately o r  whose production has  external  diseconomies. This is another  
way of saying tha t  governments are to  help homeostatic conditions to prevail. One 
of t he  public goods whose production i s  in t he  hands of governments i s  competition. 
Competition makes, e.g., real wages decline when unemployment r i s e s  and vice 
versa.  I t  provides f o r  new entrepreneurship when old lines of production (among 
which, in the  Federal Republic of Germany, a r e  shipbuilding, steel industries, and 
agricultural production) do  not sell sufficiently w e l l  any more. And thereby com- 
petition dampens fluctuations. 
My conclusion therefore  i s  t he  following. If w e  experience economic fluctua- 
tions tha t  are deemed to b e  too strong, this i s  t he  outcome of governments failing 
t o  do the i r  job. And indeed, today w e  observe governments hindering competition 
t o  work instead of strengthening it. Governments pay subsidies t o  shipbuilding and 
t o  steel industries; governments tend t o  unite economically and then weaken the i r  
economies considerably through suppressing competition. The example of tine 
European Community's Common Agricultural Policy, wnicn absorbs most of the  EC's 
activities, may il lustrate this; I do not want t o  neglect the  o the r  fields of the  EC's 
activities but they are quantitatively of minor importance and they a r e ,  unfor- 
tunately, t o  a l a rge  extent similar to the  agricultural policies (steel protection, 
textile protection). 
In a similar vein the  workings of o ther  international institutions may be 
analyzed. One of t he  main objectives of UNCTAD, e.g., is  to redistribute income 
through artificially high pr ices  of r a w  materials; this not only means t o  (partly) 
abolish pr ice  signals but at t he  same time t o  give new incentives t o  t he  production 
of r a w  materials and thus reinforce the  much criticized colonial-type international 
division of labor.  Similarly t he  International Monetary Fund may become a lender 
in t he  f i r s t  r e so r t  (instead of i ts  being a lender in t he  last  resor t )  in t h e  case 
where i t  provides countries suffering from severe  debt  problems with additional 
financial means. A l l  these institutions - EC, UNCTAD, IMF - seem t o  be  providing 
stimuli f o r  moral hazard by supporting attempts t o  prevent negative feedbacks. 
The feedbacir from decreasing pr ices  of r a w  materials would be, f o r  instance, 
industrial production; t he  feedback from severe  debt problems would be  a more 
restr ic t ive debt policy of both giving and receiving countries. 
Thus I disagree with Jan Tinbergen: giving additional funds f o r  the  IHF doe; 
not solve problems but raises  probiems by producing moral hazard. I also disagree 
with Christopher Freeman who says tha t  w e  need new o r  additional international 
institutions t o  cope with today's economic problems. I feel  tha t  the  old institutions 
seem t o  have fziled; so  why bother  with new ones? One should r a t h e r  try t o  change 
the  ways the  oid institutions work. 

ORAL comms 
Richard M. Goodwin 
Scbumpeter and Long Waves 
I t  seems c iear  thz t  t he re  a r e  no sinple periociicities, e i ther  long o r  short ,  in 
economic statistics. The observed fluctuations a r e  highly i r regular  so  that ,  if they 
result  f r o n  various cyclicai mechanisms, they a r e  so heavily disturbed tha t  they 
a r e  difficult t o  detect ,  indeed impossibly so  f o r  the  small number of long waves. 
Therefore I would like t o  suggest a more flexible alternative conceptualization. 
Consicier a short-run economic response mechanism, based on the systematic, vari- 
able costs of production. The behavior of such a l inear system can be fully 
analyzed, showing i ts  own character is t ic  motion along with i t s  responses t o  exo- 
genous events, the  resul t  being highly e r ra t ic .  
In t he  same yea r  that  Darwin published the  Origin ofspecies, volume one of 
Marx's Capital appezred. Marx correct ly  believed that  he w a s  doing f o r  society 
what Darwin w a s  doing f o r  the evolution of plants and animals. Schumpeter seized 
upon this bzsic idea t o  propose a revolutionary conception of economics - morpho- 
genesis through innovations in production. The consequences of this evolutionary 
view are at least twofolci: we cannot posit z single, specific mociel and then study 
i ts  enciogenous motion over  long periods; w e  cannot use even the most sophisticated 
econometrics t o  cietermine behavioral parameters as a basis f o r  prediction and 
control. 
My hypothesis is tha t  t he  long swings are the  result  of the  slow perfection and 
adaptation of major technological innovations, which persisted over  a number of 
sho r t e r  fluctuations: the  depressed phzses come with the substantial completion 
of the major innovations, followed by only minor o r  weak ones. To effect increases 
in prociuctivity t h e r e  must f i r s t  come investment, which increases output and 
employment. This accelerates  the  spread of the  innovation, Schumpeter's 
"swarms". A s  t he  innovation becomes operative, gradually a new equilibrium of the  
economy is created,  with ensuing changes in relative prices. Consequently t he re  
will be  sequential innovations in a wide range of o ther  industries. These changes in 
production processes mean basic alterations in the morphology of production, 
yielding higher prociuctivity. 
Such a transformation, e.g. in energy o r  t ransport ,  may last  a long time and 
consist of a grea t  number of successive small improvements and adaptations t o  dif- 
fe ren t  uses, with the  resul t  tha t  i t  will approximate t o  z smooth process. The econ- 
omy, however, acts as a frequency converter,  i.e. converting a substantially 
constant flow of technological change into fluctuating growth. It  does this in the 
foiiowing wzy: the  initizi investments (which a r e  independent of a depressed s ta te  
of t rade  and/or excess capacity) bring an increased demand and growth of output 
and employment, which fzcilitate the  adoption of the  innovation. In t he  case of a 
major innovation, this  will push output increasingly t o  t he  capacity limits of exist- 
ing industry, thus requiring acceierational investment and rendering the  economy 
unstable dynamiczlly, i.e. producing a bifurcation. The economy reacts t o  t he  ini- 
tial stimulus, magnifies it, (the multiplier), and over reac ts  (the accelerator)  in t he  
sense tha t  i t  grows at a rate which cannot be sustained, since unemployment falls 
towards zero. The deceleration destroys expectations and cancels t he  accelerator  
s o  tha t  t he  economy reiapses t o  a new lower level of employment as determined by 
t h e  more productive, but partly unemployed, structure of production and employ- 
ment. Innovational investment will be  inhibited by t h e  collapse, but since i t  will not 
have been exhausted in any one boom, i t  will recommence once the  decline has 
ceased. The process  w i l l  then recommence but at a different pace and with the  
newer, more productive s t ructure.  There is  no difficulty in explaining t h e  upswing 
and downswing: firms spend vigorously because demand i s  high; demand i s  high 
because firms spend vigorously. The explanation of the  upper  turning point is  w e l l  
understood and. accepted by most economists. Not s o  fo r  the  lower turning point, 
f o r  thz t  w e  require  t he  Man-Schurnpeter thesis thzt  t h e  f ierce search  f o r  profit' 
by innovation is  tine continuing engine of capitalist production. 
Each boom will be  different both because the  investments and the i r  distribu- 
tion by industry will be  different,  and because the  response mechanism has 
changed because of t he  tecnnologicai evoiution. A single la rge  innovation, o r  a 
constellation of innovations, will mean a prolonged span of vigorous expansions 
plus high growth ra tes ,  along with short ,  sha rp  recessions: this constitutes the  
long-wave boom. Once a major technological advance has been fully incorporated 
into the  economy, t he re  will be  a relapse into weak booms and prolonged depres- 
sions until a dominating new set of innovations becomes feasible. The hypothesis 
h e r e  is  tha t  history, in t he  sense of extraeconomic events, plays an  essential ro le  
in the  long-run evolution of t he  economy, but that  t he  impact on short-run 
behavior can adequately be  analyzed with the  help of systems analysis. I have 
intentionally omitted re ference  t o  the ro le  of s ta te  activity, e.g. wars, social ser- 
vices, effor ts  at control, but these can easily be introduced into such a flexible 
model, with no essential modification of i ts  charac te r .  How long the  present  
depression will last and how vigorous will be t he  recovery will surely depend on 
such extraeconomic factors  and not on systematic, economic relations. 
Gerald Silverberg 
I would like t o  point out some implications f o r  theorizing about long waves of 
economic development tha t  followed from a model of technical change and macror 
dynamics I have been working on. 
First, I would like t o  character ize this approach in a very general fashion 
without going into any technical details. I take as my starting point Dr. Goodwin's 
1967 growth cycie model, which dynamically interrelates  wages, employment, and 
investment. This resul ts  in a pair  of equations formally equivalent t o  the  well- 
known iotka-Volterra predator-prey model of ecology and thus represents  a s tep  
in the  direction of Professor  Nijkamp's call f o r  economists t o  pay more attention 
t o  this kind of modeling. Using a method developed by P e t e r  Allen, a co-worker of 
Prigogine's in Brussels, i t  is  then possible t o  incorporate innovations embodied in 
new capital goods into the model by enlarging the  state space. In this  way one can 
derive z criterion f o r  the  diffusion of a new technique as w e l l  as analyze i t s  conse- 
quences f o r  the  evolution of the  system in terms of a nonlinear interaction unfold- 
ing over  time between wages, profits, sectoral  and aggregate employment, and pro- 
ductivity. 
The f i r s t  implication of this  kind of evolutionary approach is tha t  the distinc- 
tion between innovation, investment, and diffusion is indeed an  artificial  one. 
These must be thought of as t h r ee  phases of a single process  indissoluably 
intertwined with each o ther ,  as Professor Freeman in part icular  has emphasized. 
For an innovation is distinguished from, f o r  example, an  invention in tha t  i t  is  being 
diffused through the economy by the  investment activity of entrepreneurs ,  a pro- 
cess  tha t  involves time and the  expense of economic resources and may o r  may not 
yield Schumpeterian profits. Once this point has been accepted, tha t  a consider- 
able sha re  of technical change must be  embodied in new capital goods and 
processes, any theory of investment behavior must take explicit account of techni- 
cal progress  and innovation. The l a t t e r  cannot simply be  tacked on t o  a capital- 
stock adjustment model, but r a t h e r  must en ter  in a fundamental way into the  dynam- 
ics t o  c r ea t e  a feedback from the  level and composition of investment to t he  growth 
of productivity and effective demand. 
The second point i s  t he  question of distribution raised by Professor  Freeman. 
The relationship between the  rate of change of productivity and real wages in a 
dynamic evolutionary model is crit ical,  as has been emphasized particularly by 
Rostow and Lewis. Generalizations based on basically short-run theories,  whether 
of a neoclassical o r  a Keynesian genre, can be  very misleading here.  The point is 
tha t  t he re  is no invariant historical relationship between these variables - the i r  
interaction is complex and historical and depends in a nontrivial way on the evolu- 
tion of technology. This can be seen in numerical solutions to the model (see Fig- 
ures 3 and 4 of my paper, "Embodied Technical Progress in a Dynamic Economic 
Model: The Self-Organization Paradigm," to  be published by Springer-Verlag), 
where both short- and long-run leapfrogging is taking place between the growth of 
productivity and wages. Whereas a certain neoclassical trade-off can be seen in 
the short-term cycles, which are essentially self-correcting, there  is also a long- 
term trend crossing of the productivity growth curve somewhat af ter  the middle of 
the replacement cycle, which soon combines with the exhaustion of the innovation's 
productivity potential to precipitate a 'long-wave" profitability crisis. A t  this 
point no amount of doctoring with the level of real wages will succeed in reviving 
the economy, contrary to  what one might expect f r o m  simply observing the  previ- 
ous short-run behavior. This is  a warning to all those who see in adjustments in 
relative prices a panacea for long-wave crises as wel l .  
The third point is a somewhat technical one regarding the implications for 
t rade  cycle theory of nonlinearities in the underlying dynamics. Nonlinearity 
abolishes the principle of superposition, i.e. the ability to add up cycles of dif- 
ferent periois,  a s  Schumpeter himself naively presupposed. Instead the re  is  a dis- 
tinct possibility of, for  example, amplitude modulation between long and short, 
cycles, a s  one can also see in the numerical runs, where the amplitude of the 
short-period cycle dies out during the long-period upswing and only reasserts  
itself a f ter  the long-period crisis. And if I have understood Professor Piatier 
correctly, he also implied that  there  has been frequency modulation as w e l l ,  such 
a s  the snort-period downturn that did not take place in 1926 a s  predicted, but 
three  years  later ,  and then with a vengeance. 
My fourth point is a question of modeling philosophy. The striving to  endogen- 
ize everything into a closed dynamic model may be less a virtue than a straitjacket 
on our thinking. The contemporary approach to  open dynamic systems developed 
by Prigogine and his group in Brussels and Haken and his co-workers in Stuttgart 
hinges in an essential way on the nontrivial interaction of stochastic and deter- 
ministic elements. It  is not simply a question of superimposing noise on a deter- 
ministic system to  add a bit of realism. In an interdependent nonlinear system, 
fluctuations, innovations, or changes in external constraints can play a decisive 
role in triggering bifurcations and changes in regime, and thus serve as the  driv- 
ing force in an evolutionary process. This can be shown for open systems in biol- 
ogy and physics, and there  i s  no good reason why economic processes should be an 
exception. By applying the o rde r  parameter concept i t  is possible to overcome the 
apparent indeterminacy of such systems and proceed to conditional prognosis for 
systems alternating between a w e l l  defined behavioral regime and critical instabili- 
ties. The advantage of this approach is that  i t  lets history back in without 
renouncing analytical technique. An overendogenization of our models only leads 
to  a specious appearance of certainty and resignation. 
Apart f r o m  these more technical considerations I would like t o  bring up the 
la rger  issue that  w a s  touched upon by Dr. Sinibaldi and Professor Forrester  ear- 
l ier  today and should not be lost sight of in concentrating on long waves proper. Is 
our  policy choice to latch on to  the next Kondratiev upswing as quickly as possible 
to catapult us out of the current  or threatening depression, by encouraging and 
accelerating the  process of innovation, overcoming economic and social rigidities, 
or some other  means? O r  is i t  to expedite the transition to some kind of stationary 
state in which it  will be possible to  enjoy the fruits of economic growth without 
being subject to a fur ther  growth imperative and the onus of m a s s  unemployment? 
This is the basic issue a s  I see it. I do not w a n t  to go into the merits of each case 
now but simply want to emphasize that one should not underestimate the profound 
impiications of the stationary state  option if i t  is  to be viable in the modern world, 
quite apa r t  from i ts  desirability. Industrial capitalism has been subject to  what 
one could call the Red Queen Principle, t o  borrow a metaphor from Lewis Carroll: 
i t  must run as fast as i t  can just to  stay where i t  is. A s  irrational as this may seem 
from a purely technocratic point of view, t he re  a r e  profound s tructural  reasons 
why this has been the  case until now. To break this  dynamic permanently will 
require  a radical reorganization of social and economic s t ructures ,  which one must 
confront squarely if t he re  is to be any chance of success. Furthermore, techno- 
logical change i s  showing no signs of abating and mitigates against any complacent 
withdrawal from the  growth imperative through powerful pressures  transmitted 
both by the world market and potential o r  r e a l  military threats .  Historically these 
pressures  have sufficed to compel increasing adherence by most nations to an 
economic o r d e r  predicated on the  vicissitudes of permanent change, and their  
merciless logic is perhaps even more evident today than at any previous time in 
history. 

ORAL COMMENTS 
Raberto Vacca 
The striking regularity of the  long economic cycles cannot be construed t o  
indicate t he  existence of a n  anthropological time constant of 52 years ,  as implied 
by Marchetti. For millennia, before  t h e  f i r s t  Kondratiev cycle, no such regularity 
w a s  apparent.  Other cul tures  (in Asia and in America before Columbus) also 
appea r  not t o  have been affected by 50-year cycles. I t  is reasonable t o  think tha t  
cultural interventions (social engineering, m a s s  education) could have deep effects 
on economic t rends,  innovation r a t e s ,  and o ther  socioeconomic events. 
Industrial innovations, l ike steam power, electricity,  automobiles, rapid t ran-  
spor t ,  and cheap a i r  t ravei ,  have certainly affected t he  behavior of individuals 
and of human masses. I t  is  plausible tha t  innovations in communications and infor- 
mztion handing and processing may affect  human behavior f a r  more. This is  not a 
s t r i c t  cause-effect relationship. Radio and television have made possible m a s s  
communication, but t he  corresponding cultural impact has  been minimal. Cheap 
computers, easy-to-use software, and telematics are perhaps  only necessary, but 
not sufficient conditions f o r  a massive cultural upgrading of t h e  population. The 
most significant innovation in t h e  next cycle could b e  represented by t h e  s t ra tegy  
needed t o  employ computers and. telematics in o r d e r  t o  achieve significant cultural 
results.  Strategies  and procedures  a p t  t o  optimize p r i ce  s t ruc tures  alone would 
permit enormous benefits t o  b e  reaped. These would include elimination of t he  
waste of human resources;  increase of productivity; national and international 
adoption of cooperative stances. 
Stepped up effor ts  in international cooperation adequate t o  produce the  
economic take-off of m o s t  Third World Countries would also open up a vast market 
f o r  t he  products of industrial countries; and provide a t r i a l  ground to  study the  
eventual cyclic behavior of new economic systems tha t  up t o  now have operated at 
subsistence level with minimal and nonsignificant variations in time. 

APPENDIX 1 
CONSENSUS OF PARTICIPANTS 
A t  the end of the Conference the participants felt  that  i t  would be of interest 
to present some common understanding of issues, stressing the usefulness of the 
Conference and the desirability of fur ther  cooperation: 
'?n recent  years,  i t  has been increasingly recognized that  the present 
economic situation cannot be explained as merely a short-term recession. As a 
result, the  'long-wave" behavior of global, regional, and national economic activi- 
t ies has become the  subject of thorough scientific investigation. But, despite this 
widespread interest, t he re  is still no generally accepted interpretation of these 
cycles o r  fluctuations, much less of their  causes. I t  is  particularly difficult to 
d r a w  an analytical line between cyclical andfstructural impacts, and this severely 
handicaps attempts to identify the underlying causes of economic depression (or  
upswing). 
"However, as different and even contradictory as the  various theories may 
look, the re  is f a r  less divergence between the sets of policy recommendations t o  
be drawn from them. No matter whether innovation is  a cause or a consequence of 
cyclical behavior, all scientists working in this field would agree  that  one of the 
foremost tasks of government will lie, in the years  ahead of us, in enhancing a cli- 
mate favorable f o r  innovations, especially if innovation is understood to include 
institutional and social changes. 
'The IIASA-IRPET "Long Waves Meeting" (Siena-Florence, October 26-29, 
1983) has brought together, f o r  the  f i rs t  time, the  leading scientists working in 
this field with the twin goals of advancing theoretical insight into the problem and 
examining policy implications on the national and regional level. 
'?n this context, the role of innovation has received particular attention. The 
results of the meeting have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of the  theme 
fo r  theoretical analysis, empirical research,  and practical policy making. 
'The key concepts, methods and data have developed to the point where exist- 
ing international resources of the  scholarly and policy communities could be mobil- 
ized to fur ther  understanding and to define action." 
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